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Abstract
The present doctoral thesis consists in a study of the conditions of possibility of knowledge 
for a post-ecocidal age otherwise called Age of Re-Embodiments. The epistemological 
trajectory largely inaugurated by Socrates's equation of the beautiful with the intelligible is 
assumed as intrinsically ecocidal. The figure of a transcendent God that reverts plurality back 
to one and becoming to being is taken as the operative metaphor that systematizes and 
provides coherence to the epistemological tradition. In assessing the official project of 
sustainable development as continuous with the latter, valuable cognitive artillery to 
proceed with our study is instead found in Nietzsche's work and that of part of his entourage 
-Heidegger, Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze, Vattimo, Plotnitsky. Nietzsche's philosophy of the 
future and Derrida's set of undecidables are reworked as an analytics of transposition. The 
main remit of the transposition is that of reinscribing the solipsist positions -th e  conditions 
of possibility of knowledge—of epistêmê in the cultural matrix -th e  transposition or 
reconfigurative operator par excellence. Customarily, one finds positions hierarchizing their 
opposite poles -productivity/sustainable development, realism/constructivism, living 
organism/inert matter, theism/atheism, anthropocentrism/ecocentrism. Transpositions, 
subsequently renamed transposements, conform to the third figures of such dichotomous 
binary pairs. Each chapter revolves around one or a set of related transposements. 
Conjointly but irreducibly plural, the transposements at issue come to decentre and occupy 
the objectifying place of God. Within the epistemological trajectory, the project of the 
Enlightenment is portrayed as initiating an immanent turn further carried out by authors in 
the post-Kantian tradition. The majority of transposements herein proposed are geared at 
completing the immanent mobilization. It is claimed that a static immanent plane is a 
metaphysical farce. Rather, when the impetus of the immanent spatiality is fully released the 
latter indefectibly manifests itself in concrete degrees within the constrained-engaged 
immanent continuum.
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"The only tribute to thought [...] is precisely to use it, 
to deform it, to make it groan and protest."
—Michel Foucault1
a a a a a a B H a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
Our contemporaneity involves a fundamental new mode of religare -th e  etymological root 
of religion— or of otherwise binding the elements that conform to reality. Such imminent 
reordering should distance us from the theory of representation proper to the 
epistemological trajectory that has reached our days in the form of a pervasive ecocidal 
mode of being - i t  is penetrating and desacralizing all corners of Tellus, Mother Earth. The 
epistemological disposition -which takes far more concrete overtones than a volatile ethos, 
sensibility or discourse—initially builds upon the Socratic exaltation of the intelligible in the 
beautiful, and carries on with the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century well into 
our days.
In the wake of Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophical annotations and those of his entourage, 
we may take the figure of a transcendent God as convenient shorthand for the motive that 
inspires and organizes the building blocks of the epistemological trajectory (cf. Vattimo 
2002). For the sake of convenience we shall indeed more commonly refer to the trajectory at 
issue and the disposition proper to philosophy and science as epistêmê. A hallmark in this 
disposition is the Enlightenment that heralds the so-called Modern Age as of the late 
eighteenth century. "Aufklarung is the conscious departure an individual undertakes with an 
eye towards releasing themselves from their self-incurred attitudinal immaturity." (Kant 
1784; own translation from the original German) reads Immanuel Kant's initial
1 Foucault, 1980:54.
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characterization of such a disposition (cf. also Foucault 1997). An initially European 
endeavour, the Enlightenment marks the intellectual negotiation of a universal order bereft 
of otherworldly values. It brings about an immanent turn which is brought to bear upon 
human reason. However, it is precisely human reason as the solemn fulcrum of immanence 
that renders the immanent turn in hand largely imperfect -Aufklarung remains an 
anthropocentric and onto-logical project through and through.
In this process of wholesale restructuration that we wish to co-stimulate, the relevance of 
les Lumières must be regarded as residing in the incipient immanent mobilization that it 
openly incites. The outright declaration of independence of human reason on the part of the 
Aufklarer is, first and foremost, an unabashed act of detachment from superstitions and 
dogmatisms alike. It is in this respect that we may claim that the Enlightenment is an 
unfinished symphony. It encourages us to locate innerwordly ground for a new mode of 
religare, to bind the immanent elements together in a manner that induces in us a sense of 
respect for them, steers our way out of nihilism, and conduces us to a post-ecocidal age. The 
tremendous force of the immanent turn, this thesis contends, is yet to be released.
Karl Marx considered German materialism, largely led by Ludwig Feuerbach, disjointed and 
tied to metaphysics for the most part. In due response, he wrote the 'Eleven Theses on 
Feuerbach', where, largely prefiguring social constructivism, Marx characterizes the essence 
of the human being in organic connection with his social relations. These relations emanate, 
in turn, from the mode of production and render materialist philosophy inextricable from 
revolutionary praxis. In an analogous manner, the present thesis intends to liberate the full 
impetus implicit in the immanent turn that ensued from the timid theocide committed by 
the Aufklarer at the entrance into the Modern Age and carried on by authors in the post- 
Kantian tradition. The findings that follow from the present work largely find that the figure 
of God may have been slain but its place hasn't been eradicated. Exceeding the 
epistemological outlook "does not consist in passing from one concept to another, but in 
overturning and displacing a conceptual order, as well as the nonconceptual order with 
which the conceptual order is articulated" (Derrida 1984 [1971]: 329). Against this backdrop, 
the modern immanent turn lends to an alternative reading. Perhaps it consists less in an 
unfinished project to be perfected by walking further into the self-same direction, as Jürgen
Habermas eagerly holds (cf. Ashenden andOwen 1999), as a mere culmination of the 
disposition proper to philosophy and science as epistëmë. An immanent turn that remains 
statically immanent is but a metaphysical farce. The liberation from the objectivation of an 
eternal being or God automatically entails the engagement or constraint of the immanent 
plane to a certain degree.
The truly immanent revolution uproots the principle of causality and the onto-logical frame 
where it is embedded to the advantage of a correlation in degrees and a theoretical 
approach that is osmogenetic. A composite word of coap,o£ 'impulse/ ysvvaoo 'to engender' 
and the suffix -cn£ denoting 'action', 'formation', 'operation,' 'generalization,' osmogenesis 
signifies the perpetual, impulsive, action or activity of engendering; the perennial rebirth of 
the engagement. The osmogenetic outlook reminds us that there is no such thing as an 
immovable, static plane of immanence. The only plausible immanent turn is one that 
engages-constrains the plane at issue to a certain degree. The currency or condition of 
possibility common to osmogenetic theory is correspondingly the transposition. Faithful to 
the etymological meaning of 'trans-position', this cognitive condition of possibility places 
each theoretical dimension over, across the remaining ones in a manner that they become 
related to one another. It also consigns those positions associated with the ecocidal mode of 
being beyond its realm by transforming them into post-ecocidal categories. The engaged- 
constrained-immanent-turn is, no doubt, still to be endeavoured. The present doctoral thesis 
is meant as a contribution to this direction.
The present thesis postulates close to twenty transpositions of the disposition proper to 
philosophy and science as epistëmë. It identifies another twenty positions related to the 
latter. In the following I broach some of the transpositions and positions set out in each 
chapter. Numbers are coincident with the chapter where the elements are developed:
[1.] From ontology and epistemology into the politicization and systematization of philosophy -th e  
acknowledgement of the mortality of knowledge.
[2.] From conditions of possibility of knowledge into conditions of in-transitivity of knowledge -th e  
analytics of transposition as an instantiation of philosophy of the future.
[3.] Culture as an asymmetric expanse of nature and foremost reconfigurative operator.
[4.] Embodiment as the transposition of idealism/materialism and a true element of the immanent
spatiality.
[5.] From modem universalism and postmodern contextualism into situated structuralism -th e  birth of 
culti.
[6.] From dualism into simultaneous correlation of low- middle- and high-culture; from causality into 
dynamic correlation in degrees of dis-embodiment, dis-embeddedness and de-contextualization.
[7.] From living organism/inert matter, theism/atheism, anthropocentrism/ecocentrism into the 
irreducibiiity of loci standi and instrumenta movendi related by a différance-effect.
[8.] From immanence into engaged-constrained immanence or from subject/object into the activity of 
manufacturers of culture and fossilizations.
[9.] From extrinsic value and unequal exchange as cultus of Leviathan into intrinsic value or culti of 
Tellus.
[10.] From philosophy and science as epistêmê into religare as Kultur.
[11.] From climate change into hyperbolic immanence as the Age of Re-Embodiments.
[12.] From what \s Aufklarung into what is Kultur?
The present dissertation is an attempt to address the following queries:
(1) How shall we characterize our currently-ecologically destructive contemporaneity?
(2) How much hope are we to place upon the institutional project for sustainable development?
(3) Does the overcoming of the mainly ecologically-destructive tendencies, mainly with a Western and 
Westernized origin, entail the location of novel conditions of possibility for knowledge?
(4) In short, how are we to cognitively-and politically— exit the ecocidal, dystopian present?
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Dystopian Contemporary Positions: 
Sustainable Development As A 
M anifest Instance O f The 
Epistem ological Disposition
a a a a a a a a a a B a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
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" [A]s long as we replace old values with new ones that only amount to new 
combinations between reactive forces and the will to nothingness,
nothing has changed" 
—Gilles Deleuze2
"The fact that at present people all talk of things which they CANNOT have any 
experience, is true more especially and unfortunately as concerns the philosopher 
and philosophical matters : [. . . ] thinking itself is regarded by them as something 
slow and hesitating, almost as a trouble, and often enough as 'worthy of the SWEAT
of the noble' —but not at all as something easy [...], 
closely related to dancing and exuberance !"
—Friedrich Nietzsche3
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Synopsis - This initial chapter deals with one of the research questions that the present 
doctoral thesis addresses: the extent to which the official project of sustainable 
development -mainly as set out in Our Common Future (1987)— can steer the global polity 
out of the ecocidal mode of being. It is argued that, cognitively, the project at issue is 
conterminous with the epistemological tradition largely inaugurated by Socrates. It is on 
these grounds that the project of sustainable development is readily dismissed as a putative 
post-ecocidal candidate.
Seven points of continuity between the project of sustainable development and philosophy 
and science as epistëmë are identified. First, sustainable development is seen to fully 
endorse the anthropological slumber into which the Modern Age -  the zenith of the
2 Deleuze 2001 [1965]: 81.
3 Nietzsche 2003: § 213.
epistemological trajectory— plunges. Similarly, sustainable development is found to project 
the analytic of finitude common to this Age to the environment as the latter turns into an 
issue of public concern. Second, the rational management with which Our Common Future is 
imbued is pinpointed as an intrinsic element of the logocentric sciences into which 
philosophy as epistêmê evolves. Third and relatedly, ecological statements that inform the 
report under scrutiny are identified as problematic logocentric claims to truth, operative and 
legitimized under the ecocidal mode of being. Points four and five relate to a leading feature 
of philosophy and science as epistêmê -namely, the pervasiveness of binary pairs. 
Sustainable development replicates the Cartesian culture/nature divide by which the res 
cogitons -'thinking matter'— stands over against the res extenso — 'extended matter'. 
Likewise, the rubric of sustainable development is conceived as conforming to an 
unproblematized reversal of productivity -as an extension and complementing pole of the 
latter, that is. Sixth, the propensity of sustainable development to take for granted a docile 
nature, assumed as it is to be utterly controllable by Promethean Man, is interpreted as an 
expression of restricted economy, a leading trait of the epistemological disposition. Seventh, 
sustainable development, in its promise to render productivity clean, is severely charged 
with the perpetuation of the teleology of progress also ingrained in the epistemological 
trajectory.
1. Descent Into Our Contemporaneity
I
Recollections Of A Past Utopia - Once upon a time there was a little girl, her cousins and 
friends from all nationalities who yet spoke a common language. They knew well how to 
proceed with a few affairs. They had come to master a range of trades in the idiosyncrasies 
of a cove by the name of Cala Cranes -'Crab Cove.' Notably well, they had developed all their 
own techniques on how to turn fine-speck sand into a number of items of public display. 
Their varied production included robust and quite exuberant castles, bakeries exhibiting the 
most appetitive -o r  so they believed— shapes of croissants, and impervious barriers against 
the corrosive salt water in times of choppy sea. W ater was another of the domains where 
these children had found a secure ally. The little girl and her relatives and friends had come 
to develop a remarkable command of wave-surfing with their physical bodies. Their prolific
imagination on how to establish an adequate relationship with the waves made up for 
boards or any kind of additional accessories. Remarkably our characters were able to hold 
their breath for as long as the wave was keeping its momentum. On every ride they would 
succeed in maintaining their bodies stretched out and supple at one and the same time to 
readily permit wave-transport to the shore.
Water being a tacit accomplice, expeditions out to sea were activities they would also 
undertake on a regular basis. By combining breast and backstroke with crawl, this group of 
children knew how to swim with and against the mild Mediterranean currents to reach a 
majestic rock offshore. Once standing on that rock that would keep their bodies submerged 
up to their hips, they enjoyed gazing at the fauna, often aided with diving goggles. They 
happily befriended those exotic creatures which looked in any case quite similar to the 
animals populating the rocks neighbouring the cove. Collective incursions onto the rocks 
surrounding their cove -th a t singular and safe place of their childhood— were also frequent. 
These kids were keen to visit the crabs, the mussels, the winkles, the starfishes and the sea 
urchins on a regular basis -they were at one with their sea-friends.
In her mid-teens that little girl now on her course to womanhood lost interest in her sand- 
converting skills. She replaced her direct contact with sand with windsurfing. With the 
supplement of a board and a sail, our main character preserved her keenness for both 
swimming out to the Mediterranean sea and playing with the waves. To her utter surprise 
and disappointment, the knowledge and skills this girl on her course to womanhood had 
been accumulating since her tender age had become redundant for a good part. Not 
because of the uselessness of the skills at issue. This woman remained fond of swimming. 
She had moreover grown increasingly aware of the healing properties of her swimming 
practices out to sea. Yet some skills of hers had turned impracticable almost overnight. In 
the course of five years, two blocks of apartments on the rocks where she and her cousins 
and friends used to visit their sea peers had been built. (Surprisingly, this woman knows well 
that the Spanish Coast Act, only recently patchily enforced, prohibits built environment 
within the first 150 meters off the sea coast!). What is more, at this stage of her life this 
woman had to develop new techniques and precautions to approach the sea -th e  sewage of 
the new inhabitants didn't always render the swimming salubrious.
Aware of and preoccupied with her steadily constrained ability to swim out to sea and heal 
herself at will, this character in her mid-twenties and in love with the sea eagerly visited an 
exhibition at the Museu d'Art Contemporani de Barcelona (MACBA). The exhibition in hand 
was a turning point in the life of this woman wedded to the Mediterranean waters - i t  was to 
determine her next moves. The MACBA exhibition was about the promise of sustainable 
development in a middle-class suburb in a Nordic country. In her condition of curious 
student, this woman grew very impressed with this display that was dealing with key issues 
of her contemporaneity -  how is one to regain a post-industrial alliance with the sand, the 
waters, the rocks, the crabs, the mussels, the winkles, the starfishes and the sea urchins -th e  
sea-friends of one's childhood?' As a result, she came to hold great convictions and hope 
that this somewhat mysterious rubric -'sustainable development'- would tell her how to 
recover her cherished cove and her practicable ability to swim and heal at will in 
Mediterranean waters.
II
Religare As An Apt Avenue To Politicize Our Times -  Let us note that the narrative above 
mentions a series of growing constraints in the life of our main character. As the little girl 
leaves her childhood behind to enter womanhood, the development of new housing on the 
coastline results in the proliferation of sewage out into sea. With it, the number of people 
and cars travelling in and out of the new buildings rises sharply. Yet what must be noted is 
that the case of our main character isn't an isolated one. It conforms to one among billion. It 
speaks, in the form of an embodied metonymy, of our contemporaneity. It exhibits the 
contingent fashion in which the elements that conform to reality are arranged. The case of 
our main character points to a specific mode of religare, to a concrete way of binding 
strongly together the components of reality (cf. Capra 1988: 1945-1946; Ferré 1988). This 
girl-woman in love with the sea bespeaks two confronted religions -w h a t results from  
assembling elements or from the act of religare. The initial layout to which she is exposed 
kindly invites her to interact with neighbouring characters -th e  fine-speck sand, the sea, the 
rocks, the crabs, the mussels, the winkles, the starfishes and the sea urchins. The disposition 
of the elements that develops in her puberty, by contrast, interposes a number of 
instruments -sewage, cars, new buildings— on the girl-woman's way to relate to her
bedfellows.
We can take the two different engagements with the two distinct dispositions of the building 
blocks of reality on the part of our main character as much informing as intervening in the 
process of knowledge-production in and for our times. "In a sense [...] we have to conform 
to a 'logic' which is inscribed only in the course of events" (Vattimo 1991 [1988]: 177). 
Against this backdrop, we can assert that today all philosophers, as initial testimonies of the 
conditional and conditioning truth prevalent in the space where we speak, have undergone a 
particular shift in the manner they customarily interact with the components of reality. Our 
ability to labour, repose, heal and be at leisure in our native or subsequently adopted places 
has been constrained to a certain degree (La Vanguardia, 10/01/2012).
For the sake of convenience, we may refer to these constraints on different fronts as 
ramifications, splittings, manifestations of an ecocidal mode of being. As a mode, that is, 
which deliberately interferes with our ability to work, rest, heal and be playful with and in 
our autochthonous sites or those subsequently adopted following migratory processes. This 
feature stands out so prominently in the philosopher's test of our age that in seeking the 
possibility of knowledge for our times, the feature at issue, surreptitiously but unwaveringly 
so, creeps in. It filtrates in the process of knowledge-production.
This anterior cognitive condition -i.e ., an ecocidal mode of being— carries with it an 
implication that energetically intervenes in the narrative. It mediates the constitution of 
knowledge by forcing upon it an irreducibly normative dimension. Attesting to one of the 
foremost outstanding dimensions of these present times —their systematic ability to debase 
and replace local knowledges and techniques, medicinal remedies and labour-related and 
recreational resorts— we take due precautions against giving free reign to an unmitigated 
relativism. In the present conditions of existence there are palpable ecocidal elements. Our 
main character cherishes the direct interaction with her surrounding friends -th e  sand, the 
sea, the rocks, the crabs, the mussels, the winkles, the starfishes and the sea urchins. Hence 
the imperative necessity to consider as normative those initiatives which safely secure the 
keeping of ecocidal elements at bay. The body of knowledge we are to construe should 
facilitate sharp analysis but shall simultaneously subject this analytical process to the
demands of our times, namely, to the placating of the ecocidal mode of being. "The 
philosopher of the future is both artist and doctor -in  one word, legislator" (Deleuze 2001 
[1965]: 66); she must be both interpret and evaluator.
This militantly political departure shall at least partially inoculate us against two perverse 
leanings pervasive among professional philosophers. One is abstract thinking and the other 
is the incessant speaking of the terms that one is taking issue with. There is indeed a 
tendentious propensity to address philosophical issues, such as the nature of truth, 
knowledge, action, reality, morality in a vacuum; debarred from the context which is to 
define it in the first place. I associate this insidious practice with the history of Western 
philosophy and science as epistêmê, and its dogged search for ontological predicates on the 
eternal nature of being. This tradition has encouraged the circulation of moral and political 
advocacy (cf. Leiter 2006a: 88; Nietzsche 1989a [1967]). However, our eagerness to regain 
the conditions to undertake labour, leisure and healing activities rather leads us to engage in 
systematic philosophizing out of which certain aspects of reality gain illumination, so that we 
can grow in the position to draw ethical and political conclusions. "The dispute over the 
reality or non-reality of thinking which isolates itself from practice is a purely scholastic 
question" (Marx 1976a [1845]: Thesis 2). It must without fail be a political perspective; the 
one that dictates what we are to do with knowledge. Claims to truth are apt to the extent 
that they cast light upon the set of problematics that beset our times and take us well 
beyond them. Philosophy must relinquish its immortal aspirations in order to be apt love to 
timely -however untimely for the status quo- knowledge and knowing. We are to hold a 
theoria, understood in its etymological meaning of speculation, as provisional knowing that 
momentarily sheds light upon a state of affairs “which attributes a temporal core to truth  
instead of [approaching] truth as something invariable to the moment of history" 
(Horkheimer andAdorno 2002 [1969]: xi; cf. also Curry 2010c; Salleh 2010).
The philosophical practice to engage in a sterile critique of the positions one is in obstinate 
disagreement with, is no less frequent. By way of contrast, the politically-oriented 
philosopher is constrained to uphold, not the notion -any universal notion- of truth, but a 
timely and operative truth that shall -in  our case— walk us out of the ecocidal mode of 
being. This truth with a political agenda writ large, doesn't step in virgin and naked. Rather,
it shrewdly arms itself with a constellation of effective devices in the form of new categories 
of knowledge that, wisely operated together, should be in the position to alter the negative 
sign of reality. Now, this unstoppable urge for self-articulation overrides the scattering of 
energies on the fervent disprove! of those philosophical outlooks that one loathes with 
considerable animus.
Finally, we are interested in the way that the constituents of reality combine together. The 
metaphor of religare, true to its etymological meaning as 'to bind strongly/ 'to put together', 
'to assemble' disperses disembodied and disembedded approaches such as Hegels' spirit of 
the times, Michel Foucaut's (1997) fascination with the ethos, milieu of the Enlightenment, 
Foucault's own exaltation of discourse as well as Patrick Curry's (2010d) steady focus on a 
non-modern sensibility. Our literal meta-physics of religion pays attention to the disposition 
of the elements of reality, a disposition which is always embodied, embedded and 
contextualized. The uncompromising politics of religare take issue with the various ways in 
which this contextualized disposition is arranged.
Against this backdrop, we shall refer to the history of Western metaphysics as the 
disposition proper to philosophy and science as epistëmë, or as the epistemological layout 
or, for that matter, disposition. This disposition must be conceived as the cradle of Western 
materialism, which culminates the civilizational tendency in the history of humankind to 
develop steadily more complex artifacts.
Ill
Four Research Questions For A Post-Ecocidal Age -  It should be noted that what was a lived 
utopia in my teens4, turned into a growing dystopia by my early twenties, and has 
manifested as a search for understanding and hope since my mid-twenties. Against this 
background, the present dissertation is an attempt to address the following queries:
(1) Is this pervasive, indisputable, so profoundly palpable, ecocidal contemporaneity we are forced to
adapt to as our ability to swim at will, as an instance of labouring, reposing and conducting healing and
4 Which can only be so defined in face of our dystopian present.
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recreational activities5 in our autochthonous or subsequently adopted places, being constrained by 
further development?
(2) How much hope are we to place upon the institutional project for sustainable development in 
relation to the regaining of our old ability to swim at will, and therefore labour, repose and conduct 
healing and recreational activities in our native or subsequently adopted places?
(3) Does the regaining of our old ability to swim at will in our original places altogether entail to locate 
novel conditions of possibility for a kind of knowledge capable of grappling with the ramifications, 
splittings, manifestations of an ecocidal mode of being? "An inquiry whose aim is to rediscover on what 
basis knowledge and theory bec[o]me[s] possible" (Foucault 1980 [1970]: xxi) again. Or what is equal to 
saying, what transformations are needed in the 'critical theory' project if 'nature' is to be wholly 
incorporated into its conceptual and political framework?
(4) In short, how are we to cognitively -and politically— exit the ecocidal, dystopian present?
2. Sustainable Development In Ecocidal Times: An Anachronistic Instance Of 
Science As Epistêmê
I
Common Denominators Of Sustainable Development - Sustainable development is a 
project already at work (WCED 1987). It may have some merit to proceed by addressing 
research question (4) by way of (2). We should therefore conduct an inquiry into whether 
the project under this rubric is the blueprint that will guide us out of the ecocidal, dystopian 
present so that we may regain our ability to swim at will -as a metonymy for labouring, 
reposing and conducting healing and recreational activities in our own or subsequently 
adopted places.
There are plural understandings of sustainable development (cf. Jackson 2006a). For reasons 
that will be clarified at the beginning of Chapter 2, the banner at issue has undergone a 
process that positions it now on a par with the term democracy. Democracy is a highly
5As Tim Jackson has aptly noted in a personal communication, these abilities should be extended, among other terrains, to nutrition, 
shelter, exploration, relationship, reproduction, identity. Jacskon also suggested happiness, but as Chapter 9 will clarify, this putative site 
follows, in my view, from the arrangement of other factors - i t  is its contingent by product.
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elastic signifier that speaks for disparate dispensations. It can be stretched out to one 
extreme by anarchist authors to refer to direct -as opposed to representative— politics. It is 
reclaimed with the same impetus by an opposite extreme made up of the likes such as the 
American administration to justify warfare incursions into various countries. Similarly, 
currently the placard of sustainable development and its associated form sustainability is 
different things to different groups of people. It is, on the one hand, eagerly upheld by 
ecocrats who regard the management of nature as the justification for the centralized forms 
of governance that have destabilized her in the first place. This signifying bloc is, on the 
other hand, also appropriated by rural activists in West Bengal who exhibit the most 
exemplary practices of Gandhian politics. The topic of the present dissertation falls well 
beyond a discourse analysis of the various ends to which either the placard sustainable 
development or that of sustainability are put to use -o u r concerns are the conditions of 
possibility of knowledge for a post-ecocidal age. We shall therefore identify the promise of 
sustainable development with the official or, at any rate, primordial definition and strategy. 
This choice is by no means arbitrary. The initial characterization of sustainable development 
is playing a crucial role in the perpetuation and naturalization of the modern mode of being, 
as will be unravelled below.
The locus classicus of the primal characterization of Our Common Future, a report drawn up 
by the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) under the aegis of the 
General Assembly of the United Nations. After its chairperson, the document at issue is also 
known as the Brundtland Report. In this initial statement, "[sjustainable development is 
development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs" (WCED: 43). Now, to introduce the germane 
concept 'sustainability/ we may go by way of a definition attributed to 'sustainable 
consumption/ Let us take the characterization of the British Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) as an example. The DTI understands "[sjustainable consumption and 
production [a]s continuous economic and social progress that respects the limits of the 
Earth's ecosystems, and meets the needs and aspirations of everyone for a better quality of 
life, now and for future generations to come" (quoted in Jackson 2006b: 5). This is a precious 
definition in that it captures the common denominator of sustainable consumption
specifically6, and the promise of sustainable development more generically. Let us next 
explore this set of concomitances systematically.
1 /  The Analytic Of Finitude, Man And The Environment
As quoted above, the rubric sustainable development highlights environmental limits — 
'progress that respects the limits of the Earth's ecosystems'. This appeal to limits is 
reminiscent of the analytic of finitude proper to the modern mode of being in the West, 
when "man [...] find[s] the constant reminder of his limitations in his needs" (Foucault 1980 
[1970]: 314). Once Western philosophy cleanses itself from religious and metaphysical 
cosmetics to enter the modern age, the finite status of the human condition is more 
perspicuously perceived. "Man's finitude is heralded -and imperiously so— in the positivity 
of knowledge" (ibid: 313). Man, finitude and this kind of knowledge -positivism— that is no 
longer concerned "with an edifice of theory structured upon deductions from absolute 
principles, but rather with viewing events as they occurred and discussing actual problems 
that had arisen" (Shaw 2005 [2003]: 25) conform to the distinctive trinity of the Modern 
Age:
if man's knowledge is finite, it is because he is trapped, without possibility of liberation, within 
the positive contents of language, labour, and life; and inversely, if labour, and language may be 
posited in their positivity, it is because knowledge has finite forms (Foucault 1980 [1970]: 314).
This emphasis upon existential contours is part-and-parcel of the canonical definition of 
sustainable development, which highlights humanity's finitude vis-à-vis the capacity of the 
environment to sustain its needs. "Sustainable development [...] contains within it [...] the 
idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organization on the 
environment's ability to meet present and future needs" (WCED 1987: 43).
The primacy of finitude follows from the tendency of modern philosophy to regard the being 
of man as its object of study. One must note that such marked anthropocentrism, first 
apparent in Kant, is self-referential and moulded by factors internal to philosophy. It reasons 
that the objective factors that restrict knowledge -space, time and the framework of the
6 For more definitions cf. Jackson 2006b: 5.
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categories that Kant proposes— are also the conditions for the possibility of knowledge. 
"Despite its finitude -and also because of it— human reason takes over the role of God as 
legislator for both nature and morality" (Yovel 1989b: 7). No wonder that finitude, man and 
the environment conform to a triad. We should indeed note the arbitrariness of the chosen 
objective factors, which fail to highlight the political agenda of Kant's time. Rather, Kant's 
philosophy aims at an immortal truth, holding together independently of one's actuality. Be 
this as it may, human finitude's self-foundation in the modern age stands both for the 
founding, and the fundamental and the positive. In the ecocidal mode of being, the 
environment turns into the exalted foil for human finitude. The environment becomes part 
of man's extended finitude and thus part of man's own foundation. Scientific bodies such as 
the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED 1987) and the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2001, 2007) develop an analytic of finitude of 
Man in relation to the limited carrying capacity of his environment. In so proceeding, these 
scientific bodies and the institutional endeavour on sustainable development grow situated 
in the core of the modern mode of being. The empirical work of these two scientific bodies 
situates Man's needs in the bilateral flows of the physical and cultural bodies, on the one 
hand, and the environment's "maximum sustainable yield" (WCED 1987: 45), on the other. 
By way of sustainable development, which poses the queries "which of nature's 'services' 
are indispensable for further development, and to what extent?' [...] "Which 'services' of 
nature are dispensable or can be replaced by, for example, new materials or genetic 
engineering"? (Sachs 1996: 244), the analytic of finitude is drawn on new contours. Man's 
awareness of his finitude is exacerbated in relation to his environmental limitations.
Whilst in the early modern age, empirical biological knowledge of the human body marks 
the threshold of finitude, with the advent of the ecocidal mode of being -o r  at any rate 
heightened and officially-voiced awareness thereof, it is the environment and its carrying 
capacities that circumscribe the boundaries of human life. To put it inversely, it is humanity's 
acute urgency to have "access to resources" (WCED 1987: 43) what extends, via the 
institutional project of sustainable development, the modern condition onto the 
environment. "[Fjinitude is always designated on the basis of man as a concrete being and 
on the basis of the empirical forms that can be assigned to his existence" (Foucault 1980 
[1970]: 318, 313; cf. also Latour 1993). What must be retained at this initial stage is that
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sustainable development, in enacting the analytic of finitude to secure humanity's existence, 
remains anchored in the modern mode of being. This realization modifies, in turn, the 
course of our investigation. Research questions (2) and (4) in tandem will now read: shall the 
modern mode of being steer us out of the ecocidal mode of being?
There is a topic closely related to the analytic of finitude which is highly pertinent to address 
research question (3), that is, relevant to our groping through the conditions of possibility of 
that kind of knowledge that shall assist us in our process of regaining our sites of labour, 
repose, healing and leisure. The modern age presents finitude as a caustic fabric against 
traits of the history of Western philosophy: "Modern thought [...] will contest even its own 
metaphysical impulses, and show that reflections upon life, labour, and language, in so far as 
they have value as analytic of finitude, express the end of metaphysics" (Foucault 1980 
[1970]: 317). Finitude presents Western metaphysics as "a veil of illusion" (ibid), a form of 
estrangement -"an  alienated form of thought" (ibid)- and, therefore, as a passing "cultural 
episode" (ibid). Yet for all its anti-metaphysical claims, finitude perse  is no guarantee of full 
eradication of Western metaphysical traits. The structure of finitude may be still disposed in 
dependency upon part of the network that defines the Western metaphysical tradition. "All 
metaphysics, including its opponent, positivism, speaks the language of Plato" (Heidegger 
2000f [1978]: 444).
This being so, the concern for finitude that traverses the politics of sustainable development 
further contextualizes this institutional endeavour in a context even broader than that 
demarcated by the modern age. The quest for sustainable development shows some initial 
signs to be a spinoff of the history of Western philosophy in the ecocidal mode of being. 
Western philosophy may be characterized as an episode in the history of European culture 
inaugurated by Socrates but largely prefigured by Parmenides (Feyerabend 1987: 121; 
Plotnitsky 1994: 231; Panikkar 2009: 284), [that] "goes back to the Greeks, and goes 
sideways into all sorts of non-philosophical disciplines which have, at one time or another, 
proposed themselves as substitutes for epistemology, and thus for philosophy" (Rorty 1980: 
390). This is a philosophical and scientific trajectory that grounds cognitive processes upon 
epistëmë, namely, upon the production of "certain theoretical knowledge of abstract 
universal" (Curry 2004f: 104) commonly understood as logos, ratio, reason. "Kant is no less
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certain than Heraclitus that th[e] ordering of perceptions, this kosmos, is governed by a 
logos which transcends the merely local differences of history and power" (Allen 1993: 28). 
This is a tradition ruled by the supreme law of aesthetic Socratism: "To  be beautiful 
everything must be intelligible'" (Nietzsche 1967a: 84).
In the wake of Nietzsche and denoting distinct emphases upon its different aspects, this 
philosophical and scientific tradition has been referred to as the history of Western 
metaphysics, metaphysics of presence, ontotheology, logocentrism and the epistemological 
tradition (Schrift 1990, 1995: 14; Derrida 1997: 12 et passim; Heidegger 2000f [1993]: 446; 
Rorty 1980). To facilitate research question (3) and feature the fact that it is possible to 
engage in non-epistemological philosophical and scientific praxis, it is equally legitimate to 
refer to this tradition as philosophy and science as epistêmê, or as noted above, in line with 
our exposition of the facts in the light of religare, as the epistemological layout or 
disposition. In the following, it will be exhibited how the rubric 'sustainable development' 
replicates six traits proper to Western metaphysics, namely, rationalism; logocentrism; 
binary logic; unproblematized reversal; restricted economy; and teleology of progress.
2/Rationalism
Modern philosophy starts with the acceptance of the collapse of metaphysics, and the 
search for philosophical grounding for human action out of its own actuality. The leading 
exponent of modern thought, Immanuel Kant, accepted the loss of metaphysical anchoring. 
Yet, as it was highlighted in the previous section, Kant came short of deriving a critical 
rationality out of his contemporaneity. Instead, the Prussian thinker submitted philosophy to 
an idealist turn. Or, what is equal to saying, Kant faced up to the metaphysical loss by 
culminating the Cartesian cogito and propounding universal -decontextualizing— human 
subjectivity as the new guardian over superstition, custom and despotism (Dreyfus and 
Rabinow 1991 [1986]; Habermas 1991 [1986]; Rorty 1980).
The meaning of truth in classical and modern philosophies differs in so far as the latter is 
brought to bear upon distinct ontological a prioris. It is a natural phenomenon with a 
principle of its own that marks the tone for truth in classical philosophy. By contrast, the
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Cartesian cog/to and its culmination into Kantian ground operate as the new platform for apt 
knowledge in the modern age. Kant's critical reason, to be sure, supplants the place reserved 
for nature in classical philosophy by the subject's subjectivity. In this novel setting, human 
"understanding does not derive its laws from, but prescribes them to, nature" (Kant quoted 
in Allen 1993: 37).
With Kant, the Archimedean point of philosophy and science as ep/stëmë turns anti- 
naturalistic and comes indeed to reside upon human reason, "a foreign power that has to 
impose its laws upon nature from without" (Yovel 1989b: 7). This U-turn is referred to as 
Kant's Copernican Revolution, namely, the movement by which the logos that sanctions the 
epistemological disposition is relocated in subjective idealism. Kant's scholarly endeavour is 
the victorious anthropomorphization of /ogos. "The human mind itself, when exercising its 
rationally structured spontaneity, prescribes the basic laws of morality and religion to itself, 
just as it legislates the universal and necessary lawlike patterns that nature itself obeys" 
(ibid).
Subjective idealism is the context where science as ep/stëmë evolves (cf. Rorty 1980: ch 3; 
Allen 1993: ch. 2; Latour 1993: ch 2). "[Tjhe truth of the Platonic ideas has become more and 
more identifiable with the objectivity of the statements of physics" (Vattimo 2002: 14). 
Rationalists philosophers, Descartes and Spinoza, marked the first moves in this direction (cf. 
Serrano 2011). Yet it is Kant who substantiates the divide between philosophy vs. science 
and epistêmê by rendering the former the primary, underlying discipline. "The eventual 
demarcation of philosophy from science was made possible by the notion that philosophy's 
core was 'theory of knowledge', a theory distinct from the sciences because it was their 
foundation,, (Rorty 1980: 132). Heideggerian sources regard the transition from philosophy 
as epistêmê into science as epistêmê more as a logical conclusion of a trend long initiated 
than as a schism. "The development of philosophy into the independent sciences [...] that, 
however, interdependently communicate among themselves ever more markedly, is the 
legitimate completion o f philosophy" (Heidegger 2000f [1993]: 434 et passim).7 Heidegger, 
that is to say, regards empiricism as a mere prolongation of philosophy as epistêmê.
7Yet as Heidegger (2000 [1978]: 433) notes "[we forget that already in the age of Greek philosophy a decisive characteristic of philosophy 
appears: the development of the sciences within the field that philosophy opened up."
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"Epistemology was not necessarily a rationalist enterprise. Indeed, its last great defenders 
were and are empiricists" (Taylor 1987:465).
Sustainable development attests to this anthropocentric rational vein: "at stake is not just 
the sustainable development of shared ecosystems and the commons, but of all nations 
whose development depends to a greater or lesser extent on their rational management," 
reads a passage in Our Common Future (WCED 1987: 261). Ecology, the discourse on the 
natural environment set in order by the enlightened mind as we shall further see in the next 
subsection, is to inform the right management of 'Earth's ecosystems' or 'environmental 
resources' an entity which is seen as practically segregated from the human realm, were it 
not that it guarantees humanity's needs. "[Sjustainable development requires the 
promotion of values that encourage consumption standards that are within the bounds of 
the ecological possible and to which all can reasonably aspire" (WCED 1987: 44). As it was 
anticipated above, sustainable development must be read as the legislator of modern 
features once ecocidal tendencies that follow from the realization of the latter become 
apparent with the naked eye.
3 /  Logocentric Claims to Truth And Ecology
As a vestige of Christian dualism preserved by way of the God that underwrites the Cartesian 
schism, Kantianism favours logocentric claims to truth anchored in transcendental human 
reason. This practice "is a product of viewing knowledge as an assemblage of 
representations" (Rorty 1980: 136). Kantian categories -substance, quantity, quality, 
relation, action, affection, place, time, position and state— are no more than ontological 
attributes, properties, qualities or characteristics that can be predicated of a thing. The need 
for "unconditional authorities [truth and logos] is so strong that, even in a critical age such as 
Kant's, it showed itself superior to the need for criticism and was, in a certain sense, able to 
subject the entire work of critical reason and put it to its own uses" (Nietzsche 1967c: § 412; 
cf. Rorty 1980: ch 3). In this light, biology must be interpreted as the human discourse on life 
or the logocentric representation thereof; ecology as the discourse on the natural household 
or the logocentric representation thereof; geology as the human discourse on the Earth or 
the logocentric representation thereof; sociology as the discourse on society or the
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logocentric representation thereof; and so on and so forth. All the sciences prolifically 
ferment in this logocentrically-mediated ethos unravelled by the human mind. "By taking the 
totality of beings and making it dependant upon the synthetic accomplishments of the 
subject, Kant downgrades the cosmos into the object domain of the nomological natural 
sciences" (Habermas 1996 [1992]: 407), where nomology is the human treatise on -read: 
logocentric representation of— laws and their interpretation.8 Kantian and neo-Kantian 
authors "present themselves as the inheritors of the Greek claim that to understand is to 
identify a 'logos,' or in Latin a 'ratio,' both terms leading to reason, to account" (Stengers 
2009). Hence Nietzsche's (1967a: § 13) derogatory branding of Socrates as "the precursor of 
an altogether different culture, art and morality." Socrates readily identified knowledge with 
epistêmê, namely, as a logocentric quest for abstract universal, marking thereby the tone 
for the entirety of Western philosophy. Socrates "made of life something that must be 
judged, measured, restricted, and of thought, a measure, a limit, that is exercised in the 
name of higher values: the Divine, the True, the Beautiful, the Good..." (Deleuze 2001 
[1965]: 70).
This rational vein is with no less impetus exalted in the scientific project of sustainable 
development. In Our Common Future the human power of representation remains another 
name for the production of knowledge. Ecology turns now into the domain of representation 
par excellence; the cognitive matrix from which predicates on nature emanate, are justified 
and pronounced as necessary. The "common and mutually supportive objectives" in the 
Brundtland Report must "take account of the interrelationships between people, resources, 
environment and development" (WCED 1987: IX).
4 /  Culture/Nature As An Instance Of Epistemological Binary Logic
Another salient trait of philosophy and science as epistêmê is binary logic or "the belief in 
antitheses o f values" (Nietzsche 2003: § 2). The Western philosophical tradition has been 
one of clear-cut blacks or whites. "Aristotle gave us our binary logic and much of our 
scientific worldview. He taught us to logic chop and always draw the line between opposites, 
between the thing and the not-thing, between A and not-A. The better you drew those lines, 
the more logical your mind and the more exact your science" (Kosko 1994: 68). One can find
8'Nomos' is the Greek form for 'use, costum, law.'
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an abundance of these bipolar positions enacted in this tradition; "we define metaphysics by 
the distinction between two worlds" (Deleuze 2001 [1965]: 69-70): nature/culture, 
idealism/materialism; good/bad; unity/plurality; logos/mythos, logic/rhetoric, 
intelligible/sensible, speech/writing, literal/figurative, presence/absence, 
intuition/signification, identity/difference, truth/error (Baynes et al. 1987:119; Schrift 1995: 
15; Johnson 2004: viii). It must be noted that the two entities, far from standing on equal 
footing, form an uneven structure with the first contrasted pole in a privileged position over 
the second. An "opposition of metaphysical concepts [...] is never the face-to-face of two 
terms, but a hierarchy and an order of subordination" (Derrida 1984 [1971]: 329). The 
second term is considered as the degraded, corrupted and undesirable version of the first. 
Out of the lengthy list, one binary pair may be readily associated with the rubric sustainable 
development, namely, culture/nature. However, in our context, the order of the opposition 
is reversed as both the culture and nature we are dealing with are cognates of the Cartesian 
res cogitans and res extenso, respectively.
On one reading, sustainable development is the all-out crusade that the West undertakes in 
face of an increasingly absent nature. This dire situation renders human finitude more 
acutely conspicuous against a backdrop that now must be taken into account, and for which 
an alleged whole new culture -sustainable development— is marshalled. In this light, we 
may corroborate our initial suspicion that the analytic of finitude proper to the modern age 
-which the institutional project of sustainable development proceeds to relate to 
environmental matters— is pervaded with vestiges of the tradition of philosophy and 
science as epistêmê. Far from defeating Western metaphysics, this analytic extends the traits 
common to this trajectory into the ecocidal mode of being. Sustainable development, in so 
far as it enlists the Cartesian dispensation that also characterizes the modern age, 
"require[s] an absolute distinction between the two terms [culture/nature] and the 
continual repression of the work of mediation" (Latour 1993:140), and therefore also that of 
analysis. Yet the proliferation of all kinds of artefacts, from GMOs to IMF policies geared at 
structural adjustment, to geo-engineering rather speaks of a highly populated space in- 
between the extremes 'culture' and 'nature'. A genetically-modified seed, to take the 
example above, is neither fully 'natural' nor fully 'cultural'. Rather, it lies somewhere in- 
between the continuum that 'culture' and 'nature' draw should we be able to approach the
bipolar oppositions from a non-hierarchical perspective (Nietzsche 2005 [2001]: § 112). In 
other words, the space of analysis opens up once the contrasted Cartesian res cogitons vs. 
res extenso undergo a profound recasting. This space is suffocated in the quest to sustain 
present and prospective human needs against a backdrop that secures the latter.
The marked anthropocentrism imbuing Our Common Future, announced above in the 
section 'Logocentric Claims To Truth and Ecology/ is perennial to the history of philosophy 
and science as epistêmê. "[T]he name of man being the name of that being who, throughout 
the history of metaphysics or ontotheology -in  other words, throughout his entire history— 
has dreamed of full presence, the reassuring foundation [...]" (Derrida 1978f: 292). 
Anthropocentrism is further exacerbated in the modern age, when man, the subject of 
representational knowledge becomes, at the same time, the object of knowledge. In the 
ecocidal mode of being, the finitude of the human condition is mainly apparent in the res 
extenso, where environmental constraints limit the possibilities of man. In the institutional 
project of sustainable development the self-presentation of meaning proper to logocentrism 
is indeed apparent in the domain of ecology. Universal, regular and unchangeable laws are 
attributed to Cartesian-Newtonian nature. These emerging epistemolological predicates 
place the latter freely upon the hands of global management (cf. Sachs 1996). The signifying 
structure man-present-in-nature is another name for sustainable development.
The regular nature by which the application of eco-efficient means are to render 
productivity sustainable is "a central presence which has never been itself, has always been 
exiled from itself into its own substitute" (Derrida 1978f: 280). The regular, manipulative and 
cause-effect-determined presence that man assumes in nature is only a foundered, 
logocentric representation of the latter. Derrida induces us to conceive the actual
ismanifestation of 'the natural' by alternative means. "The most dangerous monotheism 
that of a rationalist nature" (Panikkar 2009: 99; own translation from the Catalan 
translation). In this context, Nietzsche had already suggested replacing the principle of 
causality proper to the natural sciences with a continuum (cf. Nietzsche 2005 [2001]: § 
112).9 Via Derrida we can infer that sustainable development conveys a nominal natural 
presence which coerces "the play of the structure" (Derrida 1978f: 278) (read: the activities
For a further development of this topic cf. Chapters, Section 3, Subsection 1 below.
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that take place in a given context)10 not by what it promises to be delivering but by what it 
succeeds in concealing and naturalizing. In other words, by perpetuating the 
humanity/nature divide, sustainable development closes off the spatiality of critical analysis.
5 /  An Unproblematized Reversal Of Productivity In The Context Of Industrial Capitalism
Once the pervasiveness of binary logic is duly understood, we are only one step away from 
the formulation of another defining trait of philosophy and science as epistêmê, namely, 
'unproblematized reversals/ Within this category, the dialectical space becomes only 
sufficiently wide to accommodate oscillations between two extremes of the same 
worldview. An unproblematized reversal is "a reversal that is unaccompanied by a 
réinscription of the members of a given metaphysically established opposition or hierarchy 
[...] leavpng thereby] the metaphysical base supporting the initial configuration untouched" 
(Plotnitsky 1994: 35). Unproblematized reversals conform to the opposite, second-rate, pole 
of a logocentric initial position. In this light, 'nature' is the unproblematized reversal of 
'culture/ 'matter' that of 'mind.' Unproblematized reversals are often adopted when the 
deficiencies of the initial pole become so conspicuously apparent that one needs to re­
invent one's own position. Yet this remains a cosmetic operation as long as one falls short of 
simultaneously recasting the operative metaphysical disposition where the initial polarity is 
inscribed. Indeed, it often occurs that values change but "what is essential hasn't changed: 
the perspectives or the evaluations on which these values, whether old or new, depend" 
(Deleuze 2001 [1965]: 71) remain intact.
The banner 'sustainable development' lends to the charge of being an unproblematized 
reversal of, and thus of conforming to a binary pair with, its complementing and ratifying 
logic, viz. productivity. Let us recall that the second term in the dichotomy is deemed as a 
second-rate activity; as the undesirable, negative, distancing, failed version of the original. It 
is the first term, the component that opens up the spatiality of meaning and, in so doing, 
indelibly marks the tone for both ends of the opposition. Within this determined bosom of 
significance, the second term articulates itself in negative terms. Absence is lack of presence, 
and error a defiguration of truth. Sustainable development, for its part, should be seen as
10 To be more precise, in Derrida 'play' stands for the inflections that emerge out of the Nietzschean affirmation of life, in contradistinction 
to the "eschatological meaning of being as presence, [...] as life without difference: another name for death" (Derrida 1997: 71).
menaced productivity. The formula 'sustainable development' encapsulates within its 
heading the two poles of the opposition -viz. productivity/development. "Currently, the 
term sustainable development is used as a synonym for the oxymoronic sustainable growth" 
(Daly 1996 :193).11
The basic message conveyed in Our Common Future may be summarized by way of this 
passage: "What is needed now is a new era of economic growth -growth that is forceful and 
at the same time socially and environmentally sustainable" (WCED 1987). The assumptions 
in these sentences lend to an analogy in a similar debate. Amartya Sen declares that "[t]o 
lead a life without shame [...] requires a more expensive bundle of goods and services in a 
society that is generally richer" (quoted in Jackson 2006d: 373-374). Sen, that is, is simply 
naturalizing people's functioning in wealthy nations. In response, Tim Jackson promptly 
notices that Sen's declarations are "not really an explanation at all, merely a description of a 
contingent state of affairs: we behave this way in rich societies, because this is what rich 
societies are like" (ibid: 374). Correlatively, we may conclude as regards Brundtland's 
naturalization of Western, industrial standards of living that it 'is not really an explanation at 
all' of essential human needs. Rather, the explicit necessity of industrial production, and, for 
that matter, sustainable development, is a construct based upon 'a contingent state of 
affairs' that stems directly from Western and Westernized cultural convictions. "Opinions 
may be 'objective' [...] as if they had arisen from the very essence of the world while merely 
reflecting the peculiarities of a particular approach" (Feyerabend 1987: 73). Besides, this 
pretence of objectivity further reveals the Western origin of the creed 'sustainable 
development'. "Believing that there is such thing as a purely objective thought is one of the 
main Western dogmatisms" (Panikkar 2009: 99; own translation from the Catalan 
translation).
In Our Common Future, industrial production is the undisputable mode of production for 
prospective generations (cf. WCED 1987: ch 8). Human finitude is manifested as a multiple 
concern for food and energy security only met with the expansion of industrial bases. "Many
This also means that ‘sustainable development1 lends to the charges of ’development'. "Here is an idea [development] which has been 
eminently influential, highly misleading (precisely because, in its partial correctness, it has seemed so persuasively self-evident), and 
consequently generative of false expectations {both intellectually and politically). And yet there are very few indeed who are ready truly to  
unthink this central notion" (Wallerstein 2001:2). This exercise is one such attempt.
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essential human needs can be met only through goods and services provided by industry. 
The production of food requires increasing amounts of agrochemicals and machinery. 
Beyond this, the products of industry form the material basis of contemporary standards of 
living" (WCED 1987: 206), in a context where "all nations" (ibid) are assumed to "require and 
rightly aspire to efficient industrial bases to meet changing needs" (ibid). The desired form of 
human culture, that is to say, takes the form of industrial production. We see again how the 
formula sustainable development is a late-modern binary pair positioned at the antipodal 
and complicit extreme of production. Sustainable development vindicates the existence and 
implications of industrial production by highlighting the implicit environmental dependency 
of the latter. Against this backdrop, eco-efficient formulas are to metamorphose domestic 
productivity into sustainable development. "[Industries and industrial operations should be 
encouraged that are more efficient in terms of resource use, that generate less pollution and 
waste, that are based on the use of renewable rather non-renewable resources, and that 
minimize irreversible adverse impacts on human health and the environment" (ibid: 213).
Putatively, the motive of this hierarchizing opposition -from  industrial productivity to eco- 
efficiency and sustainable development— must be found in the transgression that the 
modern green movement represents for industrialization. In the post-1945 period 
industrialization is rebranded 'development' (Wallerstein 2001: 2; Sachs 1996; Rist 2002: ch. 
10). "It is precisely the force and efficiency of the system that regularly change 
transgressions into 'false exists7" (Derrida 1984 [1972]: 135). In our context, the 'false exit7 is 
industrial eco-efficiency or 'sustainable development7, which massively sanitizes the green 
movement. "[T]he naturalist and biocentric currents of present-day environmentalism have 
been cut out by th[e] conceptual operation" (Sachs 1996: 244) of sustainable development.
"To produce [a] signifying structure obviously cannot consist of reproducing" (Derrida 1997: 
158) the disposition of the modern age and of the epistemological tradition in the rubric of 
'sustainable development7. "Without this recognition and this respect, critical production 
would risk developing in any direction at all and authorize itself to say almost anything. But 
this indispensable guardrail has always only protected, it has never opened/' (ibid) a 
spatiality. When the motif sustainable development is engendered along the guardraW of 
industrial 'productivity7, it preserves all the traits of the latter and, for that matter, it fails to
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open up the space of modulations. In this light, we can read sustainable development as the 
strategy in ecocidal times by which "metaphysics normalizes Western discourse" (Derrida 
1984a [1968]: 23), rendering propositional, universal knowledge -as delivered by the realm 
of ecology— the natural way of cognition, and industrial production the common way of 
sustenance.
It must be noted that a number of scholars have tried to read the rubric 'sustainable 
development' from more radical perspectives. The advent of the related signifier 
'sustainability' partially attests to these novel developments. The leading ecological 
economist Herman Daly (1996b: 237, cf. also Daly 1996a), to name one strategy, reclaims 
the original definition of 'development' -"the  qualitative evolution to a fuller, better, or 
different state." On the basis of this nuanced characterization, Daly is in the position to 
extricate sustainable development from 'sustainable growth' (Daly 1996a). "Development 
without growth is sustainable development" (Daly 1996b: 237). The politics of such 
alternative approaches are, it goes without saying, respectable. Yet we still must operate a 
critical reading of these emerging directions from the perspective of post-ecocidal conditions 
of possibility of knowledge. In this respect, it must be noted that this brand of sustainable 
development or sustainability which reclaims a qualitative change remains cognate with 
mainstream sustainable development: it reinstates the anthropocentric analytic of finitude 
proper to the modern age, it places rationalism centre stage, and it advocates the 
generation of a logocentric planetary science which easily falls in the hands of global 
ecocrats.
6 /  The Perpetuation Of Restricted Economy
The enlisting of Cartesian nature introduces us to an additional theme of the history of 
philosophy and science as epistêmê. It is the distinction, prominently raised by Georges 
Bataille, between restricted economy or classical theory and general economy or non- 
classical theory (Bataille 2004b; Derrida 1978e; Habermas 1987c; Plotnitsky 1993a: ch. 1, 
1994: ch. 2). Restricted economy characterizes
classical theories across a broad spectrum of Western intellectual history: in philosophy, in social
and human sciences, history and other fields. Mathematics and the natural and exact sciences,
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too, can be seen as restricted economies, when their practice is governed by metaphysical 
epistemologico-ontological agendas, as they have often been even in the works of many 
revolutionary scientists, from Kepler to Einstein, and beyond (Plotnitsky 1994: 2).
One of the cornerstones of this conceptual setting is the position, so called given its staticism 
in the disposition of the elements, in the religare grid. Positions, to be sure, are the currency 
proper to the epistemological disposition. They convey ontological predicates or, what is 
equal to saying, perennial, static truths. Different post-Kantian authors have attributed 
different meanings and emphasized different aspects of the positions at issue and the 
ontological predicates they generate. Nietzsche (1967c: § 275), to name one, presents the 
position as a "categorical imperator' or "metaphysic of unity"; Derrida (1978f: 279 et passim), 
to name another, as "metaphors and metonymies of Being as presence"; Plotnitsky (1994: 6- 
7) via Bohr and Ferré (1988) names a position an "idealization"; and Curry as "monist 
essentialism" (2003).
One of the cornerstones of restricted economy is the pervasive tendency to unify diverse 
parameters under a single value. The belief that plurality may be traced back to one is 
certainly one of the fulcrums of Western metaphysics. The fall of Christian morality, 
"Christian conscience, [was] translated and sublimated into a scientific conscience, into 
intellectual cleanliness at any price" (Nietzsche 2005 [2001]: § 357). Friedrich Nietzsche 
upbraids the course of Western science for indiscriminately lending allegiance to two 
authorities exempt from conditions, namely, truth and logos. "One needed God as an 
unconditional sanction, with no court of appeal, as a 'categorical imperator'-: or, if one 
believed in the authority of reason, one needed a metaphysic of unity, by virtue of which 
this was logical" (Nietzsche 1967c: § 275; cf. also Curry 2006: 109). Jacques Derrida (1978f: 
279), for his part, defines the history of Western metaphysics as a series of "metaphors and 
metonymies [...] of Being as presence." These are the various expressions of ep/stëmë, which 
"since Plato" have set philosophical and scientific work under constant "repression and 
suppression" (Derrida 1978d: 196). These practices have established the science of 
presence, or logocentrism, where self-evident meaning -th e  ontological predication of an 
alleged objective reality ("The sky is blue")— is assumed as the ideal form of knowledge. In a 
similar manner, Arkady Plotnitsky, in the wake of Niels Bohr, brands as idealizations those
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theories such as classical physics that unify parameters -as opposed to complementing 
them. Patrick Curry (2006: 109; cf. also Curry 2003, 2007) calls each such idealizations 
'monist essentialism/ the fundamental premise of which being "that there is o single 
reference point by which all other possible perspectives are exhausted". While "the doctrine 
of universal unity [p]rior to Plotinius [...] was called the idea of the good or the first mover; 
after him, it was called summum ens, the unconditioned, or absolute spirit," (Habermas 
1996 [1992]: 399) in the ecocidal mode of being such totalizing doctrine comes in the form 
of sustainable development. In face of the noxious effects of industrialism, industrial homo 
faber must be tamed but not questioned - le t  alone eradicated.
A salient trait of restricted economy is indeed the credence that plenitude, full presence, full 
knowing is a plausible possibility. Restricted economy assumes that "universally true 
knowledge [is] an achievable goal" (Curry 2003: § 7). Yet the paradox is that "such reasoning 
never occurs" (ibid: § 4; emphasis in the original) or, expressed in Nietzsche's (1967c: Book I, 
§ 12) apt exhortation "but behold, there is no such universal!; [...] any comprehensive unity 
in the plurality of events is lacking." Curry and Nietzsche interpret the epistemological 
practice of describing "the eternal elements in the intelligible gathering-together {iogos) of a 
static yet tensed (enduring, permanently present) natural order {kosmos)" (Allen 1993: 11) 
as thoroughly impracticable. Nietzsche (1967c: Book I, § 12) reads such practice as nihilistic; 
it renders "the world look[...] valueless". What is more, as soon as one sets to analyze 
restricted economies, the illusory unity of its provenance vanishes, and the local effects 
along with its power relations become apparent (Plotnitsky 1993b: 150 et passim; Derrida 
1978f: 278-281).12
Restricted economies customarily consider their objects as utterly meaningful and claim that 
the systems they deal with can avoid the unproductive expenditure of energy while 
controlling multiplicity and indeterminacy (Plotnitsky 1994: 2). General economy, by 
contrast, repeatedly emphasizes the existence of ineluctable losses in every action. It is thus 
restricted economies that breed the belief in the suitability of logocentric knowledge on the 
environment or ecology, in a fully manageable nature and in the possibility of eco-efficiency. 
"The maintaining of any unique or absolute grounding, such as fundamental meaning,
12 For the further development of this point, cf. Chapter 2, Section 1, Subsection I below.
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consciousness, or presence, will lead to a restricted economy" (Plotnitsky 1993a: 78). The 
vision of sustainable development, with a docile nature taken for granted and utterly 
controllable by Promethean man, is an expression of restricted economy in the ecocidal 
mode of being.
7 /  The Enactment Of The Western Teleology Of Progress
The rigorous preservation of epistemological traits in the age of sustainable development 
further feeds the faith in a teleology of progress. It portrays Western history from its Socratic 
cradle and earlier times as an unbroken ascent towards the perfectibility of the world paying 
"at once tribute to the greatness, and indispensability of the past, and confidence in an ever 
more golden future" (Nisbet 1980: 8) sturdily anchored in the industrial mode of production. 
Sustainable development is, in this light, the consummation of Western metaphysics. "The 
completion of philosophy, the most extreme possibility or 'place' for metaphysics, is a world 
civilization based on the Western technological model. This model is the Platonic idea 
ostensibly drained of all ontological content and becomes a mere cipher, a monadic carrier 
of information, a unit of cybernetic science" (Krell 2000 [1993]: 428). In this unbroken 
trajectory, the promise of sustainable development is in charge of eradicating the decadent 
consequences that follow from the deployment of the Western scientific and technological 
progress. What is more, sustainable development, which, in partaking of "the idea of 
progress!,] is a synthesis of the past and a prophecy of the future" (Nisbet 1980: 5), which 
restores the damaged reputation of industrial production in the face of desertification, 
biodiversity loss, climate forcing, global warming - to  name a few expressions of the ecocidal 
mode of being. Sustainable development, in securing 'continuous economic and social 
progress'13 or 'development'14 is the hinge for industrial production in the ecocidal mode of 
being. On this reading, the project of 'sustainable development' may be read as a Hegelian 
Aufhebung or folding of development theory. Development theory sets down catching-up 
deployment of technological means for all countries on the Planet to reach first world's 
standards and beyond (Mies 1993a). Brundtland's sustainable development prescribes the 
same recipe but certified with the ontological predicates that emanate from the field of 
ecology.
In the definition of sustainable consumption provided by the British DTI and quoted above.
14 In the canonical definition of sustainable development provided by Our Common Future and quoted above.
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Sustainable Development Appears Impervious To The Ecocidal Mode Of Being -The rubric 
'sustainable development', in relating human finitude to environmental limits, perpetuates 
the analytic of finitude proper to the modern age while extending the epistemological 
tradition into our days. As such, the institutional project of 'sustainable development' must 
be read as the complicit binary opposite of productivity, aiming at the restoration of a fully 
present and manageable nature instead of acknowledging the intrinsic failures of the eco- 
efficient endeavour along the lines of restricted economy. Yet what must be settled in order 
to address research question (4) by way of (2) is whether the agenda of sustainable 
development is a compatible candidate to steer us out of the ecocidal mode of being. To put 
it reversely, we must entertain the possibility that the prolongation of the modern mode of 
being into ecocidal times by way of sustainable development be an undesirable anachronism 
to conduce us to a post-ecocidal panorama. This hypothesis can be formulated even more 
compactly: is the modern mode of being capable of coping with -o r, at any rate, 
registering— the ecocidal mode of being? On the grounds of the seven points outlined 
above, we may initially suspect that the promise of sustainable development "is designed to 
leave in the domain of the unthinkable the very thing that makes this conceptualization 
possible" (Derrida 1978f: 284), namely, the ecocidal mode of being.
It is the unpostponable remit of the philosophers of the future, to which we now turn, to 
render the blind spots of our present times transparent.
Yet before moving to this new ground, a note on timeline. In keeping with the analysis 
conducted above, the ecocidal mode of being is associated with Socratic Greece, the cradle 
of secular materialism. This must be seen as the instutionalization of a historically detected 
tendency: "the selective pressures on megafauna [...] intensified as human-tool making 
technologies and hunting strategies became more sophisticated" (Lyons et al.: 354). A 
proclivity towards materialism which is well apparent at the scientifco-philosophical level.
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Philosophy O f The Future: 
Conditions O f in- T ra n s itiv ity  O f 
Knowledge For A Post-Ecocidal Mode 
O f Being
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"[••.]the world of knowledge has been facing a basic epistemological 
challenge, that of overcoming, the artificial divide of the "two cultures," 
and creating a new, reunified epistemology of scientia/philosophia. In the 
decade to come this will turn out to be, I believe, the central intellectual 
issue of the world of knowledge and will lead not merely to new intellectual 
constructions, but inevitably to new structures of knowledge and a radical 
revision of the cultures that inform the life of the academy."
—Immanuel Wallerstein15
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Synopsis - Chapter 2 proceeds with the three remaining research queries, namely, the 
development of those conditions of possibility that shall both illuminate the nature of the 
ecocidal mode of being and conduce the global polity out of it. To articulate the conditions 
of possibility at issue, Nietzsche's call for the creation of a philosophy of the future is 
heeded. The signifier 'future' is subsequently interpreted in the light of a number of 
traditions within the post-Kantian critique of reason: as total transformation in step with the 
Marxist tradition; as immanent critique in keeping with the proposal of the Enlightenment 
project; as genealogy in keeping Foucault's historical method. Yet the philosophy of the 
future initially developed in this chapter takes its most imminent cues from the tradition 
inaugurated by Nietzsche in the direction of tranvaluating all values, further carried on by 
Heidegger's attempt at a destruktion of philosophy and science as epistêmê and perfected 
with Derrida's deconstructive method.
15 Wallerstein 2001: ix.
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In Derrida's deconstructive endeavour the conditions of possibility of knowledge are marked 
by the undecidability -'inability to decide'— with respect to any of the two poles for which 
the binary epistemological trajectory has randomly chosen, thereby bringing to light the 
arbitrariness endemic to this tradition. It follows, it is further argued, that undecidability is a 
critique internal to philosophy. There are no external factors that tilt the balance into any 
specific direction. In our search for conditions of possibility of knowledge, the exit from the 
ecocidal mode of being -a  factor unconnected to the internal development of philosophy— 
rules. This quest must lead us over, across and beyond our decadent contemporaneity. The 
production of knowledge must not only illuminate the nature of the predicament but walk 
us out of it. In this context, it is concluded that it is the logic of transitivity that rules over 
both the epistemological binary one and Derrida's of supplementarity -th e  latter operates 
by adding both binary poles instead of privileging one.
Against this backdrop, Nietzsche's call for a philosophy of the future is instantiated as an 
'analytics of transposition'. The rubric 'transposition' must be understood as both the overall 
exercise of metamorphosing the ecocidal epistemological tradition and the very conditions 
of transitivity in charge of such task. Faithful to the etymological meaning of trans-position, 
the proposed analytics both embark upon a critical analysis of epistemological terrain - i t  
goes across and over the latter— and endeavours to overcome it - i t  goes beyond the latter.
1. A 'Philosophy Of The Future' For A Post-Ecocidal Mode Of Being
I
The Nietzschean Revolution And Sustainable Development - One of Nietzsche's noted 
contributions to knowledge lies in the pointing to the fact that the unity of the history of 
philosophy and science as ep/stëmë has been sustained by virtue of a univocal truth and 
logos. Perhaps even more notable has been Nietzsche's disclosing of the fact that these two 
"unconditional authorities]" (Nietzsche 1967c: § 412) obscure a wide range of 
interconnected local effects:
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Nietzsche exposes the philosophical, as well as empiricist, conceptions of logos and truth -  
unconditional authorities— as local effects of a particular system [...] These effects also become 
'causes' of many other things and act over long historical intervals and across broad spaces— 
geographical, historical, political, or theoretical. They become globalized, hence the complexity 
and instability of all these denominations (Plotnitsky 1993a: 152).
It is worth clarifying in the quote above that 'instability' or plurality of signifiers translates 
into stability or unity of the signified within the same historical interval. Let us illustrate this 
statement with our findings in Chapter 1. The epistemological trajectory remains intact till 
the present day but it has manifested itself under different faces. According to Heidegger, 
the hatching out of the sciences is a plural and alternative expression, in the form of a 
culmination, of Western philosophy. We have also seen above that the modern mode of 
being rebrands itself as sustainable development when the ecocidal mode of being becomes 
an issue of public concern, thereby protecting signifieds common to the former -progress, 
industrialization, efficiency, productivity. All these, to be sure, are tokens of the inexorable 
operability of the 'unconditional authorities' by virtue of which philosophy and science as 
epistêmë has perpetuated itself. The extensive geographical effects of a system that puts 
itself forth as unconditional such as that under the rubric sustainable development further 
explains the reason why, as announced above, this banner has been adopted by rural 
communities in India and elsewhere, where Gandhian and thus largely anti-industrial values 
prevail. This means that foci of resistance -local signifieds— remain in place in spite of the 
fact that the homogenizing banner 'sustainable development' may be making inroads.
Plotnitsky (1993a: 152) goes on to specify that the repeated insistence on "a unity that is 
compulsory and, to that extent, illusory" (Habermas 1996 [1992]: 403) elicits "the rebellion 
of a disenfranchised plurality" (ibid). It follows that an analytical framework that documents 
and makes sense of this series of rebellions is in order. Only by virtue of such frame of 
analysis can we pursue our research inquiry (1) on the nature of our multiply ecocidal times. 
Plotnitsky (1993a: 153) associates the eventual provision of such theoretical matrix with the 
Nietzschean revolution. Nietzsche's philosophy has earned the qualification of revolutionary 
in nature and effects in having juxtaposed will to knowledge to will to power (Macksey 
andDonato 1972a: xii-xiii; Plotnitsky 1993a: 152; Schrift 1995; Schmidt 1996: 25-27).
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Pointedly, one of Nietzsche's most direct disciples, Michel Foucault (1980: 53), qualifies his 
master as the pioneer "philosopher of power." Accordingly to Foucault, Nietzsche was "a 
philosopher who managed to think of power without having to confine himself within a 
political theory in order to do so" (ibid).
Will to knowledge as will to power is tantamount to saying that in apparently value-free 
cognitive positions one should suspiciously seek sophisticated configurations of provincial 
beliefs. The mounting of such an unbroken dialectic between universal claims to truth and 
the identification of their contingent provenance is said to be one of Nietzsche's major feats:
Once the local character of all philosophical authority and subordination is exposed [...] the 
ultimate or unconditional nature of authority, starting with logos and truth, is removed. All such 
authorities have to be reconfigured locally, historically, practically, including politically but also 
psychoanalytically [...] All authorities then become local authorities. It is this reconfiguration of 
authority and subordination as local and always conditional 'determinations' and 'effects' that I 
see here as the Nietzschean revolution (Plotnitsky 1993a: 153).
Once we endeavour to translate the overarching project of sustainable development into 
the universalization of a regional will to power, we shall also be on our way to take to bits 
some of the epistemological residues prevalent in green politics today. We will, in short, be 
setting ourselves on track to develop a philosophy of the future, another name for the 
practice of critique (Foucault 1980 [1970]: 382-7; Deleuze 1988: 129-32; Schrift 1995: 24). 
This is, surely, the task of the present dissertation. We require a spatiality where the 
elements that populate it are rendered transparent and duly liable to analysis. We need to 
fulfil the demands of research question (1) and develop an account of the profoundly 
palpable ecocidal present that deprives our ability to swim at will. In the wake of Nietzsche 
and Heidegger, Gianni Vattimo (2002: 22) associates the demise of metaphysics, in the form 
of the end of modernity, with the weakening of Being's stable, objective and suprahistorical 
scaffold -"i.e . [as] the consummation of strong structures [...] from the metaphysical 
metanarrative to local rationality; from the belief in the objectivity of knowledge to the 
awareness of the hermeneutic character of truth". Similarly, the philosophy of the future for 
a post-ecocidal age we are to give shape to is to dismantle the implacable homogeneity 
acquired by the official sustainable development project while, cognitively, further
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expediting the end of modernity.
To develop the spatiality of analysis we are after, "the structurally of the structure ha[s] to 
begin to be thought" (Derrida 1978f: 280). As a result of this process, "a rupture" (ibid) in the 
systemic integrity of the unconditional authorities such as the Nietzschean revolution 
"come[s] about" (ibid). A philosophy of the future renders "necessary to think both the law 
which somehow governed the desire for a center in the constitution of structure, and the 
process of signification which orders displacements and substitutions for this law of central 
presence" (ibid). Such a philosophy has to, on the one hand, be sufficiently sophisticated to 
incisively penetrate into the logic of the metaphysical project and amply transcend it. It 
must, on the other, account for the various reasons why the unconditional authority that 
preserves the metaphysical project intact is forced to go on changing its names -signifiers- in 
order to remain in place.16 In the context of our concerns here, these two remits translate 
into both the development a set of analytical tools fit to gain access to the modern mode of 
being, and the answering of the query: in which different fashions does this modern mode of 
being intend to perpetuate itself into the ecocidal mode of being by rebranding industrial 
productivity 'sustainable development'? The answer to this latter query was largely 
developed in Chapter 1, while the remaining chapters of the present dissertation 
concentrate on the set of analytical tools along with the cognitive implications of the latter.
To recapitulate, we should note that in endeavouring to address research question (4) via
(2)-v/z. in coming to terms with the impossibility of the official rubric sustainable 
development to restore our old routine to swim at will— and subsequently submitting this 
rubric to a Nietzschean turn, a series of contingent spaces emerge. These give form to and 
mould the spatiality that shall permit us to address question (1) on an explanation for the 
growing number of ecocidal manifestations. Likewise, these contingent spaces present us 
with the potential plausibility of locating 'conditions of possibility for another kind of 
knowledge/ thereby satisfying the demands of research question (3), and paving the way for 
the addressing of question (4) on practicable directions out of the ecocidal mode of being.
16 Heidegger (quoted in Schrift, 1990: 22) lists out some of the protean signifiers of this steady signified: "the supersensory world, the  
Ideas, God, the moral law, the authority of reason, progress, the happiness of the greatest number, culture, civilization".
-35-
Il
Philosophy Of The Future As Challenge To Nihilism And Dystopia - In Beyond Good and Evil, 
Nietzsche (2003: § 211; cf. also Foucault 1980 [1970] 382-7; Deleuze 1988: 129-132; Schrift 
1995: 24) invokes the appearance of the philosophers of the future in an exasperated tone: 
"Are there at present such philosophers? Have there ever been such philosophers? Must 
there not be such philosophers some day?" Despite the rhetorical strategy adopted by the 
German philosopher, there is some merit in addressing these interrogative positions vis-à-vis 
our research agenda. This exercise serves, more precisely, the purposes of research question
(3) on the conditions of possibility for another kind of knowledge in having acknowledged 
the incapability of sustainable development to ever restore our old ability to labour, rest and 
conduct healing and recreational practices in our autochthonous places. It therefore seems 
that "philosophy must always be -[...]and true philosophy can only be— philosophy of the 
future, a philosophy for new stages of life and spirit" (Plotnitsky 1996: x). Only to add that 
the demands of the new phases may potentially displace the teleology of spirit -and  
otherwise— assumed in the old ones, an alteration of note not captured in Plotnitsky's 
asseveration.
The 'future' of the philosophy of the future refers in many respects to utopia, "'another 
place', where justice prevails, the people are perfectly content, and where sadness, pain and 
violence are banned" (De Geus 1999:19). At a very immediate level, this kind of philosophy 
speaks of an agonizing state on the part of the philosopher who grows cognizant of the fact 
that the exigencies of their project "are by [their] very nature anticipatory" (Cashell 2005:1). 
In effect, Nietzsche regards the figure of the real philosopher17 as the one who is 
unremittingly unsettling the prevailing order of values. The effects of such endeavour remain 
by necessity prospective. The actualization of "thinking and creating will inexorably be a 
posthumous task, belonging to those who will hear me after m yself writes Alba de la Vega 
(2002: 17; own translation from the original Spanish) rephrasing Nietzsche. At this level, a 
'philosophy of the future' is an exercise in critique. The 'future' —a place yet to become— 
that this philosophy proposes coincides with both the practice of protest and the utopias 
enacted by the critical project.
17 The one at antipodes with the utilitarians, and the "scientific workers of philosophy" such as Kant and Hegel (Nietzsche 2003: §211).
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Instances of philosophers of the future, of practitioners of critique vis-à-vis the modern age 
abound. Karl Marx (1977 [1859]: 211) pronounced as regards his contemporaneity that he 
was face to face with one of those "rar[e] and [...] quite special conditions [when] a society 
[is] able to adopt a critical attitude towards itself'. The distinctive rubric 'intellectual' is 
secured to those scholars and activists who during critical, transitional periods enact the 
intrinsic potential of 'critique' and 'critical' (both stem from Kpiveiv, 'to decide', 'to judge') 
and exert what may be fair to qualify as superhuman efforts to provide orientation towards 
alternative routes (Said 1994). "Crisis is a necessary condition for a questioning of the doxa 
[or prevailing set of values], but is not in itself a sufficient condition for the production of a 
critical discourse" (Bourdieu 2005 [1977]: 169). It is incumbent upon the intellectual to step 
forth, give shape and voice the critical discourse geared at change.
Ours is a dystopian present in the form of an ecocidal mode of being that, under the 
institutional project of sustainable development, turns into human domination over nature 
to secure the continuity of industrial production. When a sense of decadence imbues one’s 
contemporaneity, Michel Foucault interprets (1980 [1970]: 384), it "makes us believe that 
something new is about to begin, something we glimpse only as a thin line of light low on 
the horizon." Abundance of hope in face of nihilistic decay is the inexhaustible quarry of a 
philosophy of the future. In the context of modern processes of rationalization and 
domination, Foucault (ibid) explicitly states that "that feeling [of prospective amelioration] 
and that impression are perhaps not ill founded [...] Hôlderlin, Hegel, Feuerbach, and Marx 
all felt this certainty that in them a thought and perhaps a culture were coming to an end, 
and that from the depths of a distance, which was perhaps not invincible, another was 
approaching" (ibid). Analogously, the dystopian present energetically enjoins the gaining of 
increasing distance from the modern mode of being, and the establishing of a spatiality 
where all elements of this mode be both visible and liable to alteration. Ultimately, we have 
to encounter ourselves in the position to grapple with research question (4) to leave behind 
the 'nature'-threatening present. As indicated above, Derrida (1978f: 280) has dubbed the 
necessary marking of such distance the "rupture" or "disruption" of the Western 
metaphysical disposition. There have been distinct approaches to the decided bursting of 
epistëmë. We now turn to an exploration of these attempts.
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2. The Import Of Transpositions In The Post-Kantian Critique Of Reason
l
A 'Goal In The Future' As A Multidirectional Transposition - At one point Nietzsche (1967c: 
§ 408) rebukes philosophers on three counts, viz. on want of "(a) an historical sense, (b) 
knowledge of physiology, (c) a goal in the future". Due attention to these three points is part 
of designing a philosophy of the future. We shall start with the 'goal in the fu ture / while 
reserving discussion space for a 'historical sense' in chapters 5, 7, 8 and 9, and for the central 
'knowledge of physiology' in chapters 4 and 6.
Above Derrida (1978f: 280) was quoted speaking of the "repetition [of the] disruption" of 
metaphysical structures that operate under unconditional authorities or centres. Foucault 
(1997: 309) alludes to such disruption as a "recurrent ethos" (Foucault 1997: 309). Both 
authors make allusion to a second modern philosophy, one which goes beyond the 
subjective idealism proposed in the Kantian critique, and which is consistently generically 
referred to as post-Kantian critique of reason. Ironically, one of Kant's latter-day 
contributions, his terse Was is Aufklârung? (Kant 1784)18, is attributed to have set the tone 
for this latter tradition which seeks to capture the structural in "the ephemeral, the fleeting, 
the contingent" (Baudelaire quoted in Foucault 1997: 310; cf. also Foucault 1996 and 
Habermas 1991 [1986]). Contra Kant, this post-Kantian group of thinkers associates the 
collapse of metaphysics with reason's full autonomy -now  a faculty fully bereft of subjective 
idealistic anchorages.
Above, the 'future' of 'philosophies of the future' was rendered coincident with 'utopia' — 
both vocables point to a place other than the present situation. It must be noted that this 
doubly vocal call for transportation to the unknown isn't necessarily restricted to a 
temporally distinct setting. In a strictly etymological sense, utopias have 'no place', any more 
than future enjoys 'no presence'. One may read this denial of 'space' and 'time' in absolute 
terms or simply aknowledge the diversification of the meaning of 'utopia' as that which is
18 In Chapter 12 the reader can find the first four paragraphs out of the total ten included in Kant's text.
philosophically, socio-politically, ethically and materially distinct. Perhaps it makes sense to 
marshal these plural directions around three clusters. One such epicentres could be made to 
correspond with a theoretical displacement which would enclose the propitious categories 
to grapple with the ecocidal mode of being. These categories would, in turn, contain within 
their conceptual expanse the actual possibility of overturning this mode of being. Marx and 
Nietzsche practised this kind of transgression. With the results of this initial cluster we ought 
to be in the position to fulfil the demands of research question (3) above on the exposition 
of another kind of knowledge that takes into account the ecocidal mode of being vis-à-vis 
our willingness to recover the sites where we labour, repose and conduct healing and 
recreational activities. A second main direction that would take the philosophy we are to 
contrive is the application of its conceptual body upon at least one aspect of the relevant 
contemporaneity. Here we should gauge the extent to which it is possible to reshuffle the 
present state of affairs so that we may regain our ability to reside in our native or 
subsequently adopted places and address research question (1) above on an explanation of 
the growing threatening nature of our present and (4) on how to exit it. A third direction or 
epicentre would conform to the actual surpassing of the ecocidal mode of being - to  the 
extent that this might be possible. It is the initial epicentre the one that concerns us in the 
scope of the present thesis.
In the following we shall explore four prospective directions as intimated by the post- 
Kantian critique of reason. First, the Marxist idea of future as total transformation will be 
explored. Subsequently, future as the utopian horizon outlined by critique qua Aufklarung 
will be investigated. In contraposition, Foucaudian discourse analysis will be exposed as 
invoking a distinctive future. Finally, future will be analysed as the overcoming of philosophy 
and science as epistëmë in the footsteps of transvaluation-Destru/ct/on-deconstruction. The 
philosophy of the future that this dissertation proposes chiefly builds on the second and 
fourth meanings.
II
'Future7 As Total Transformation: The Marxist Tradition - International political economist 
Robert W. Cox, a post-Kantian practitioner in the neo-Gramscian tradition, claims that 
critical theory is a "theory of history in the sense of being concerned not just with the past
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but with a continuing process of historical change" (Cox 1999 [1981]: 89). Critique overtly 
engages in emancipatory politics. In intending to gain perspective into the extant socio­
political conjuncture, a historical critique in the Marxist tradition seeks out the 
contradictions which the former has been incurring in the course of time.
Critical theorists make room for a normative choice. They proceed by growing reflective 
upon the process of theorizing, and adequately exploring the ideology that informs a given 
theory. A historico-critical approach to theory intends to gain "a perspective on 
perspectives" (ibid: 88), so that an alternative worldview (conceptually and'materially') may 
supersede the dominant one. Or as Mark Poster (1996 [1989]: 3) puts it, "critical theory 
springs from an assumption that we live amid a world of pain, that much can be done to 
alleviate that pain, and that theory has a crucial role to play in that process". Marx may have 
been one of the leading exponents of the need to supply a prospective vision. It is no 
overstatement to claim that the whole of the Marxian philosophical corpus is directed 
towards the formulation of a 'revolutionary praxis/ This notion of philosophy as 
transformation was duly typified in Marx's oft-quoted Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach: "the 
philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it" 
(Marx 1976 [1845]: 5).
Marxian scholars conceive philosophy relevant to illuminate the quandaries of the present, 
and in inexorable need of actualization in a near future. Not surprisingly, for Marxian 
thinkers, a philosophical doctrine only reaches the status of maturity once it fulfils Hegel's 
famous dictum: "philosophy is its own time apprehended in thought" (Avineri 1969: 134; 
Metha 1971: x). Yet no sooner has philosophy reached this climactic point than it "ceases to 
be a theoretical reflection and turns into practical energy acting upon reality" (Avineri 1969: 
135). The Marxian vision sets the end of philosophy in its self-consummation [sich 
aufheben). Philosophy fulfils its remit when the theoretical contents spill over the material 
reality and metamorphose it. The historical Marxist Immanuel Wallerstein (2001: 270) has 
turned the thoughtful reflection upon the scope for change inherent in each conjuncture 
into the science of "utopistics":
Utopistics is the science of utopian utopias, that is, the attempt to clarify the real historical
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alternatives that are before us when a historical system enters into its crisis phase, and to assess at 
that moment of fluctuations the pluses and minuses of alternative strategies.
It should be noted that in the Engelsian tradition and the attendant line of orthodox 
Marxism that Engels inaugurated, the space for exploration of socio-politico-economic 
change vanishes. Transformation is largely assumed to occur teleologically, as a logical 
conclusion of the contradictions incurred in the past (Holloway 2002: ch. 7).
Ill
Aufklarung: Philosophical Activity As Immanent Critique -  Here we turn our attention to 
the figure of Michel Foucault and the extended practice of (Foucaudian) discourse analysis.19 
In Foucault we find a puzzling decalage between his essayistic positions on the remit of 
critique, and his exercises in history -e ither as archaeologies or genealogies. His intellectual 
musings allude to a future rebellious of and freed from "the limits imposed on us" (Foucault 
1997: 319). His historical narratives, on the other hand, are always staged in the past. Let us 
first examine his conception of the future, which corresponds to that of immanent critique.
In the wake of Kant's characterization of Aufklarung (Kant 1784), Western philosophy 
undergoes a turning point. "The history of the nineteenth century -and of course, the 
history of the twentieth century even more— seemed, if not obligated to decide in favour of 
Kant, at least to give substance to this new critical attitude, to this critical attitude hovering 
in the background of Aufklarung which Kant had foreseen as a possibility" (Foucault 1996: 
388). Released from the Kantian transcendental categories and the other-worldly nature of 
reason (Yovel 1989b: 7), the philosophical act undergoes for the post-Kantian critics of 
reason a resolute immanent turn. Philosophical activity turns into critical practice, "the 
critical work that thought brings to bear on itself" (Foucault 1986: 8-9). This philosophical act 
as Aufklarung is far from foundationalist. Nor is it positivist in its emancipatory practice. 
"There is something ludicrous in philosophical discourse when [...] it works up a case against 
[others] in the language of naive positivity. But it is entitled to explore what might be 
changed, in its own thought, through the practice of a knowledge that is foreign to it" (ibid: 
9). Rather, philosophical activity becomes a courageous experiment in relation to the
19 While Foucault will prove of scant use in this respect, his scholarship will inform the present work in other respects. Cf. Chapter 5 Section 
2 below.
-41-
standing of thought in the philosopher's time. "The 'essay' —which should be understood as 
the assay or test by which, in the game of truth, one undergoes changes, and not as the 
simplistic appropriation of others for the purpose of communication -is the living substance 
of philosophy" (ibid).
Foucault (1997: 384) characterizes critique as recurrent disobedience of prevalent 
manifestations of authority, "as a way of suspecting them, of challenging them, of limiting 
them [...], of transforming them, of seeking to escape these arts of governing, or, in any 
case, to displace them". In keeping, the French thinker (Foucault 1986: 9) defines 
philosophical activity as one that escorts us in the process of change: "What is philosophy 
today [...] in what does it consist, if not in the endeavour to know how and to what extent it 
might be possible to think differently, instead of legitimating what is already known?" In a 
marked Marxist vein, Foucault goes on to link critique as transgressing theoria to critique as 
transgressing praxis. Aufklarung, the ethos in which the post-Kantian critique of reason 
comes into being, has as its remit "transform[ing] the critique conducted in the form of 
necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible crossing over 
{franchissement]” (Foucault 1997: 315).
Immanent philosophical activity is largely the kind of critique operated during the Modern 
Age, which runs parallel with "a specific attitude in the West from [...] what was historically 
the great process of the governmentalization of society" (Foucault 1996: 386-7). Foucault 
regards this strand of critical practice as characteristically external to the body of knowledge 
it is policing. "[CJritique only exists in relation with something other than itself: it is an 
instrument, a means for a future or a truth it will not know and that it will not be" (ibid: 
383). Philosophy qua critique remains a utopian project, a 'nowhere land.' This facet of the 
critical project is directly bound up with the traits of knowledge in the Modern Age. As it was 
announced in Chapter 1, in his archaeology of the human sciences, Les mots et les choses, 
Foucault announces that in the late eighteenth century, knowledge falls into an 
anthropological slumber.20 Knowledge in the Modern Age revolves around a Man that 
creates an eschatology out of his own anthropocentric experience. The "subject-centred 
reason [i]s the principle of modernity" (Habermas 1987c: 101). This marked
20 Cf. Chapter 1, Section 2 Subsection I under the heading 'The Analytic Of Finitude, Man andThe Environment' above.
-42-
anthropocentrism subsumes the surrounding elements to a second-rate status. In Chapter 1, 
we saw how one of the facets that this anthropocentrism takes on is sustainable 
development, where environmental resources and ecocentric concerns such as 
desertification, biological loss and climate change are relevant to the extent that they 
redraw humanity's finite condition on the Planet. The space of knowledge in the Modern 
Age circles around what is anthropomorphic and positively constituted by the defining traits 
of Man, including his body, chrematistic -o r  exchange-value-oriented— activities and 
communicative abilities (Foucault 1980 [1970]: ch. 8). While critical practice incisively attacks 
these claims to truth, it fails to prominently raise itself above the threshold of the positively, 
anthropomorphically constituted. Immanent critique tacitly agrees to play the role that the 
official quarters have assigned to it. "All this makes [critique] a function that is subordinated 
in relation to that which is positively constituted" (Foucault 1996: 383) by the official 
Modern Age (cf. Latour 1993: 35-37).
Immanent critique equally fails to overcome modernity in its logocentric tendencies. 
Emancipation from the processes of "intellectualist rationalization, created by science and 
by scientifically-oriented technology" (Weber 1964a [1948]: 139) is attained with the 
spotless deployment of reason, now fully autonomous. Foucault (1996: 387) elaborates at 
length:
In relation to Aufklarung [namely, in relation to immanent critique], critique for Kant will be 
that which says to knowledge: Do you really know how far you can know? Reason as much as 
you like, but do you really know how far you can reason without danger? Critique will say, in 
sum, that our freedom rides less on what we undertake with more or less courage than in the 
[logocentric] idea we ourselves have of our knowledge and its limits and that, consequently, 
instead of allowing another to say 'obey/ it is at this moment, when one will have made for 
oneself a sound idea of one's own knowledge, that one will be able to discover the principle of 
autonomy, and one will no longer hear the 'obey'; or rather the 'obey' will be founded on 
autonomy itself.
In this passage we see how the autonomy of the practitioner of critique is one largely 
founded upon conceptual, mental, intellectual means. It is true that within the post-Kantian 
critique of reason there are proposals for the subversion of instrumental reason that 
profusely transcend the mental plane. Later in his career, Foucault himself sets forth an
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aesthetics of existence as an antidote to the implacable empire of reason (Foucault 1986; 
1988 [1986]; 1990 [1984]; Darier 1999a: 25-27). Here Foucault patiently harnesses the 
Dionysian vein that transversally imbues Nietzsche's writings (Nietzsche 1967c: Book 4, II; 
Habermas 1987c). This attempt at an apparent departure notwithstanding, as Curry (2004c: 
107-8) aptly highlights, one has to question whether Dionysus, "the driven god of frenzy, of 
madness, and of ceaseless transformations" (Habermas 1987c: 91) may really operate as the 
effective dissolvent of reason or turns out to be its mere inflammable accomplice. On a 
similar note, Foucault's earlier work on the examination of the institutionalisation of 
psychiatry, Madness and Civilization, had registered "the loss involved in the relegation of 
the wildly charismatic or inspirational area of our experience to the desperate region of 
pseudo-medical categorization" as madness (Cooper 2001: ix). In his leading work in the 
realm of anti-psychiatry, Foucault (2001 [1967]) seems to overtly intimate that manic 
experience may conform to a valid pathway out of the modern mode of being. Yet, except 
for a reduced number of Nietzsche scholars, the other of reason -which is not necessarily 
synonymous with the irrational— remains an underexplored avenue among post-Kantian 
practitioners. Rather, immanent critique aims, by and large, to overcome governmentalized 
forms of instrumental reason by way of operating reason in its full autonomy. No wonder 
that one of the Aufklarer's main functions remains the conduction of "an inquiry into the 
historical point at which reason could appear in its 'adult' form, 'unchaperoned'" (Foucault, 
1998 [1983]: 439). On this count too critique is failing to rise beyond the contours delineated 
by the Modern Age.
IV
Foucaudian Genealogies - Foucault's theoretical position with reference to the mandate of 
critique is nonetheless slightly discordant with the implications of his historical method. 
Foucault's archaeologies and genealogies stop short of transforming the historical narrative 
on prospective ground. The French philosopher's exaltation of the "undefined" and 
"experimental" dimensions of "freedom" (Foucault 1997: 316) renders him to interpret the 
'goal in the future' reclaimed by Nietzsche in a highly specific direction. Foucault rejects 
outright the possibility of himself sketching the course of change largely to evade the 
advancement of universal structures of human existence. "There is always something 
ludicrous in philosophical discourse when it tries, from the outside, to dictate to others {faire
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la loix aux autres), where their truth is and how to find it". (Foucault 1986: 9; also quoted in 
O'Leary 2002:156). Instead, Foucault adopts a highly situated approach "responsive to what 
is intolerable in [each] situation so as to frame both a general problem and to embody a 
style of action which allows us to see, through a text of limits, that there are meaningful 
differences in the kind of society we can have" (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1991 [1986]: 112-3).
Foucault's histories start in the past and cease in the present. There is probably a valuable 
insight to gain from Allan Megill's evaluation of the Prophets o f Extremity as forming a "four- 
stage dialectic" (Toews 1987: 894). In this process, "Nietzsche is seen as positing a 
perspective that is adopted in more unequivocal fashion by Heidegger, critically adopted by 
Foucault, and finally deconstructed by Derrida" (ibid).21 It seems therefore that in this 
sublating (Aufhebung) of the tradition, Heidegger takes responsibility for the act of "to//ere, 
removing and eliminating the mere, initial illusions" (Heidegger 1988: 28); Foucault 
undertakes the process of "conservare, preserving and including in the experience" (ibid) 
Nietzsche's various perspectives; and only Derrida carries out Nietzsche's vision by 
consolidating an “elevare, a lifting up to a higher level of knowing itself and its own" (ibid). In 
spite of the fact that Foucault is attributed to pertain to Nietzsche's tradition, the French 
thinker stops short of conceiving the 'future' —the place/time or, in a broader sense, 
direction where transgressions take place— as perhaps the most fascinating chapter of 
history, in the very sense that Heidegger presents it in his The Introduction to Metaphysics 
(2000: § 33-34): "history is not equivalent to what is past, for this is precisely what is no 
longer happening [...] History as happening is determined from the future, takes over what 
has been, and acts and endures its way through the present'. Nietzsche's (1967c: Book III) 
urgent call for the 'transvaluation of all values' captures Heidegger's futuristic focus, where 
history is written backwards in accordance to the values pitch in the future from a present 
anchoring.
Whilst not being directed towards the future in a literal sense, Foucault's transgressions take 
another form and direction. In enacting Nietzsche's genealogical strategy, the French 
philosopher construes, as it were, 'transgressed histories.' Nietzsche's genealogy effectively 
frustrates the pretentions for security that semiology promises to the signifier by granting
21 This four-stage dialectic is transformed into a five-stage one below. Cf. Chapter 10, Section 1, Subsection IV below.
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the latter an enduring signified. Genealogy z,result[s] in a transformation of the signified 
itself, giving it over to interpretation in the position of the signifier" (Schrift 1990: 85). In this 
light, it can be said that Foucault is crossing over, dislocating, decentering the past by 
according to it a signified more distinctive than the one he would have been restricted to, 
had he laboured in the context of traditional historiography. Foucault's is a conceptual 
crossing-over ['franchissement']. The exercise of this linguistico-philosophical transgression 
is no less explicit in Nietzsche and Derrida, as we will see at the beginning of Chapter 10 
below. What must be retained at this stage is the fact that Foucault's 'goal in the fu ture / as 
the French thinker adjudicates to critique, can only take spontaneous or concerted forms out 
of growing aware of and energetically rejecting the unpalatable arrangements of the past 
that become apparent in Foucault's historical work.
3. Transposing Over, Across And Beyond Deconstruction
I
Transvaluation-Destrivkt/on-Deconstruction- In this section, we are to review the 
philosophies that explicitly dared tread the fertile ground 'beyond good and evil.' Their 
strategy consisted indeed in 'destroying' —with qualifications— this space of dualisms but of 
no plurality. Let us review this legacy. The urge "to stand in opposition to th[is dualistic] 
mendaciousness of millennia" (Nietzsche 1989b [1967]: XIII, § 1) is first publicly voiced by 
Nietzsche. In consonance, the German thinker proposes, as it has already been disclosed 
above, a theoretical strategy which he consistently terms 'transvaluation of all values' 
[Umwerthung aller Werthe] (ibid; Schrift 1990:141-143; Allen 1993: 45-51; Plotnitsky 1993a: 
153; Deleuze 2001 [1965]), a comprehensive procedure which turned into the fulcrum of the 
philosophies of the future. Nietzsche's own philosophical teachings were designed to 
systematically overturn the values endemic to philosophy and science as epistêmë which 
hitherto had subjugated the "joyous affirmation of the play of the world and of the 
innocence of becoming" (Derrida 1978f: 292). By undertaking a recomposition of values, the 
German philosopher was strategically circumventing the search for an univocal truth. "[I]n 
the end Nietzsche is entirely right when he calls the 'highest concepts' such as Being [and
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Truth] 'the final wisp of evaporating reality'" (Heidegger 2000: § 27)22.
The phenomenologist philosopher Martin Heidegger, for his part, endeavoured to construe a 
philosophy grounded upon "Being-in-the-World" (Heidegger 1962: Part II, Division I, § II). 
With an akin objective to Nietzsche's, Heidegger proceeded by way of 'Destruktion' (from 
the German for 'destruction'). He aimed at a two-fold task: building down an antiquated 
edifice in order to edify a new one afresh (Heidegger 1962: Int. II, 6; Metha 1971: 44-47). 
Destruktion deals with the "taking to pieces [of] the whole fabric of Western metaphysics" 
(Metha 1971: 44) which is, indeed, another name for the history of Western philosophy, 
from Socrates up to (and, according to Heidegger, including) Nietzsche.
Cognizant of the double bind of Destruktion, and not free from Emmanuel Levinas's sphere 
of influence, the French poststructuralist Jacques Derrida experimentally presented a 
recasting of his masters' theoretical strategies. Richard Rorty (12/11/2004) interestingly has 
formulated the crescendo Nietzsche-Heidegger-Derrida in the following words. Nietzsche 
told the story "about the unfortunate effects of Plato's obsession with fixity and certainty 
and [...] of Western philosophers as 'ascetic priests' [...] Heidegger folded that story into his 
own larger account of the Western intellectual tradition, and Derrida folded Heidegger's into 
his still larger and more imaginative one." It was in this context that deconstruction as "a 
double gesture, a double science, a double writing" (Derrida 1984 [1971]: 329; cf. also 
Plotnitsky 1994: Part III) came into being.
Derrida postulates that by adopting the sheer opposite extremes of the elements that make 
up the history of Western metaphysics, such as allegiance to the notion of absence over that 
of presence, one runs the risk of locking themselves within (thus not without) the closure of 
metaphysics, of philosophy and science as epistêmë}3 Performing an absolute reversal 
therefore is like remaining statically immobile. Far from consolidating any decenterings at 
all, totalizing changes of terrain remain but abortive attempts -th ey  lead to
“ Though Heidegger uses this statement as a strategy to name Nietzsche the last of the metaphysicians: "the final victim of a long-standing 
errancy and neglect, but as this victim the unrecognised witness to a new necessity" (ibid: § 28).
“ Heidegger must be all the same credited for anticipating this point when he discusses Nietzsche's inversion of Platonism in Nietzsche: the 
Will to Power as Art (Schrift, 1995: 16 n. 24). In an analogous vein, Heidegger (2000 [1978]: 433) writes in "The End Of Philsophy and the 
Task of Thinking" that "Nietzsche characterizes his philosophy as reversed Platonism. With the reversal of metaphysics that was already 
accomplished by Karl Marx, the uttermost possibility of philosophy is attained. It has entered into its end".
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unproblematized reversals.24 "[T]he passage beyond philosophy does not consist in turning 
the page of philosophy (which usually amounts to philosophizing badly), but in continuing to 
read philosophers in a certain way" (Derrida 1978f: 288). Deconstruction is a critique that, 
through sophisticated analysis, takes issue with the conditions of possibility of the Western 
metaphysical apparatus. It "reads backwards from what seems natural, obvious, self- 
evident" (Johnson 2004: xv) and re-establishes the historical coordinates from which the 
apparatus had detached itself, thereby immortalizing its statements.
Deconstruction doesn't limit itself to a neutralization of the metaphysical system; it is also its 
decided decentring. "Deconstruction cannot limit itself or proceed immediately to a 
neutralization: it must [...] practice an overturning of the classical opposition and a general 
displacement of the system" (Derrida 1984 [1982]: 329; emphasis in the original). To this 
end, Derrida ingeniously creates a new cognitive category that he appositely designates as 
'undecidability/ To be in a state of undecidability literally means to fail to locate grounds to 
decide either for 'presence' or 'absence,' that is, for any of the two ends -as synonymous 
with both 'purpose' and 'extreme'— of the metaphysical cleavage. In face of the conceptual 
hesitation that undecidability entails, one is bound to repose at the interface of the two 
extremes and thereupon open up a new spatiality. Philosophy and science as epistêmë 
knows no "intermediary between everything or nothing. The intermediary is the mid-point 
and the mediation, the middle term between total absence and the absolute plenitude of 
presence. It is clear that mediacy is the name of all that" (Derrida 1997: 157), which 
philosophers and scientists under the spell of epistêmê "want[...] opinionatedly to efface" 
(ibid). Mediacy is precisely the function strategically created with undecidability. This 
nascent orientation is meant as a relieving outlet to the agonizing position of indecision to 
which one was locked in the earlier regime. Indeed, "the task of deconstruction is to bring 
[the] contradictions and paradoxes [incurred by Western metaphysics] to light, to undo, 
rather than to reverse, these hierarchies" (Baynes et al. 1987:119).
Il
Toward A Post-Ecocidal 'Deconstruction' -  In Kant the conditions of possibility of knowledge 
coincide with the self-same factors that are identified with the limitation of human
24 Cf. Chapter 1, Section 2, Subsection 1 under the heading '5 / An Unproblematized Reversal of Productivity In The Context Of Industrial 
Capitalism'.
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knowledge -space, time and the framework of the categories. These are cognitive conditions 
that emanate out of an intellectual concern internal to the history of Western philosophy. 
Deconstruction, for its part, claims to invariably intrude upon myriad terrains of knowledge. 
It is a form of critique that challenges "what one would be wrong to assign to [philosophy] as 
its external housing, its extrinsic conditions of practice: the historical forms of its pedagogy, 
the social, economic or political structures of this pedagogical institution" (Derrida 1987:19). 
However, for all its vocal claims to be dealing with all facets of 'Being-in-the-World/ 
deconstruction, like Kantianism, remains an endeavour largely internal to philosophy 
(Mignolo 2007). When Derrida (1981: 64) claims "I am not even sure that there can be a 
'concept' of an absolute exterior," he ostentatiously reminds the reader of the internally 
fluent dialogue he incessantly holds with the history of philosophy and science as epistêmê. 
By way of contrast, once the development of a philosophical corpus is motivated by a 
political position anchored in the times where one lives, the interior dialectic with the 
established course of Western philosophy is abruptly truncated. The nascent philosophical 
body features, away from the characteristic ontological, and for that matter immortal, 
claims to truth, a marked contextualization in its times that grounds and limits its 
philosophical claims to the age they belong. Politics cut off philosophy's umbilical cord from 
the latter's own historical trajectory; it provides to the art of philosophizing the possibility of 
rethinking itself from scratch. A politicized philosophical body is of a conspicuous Marxian 
ascendancy in the uncommon direction in which Marx's endeavour has gone down the 
annals of history. Not as a political economy of the material conditions of life, but as a 
theoretical departure invariably informed by praxis and the quandaries assailing one's 
contemporaneity. It is this time-rooted defence, not the agenda of undated and thus 
outdated philosophies, that is to exhaust the imagination of the philosopher of the future.
In order to adjust a philosophy of the future to the requirements of a post-ecocidal age 
which we are at a time to envision, we need to effect a transvaluation, a Destruktion, or, 
even better, a deconstruction of philosophy as epistêmê and the positively constituted 
sciences. Among the latter looms the towering authority of key sciences for our purposes 
here such as ecology, biology and thermodynamics. We may have to reinscribe the 
epistemological claims of these scientific bodies in the bodies of knowledge whose erection 
has been with the purpose of de-linking [desprenderse) from the Western colonizing and
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totalizing project (Mignolo 2007). Like in the case of the author of the present dissertation 
who ignites her philosophizing to defend a desirable position in the world -h e r willingness to 
conduct laboral, healing and recreational activities in her autochthonous places— and 
introduces bodies of knowledge that imbibe non-academic sources. These sources derive 
from concrete, embodied and heartfelt positions in the world.
To be sure, these outlooks are not intellectualized decisions "to change terrain in a 
discontinuous and irruptive fashion, by brutally placing oneself outside, and by affirming an 
absolute break and difference" (Derrida 1984 [1972]: 135). These are rather approaches that 
encounter themselves outside of the modern and related Western metaphysical expanses to 
start with. Whilst they may have been heavily hampered by the latter's far-reaching projects, 
these non-modern positions remain unassimilated and un-co-opted by them. That is why 
despite often falling within the geography of the overarching modern and Western 
metaphysical sphere of control, these embodied and embedded standpoints appear as 
"exteriorities" (Mignolo 2007: passim) to the modern and Western metaphysical projects. 
Such consistent enclaves mark the initial hallmarks towards orienting the task of going over, 
across and beyond —of transposing, that is— the totalizing epistemological project. They are 
geared at the moulding of not postmodern theory which remains "a project of scholarly 
transformation within the academy" (ibid: Mignolo 2007: 449) but of a "transmodernity" 
(ibid: passim), a going over, across and beyond modernity. Prima facie, our "exterior fields" 
(Plotnitsky 1994: 225) with transmodernizing potential, are those which have been erected 
with a view to transmodernizing in the first place; that follow from a political motivation 
rather than an intrinsically academic one. We may find manifest expressions of this political 
urge scattered in the realms of the post-Kantian critique of reason, social theory, human 
ecology, ethno-ecology, ecological anthropology, political economy and ecology, consumer 
culture, world history and contemporary theoretical physics. These ambits of cognition 
conform to, in a number of respects, our "'others' of philosophy" (ibid: 229). Their 
transmodernizing potential notwithstanding, the '-logy' < logos to which some of these 
cognitive ambits still remain subject may irremediably condemn their claims to knowledge 
within the closure of philosophy and science as epistêmë (ibid: 229), "thereby inhabiting 
more naively and more strictly than ever the inside one declares one has deserted" (Derrida 
1984 [1972]: 135). We must be brave and reinscribe the latter in the texture woven by the
truly "exterior fields" (Plotnitsky 1994: 225), which "can be used to deconstruct philosophy, 
or each other" (ibid: 225).
In our deconstruction "physics is no longer the model and source of metaphors for the other 
sciences. [Pjhysics has now lost its role as the science providing the most fundamental 
description of reality" (Capra 1988: 146; cf. also 1996: 39). We may in any case firmly state 
that at issue are "the limits...of the classical notion of science, whose projects, concepts and 
norms are fundamentally and systematically tied to metaphysics" (Derrida quoted in 
Plotnitsky 1994: 225).
Ill
From Undecidability And The Logic Of Supplementsrity Into Transpositions And The Logic 
Of Transitivity - What is at issue in the present study therefore is the set of 'undecidables' 
which is to enact the philosophical transgressions for the construction of a post-ecocidal 
philosophy of the future. Undecidables are structures introduced in order to account for 
various configurations of Derrida's theoretical matrix and, often correlatively, to enact 
deconstructions of classical fields (Plotnitsky 1994: 44). The designation 'undecidables' is 
"strategic and adventurous" (Derrida 1984 [1982]: 7). By conveying ambiguity, undecidables 
are geared to underscore the fact that these are marks "that in one way or another resist 
the formal structure imposed by the binary logic of philosophical opposition while exposing 
the optional character of those choices that the tradition has privileged as dominant" 
(Schrift 1995: 17). To be sure, to combat Hegel's concept of philosophy as the progressive 
"history of consciousness and knowledge" (Plotnitsky 1994: 226), Derrida aims to bring 
"indeterminacy into philosophy" (ibid). Derrida's detailed analysis of the category 
pharmakon in Socrates's dialogue with Phaedrus exhibits how this polysémie vocable has 
been conveniently translated on some occasions as 'remedy' and on others as 'poison', 
"consistently decid[ing] what in Plato remains undecidable, and thus influencing] the course 
of the entire history of 'Platonism'" (Johnson 2004: XXVI).
Undecidability opens up the median space, thereby exhibiting and transcending, at a time, 
the contingent nature of that which propositional knowledge or epistëmë re-presents as 
universal. While the logic of Western metaphysics is characterized by binarism ('either
remedy or poison'), the logic proper to undecidability is that of supplementarity ['both 
remedy and poison') (cf. Derrida 1997: 179, 215). However subversive of epistemological 
tendencies, the supplementary outlook responds nonetheless to a decentering urge that 
remains internal to philosophy. The philosophy of the future we are after, by contrastais 
answerable to a critique utterly external to philosophy. It needs to convey a logic that 
approves of those philosophical and scientific practices and dispositions that induce the 
circulation and propagation of non-ecocidal tendencies, while banning or qualifying as 
intransitive the ecocidal ones. Our times command the theoretical articulation of the logic of 
transitivity and intransitivity, of the continuum in-transitivity, that is to say, in relation to the 
non-ecocidal and ecocidal, respectively. The virtues of the philosopher of the future are 
"first the critique of all established values" (Deleuze 2001 [1965]: 68) or, in our case, the 
categorizing as intransitive of that which is disrespectful of the oikos ('household') and its 
surroundings, "and then the creation of new values" (ibid) or, in our case, the 
characterization as transitive of those practices and arrangements that exhibit a respectful 
communion with the constellation of elements surrounding the oikos. "Hammer and 
transmutation" (ibid) is Nietzsche's pithy recipe for the philosopher of the future. Namely, it 
is not enough to enact a logic that assesses practices as transitive or intransitive according to 
their relation with the household and its surroundings; what emerges as intransitive exacts 
due 'transmutation.'
It seems to me that the transvaluation, Destruktion, deconstruction required to address our 
ecocidal times that is to wholly capture the logic of in-transitivity expounded in the previous 
paragraph, could take the form of an 'analytics of transposition.' Unlike the static 
connotations of a 'theory,' an 'analytics' conveys critical assessment. The vocable 
'transposition,' for its part, is a term that is liable to properly set forth the logic of in­
transitivity qua an act of characterization, evaluation and transmutation alike.
We shall call a 'position' that practice which qualifies as 'intransitive,' in that it breaks down 
the transitivities, the cycles, of the oikos. Following the meaning of the suffix 'trans-' in 
'transposition' as 'across', 'over', we shall, by contrast, call a 'transposition' that practice 
which qualifies as transitive, in that it facilitates the transitivities, cycles, of the oikos. In so 
far as the suffix 'trans-' of 'transposition' additionally signifies 'beyond/ 'transposition' not
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only conforms to the banner for transitivity but also to that of transmutation; to that of 
correcting and converting 'positions' -intransitivities— into 'transpositions/ transitivities. In 
this respect, transpositions emerge as corrosive strongholds scattered over the 
epistemological monolithic structure. They pitch post-ecocidal hallmarks while putting in 
place labyrinthine structures unrecognizable by the objective standards of philosophy and 
science as epistêmë.
IV
Transpositions Form A M ultidirectional^ Transitive Constellation - In view that 
transpositions are never fixed structures or positions, the analytics operates as an ensemble 
of concomitant transpositions that recurrently transit and refer to one another. They 
depend upon and require one another to complete their meanings, suggesting that 
transpositions remain incomplete but "as complete as a theory can be under these 
conditions of irreducible incompleteness" (Plotnitsky 1994: 8).25 For "[tjhere is no complete 
system; no way to determine in advance the conditions of possibility of which the present 
system is one possible instantiation" (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983: 55-6). In sum, as part of 
"the heterogeneity of (or within) the closure of metaphysics" (ibid: 229), the analytics under 
construction refigures 'undecidable' into 'transposition'.
"One [transposition] is always an index of a multiplicity" (Deleuze 2001 [1995]: 30). 
Transposition turns into the designation for both the overall exercise in the present thesis -  
namely, the development of an analytics of transposition; and each of the elements of which 
this exercise is made up, namely, (the) transposition
[a] by virtue of which the Nietzschean philosophy of the future is converted into an analytics of 
transposition. Such analytics opens up the possibility for the conditions of in-transitivity for a kind of 
knowledge that is to grapple with the ecocidal mode of being. (This exercise has been undertaken in 
Chapter 2)
[b] as the passage into another key or terrain; as the going beyond a foundational binary opposition -  
namely, culture/nature— into the all-encompassing cultural matrix. This nascent structure no longer 
shelters unidimensional positions such as 'beauty/ 'democracy/ 'the good life / 'justice' and 
'freedom’-th e  ones which always need a polar opposition to gain its identity. Rather, the cultural 
matrix is traversed by an ensemble of dynamically, multidimensional transpositions. (Chapter 3)
25 We return to this point in Chapter 10, Section 3, Subsections IV andV below.
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[c] as the immanent transfiguration of an inveterate binary pair, namely, idealism/materialism, which 
comes to characterize the cultural matrix. (Chapter 4)
[d] as a historicizing device of universal modern positions and a stabilizer of wobbling, radically 
contextualized, post-modern ones; transposition as situated structuralism or cultus. (Chapter 5)
[e] as correlation -as opposed to dualism— and dynamism, thereby engendering six novel 
transpositions: low- middle- and high-culture and dis-embodiment, dis-embeddedness and de- 
contextualization. (Chapter 6)
[f] as two irreducible cultural components of global history, viz. (low- middle- and high-cultural) loci 
standi and (low- middle- and high-cultural) instrumenta movendi, and their interpenetrations via the 
différance-effect. (Chapter 7)
[g] as regimes of engaged-constrained immanence enacted by manufacturers of culture and 
fossilizations. (Chapter 8)
[h] as intrinsic value in culti of Tellus and its bastardization, viz. exchange value operative in the cultus 
of Leviathan. (Chapter 9)
[i] as a philosophical and scientific disposition; transposition as Kultur. (Chapter 10)
[j] as hyperbolic immanence in the form of an Age of Re-Embodiments. (Chapter 11)
[j] as a reflective and aesthetic item in the tradition of the post-Kantian critique of reason. (Chapter 
12)
The remaining chapters in this dissertation steadily deploy the transpositions that refigure 
manifestations of science as epistêmë in green politics -including the promise for 
sustainable development. At the end of this exercise the reader will have witnessed the 
progressive construction -o r  rather, transposition— of the analytics of transposition.
a a a a
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Chapter 3
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Transposition As Reconfigurative  
Operator: 
From The C u ltu ra l/N atura l 
Hyposition into The C ultural M a trix
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" 'Overcoming' naturalism [. . . ] is more than a matter of 
criticizing a particular methodological approach. It involves 
deconstructing the anthropology-cum-moral-and-spiritual-values
that carry them." 
—Charles Taylor26
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Synopsis -  Chapter 3 paves the way towards the proposing of culture as a pivotal 
transposition. This chapter starts off by renaming what is perhaps the foremost 
characteristic trait of the epistemological trajectory, viz. the binary pair, a hyposition. A 
hyposition is made up of the initial hierarchizing position -e.g . productivity— and its 
complementing hypo-position -sustainable development. The chapter subsequently deals 
with the various hypositions that emanate out of the Cartesian dispensation. The 
subjective/objective approach to knowledge as enacted by realist and constructivist 
quarters, respectively, is found to engender the mode of being and no-being —realists issue 
ontological predicates on nature and constructivists deny those, while instead underscoring 
the fact that a political outlook irreducibly colours scientific statements. Both schools of 
thought are portrayed to repudiate the establishment of the rapports that philosopher of 
science Isabelle Stengers fiercely claims to be part-and-parcel of the scientific method. It is in 
this respect that realism and constructivism are put on a level.
26Rephrased in Baynes et al (1987:461).
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Through the lens of the world historian Arnold J. Toynbee's own rendering of environment, 
and the scientific outlook of quantum physics, the banner 'environment' is re-read as 
conforming to an ensemble of relations, a reading which is in step with Stengers's apt 
assumption of the fact that the scientific method is based upon engagements. What is more, 
the establishment of relations is set forth as a key transposition of the Cartesian cogito. The 
fact that the scientific method is regarded as being erected on the basis of relations is 
further key for chapters 8 to 10. It means that the nature of truth, value, philosophical and 
scientific practice no longer depends upon an immaculate description of the thing-in-itself- 
as in realism— nor upon the a priori political loads of a scientific assertion -as in 
constructivism. Rather, philosophical and scientific truth gains its relevance vis-à-vis a 
constellation of relations that may be established directly, or mediated by way of a pool of 
artifacts -as will be initially unravelled in Chapter 7.
Last but not least, culture is presented as a false or asymmetric antinomy of nature -thus  
not conforming to a hyposition with the latter. Culture is set forth as the apt repository of 
the transpositions that are to be subsequently developed in the course of the present 
dissertation and that make up the analytics of transposition -o u r specific version of 
philosophy of the future. Set on a par with the role played by Gaia in Gaia Theory and that of 
the double science of writing in Derrida's work, culture is presented as a matrix -th e  
transpositional operator por exce//ence.
1. Subject Over Object And Philosophia Vs. Scientia
l
From Binary Pair Into Hyposition - One of the first transpositons that the analytics of 
transpostion calls for is that of the binary pair. As exposed above, the binary pair is a salient 
trait of the epistemological disposition. Multiple instances of binary pairs that pervade 
Western metaphysics have been thoroughly studied by Jacques Derrida (Baynes et al. 1987: 
chapter 4; Johnson 2004). Binary pairs privilege the first element of the duet to the 
detriment of the second one. In the binary pair productivity/sustainable development, it is 
productivity that sets the tone and determines the whole significance of the latter as
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brought to the light of the reader in Chapter 1 above.27 With a view towards developing a 
coherent pool of transpositions, the first term of the opposition shall be called, as also 
tangentially announced in the previous chapter, a 'position'. Relationally, the second term  
will be called a 'hypo-position'. Positions fail to allow for the transitivity of elements. Hypo- 
positions are their immediate victims. Together, in the wake of the analytics herein 
developed, they no longer form a binary pair but a 'hyposition'. A hyposition, that is, is the 
conflation of a dichotomous pole (intelligible) with its corresponding downgraded opposite 
(sensible) proper to the epistemological disposition. The two constituents of the hyposition 
need one another for their own respective definition, constitution and standing. To be sure, 
productivity, to stick to the relevant example advanced in Chapter 1, generates, for its own 
survival, the official project of sustainable development. In a reciprocal manner, the entire 
project of sustainable development, as set out in Our Common Future, is utterly dependant 
upon the notion of productivity or, what comes down to the same thing, industrial 
production, for both its detailed characterization and actual realization.
This chapter takes issue with the subjective/objective hyposition in all its dimensions. 
Namely, as philosphia vs. scientia was correspondingly enacted by constructivists and 
realists, as humanity pitted against the environment, and as culture contra nature. This 
chapter, in short, thoroughly problematizes what Teresa Brennan aptly names the 
foundational fantasy, viz., the androcentric Cartesian cogito. "The foundational fantasy is the 
means whereby the human being comes to conceive itself as the source of all intelligence 
and all agency. It conceives of the other (other people, the world around it) as objects that 
are there to serve it" (Brennan 2000:178).
II
Taking Issue W ith The Subjective/Objective Hyposition- The cultural theorist Mark Poster 
(1996 [1989]: 6) states that critical theory "refer(s) to a certain style of questioning the 
foundations of the disciplines in the humanities. Theory in this sense is decidedly inter or 
transdisciplinary." In the previous chapter it has already been noted that post-Kantian 
philosophy mingles with (a selected number of) disciplines in order to effect deconstructions
27 Cf. Chapter 1, Section 2, Subsection 1 under the heading '5 /  An Unproblematized Reversal Of Productivity In The Context Of Industrial 
Capitalism'.
-57-
on both fronts -philosophical and disciplinary alike. Post-Kantian critique has evolved out of 
deploying diagnostic thought on contemporary issues. Similarly, the human ecologist Alf 
Hornborg (2001: 130) posits that the questioning of the foundations of the disciplines "is 
ever more pressing in an age of collapsing distinctions." Hornborg emphasizes the need to 
acquire "more holistic perspectives" (ibid). The reason is univocal: "the social and ecological 
failures [...] of modern scientific thought [...] pose a challenge to that mode of thought" (ibid; 
emphasis in the original).
Modern scientific thought is characterized by the clear-cut divide that resolves the 
Geisteswissenschaften —human, social sciences— from the Naturwissenschaften -natural 
sciences, presenting to scholars one of the greatest challenges today. In the words of the 
sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein (2001: ix):
the world of knowledge has been facing a basic epistemological challenge, that of overcoming the 
artificial divide of the "two cultures," and of creating a new, reunified epistemology of 
scientia/philosophia. In the decade to come this will turn out to be, I believe, the central 
intellectual issue of the world of knowledge and will lead not merely to new intellectual 
constructions, but inevitably to new structures of knowledge and a radical revision of the cultures 
that inform the life of the academy.
This marked chasm, which we are bound to transpose in the construction of a post-ecocidal 
analytics of transposition, follows from the hierarchizing opposition subject/object, a divide 
of unabashed anthropocentric dimensions. As noted in Chapter 1, Nietzsche scholars inform 
that this binary opposition prefigured in classical Greece, was forcefully institutionalized 
with the Cartesian cogito, and epitomized in Kant's transcendental idealism. "Kant 
introduced the idea that man is the unique being who is totally involved in nature (his body), 
society (historical, economic, and political relations), and language (his mother tongue), and 
who at the same time finds a foundation for all of these involvements in his meaning-giving, 
organizing activity" (Dreyfus andRabinow 1983: xix).28
Ill
Philosophia Vs. Scientia In Relation To Cartesian Nature - For the purpose of transposing
28 Cf. Chapter 1, Section 2, Subsection I under the heading '1 / The Analytic Of Finitude, Man andThe Environment' above.
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the subjective/objective hyposition, it is relevant to review how quarters of philosophia and 
scientia proceed with their own interpretations of nature. Those representing scientia, the 
positive sciences, are the realists (Curry 2003: 350; Gare 1996 [1995]: 2), more graphically 
termed 'nature-endorsing' by Kate Soper (2001 [1995]: 4; Darier 1999a: 3). Realists, in 
"directing us to the 'nature' that we are destroying, wasting and polluting" (Soper 2001 
[1995] 3-4), portray the natural world as foundational for any theory of being and 
knowledge. For these quarters, nature is endowed with "an irreducible positivist reality 
outside human interpretations" (Darier 1999b: 3). Incurring a major paradox, this group 
presents the natural world as an object easily accessible to the enlightened anthropocentric 
subject, who, "withdraw[n] even from his own body, [...] he is able to look on as an object" 
(Taylor 1987: 472). This process further forms the basis for one of the antinomical 
constituents of the Modern Age: "even though we construct Nature, Nature is as we did not 
construct it" (Latour 1993: 32), in line with "the philosophy of physics that such metaphysics 
has produced" (Plotnitsky 1994: 10). Crudely put, realists seem to rejoice in culminating the 
Cartesian cogito. They are the practitioners of science as epistëmë in the present day. 
Realists conform to the quarters who argue that a given worldview "follows from some basic 
law of nature" (Capra 1988: 145). Horkheimer categorized this empirical acceptance of the 
laws of nature, that science has only to outline 'traditional theory' to distinguish it from 
'critical theory' (Horkheimer 1972; Mignolo 2007: 485).
Some of the circles holding the rubric of 'philosophia' 
conform to the constructivist school (Curry 2003: 349; Gare 1996 [1995]: 2-3), which Soper 
(2001 [1995]: 4; Darier 1999b: 3) descriptively calls nature-sceptics. Constructivist associates 
antéposé cultural experience in the formation of meaning and attribution of value to nature. 
This school of thought centres "on the ideological functions of the appeal to 'nature' and on 
the ways in which relations to the non-human world are always historically mediated, and 
indeed 'constructed', through specific conceptions of human identity and difference" (Soper 
2001 [1995]: 4). Constructivists also examine how these political mediations exert 
inescapable power effects.
Many ecological philosophers and other left campaigners exhibit a cross-breed between the 
two broad categories broached above. Patrick Curry (2003: 351) pertinently names this
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hybrid strand of ecologism 'scientific humanism:' it "combine[s] the ideology of scientific 
naturalism with the 'left' cultural politics of constructionism" (ibid). To pick up one example, 
Brian Baxter's (1999: 8) environmental political philosophy presents itself as "science- 
oriented and naturalistic". It puts to use "the findings of natural science for the light these 
throw on the moral standing of the non-human." Baxter's (ibid) is "the attempt to 
understand and explain human values as produced by natural, biological, processes." 
Similarly, the practice to have recourse to realist data provided by the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is well extended among ecologists who stand for ecological 
and climate justice. The latter appeal to IPCC-predictions on the threatening risings of sea 
levels and global warming defends the sovereignty of bioregions over their territories and 
vernacular traditions (cf. OilWatch 2008). One may see scientific humanism as a variant of 
naturalism. Naturalism has been highly influential amongst English-speaking philosophers. In 
this current, "philosophy analyzes only those concepts that figure in successful empirical 
theories and tries to develop philosophical answers that win support from, or are entailed 
by, scientific evidence" (Leiter 2006b: 3).
Foucault (1997 [1984]: 295), for his part, recounts a long-standing interaction between 
realists and 'scientific humanists' within the ecological movement:
there has been a whole so-called ecological movement -a  very ancient one, by the way, that did not 
just start in the twentieth century- that was often in opposition, as it were, to a science or, at least, 
to a technology underwritten by claims of truth. But this same ecology articulated its own discourse 
of truth: criticism was authorized in the name of a knowledge [connaissance] of nature, the balance 
of life processes, and so on.
On this account, the green movement is one pervaded with at least two main antipodal 
political agendas -albeit each seeking shelter in the secure place of epistemology. "Thus, 
one escape[s] from a domination of truth not by playing a game that [is] totally different 
from the game of truth but by playing the same game differently" (ibid).
If we are to take serious the admonitions advanced above by Mark Poster, Alf Hornborg and 
Immanuel Wallerstein on the ill-condition of scientific practice as long as it remains 
transversally parted by the subject/object divide, we should resolutely make the following
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prediction. The standard-bearers of justice shall only secure a sound position on which to 
stand once the onto-epistemology that dissects the res extenso is uprooted instead of being 
further relied upon. Or in Latour's (1993: 136) own phrasing, "[s]o long as humanism is 
constructed through contrast with the object that has been abandoned to epistemology, 
neither the human nor the nonhuman can be understood."
In this light, the challenge of green politics seems to lie in imaginatively engraving a 
distinctive, post-ecocidal pack of cards -priorities, perspectives, transpositions- by which the 
unfailing devotees of green peace are in a position to shuffle and hand out playing cards to 
the custodians of the Modern Age and, for that matter, the official sustainable development, 
and set the tone for the negotiations. Not the other way round. Some consider that this 
comprehensive and provocative recasting of the game of truth reaches down to the ontic 
level - i t  should re-encode the understanding of reality altogether (cf. Panikkar 2009: 111; 
Curry 2010c). Yet the hammer with which Nietzsche endows the philosopher of the future 
must be prepared to smash to bits even this scenario. Still bespeaking a marked 
metaphysical bend, attending to ontic needs may appear overly cautious and conservative 
should we endeavour to philosophically capture the import of regaining our native or 
subsequently-adopted places of residence. Namely, adherence to the notion of reality may 
be a perpetuating part of the problem. We may have to do away with, fully transpose both a 
traditional concept of the ontic or reality and its justification or ontology.
2. Humanity Contra The Environment
I
Varieties Of Environmentalism - In his political ecological writings, Joan Martinez-Alier 
contends that the manifold varieties of environmentalism which the world hosts today can 
be reduced to three main currents-viz. 'the gospel of eco-efficiency', 'the cult of wilderness' 
and 'environmentalism of the poor and minorities.' On one extreme, one can find the 
economic and utilitarian environmentalism. This current is content with an eco-efficiently 
run nature, gently harnessed with cutting-edge clean technology but "without a notion of 
the sacred" (Martinez-Alier 2002: 5). Congruent with the belief of its practitioners, in this
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current the environment equates with "natural resources or even natural capital or 
environmental services" (ibid). This is the terminology one can spot (though not exclusively) 
in the academic and bureaucratic pages of /sustainable development" and 'eco- 
modernization" alike (cf. Sachs 1996).
Ecological modernization is presented as a set of successful environmental policies enacted 
in corporatist systems where government officials sit along with business executives, union 
leaders and environmentalists. Such settings explain the success of a 'reflexive modernity' -  
to convey it in Ulrich Beck's parlance— in countries such as Finland, Germany, Japan, The 
Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, in opposition to its failure in their English-speaking 
counterparts -Britain, the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, where adversarial 
policy-making patterns are the norm (Dryzek 2005: Ch 8). Governments and industry in the 
former group of countries "tend to perceive sustainable development as a chance to market 
environmental technologies, focusing otherwise on the correction of market failures through 
top-down regulatory environmental polices" (Lenschow 2002: 6). This is the type of 
environmentalism professed by those who see nonhuman nature as a (sometimes 
alchemical) gold mine in service of human needs and their desires. On such grounds, 
Martinez-Alier (2002: 5-10) baptises this streak of environmentalism 'the gospel of eco- 
efficiency' .
Exhibiting more romantic inclinations flows a constellation of scholars and activists moved 
by "the love of beautiful landscapes and from deeply held values, not from material 
interests" (ibid: 2). This group of radical but conservative ecologists (Salleh 2010) exhibits a 
tendency to contemplate "the natural world as having its own ontological status" (Mellor 
2000: 115). This explains the reason why, in this strand of ecologism, the nexus between 
nonhuman nature and human nature is predominantly established hierarchically, where the 
dominant position tips on nature's side, "implying a dualist distinction between 'humanity' 
and 'nature' where nature is 'right' and hu(man)ity is 'wrong'" (ibid). Perhaps owing to the 
sweeping role that deep ecologists play in colouring this section, Martinez-Alier (2002: 1-5) 
calls the group at hand 'the cult of wilderness'.
Positioned on the defensive, with not much room left to consider their political hue, runs a
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worldwide movement of resistance against the increasing impacts upon the means of 
livelihood. In urban neighbourhoods this third current has materialised in the form of 
'environmental justice'. Starting as a self-aware movement as of the 1980s, Martinez-Alier 
informs us that this strand of environmentalism can be attributed to a green-variant of the 
well-anchored antiracist tradition in the USA. Similarly, "it has strong links with the civil 
rights movements of the 1960's" (ibid: 11). In rural areas, predominantly located in the so- 
called Third World, it has taken the form of 'livelihood ecology.' A heterogeneous 
conglomerate is more often than not free of environmental self-consciousness, livelihood 
ecology is stood for by peasants, artisanal fishermen and many women nurturing their 
families whose subsistence depends wholly on the access to the commons (cf. Shiva 2002 
[1989]). On the grounds that it is disadvantaged groups which push forward both the urban 
and rural versions of such environmentalism of survival, Martinez-Alier (ibid: 13) argues that 
a rubric reading "environmentalism of the poor and minorities" would do justice to these 
peoples's quest. Other terminology is employed in academic research: 'popular 
environmentalism', 'liberation ecology', 'environmental agrarianism', and 'ecological 
narodnism' or 'eco-narodnism' (Martinez-Alier 2002: 10 andlB). I further suggest the 
following to be considered as alternative names: 'embedded environmetalism', 'immanent 
environmentalism', 'cultural environmentalism', 'environmentalism by default' (or 'by 
virtue'). Moreover, should we take on board Dobson's (2000) distinction between 
environmentalism vs. ecologism, where it reads 'environmentalism' should reversibly read 
'ecologism'. Ecologism "pressuposes radical changes in our relationship with the non-human 
natural world, and in our mode of social and political life" (Dobson 2001 [2000]: 2). 
Environmentalism, by contrast, "argues for a managerial approach to environmental 
problems, secure in the belief that they can be solved without fundamental changes in 
present values or patterns of production and consumption" (ibid: 2).
In Martinez-Alier's very wording, "the main thrust of this current is not a sacred reverence 
for Nature, but a material interest in the environment as a source and a requirement for 
livelihood; not so much a concern with the rights of other species and of future generations 
of humans as a concern for today's poor humans" (ibid: 11). The ethics of this group is 
derived from its call for contemporary social justice among humans.
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Questioning The Cultural/Natural Hyposition -  Thus abridged, here you have the three 
conceptions of 'environment/ On the one hand, the gospel of eco-efficiency trumpets an 
environment in service of (a well domesticated) capitalism. The cultists of wilderness, for 
their part, conceive of the environment as a vessel shipping sacred values. Their out-and-out 
defence of 'wilderness' "in order to preserve the remnants of pristine natural spaces outside 
the market" (Martinez-Alier 2002: 2) renders this strand of ecologism to trace a neat dividing 
line between the human and the non-human. This salient tenet is foremost apparent in the 
pronounced dislike exhibited on the part of this group for "agriculture, whether traditional 
or modern, because agriculture has historically grown at the expense of wildlife" (ibid: 3), 
and the corresponding fervour marshalled for a politics in favour of keeping 'national parks' 
exempt from human interference. Finally, the poor and disadvantaged minorities, i.e. "the 
majority of humankind" (Martinez-Alier 2002: 13, emphasis in the original), regards the 
environment primly as a tangible provider of means for sustenance, though not necessarily 
free from a sense of the sacred.29
Albeit for diametrically opposed reasons, the first two strands of environmentalism abide by 
the notion of environment as defined in the first and second entries of Collins Cobuild 
English Dictionary of Language. Namely, "someone's environment is all the circumstances, 
people, things and events around them that influence their life." Or "the environment 
[understood] as the natural world of land, sea, air, plants and animals, that exists around 
towns and cities" (ibid). The environment is conceived as all that is external to the human 
species, externalities which, given the Cartesian legacy, include our own body. The 
environment for those who trumpet either 'the gospel of ecoefficiency' or 'the cult of 
wilderness,' starts where we human beings -conceived mainly as an instrumentally- 
enlightened mind— come to an end. The 'environmentalism of the poor and minorities,' on 
the other hand, exhibits a much more embedded and thus intimate nexus humanity- 
environment. At any rate, the fact that the 'environment' remains, in particular in the first 
two varieties of environmentalism, an extraneous entity to the human world is problematic 
to say the least: are the human body and our thoughts 'unnatural1 by any means? Are 
'nature' and so-called 'natural entities' such as the flora, the fauna and the mineral kingdom,
29 In effect, vernacular communities inexorably approach 'nature' reverently (cf. Goldsmith 1998: ch. 63; Toledo 1999). Cf. Chapter 7, 
Section 1 below.
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deprived of cultural activity such as the exercise of politics and the exposition of (ideological) 
positions all their own? These are questions to be settled as we give shape to an analytics of 
transposition for a post-ecocidal age.
Ill
Environment As A Correlation Of Knowledges - Let us now see what elements from other 
disciplines -beyond the confines of green thought— might be used as artillery to effect a 
transposition of the human/environmental hyposition. The concept of 'environment' put 
forth by Arnold J. Toynbee seems promising in this respect. Toynbee (1889-1975) was not 
specifically versed in environmental philosophy. Rather, he was a historian philosopher -  
with some visionary insights into the future, I must concede (cf. Toynbee 1992a [1966])- 
who challenged the parochial state-related analysis of history. Toynbee committed himself 
to a comprehensive study of human affairs by way of a comparative examination of 
civilizations. The English historian also wrote an outstanding global environmental history 
(ibid: 1976), a prescient and much-neglected source of modern ecological thinking, it must 
be regrettably noted.
In his opus magnum, A Study of History (Toynbee 1977 [1972]: 96), Toynbee propounds a 
definition of 'environment' which appears pregnant with new possibilities:
'Environment' is a relative term. It implies the existence, the presence, and the action of some 
other party. This other party is some living creature; and the environment of every living 
creature is the sum total of the rest of the Universe. For instance, a human being's environment 
consists of the whole of non-human Nature, both inanimate and animate, together with all his 
fellow human beings, (including the dead as well as the living).
In spite of the fact that the phrasing in this paragraph reproduces the human/environmental 
hyposition, Toynbee's characterization of environment is informative for us predominantly 
in two directions. First, it denotes a plane imbued with relations. Second, it points towards 
the 'humanization' or 'culturization' of the concept of 'nature'. Indeed, Toynbee clarifies that 
the environment conforms to no absolute term. Rather, it is 'relative' to, 'relational' with 
respect to a plethora of additional elements. The all-encompassing dimensions of Toynbee's 
environment edify its confines around the existence of other entities. Toynbee seems to 
dissociate the study of the environment from an exclusively positivist approach. The 
historian's environment is rather one which distances itself substantially from the realism 
proper to the nature-endorsing disciplines such as ecology, biology, and many variants of
ecological ethics.
When the British historian describes one's milieu as 'the sum total of the rest of the 
Universe/ the degree of resemblance of this characterization with the cosmology held in 
quantum mechanics is prominent. Let us swiftly recollect that the findings in quantum 
theory eroded (and thus largely replaced) the scientific edifice established with Newtonian 
mechanics. This rested upon two pillars. One was the ancient scientific outlook moulded by 
Aristotle; the other the partition established by Descartes of res extensa (or extended 
matter) in unquestioned servitude of res cogitons (or thinking matter) -th e  hypositional 
configuration we are precisely contesting in this chapter. Opposed to the Cartesian- 
Newtonian mechanical view, a novel concept of reality emerged at the first third of the 
twentieth century with Werner Heisenberg's formulation of the uncertainty principle, Albert 
Einstein's special and general theories of relativity, and Bertrand Russell's logic paradoxes in 
mathematics (cf. Hawking 31/12/1999). The new approach should not be interpreted as a 
"continuation of the past; it seem[ed] to be a real break in the structure of modern science" 
(Heisenberg 1999 [1958]: 29). In Kuhnian terms, quantum mechanics effected a scientific 
revolution while delivering an accompanying post-normal science (Kuhn 1996 [1962]). A key 
principle of quantum physics proclaims the impossibility of knowing "the microscopic 
structure of the whole world including ourselves" (Heisenberg 1999 [1958]: 90; cf. also Nash 
31/12/1999). Yet only the unveiling of "the interaction between the [atomic] nucleus [of a 
particle] and the rest of the world" (ibid) may disclose the conditions under which the 
particle at issue is emitted. Heisenberg's microscopic environment appears to be no less 
comprehensive than the macrocosmic one meticulously depicted by Toynbee. Most 
importantly, it underscores with the same impetus the import of relations.
The environment that Toynbee and quantum physics uphold provides a starting basis for the 
transposition -qua  transmutation— of this very category. Toynbee covertly suggests as 
"exterior fields" (Plotnitsky 1994: 225) the history of philosophy and science as epistêmê 
where the rubric 'environment' is inscribed, inter alia, psychology, history, anthropology, 
archaeology and theology; the crème of the humanities. Heisenberg's depiction of the 
quantum environment, for its part, seems to simply emphasize the unveiling of the 
'microscopic structure of the whole world' -an  unattainable quest. We thus see how
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Toynbee's and Heisenberg's environmental spatialities are pervaded with relations. The 
environment is 'the sum' of 'every living creature' partaking 'in the action of some other 
party.' Given the multidimensionality of these ongoing interactions, the correlation of 
various fields of knowledge may be argued as a favourable strategy. Similarly, our reading of 
Toynbee's and Heisenberg's environments as a correlation of events further displaces the 
conception of history in the epistemological tradition, where history is regarded as a series 
of events in progressivist continuity (cf. Foucault 1972: Introduction; Nisbet 1980). Instead, 
to have access to 'the sum total of the rest of the Universe' or to fathom 'the interaction 
between the [atomic] nucleus [of a particle] and the rest of the world', a complementarity of 
knowledges may supply a more satisfactory panorama of both the past and present than 
large amounts of historical facts set in linear continuity. This critique of an unilinear 
approach to history shows strong resonances with post-structuralist thinking (Foucault 1972, 
1998 [1967], 1998 [1972], 1998 [1985]: 472-473; Plotnitsky 1993a: ch. 4 , 1993b: ch 6)J|
In particular Toynbee's depiction of the rubric 'environment' seems to additionally point to 
the transposition -transvaluation—of the positively constituted sciences -biology, ecology- 
by way of the humanities. The emerging transpositions -namely, conditions of transitivity of 
knowledge for a post-ecocidal age— are in turn to be correlated. Tentatively it can be 
concluded that 'relations' conforms to a preliminary transposition of the Cartesian 
subject/object rift and its variant in the form of the human/environmental hyposition. This is 
equal to saying that the analytics of transposition, as the actual shape that takes our 
philosophy of the future, will consider as transitive -approve of— those philosophical and 
scientific bodies grounded upon the interaction of a plurality of factors. Viveiros de Castro 
rephrases the scope of this emergent transposition in the ensuing words: "[m]onism and 
pluralism: multiplicity, not duality, is the paired complement of [...] monism" (quoted in 
Curry 2003:348; emphasis added). Curry (ibid) subsequently remarks that other signifiers for 
'pluralism' and 'multiplicity' are 'perspectivism', 'relationism' and 'relativism.' 'Environment 
is a relative term', asserts Toynbee unwaveringly. Yet we shall next see how this relationism 
far from being regarded as terminus corresponds to a preliminary sine qua non for the 
transposition -transmutation— proper of the Cartesian cogito.
30 This topic is developed at length in Chapter 10, Section 3, Subsections IV andV below.
IV
From Relations Into Engagement - It is the vantage point that 'relations' provide that assists 
us in both realizing the continuity between realism and constructivism and our attempt at 
transposing such continuity. It was noted above in Section 2 that realists, direct heirs of the 
project of the Enlightenment, run into the methodological paradox of, on the one hand, 
attributing an independent status to nature and, on the other, having access to its laws by 
way of their 'enlightened' mind. Philosopher of science Isabelle Stengers further expounds 
upon the methodological oxymoron at hand. Realist "scientists claim they benefit from 
something they have not imposed, something that belongs to phenomena" (Stengers 2009: 
3), whilst at work is a scientific method that, on previous stages, has been decided upon a 
relational basis with its object of study. "The important fact about the unifying effects of art 
or experience in nature is that it enables our conscious selves to recognize the deeply 
interrelated engagement that we already have" (Charlton 2008: 144). To be sure, the 
acquisition of knowledge in the experimental sciences entails engagement, "the production 
of a new 'rapport1 with a phenomenal domain, which this rapport specifies" (Stengers 2009: 
3). By contrast, constructivist thinkers, for all their variety (Sismondo 1993), deny the 
existence of engagement at all. In holding that "representations routinely create their 
objects" (Sismondo 1993: 536), constructivist scholars claim that "scientists have no special 
access to reality, since they impose on what they study a socially transmitted frame" 
(Stengers 2009: 3). The neo-Kantian constructivism of Latour and Woogler as expounded in 
their noted laboratory ethnography, Laboratory Life, "without any commitment to a world of 
things-in-themselves" (Sismondo 1993:536) is a conspicuous case in point of the denial of 
the mode of engagement. The common sense for the palpable is replicated in Terry 
Eagleton's (2000: 87) precise observation that "we still die, however we make sense of it. 
Death is the limit of discourse, not a product of it."
The uncompromising reclaim of relations is also much of the thrust of Marx's (1976 [1845]) 
reproach of contemplative materialism in his celebrated 'Theses on Feuerbach'. To be sure, 
Marx's rebuke of liberal civil society resides in having mistaken "the essence of man" (Thesis 
number 6) for "an abstract -/so/otec/— human individual" (idem; emphasis in the original).
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Marx rather impetuously sustains that it is in "the ensemble of social relations" (idem) 
where one is to find the kernel of "the new [...] human society, or associated humanity" 
(Thesis number 10; emphasis in the original). It is also in these societal interactions that one 
is to pinpoint “social product[s]" (Thesis number 7; emphasis in the original) thereby setting 
the tone for much of contemporary constructivism.
Realists, it seems, abide by a mode of being, the being-in-itself they derive from their objects 
of study; they make universal claims to what they portray as a static truth that manifests 
itself in the object under scrutiny by mere observation aided by the right tools -theirs is 
indeed an ontological quest eager to settle for good things as they are. Constructivists, for 
their part, practice the complementing game thereby giving birth to a binary pair or 
hyposition. They enliven what may be called the mode of no-being; they relegate to the 
realm of inexistence the constructed object whilst fully concentrating on the construction. In 
the final analysis, realism versus constructivism is a struggle for an object versus a subject 
both trapped within Cartesian-Kantian ground. Stengers insistently emphasizes that it is as 
though both realists and constructivists were blind to the larger reality framing natural 
scientific work, which is mainly characterized by relations. "[Tjhere is no knowledge without 
production of relation, or rapport" (Stengers 2009: 9). By the same token, and heavily 
building upon the conclusions reached in the previous section, we may claim that it is 
relations at large and, more specifically, the mode of engagement captured in the conditions 
of transitivity of knowledge by way, in our study, of the transposition a key element in 
decentering Cartesianism; the mode of engagement undercuts the subject/object divide. 
Whilst Western "[njihilism considers becoming as something that must atone and must be 
reabsorbed into Being, and the multiple as something unjust that must be judged and 
reabsorbed into the One" (Deleuze 2001 [1965]: 84), the mode of engagement brings low 
socially-constructed human subjectivity but stops short of reifying the natural world. The 
transition from the mode of being to the mode of engagement is furthermore largely 
concomitant with what Nobel Prize-winning physicist Robert Laughlin, in A Different 
Universe, calls the move from the Age of Reduction to the Age of Emergence (Wheeler 2006: 
passim). Reduction studies the thing-in-itself, emergence emphasizes the genetic dimensions 
of the engagement.
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Similarly, Fritjof Capra (1988: 148) informs us that in the emerging outlook across the 
disciplines "the metaphor of knowledge as a building is being replaced by that of a network. 
Since we perceive reality as a network of relationships, our descriptions, too, form an 
interconnected network of concepts and models in which there are no foundations." Bruno 
Latour's (2005) own development of actor-network theory further attests to the 
comprehensive realms of this incipient but steady tendency. In light of the network 
metaphor, neither humanity nor nature ought to be assumed as either foundational or 
subservient to each other.
The transposition of subject/object, philosophia/scientia into relations destabilizes in turn 
the related hierarchizing opposition universalism/relativism. Such a hyposition arises out of 
the reduction of the mode of engagement into a mode of being/non-being. "The 
metaphysical priority of unity above plurality and the contextualistic priority of plurality 
above unity are secret accomplices" (Habermas 1992 [1996]: 400). Engagement, instead, 
speaks of the singularity in each established rapport, thereby undercutting both universalist 
and relativist claims:
I would claim that experimental sciences are not quantitative because they believe only in 
measurement. They create measurements and each such creation is an event [...] there is no 
relativist judgment involved here any longer because what matters is the singularity of what is 
kept, the fact that it lends itself to the measurement (Stengers 2009:9).
In this light, one should accord constancy and universality to the mode of engagement. Or to 
reverse the statement, multiple variables are "not subjective [...] but contingent' (Curry 
2003: § 4). It is this mode which yields an infinite number of singular events — not the other 
way round. Contingency and relativity, on the other hand, categorize the manner how the 
practices that enact this mode of engagement cluster to form scientific communities and 
scientifically-meaningful units of knowledge. Contingency and relativity are furthermore 
attributes that define additional aspects of such experiments such as the total number and 
specification of the variables relevant in each case.
In any case, in asserting that relations conform to the basis of the social fabric and scientific 
practice alike we must rename the ecocidal mode of being. Instead, we must speak of the 
ecocidal mode of engagement.
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3. The Acknowledgement Of Culture
I
Culture As Transitivity And Transposition -  Above we have seen how the history of Western 
metaphysics arrives at the present day, epistemically, in the form of the scientia/philosphia 
antagonism; ontically, with a human subjectivity on a collision course with nature, which is 
assumed as inferior and subservient to the former. Toynbee's and quantum physics' 
outlooks along with the work of historian and philosopher of science Isabelle Stengers 
seemed to readily point to the direction of a satisfactory transposition. Environment is a 
category that entails relations; cognitively, the methodology that natural scientists adopt to 
capture the peculiarities of nature consists of establishing singular rapports with some 
aspects of the latter every time. As a result, we have witnessed how the initially rigid, 
monolithic environment proper to the Cartesian divide has steadily metamorphosed into a 
tolerant space traversed by multifarious alliances, whether those of the atomic particle in 
relation with the rest of the world or those of the natural scientist vis-à-vis the natural 
world. The remit of this sub-section is that of providing the receptacle to host the
transposition at hand. For, as Nietzsche (1967c: §552) proffers, "if we give up the effective
subject, we also give up the object upon which effects are produced".
Sticking to 'environment' is obviously one possibility. However, despite Toynbee's promising 
definition, the Cartesian connotations of this signifier, cognate as they are with those of "the 
static essentialized deformation of nature" (Salleh 2010: 184), are dispiriting if not 
unsurmountable. Environment is suggestive of an inert backdrop, "the objects or the region 
surrounding anything" (Oxford English Dictionary), for ready manipulation and continuous 
management -as in 'environmental management'. Not in vain, as announced above, the 
political scientist Andrew Dobson (2000) discriminates between ecologism and
environmentalism to preserve the spatiality of the former category for the needed
radicalism in green affairs that the latter, with its ecoefficient and geoengineering promises, 
explicitly repudiates.
The biosemiotitian Gregory Bateson and the radical psychoanalyst and philosopher Félix
Guattari employ 'ecology' in a markedly extended use. Bateson speaks of ecology of mind to 
denote that all life processes are imbued with mental activity (Charlton 2008). Guattari, for 
his part, insists on approaching ecology as a complex made up of three nodal points, namely, 
the environmental, the social and the mental (Peters 2002). Whilst both authors 
interestingly point to key aspects for the construction of a post-logocentric philosophy of the 
future, conspicuous deficiencies still pervade their philosophical corpus. Bateson 
pronounced that emphasis upon mind is heavily evocative of neo-Kantian subjective 
idealism. Guattari's -and Bateson's— assumption that ecology must operate as the 
backbone along which to provide structure to his philosophy, must be radically suspended. 
Etymology alerts us to the fact that eco-logy, the logos of or discourse on the oikos or 
household, remains fully enmeshed in epistemological ground. The horizon that ecology 
indefectively outlines, far from unconditionally buttressing, in Gianni Vattimo's terms 
(2002), the weakening of Being's objective structures, redundantly confines the cognitive 
expanse and our apprehension of reality at large to a set of statements that, instead of 
attending to cultural realities, traverse and subjugate their claims to truth. A post-ecocidal 
philosophy of the future exacts a conspicuous cognitive de-linking from both logos and 
Being, from the Western metaphysical imagination, that is.
David Abram, for his part, has encoded a signifying bloc that enjoys some currency in 
ecological circles, viz., the 'more-than-human world' (Charlton 2008: passim). By this ultra­
human space, Abram (quoted in Curry 2010c: 100) upholds that "[intelligence is no longer 
ours alone but is a property of the earth: we are in it, of it, immersed in its depths". Prima 
facie, Abram's coinage appears as a plausible vocable to host the set of relations capable of 
uprooting the Cartesian dispensation. Yet, on a second reading, we realize that the phrase at 
hand still drags noxious epistemological residues. First, we remain manacled to an undying 
constant in eco-philosophy; namely, the attempt at an irruptive fracture of the whole 
metaphysical apparatus while retaining its language. As Derrida (1984 [1972]: 135) incisively 
declares, "the simple practice of [the same] language ceaselessly reinstates the new terrain 
on the oldest ground". Second, Abram's phrase is irreducibly human-centred; it is implicitly 
divisive on the outdated axis that sets the human against the non-human; and it further 
denotes a pervasive passivity reminiscent of Newtonian nature.
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In the epistemological tradition culture/nature is, no doubt, treated as a hierachizing 
opposition -a  hyposition. Terry Eagelton (2000), for his part, alerts us to the fact that this 
apparent polarity conforms to a false or asymmetrical antinomy (Curry 2010c: 108-110), 
where culture far from complementing and completing nature -as in umproblematized 
reversals,31 opens up an utter distinctive route. In effect, Nietzsche (1967c: § 552) reminds 
us of the fact that "[tjhere are no opposites: only from those of logic do we derive the 
concept of opposites—and transfer it to things." Culture "is exterior, outside of the positivity 
to which it is super-added, alien to that which, in order to be replaced by it, must be other 
than it" (Derrida 1997: 145). Under this condition, the banner culture is exempt from 
Derrida's linguistic charge -namely, that the use of the same signifier stops one from 
changing metaphysical terrain, as expressed above. In not speaking Western metaphysics, 
this rubric appears equally deprived from replicating epistêmê. Culture, therefore, emerges 
as a plausible candidate to host post-Cartesian relations.
Etymologically the noun 'culture' derives from the Latin verb 'colërë/ 'to attend to,' 'to 
cultivate,' 'to respect,' 'to inhabit,' 'to worship'. One of the original meanings of culture is 
related to the Neolithic Revolution, to "the action or practice of cultivating the soil; tillage, 
husbandry; synonymous with 'cultivation'" (Oxford English Dictionary). Attesting to these 
processes of active intervention, Eagleton underscores the synthetic force achieved by the 
vocable at hand, suggesting that this complex oddly signified commingles the quintessence 
of both realism and constructivism. Culture "is an epistemologically 'realist' notion, since it 
implies that there is a nature or raw material beyond ourselves; but it also has a 
'constructivist' dimension, since this raw material must be worked up into humanly 
significant shape." (Eagleton 2000: 2). Eagleton's message seems to be that culture itself 
conforms to the very transposition of the cultural/natural hyposition. "[I]t is less a matter of 
deconstructing the opposition between culture and nature than of recognizing that the term  
'culture' is already such deconstruction" (ibid).
There are sound grounds to cede to Eagleton's invitation but not before a number of 
qualifications are introduced. First, etymologically, the human-centredness introduced by 
Eagleton is not borne out by the rubric 'culture.' It shall remain subject to our
31 Cf. Chapter, 1, Section 2, Subsection 1, under the heading 'An Unproblematized Reversal Of Productivity In The Context Of Industrial 
Capitralism'.
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Weltanschauung to define who/what is entitled to undertake attention, cultivation, respect 
and worship. The element that must be certainly distilled out of the constructivist dimension 
of culture -subverting thereby constructivism's own anthropocentrism— is activity or - 
'active intentionality' -th e  signifying bloc under which the ecofeminist Va I Plumwood 
compactly sketches agency (Curry 2010c: 99 et passim). Second, Eagleton's Cartesian 
phrasing of nature as 'raw material beyond ourselves' must be equally severely curtailed. An 
immovable, fixed and a historical physical reality vindicated on the postulate of causality (cf. 
Plotnitsky 1994: 7; cf. also Fourtounis 2005; Curry 2010c: 108; Charlton, 2008: 1; Deleuze, 
2001 [1965]: 79) is far from supported in colërë. The characterization of the morphology of 
what is to be attended to, cultivated, and respected is equally subject to our worldview. It 
can range from inert raw matter to an animated polymorphic cosmos.
On these two qualifications, we can assert that culture readily denotes transitivity; it 
captures the entire sequence of mobility as agency and its active intentionality covers the
undertaking of the activities of attending, cultivating, respecting and worshiping in its
fieldwork. It must be noted however that these cultural transitivities radically eradicate 
Cartesianism. They fall short of reproducing a human subjectivity freely acting upon an
objective nature. Rather, culture by itself includes all participatory elements in the act of
cultivating or respecting: the agentic entity, the domain of operation and the transitive 
processes, thereby removing the focus point from the subject. We should therefore regard 
culture more as activity in constant motion than as perfected action. Non-Cartesian culture 
is motile, dynamic. "[0]ne cannot do anything [...] without determining [...] a context. Such 
experience is always political because it implies, insofar as it involves determination, a 
certain type of non-'natural' relationship to others" (Derrida in Limited Inc quoted in Allen 
1993: 111). These very-same politically contextualized practices conform to culture. By the 
same token, we ought to correct the energy-related reductionism of Teresa Brennan's 
(2000: 41) relationism. Instead of asserting that "all beings, all entities in and of the natural 
world, all forces, whether naturally or artificially forged, are connected energetically", we 
shall qualify this connection culturally, which includes energy.
By purifying culture from epistemological residues, this banner seems to form an apt post- 
Cartesian condition of transitivity of knowledge to deal with the ecocidal mode of
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engagement -attending thereby to research questions (3) on the conditions of possibility of 
knowledge for a post-ecocdial age and, partially, to (4) on the exit thereof. Above we have 
dubbed these conditions 'transpositions'. They are endowed with the ability to go across, 
over and beyond distinct regions. "It is indeed culture or cultivation that must supplement a 
deficient nature [...] This kind of supplementarity determines in a certain way all the 
conceptual oppositions within which [the notion of Nature] is inscribe[d]" (Derrida 1997: 
145). Culture as a transposition "is always the supplement of the thing itself" (ibid). It 
reinscribes the solipsist positions that conform to each polar opposite of logocentric 
hypositions -productivity/sustainable development, humanity/environment. Reason, a long­
standing sequel of the times when "Socrates conceive[d] it to be his duty to correct 
existence [by turning] instinct [into] the critic, and consciousness [into] the creator" 
(Nietzsche 1967a: §. 13), is transposed with the emergence of culture. "Reason is incapable 
of thinking [...] that there is lack in Nature" (Derrida 1997:149); logos is structurally deprived 
of the ability to register the deficiencies of Newtonian nature.
"The supplement is here both humanity's good fortune and the origin of perversion" 
(Derrida 1997: 147). Cultural activity provides breathing-space for all sorts of practices. The 
acts of cultivation, attention and respect can lead to positive ends but also to negative ones; 
they signpost plurality in the outcome. The transitive processes of culture automatically 
deflect the universal laws that realism attributes to an undisturbed set of natural elements.
Under the culture/nature hyposition the metaphors and metonymies of presence occupy a 
position of absolutism (Plotnitsky 1994: 7-11). Our non-Cartesian culture refigures these 
positions as it exhibits them as only idealizations afforded by philosophy and science as 
epistëmë or "its uncritical obverse, positivism" (ibid). To these idealizations "one grants [...] 
the power of synthesizing traces, and of incessantly reassembling them. This privilege is the 
ether of [Western] metaphysics" (Derrida 1984a [1968]: 16). Culture uproots the stable 
ground of this indulgence. "Such is the scandal, such the catastrophe" (Derrida 1997: 148). 
Only by virtue of our non-Cartesian culture, idealizing and absolutist edges common to 
positivism gain the relational and perspectival dimensions proper to critique (Curry 2003; 
2007).
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Culture -Like Gaia- As Transpositional Operator -  Qua a transposition in the ecocidal mode 
of engagement, the role of culture is virtually exchangeable with that of the Earth in Gaia 
Theory. James Lovelock retells that he came to his -and Lynn Margulis's— Gaia Hypothesis 
by realizing that the "earth's atmosphere was an extraordinary and unstable mixture of 
[elements, which] yet are constant in composition over long periods of time" (Lovelock 
quoted in Midgley 2001:15). Gaia Hypothesis, at present only accepted by some quarters of 
the realist scientific community (Botkin and Keller 2005: 47, 49-51), consists of seeing all 
involved elements constantly creating culture. This appears to have been an idea already 
mooted by the pioneer ecocentric ethicist Aldo Leopold who "recognized the Earth itself as 
possessing 'a certain kind and degree of life' [...] and [who] inferred] from his grasp of 
ecology how [the Earth] is not only context but creator" (Curry 2006: 66). This genetic 
culture, constantly negotiated, is what maintains Gaia at a certain steady state, and permits 
myriad species -th e  self-same components of biodiversity- to thrive (Brown 2003: 35). In 
Gaia Theory, where "the global ecosystem is a self-correcting entity with something like 
intelligence" (Dryzek 2005: 17), all entities within the Earth are responsible for her 
homeostasis.
A steady state, on the other hand, speaks for the stable maintenance of a dynamic system 
by means of internal regulatory processes that tend to counteract any disturbance of the 
internal stability by external forces. Should we really wish to upgrade the transposition 
'culture' to the overarching unfolding of Gaia, we must inescapably endow it with 'internal 
regulatory processes.' Processes ready to fiercely counteract the shapes and figures 
delineated by the antiquated regime -viz. inscriptions of the history of philosophy and 
science as epistëmë such as the ecocidal mode of engagement and the rubric sustainable 
development in the meaning attributed in the Brundtland Report. These internal regulatory 
processes therefore correspond to the constellation of transpositions that in seeking to 
provide corporealityjq the transitivities of cul.tu r e . l ^ lw u i t â n ^ ÿ ^ ^
[part of the epistemological tradition. They will "form, by definition, an interminable 
network" (Plotnitsky 1994: 38).
Having drawn the formal analogy with Lovelock's and Margulis's Gaia Theory, it should 
follow as a logical conclusion that culture positions itself as a leading transposition with
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respect to the remaining ensemble. Culture is to the analytics of transposition what 
Derrida's (double) writing is to language. Derrida's "writing [is] a transformation of all 
language or what is classically designated as language -oral or written, theoretical or (so- 
called) ordinary" (ibid: 38). In a similar manner, culture effects an overall quiver in 
epistemological ground - i t  reaches out to both philosophy and the sciences, theoria and 
praxis.
The centrality of writing in Derrida's deconstructive activities renders Plotnitsky (1993a: 150) 
to characterize it as a matrix "of general economy," as opposed to one of restricted 
economy. In Plotnitsky (ibid: 76 et passim), who follows closely Georges Bataille, 'economy7 
reconfigures -transposes— 'science/ In this light, Derrida's 'writing' conforms to a general 
'scientific' configuration (cf. Derrida 1997: Part II, Section III); it is Derrida's ''reconfigurative 
operator" par excellence (Plotnitsky 1993a: 150; emphasis in the original). Similarly, culture 
is the general economic matrix of the analytics of transposition; its foremost 'transpositional 
operator.' This means that culture not only conforms to the historical transposition of 
culture/nature, but it also turns into the transpositional -transposing and transposed- cradle 
of an additional number of positions on which philosophy and science as epistêmê live. 
"Notwithstanding the use of the term 'habitat' by geography and ecology, man inhabits a 
culture, not a planet" (Canguilhem (1999 [1994]): 74). When circulated in its bosom, culture 
automatically metamorphoses old hypositions while, in turn, engendering new 
transpositions. No sooner culture opens up a post-Cartesian expanse, than a torrent of 
[multidirectional 'goals into the future' is enacted. To reverse the statement, a putative array 
of additional transpositions is only possible because we have recognized the transitive 
character of culture in the first place. "All that begins through the intermediary is what is 
indeed 'inconceivable [to reason]"' (Derrida 1997: 157). Culture as a transpositional 
operator mediates transitivities. "The supplement is what neither Nature nor Reason can 
tolerate" (ibid: Derrida 1997: 148). The cultural matrix that supplements Newtonian nature 
and, in so doing, takes its place, opens up the space of analysis, and irreducibly animates an 
ensemble of transpositions which in turn displace other apparent stabilities such as the 
official characterization of sustainable development. Culture should therefore be seen as a 
matrix, grid or structure of transitivities that hosts in its bosom the analytics of transposition 
-an  instantiation of philosophy of the future in ecocidal times. Henceforth we shall speak of
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the cultural matrix, structure or grid. Let us note the etymological root of matrix. It 
emanates from the homonymous Latin noun matrice, 'reproductive female', 'womb', which 
itself derives from the noun mater, 'mother'. The cultural matrix corresponds, that is, to the 
womb of Tellus, our Mother Earth.
Derrida's writing, along with the remaining network of undecidables, aims to liberate the 
sign from its metaphysical signified. Culture, for its part, seeks to free itself both from its 
Cartesian connotations and the remaining hypositions that sustain such Manichaean 
framing. Thus where Derrida (1978: 181) sets out that "the metaphysics of presence is 
shaken with the help of the concept of sign,” the analytics of transposition clarifies that 
philosophy and science as epistêmê is shaken with the help of culture, which in turn 
transposes the ubiquity of the sign. That is to say, culture further uploads language into its 
matrix. To be more precise, the modus operand! of the cultural matrix is enriched by 
borrowing some elements from Derrida's "entire constellation of concepts that share [the] 
system" of undecidability (Derrida 1997: 144) -in  particular it borrows the undecidable 
différance32 (Derrida 1984a [1968]; 1984b [1968]). However, to activate their operability, the 
borrowed elements at stake must be thoroughly circulated in the cultural matrix. This 
corrosive operation entails a number of substitutions in keeping with the further 
transposition of Derrida's writing via the cultural grid. Writing counts "only verbal language 
as a worthy object of communication [...] thus effectively cutting off human culture from 
nature" (Wheeler 2006: 26). In reconfiguring writing, we also regain this set of relations that 
the latter denies. We shall speak of a 'transposed Derrida' to refer to such operation.
The transfiguration of language into culture is decisive in the frame of this study. It is a 
categorical distinction with respect to the work of some key authors -Nietzsche, Foucault, 
Derrida, and Heidegger to a lesser extent— on which the theoretical transpositions build. 
The move towards culture away from text, discourse and language is conceived as an initial 
requirement to root out both metaphysical residues in green politics and the ecocidal mode 
of engagement. We return to this theme in Chapter 10.33
The cultural grid "is necessary and insufficient from the moment when the substitution of
32 Cf. Chapter 7, Section 3 below.
33 Cf. Chapter 10, Section 1 below.
[presence or Newtonian nature] is no longer envisaged only 'from the physiological point of 
view'" (Derrida 1997: 146). The participation in acts of cultivation, respect and attention 
add to its physical dimensions a wholesale meta-physics which grounds the possibility of 
knowledge in the ecocidal mode of engagement. The suggested is only a hesitant 'meta­
physics' -w ith  a hiatus pluralizing its unity. The meta-physics of culture is faithful to its literal 
significance of "dealing with things beyond nature or physis" (Plotnitsky 1994: 9). It is far 
from an onto-logical endeavour engaged in the correct description of reality, thereby 
presupposing the discovery of a philosophical truth nobler than the one advanced with 
epistêmê. The meta-physics of culture is entirely constituted by the multidirectional 
transpositions of the epistemological edifice once the ecocidal mode of engagement reveals 
the latter to be inefficacious and untenable. The transpositions at issue take on a truly 
contingent and political character.
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Transposition As innerworldedness: 
From the Id e a lis t/M a te ria lis t 
Hyposition into Embodiment
"Materialism must be a form of idealism, since it's wrong—too."
—Marshall Sahlins34 
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Synopsis- Chapter 4 deals with the transposition 'embodiment'. It claims that the general 
disembodied character of post-Kantian work has opened up an uncritical door to Marx's 
materialism. Post-Kantian authors have proceeded towards the equation of the plane of 
immanence with materialism, precisely in view of their general neglect of our embodied 
condition in the world. Yet the immanent traits that these authors seek to capture in their 
theoretical corpora, it is argued, can only truly be captured with the acknowledgement of 
the body as a nexus of relations. Against this backdrop, materialism is presented as an 
unproblematized reversal of idealism, which by way of Marx's variant of materialism, further 
advances industrial homofaber. By contrast, embodiment is set forth as the third figure or 
transposition of the idealist/materialist transposition. In line with a more popular vein of 
materialism, where a materialistic personality is said to accord priority to material goods 
over being values, the analytics of transposition reserves the vocables 'matter' and 
'materialism' to refer to a characteristic state of the ecocidal mode of engagement. M atter is 
all that which no longer circulates within ecocycles, whilst materialism refers to such 
condition.
The plane of immanence, for its part, is similarly set forth in asymmetric relation with 
transcendence. Or, to be more precise, the states often attributed to theist and secular
34 Sahlins 2002:6.
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transcendence are said to be only liable to realization via the immanent plane. This is a 
pivotal move for the further building of the cultural matrix. It concerns both chapters 7 and 
8, where the immanent turn, identified as indeed incomplete, is taken to its logical 
conclusions. In this emerging context, freedom, utterly deprived of transcendent evasions, is 
associated with immediate interconnection to various embodied forms called loci standi.
1. An Initial Characterization Of Materialism And Embodiment
I
The Idealist Vs. Materialist Hyposition In Philosophy As Epistëmë - In the first chapter the 
reader was introduced to binary logic as a defining trait of the history of philosophy and 
science as epistëmë. In Chapter 3 the binary pair as a structure proper to the epistemological 
disposition was redubbed the hyposition. Hitherto we have dwelled upon two main 
hypositional instances, viz. productivity/sustainable development and that which follows 
from the Cartesian dispensation, viz. subject/object. In this chapter we turn to the 
idealist/materialist dichotomy. It is a polarity of ontological dimensions. Ontology is the part 
of metaphysics which deals with the nature of reality - i t  is its discursive justification. An 
idealist ontology asserts that the physical world around us is not real. Rather, this physical 
complex mirrors an ideal realm where an unchanging and absolute truth lies. Idealism 
"traces everything back to one and thereby devalues innerwordly beings to phenomena or 
images" (Habermas 1996 [1992]: 404). A materialist ontology, by contrast, assumes that only 
the world of discrete matter is real. Thoughts, ideas and other non-physical things are 
merely movements of physical matter or chemical reactions. There is no reality beyond the 
physical (Horkheimern 1972: ch. 10).
The antagonism at issue is perennial to philosophy and science as epistëmë. For expediency, 
what the reader should retain is that the unfolding of the scientific revolution during the 
sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries entrenched the fracture in hand, marking the 
progressive birth of science as epistëmë. "Philosophy of science developed very slowly in the 
West. Science gradually distinguished itself from the religious or metaphysical view of truth 
and knowledge, but did not necessarily attack that view" (Du Pré, 1984c: 108). A catalyst 
figure of this scientific U-turn was Francis Bacon (1561-1626), "founder of the modern
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inductive method and the first in a long line of scientifically minded philosophers" (Russell, 
2000 [1961]: 52-7; cf. also Merchant 1980: ch 7 et passim; Allen 2004: 93-110). The 
subsequent work of René Descartes (1596-1650), Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) and Isaac 
Newton (1642-1727), to name three towering figures, was equally critical for the 
consolidation of the scientific method of materialist persuasion, which defied the cosmology 
consolidated by Aristotelian scholasticism. Newton's mechanical interpretation of the laws 
of nature, for their part, brought the materialist view to one of its foremost prosperous 
zeniths. "His triumph was so complete that Newton was in danger of becoming another 
Aristotle, and imposing an insuperable barrier to progress" (Russell 2000 [1946]: 521). In this 
context, spiritual thought appeared so entangled in the idealist envelope that "it failed to 
keep up, and played into the hands of materialism" (Welburn 2004: 28). Namely, idealism 
"substitutes] God or Ge/st for ousia [substance] in a subject-centred philosophy of nature" 
(Allen 1993: 85).
The word 'materialist' -from  which 'materialism' derives, is documented to have been 
introduced by Robert Boyle in Excellence and Grounds of the Mechanical Philosophy in 1674 
(Ferrater-Mora 1979: 2143; cf. also Latour 1993: 15-32), a work where Boyle manifestly 
echoed the mechanical materialism that was being brewed in his times. Yet one should also 
speak of a materialism avant la lettre, very lively amongst pre-Socratic thinkers (cf. 
Heisenberg 1999 [1958]: ch. 4), the existence of which is key to apprehend the battle with its 
vying counterpart 'idealism'.
The independence that the scientific method acquired from the ideal world virulently 
clashed with Platonism. From the idealist perspective, an object exists in the sensible world 
insofar as it mirrors itself from a meta-physical reality where ideas dwell. An object gains its 
identity to the extent that it "partakes of an idea" (Russell 2000 [1946]: 143). The 
philosophical leitmotiv of the pre-scientific worldview was the one fabricated by Plato. The 
philosopher of the classical Greek period developed "a very powerful synthesis [of chiefly 
the logic of Parmenides with the other-worldliness of both Pythagoras and the Orphies]. 
With various modifications, such a synthesis influenced most of the great philosophers, 
down to and including Hegel" (ibid: 135). Or as Heidegger (2000 [1993]: 433) puts it, 
"throughout the entire history of philosophy, Plato's thinking remains decisive in its sundry
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forms. [Western m]etaphysics, [in the present study more commonly referred to as 
philosophy and science as epistêmë or the epistemological disposition] is Platonism". The 
modern natural philosophers fuelled the iconoclastic re-emergence of the materialist school 
of philosophy which destabilized the Platonic idealist synthesis and entrenched the 
inveterate antagonism idealism vs. materialism. Sympathy for the former automatically 
entailed animosity for the latter, and vice-versa.
II
Materialism In Marxism And Popular Materialism — In close relation to the meaning of 
materialism as a hypo-position of idealism just outlined, we should characterize materialism 
as understood within both Marxism and what may be called popular materialism. When we 
enter the realm of Marxist materialism we must distinguish between Marxian materialism 
and Engelsian historical materialism. Let's first deal with the latter.
Hegel's influence over the post-Kantian tradition is manifest. In his teleological overtones, 
Hegel is a prominent figure in the Marxist scientific tradition first mooted by Engels. Engels 
played a pivotal role in transforming the Marxian vision into an objective scientific method. 
Marx had overall merely set forth "a materialist conception of history" (McLellan 1980: 135) 
Three Engelsian moves lubricated the intellectual engines of scientific socialism. This variant 
of socialism is the one which set the vision for the era of classical Marxism -th e  one adopted 
by the intellectual elite (Kautsky, Lenin, Luxembourg, Pannekoek). Engels's scientific 
socialism informed the disciplinary orthodoxy instituted by the communist parties during 
most part of the twentieth century. Scientific Marxism posits that history takes on a 
positivist, objective character, and is thus regarded to be governed by forces independent of 
people's will. In the image and likeness of the inexorable advancement of the Hegelian Geist, 
Engelsian orthodox Marxism associated transgression with an ongoing march towards 
communism. Let us however review in more precision how Engels encroached the scientific 
variant upon Marxism.
In an initial move, Engels launched three revised editions of Socialism: Utopian and Scientific 
(1877, 1882, 1891), in itself an excerpt of his Anti-Dühring. Lenin would point out that this 
booklet turned into "a handbook for every class-conscious worker" (quoted in Engels 1987
[1894]: xviii). Subsequently, Engels published his Dialectics o f Nature. With this work the 
author contributed dramatically to the rise of the 'scientist' interpretation of Marxism. 
Finally, Marx's closest comrade shouldered the responsibility for the posthumous edition 
and publication of Volume II (1884) and Volume III (1894) of Marx's Dos Kapital. Engels's 
intervention "conditioned the way in which successive generations of socialists viewed 
Marx's economics, both in his editions and Marx's writings and in what he left unpublished" 
(Holloway 2002: 133). All in all, Engels succeeded in presenting the endeavour of his 
comrade as being entrenched in an objective 'historical materialism', "a term never used by 
Marx, who would have felt even less happy with the later expression 'dialectic materialism'" 
(McLellan 1980:135).
Marx's materialist conception of history, to be sure, is in a more conspicuous manner 
continuous with the materialism first portrayed above. Much in line with realism,35 it departs 
from the assumption that objects enjoy an autonomous existence. The kernel of Marx's 
materialism resides, no doubt, in production. "The central idea of this materialist conception 
was that the key to change in society was to be found in the way men produce their life in 
common" (McLellan 1980:135). Concordantly, Marx classifies the stages of history according 
to their mode of production. Production creates objects and, as a derivation, objectification. 
"Labour becomes an historical process only when it leaves an impression on a world external 
to human self-consciousness" (Avineri 1969: 78-9). The historical dimension in Marx's 
materialism is closely bound up with the notion of alienation. The thrust of Marx's politics 
resides in rendering objectification dissonant with alienation. In the capitalist mode of 
production objectification is still continuous with alienation. There is a "rupture [in] the 
social flow of doing [...] Doing is turned against the doer" (Holloway 2002: 43, 44) as the 
done -th e  manufactured product—is usurped from the former's hands to gain exchange- 
value and circulating currency in the market. In Marx's vision of the future society, human 
creative activity is to cease to be estranged labour in a manner that objectification will be 
radically dissociated from alienation.
When it comes to popular materialism, the banner 'materialism' is associated with sundry 
objects that are mass produced and consumed. The condition 'materialistic' is a
35 Cf. Chapter 3, Section 1, Subsection III above.
psychological state that follows from the prominence that a subject accords to consumer 
goods. Such condition is attributed to "people who strongly value the pursuit of wealth and 
possessions" (Kasser 2001: 5). This group of people is said to hold have-values in 
contradistinction to being-values (Maslow 1993 [1971]: Part VI; Maslow 1999 [1968]; 
Fromm: 1978).
Ill
Embodiment - Embodiment is that condition and attendant theoretical perspective that 
follows from the bodies with which things in the world manifest themselves. The remit of 
the philosopher of the future isn't that of treating a body as a thing-in-itself -thereby leading 
to an essentialism of either idealist or materialist persuasion. Transposing the 
epistemological trajectory includes the decentering of the category substance. "If we give up 
the concept 'subject' and 'object/ then also the concept of 'substance' -and as a 
consequence also the various modifications of it, e.g., 'matter,' 'spirit,' and other 
hypothetical entities, 'the eternity and immutability of matter,' etc." (Nietzsche 1967c: § 
552). As a result, "we have got rid of materialitŸ' (ibid). The issue of the constitutive nature 
-ideal, material— of bodies is immaterial to the embodied perspective herein defended. As 
an element of the cultural matrix, a body is a nexus of relations endowed with a number of 
characteristic traits — rhythms, shape, colour, texture. The cultural body is amenable neither 
to ideal nor molecular reduction. Embodiment commands the respect for the rhythms, 
shapes, colours and textures characteristic of bodies. As opposed to materialism, 
embodiment doesn't conceive bodies as independent from one another but utterly 
interdependent. No embodied form enjoys the vantage position to dissect another 
embodied form for there is no external reality from where to operate. Embodied forms 
structure an interminable mesh. The philosopher of the future is requested to pay attention 
to the relations that traverse bodies. It is in these interactions where the local effects of the 
objectifying Western metaphysical project in all its assorted forms are inscribed.
Similarly, the centrality attributed to bodies covers both 'organic' entities and objects.36 In 
this respect, history must be seen as written at least on the basis of two modes -namely, 
that of production and reproduction, not exclusively by the former as aptly pointed out by
36 For a discussion of the re-inscription of organic organisms in the cultural matrix cf. Chapter 7, Section 1, Subsection I below.
-85-
Marxist ecofeminists (Mellor 1987; Salleh 1987).
The main difference between idealism and materialism is said to reside in the fact that the 
latter "always presupposes a material basis, 'a natural substratum' distinct from 
consciousness and from human effort" (Avineri 1969: 98). In line with our portrayal of 
realism above37, the continuity between materialism and realism is self-evident. The 
underlying premise of both worldviews is the existence of a basis or substratum, 
independent of surrounding factors that conveniently qualifies as material or natural. This 
means that these worldviews place the emphasis upon this trait of reality. Part of the intent 
of dissociating embodiment from materialism is that of delinking the former from realism 
and the implied Cartesianism. Bodies are no background basis on which to justify the 
undertaking of further activities -like their dissection into molecules or their metamorphosis 
into technological artifacts. Rather, bodies are ultimate entities that actively partake in 
processes. Furthermore, only by setting the body centre stage can we thereupon resolve the 
latter into a number of relevant subcategories. This categorization is part of the remit of the 
cultural matrix.38
2. The Road Toward An Immanent Spatiality
l
Initial Overview - With Foucault, in this section I will claim that seminal practitioners of the 
post-Kantian critique of reason strived to open up a new spatiality:
it seems to me that Marx, Nietzsche and Freud have not in some way multiplied the signs in the 
Western world. They have not given a new meaning to things that had no meaning. They have in 
reality changed the nature of the sign and modified the fashion in which the sign can in general be 
interpreted (Foucault 1998 [1967]: 272).
Foucault, quo heir and amplifier of the linguistic turn, brings language on a level with the 
plane of existence. The French thinker is indeed retelling that the figures who set the tone 
for modern hermeneutics (Marx, Nietzsche, Freud) are opening up a new plane. I shall argue
37 Cf. Chapter 3, Section I, Subsection II above.
38 Cf. Chapter 7 below.
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that these are tentative steps taken in the direction of the plane of immanence (cf. Yovel 
1989b). This new spatiality vehemently aimed to elude the Western metaphysical apparatus. 
Yet finding itself pulled by the ripple effects of the prominent post-Kantian philosophical 
corpus -viz. Marxist historical materialism, the new spatiality came to be imprecisely 
characterized as 'material7 in nature.
The equation of immanence with materialism, and this is the most crucial point in this 
chapter, was only afforded by the disembodied condition that characterized the 
philosophical bodies of the majority of these authors. To phrase it reversely, several authors 
who seized the plane of immanence failed to exhaust its manifold possibilities. Far from 
detaching the immanent spatiality from materialism, their disembodied approach allowed 
them to equate the former with the latter.
Against the gross imprecision committed by post-Kantian philosophy, the analytics of 
transposition will argue that higher awareness of the possibilities within the underlying 
plane of immanence would have served far better the purposes of many a practitioner of 
post-Kantian critique. Finally, I will argue that by breaking out of the older traditions of 
idealism and materialism alike and harnessing the multifaceted potential of immanence, we 
will be in a position to illuminate new conditions of possibility -o r  rather transitivity— for a 
kind of knowledge fit to grapple with the ecocidal mode of engagement, thereby addressing 
research questions (3) and (4). Thus while my claim is that, in the wake of Marx, most post- 
Kantian practitioners resort to the materialist rubric to designate a spatiality that deplores 
the absolute39, when the latter is strictly liberated to immanent forces, materialism 
disentangles itself from the ontological connotations as registered in the idealist/materialist 
hyposition and acquires a distinctive sign which is central to attend to the ecocidal mode of 
engagement. In this emerging context, materialism comes to mean 'disembodied culture7 
and is thus exclusively endowed with negative connotations. It is in this immanent spatiality 
free of materialist ontological chains where the cultural matrix comes to reside.
II
39 It is worth noting that "in whatever form and however materialist in its inscription, the 'absolute' will always remain the form of 
idealism" (Plotnitsky 1993a: 250).
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The Advent Of Uncritical Materialism -  In the wake of Karl Marx's overturning of Hegelian 
idealism, a good part of the post-Kantian critique of reason has assumed a nominal 
materialist ontology (cf. Plotnitsky 1993a: 249-251). There is, to be more precise, a tendency 
amongst post-Kantian practitioners to regard materialism as a key power to undermine the 
institutional and conceptual omnipresence of epistêmë. This uncritical materialism is 
instantiated when, for instance, the historian and critical theorist Mark Poster (1985 [1984]: 
151) asserts that in the work of Foucault, "knowledge is a material force in history". This 
imputed materiality is corroborated by the self-same French thinker, when in his The 
Archaeology of Knowledge (1972: 3), Foucault contextualizes the historiographical 
contribution of la longue durée by stating that "[f]rom the political mobility at the surface 
down to the slow movements of 'material civilization/ ever more levels of analysis have 
been established." In the same vein, the French thinker refers to the "very material after all" 
(Foucault 1998 [1967]: 272) character of Freud's work. Let us note that Foucault alludes here 
to a scholarship that grapples with such an 'immaterial' element —however potent, 
insidious and grounded in everyday life and institutions— as the 'human psyche.' Foucault's 
insistent materialist allegiance contrasts sharply with his avowed immanent historical 
approach, which "ought to maintain itself in the field of immanence of pure singularities" 
(1996: 396).
Take another example -th e  occasion when the (eco)philosopher of science Patrick Curry 
attempts to clarify his use of "discourse." Following Laclau and Mouffle in Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, Curry (2007: 302) concurs with the 
authors' characterization of discourse as "both theory and practice, or both theoretical and 
material practice". Probably against the general ethos of his work, Curry's instance in 
particular exhibits two entwined aspects that concern us here. First, by linking theoria to 
praxis, this (eco)philosopher of science discloses the truism that all those who elude idealism 
seek refuge under the overarching alternative, namely, (historical) materialism. Even if the 
quarters opposing idealism are at the same time positioned at odds with Marxist doctrine, 
they are all the same swept by its ontological residues, which take the form of a spectral 
materialism. Second, in undergoing a transition from "practice" to "material practice," Curry 
attests to this subliminal assumption sanctioned by the post-Kantian tradition: what is 
neither other-worldly nor ultimately reduced to the realm of the ideas is invariably material.
Marx's triumphant victory is evident.
It must be indeed also noted that Curry's defense of "wonder" in the same essay renders it 
hard to accuse him of allegiance to materialism of any persuasion. Curry nonetheless 
endorses a characterization of discourse as "material practice". This apparent oxymoron 
puts the finger on the spot that is being problematized in this section. Namely, there is an 
unresolved dimension amongst those who embrace the plane of immanence. These authors 
come to associate it with materialism without implying the meaning of the latter spatiality-  
namely, that only discrete matter is real. The hypothesis I advance for this phenomenon 
saturating the work of many a post-Kantian practitioner concerns the bearing that Marx's 
revolutionary materialism exerts upon them. Moreover, the equation of the immanent 
expanse with materialism must be conceived as viable given the absent or scant 
consideration of embodiment on the part of these authors. To be sure, the general tendency 
among post-Kantian authors is the neglect of the worldly embodied condition. As a result, 
they are uncritically swept to regard the immanent as the material. Yet the explosive and 
critical force, so claims the analytics of transposition, belongs to our embodied condition as 
a salient trait of the immanent spatiality. A body is a nexus of power relations. Embodiment 
contemplates shapes, colour, texture - i t  is qualitative, whereas matter is only a formless 
infinity.
Derrida provides an additional instance of a covert endorsement of materialism. The French 
poststructuralist philosopher qualifies his work as 'materialist' following the subversive edge 
which the (also Nietzsche) philosopher George Bataille accorded to materialism. In the 
ensuing passage from Derrida's Positions (quoted in Plotnitsky 1993a: 249), the reference to 
Bataille proceeds via the latter's 'general economic' theoretical matrix: "in the extent to 
which matter in this general economy designates [...] radical alterity (I will specify: in relation 
to philosophical oppositions), then what I write can be considered 'materialist'." This quote 
brings into view the platitude we already observed in Foucault. Namely, the post-Kantian 
critique of reason -including those philosophers who write in the Nietzschean tradition— is 
imbued with the trinity Marx-matter-revolution. When it comes to altering the order of 
things, one engages in materialist praxis, as the spectres of Marx are writ large in a hitherto- 
unquestioned background.
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Elsewhere in Positions Derrida only corroborates the inferences just drawn.40 The French 
philosopher claims that when reconfigured through general economy and deconstruction, 
"the insistence on matter as the absolute exterior of opposition, the materialist insistence 
(in contact with what 'materialism' has represented as a force of resistance in the history of 
philosophy) seems to me necessary" (quoted in Plotnitsky 1993a: 250). Plotnitsky, for his 
part, largely endorses Derrida's prescriptions. Plotnitsky pronounces that the "question of 
the historical, that is to say transformational, force of resistance to metaphysics" (Plotnitsky 
1993a: 253) is tantamount to "the question of the critical or deconstructive réinscription of 
matter, history, and the unconscious" (ibid). Plotnitsky, to be sure, is only relapsing into the 
post-Kantian critique of reason's strategy against philosophy and science as epistêmë, where 
(Marxist) material (revolutionary) praxis emerges as the univocal underlying antidote against 
Western metaphysics.
Wendy Wheeler mounts a similar case as in her The Whole Creature: Complexity, 
Biosemiotics and the Evolution o f Culture she stridently argues against the linguistic turn 
while building on, among others, the work of the cultural Marxist Raymond Williams. 
Wheeler contends (2006: 18) that to counteract the "relativism" introduced by 
"sociolinguistic constructivist arguments" that stops us from contending in favour of the 
superiority of "social justice over self interest,[...jit is now necessary to push the pendulum 
back towards an acknowledgement of the materiality of the world" (Wheeler 2006: 18). 
Marxist resonances are conspicuous.
There is finally another philosophical tendency to be registered in relation to a 
recrudescence of materialism. This consists of a scattered group of philosophers who has 
contested transcendence to the advantage of an immanent worldview (Balibar 1998; 
Montag 1998b, Hardt and Negri 2001; Negri 2003 [1991]; Fourtounis 2005; Juniper and Jose 
2005). As it will be defined below in more detail, an immanent plane assumes that the 
entirety of reality is present - i t  is free of moments of transcendence. Somewhat 
mysteriously, however, those quarters that have embraced 'the world of immanence' have
40 As far as I have researched, only in the following quotation does a commentator refer to Derrida's immaterialism: "With a sense of 
satisfaction, Derrida cites the following passage from Saussurre's Course: 'The linguistic signifier... is not (in essence) phonic but immaterial 
-constituted not by its material substance but the differences that separate its sound-image from all others'. (Habermas, 1987f: 180).
brought the latter on a par with materialism. A pointed case conforms to a group of French 
philosophers who orbited around the 20th-century French Marxist thinker Louis Althusser. 
They seized the immanent postulates set forth by the 17th-century philosopher, Baruch 
Spinoza, as a vantage position in their attempt to reread Marx. They dangerously - i f  not 
irresponsibly— concluded that Spinoza "was perhaps the most thoroughgoing materialist in 
the history of philosophy" (Montag 1998a: xi), confining the entire immanent ground to the 
materialist abode. "[F]or them, the characteristic of th/s-worldliness appears to sanction the 
step of equating immanence with materialism" (Kerslake 2002: 10). Against the 
transgressions of theology and metaphysics, this cohort of thinkers came to assume that all 
that exists is of material nature; as though matter constituted the cornerstone of 'righteous 
philosophizing/
The continuity of the immanent plane with the material, it may be concluded, appears to be 
a pervasive move in those contemporary philosophies that reanimate "[t]he ancient 
metaphysical idea of immanence [to undertake] the project of immanent critique" (ibid). 
Having dethroned idealism, materialism turns into the univocal mooring where new 
philosophical bodies may be anchored. However, I claim that an immanence that is 
immanent or relative to matter, is in adulterated form: "only when immanence is no longer 
immanence to anything other than itself that we can speak of a plane of immanence" 
(Deleuze 2001 [1995]: 27). Or to reverse the statement, life "is just enough, holy enough, in 
itself" (Deleuze 2001 [1965]: 85) immanent to itself; "life is not to be judged [...] in the name 
of higher values" (ibid.) such as materialism. Embodiment, by contrast, is only a trait of 
immanence, not a spatiality that subjugates the former.
Ill
Mistaking Embodiment For Materialism -  On the whole, the post-Kantian critique of reason 
operates under disembodied conditions - i t  turns its back on the theoretical entailments of 
our embodied condition in the world. What is more, in this heterogeneous tradition one may 
detect a gigantic confusion between embodied experiences and materialism -th e  embodied 
is subsumed to the material. Or, to be more precise, this tradition regards embodied 
experiences to occur within a materialist spatiality, occluding thereby all the potential of 
both the former. In relation to the ecocidal mode of engagement, such an association is
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misleading. The clarification of this point is, in any case, crucial; it defines an immanent 
space in contradistinction -thus not in affinity— with a materialist one. In the cultural 
matrix, matter is only a state -directly associated with ecocidal manifestations— in which 
the plane of immanence may encounter itself. Matter is what results from the break from 
the embodied cycles, as will be further clarified below. On this reading, materialism deals 
with the many problems that follow from this disembodied state in keeping with the popular 
meaning of the term, as attributed by Tim Kasser in his The High Price o f Materialism  (2002) 
and as reviewed above. "[I]n the journey of life, materialists end up carrying an ever-heavier 
load, one that expends the energy necessary for living, loving, and learning -th e  really 
satisfying aspects of that journey" (Ryan 2002: xi).
Maurice Marleau-Ponty (1976; Taylor 1987: 478 et passim) who fathered the 
phenomenology of lived, embodied experience is one of the initial authors to take issue with 
embodiment. In his teachings, Merleau-Ponty disparages rationalism -a  form of idealism 
which the French philosopher rather calls 'intellectualism', as well as empiricism and 
behaviorism. Merleau-Ponty claims that these currents of thought mis-portray the role that 
the embodied experience plays in everyday life and which therefore should also exert in 
philosophical reflection. However, within the post-Kantian critique of reason it has largely 
been quarters of ecofeminists (cf. Mellor, 1997a, 1997b, 2000, 2010; Salleh, 1994, 1997) 
who have dealt with the issue of embodiment. Ecofeminists of a socialist persuasion41 posit 
that embodiment is indissociable from materiality and materialism -th ey  speak of 
'embodied materialism/ Embodiment, that is, takes on a material note. Under the banner 
materialism, socialist ecofeminists signal a double critique. Namely, the neglect of the 
physical dimension in the epistemological trajectory and the underestimation of the role of 
women, qua unremunerated reproductive caregivers, in the functioning and renewal of 
capitalist patriarchy (Plumwood 2002: 267 footnote 7). The contribution of these 
ecofeminists is of note, despite having been largely overlooked by co-travellers in the post- 
Kantian tradition.
Isabelle Stengers proposes an appealing alterative to gain due distance from classical 
materialism. Stengers reclaims the meso as in physics. "It concerns not matter, but material.
41 As opposed to cultural or spiritual ecofeminism.
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Why does glue stick? Why do metals tend to stress and break? This is the science of the 
interstices and the cracks. It's a science of defects. It is a kind of science where it is always a 
question of this material rather than Matter, and which encounters 'procedures,' like those 
of metallurgy" (Stengers 2008). Stenger's preference for the concrete and contextualized is 
certainly powerful. However, what this philosopher of science at heart reclaims to science is 
not so much concrete matter as a number of qualities and attributes to various embodied 
forms. In a similar manner, Marxist ecofeminism (Salleh 1997; Mellor 1997a; Mies, 1998) 
reclaims the shape of the embodiment, not its material composition. "[Hjumans are nature 
in embodied form. If people were not earthly flesh, the metabolism which keeps us alive 
could not happen" asserts Salleh (2010: 184). It is, in my view, only Marx's victory against 
idealism bearing the materialist standard, that renders this strand of ecofeminism to 
overlook the superfluous position of materialism in the category 'embodied materialism.'
As announced above, the cultural matrix rereads Marxist embodied materialism in the light 
of the ecocidal mode of engagement and concludes that materialism is a condition in which 
embodiment presents itself.42 With Teresa Brennan (2000: 178), it concurs that Marxism 
"failed as a narrative not because it was a narrative, but because it began the story in the 
wrong place, and left something vital out. It left out the fact that #materialism/[...] has 
increasingly made itself into a determinant reality, a reality that overrides that of nature." 
For Brennan, materialism is the "physical enactment with its physical effects" (ibid) of the 
Cartesian dispensation. Brennan brings a further point to the fore. Namely, Marx's 
materialism is closely related to his fierce defence of distributive justice in the context of 
industrial capitalism. The Marxist communist utopia is unilaterally inhabited by Promethean 
or Faustian man who, in his historical triumph over nature, eagerly surrounds himself with 
an overabundance of industrial artifacts (Gare 1996 [1995]: 141, Salleh 2010: 194). In line 
with Brennan's interpretation, it is precisely Marx's industrial materialism that strictly 
emerges when we severely reconfigure materialism in the cultural matrix (cf. also Kasser 
2002).
Yet the standard-bearers of materialism insist in positing materialism in asymmetrical 
opposition to idealism. Va I Plumwood is another case in point. Much in line with the position
42 Cf. Chapter 7, Section 1 below.
of the ecofeminists visited above (Mellor 1997; Salleh 1997), Plumwood uses two rubrics -  
the embodied and the material— to refer to the earthly. Plumwood (2002: 222) strives to 
retrieve materialism from its "devaluing and backgrounding" condition in the spirit/matter 
hyposition. To this end, the ecofeminist sets forth "a materialist spirituality which recognizes 
that spirit is not a hyper-separated extra ingredient but a certain mode of organization of a 
material body" (ibid: 223). This reading of materialism as a mode of organization, as 
synonymous with embodiment, is prima facie a legitimate strategy. However, the cultural 
matrix cannot afford to readily allot two strategic signifiées two a single signified - i t  must 
stick to an economical and austere strategy on its path to identify and create transpositions. 
The cultural matrix specifically needs to retain a category to convey what no longer 
circulates within the self-regulating systems. Given that it is materialism, and not 
embodiment that has often been associated with consumerism (Kasser 2002) we keep the 
former -m atter and its -ism '— to allude to the residual problems of consumer societies. In 
this light, the signifying bloc 'embodied materialism' is, undisputably, a contradiction in 
termini. Within the cultural matrix, materialism is a condition inherently disembodied.43 So 
when Plumwood (ibid: 226) asserts that "materiality is already full of form, spirit, story, 
agency, and glory," we shall say that she really means that it is embodiment that enjoys all 
these predicates. Matter is what no longer circulates in ecocycles.
No less relevant are the connotations that ensue from materialism as the hypo-position of 
idealism -in  the context of a post-ecocidal framework these elements can be scarcely 
overlooked. On this reading, materialism ultimately signifies amenability to biotechnological 
manipulation and purported geoengineering perfection. In a passage worth reproducing, 
Andrew Welburn (2004: 25) highlights the historical fact that materialism was only an 
unproblematized reversal of idealism. "A developing universe," as a prominently 
multifarious instance of embodiment,
if one thinks about it, does not carry any necessary connotation of a materialistic universe. Indeed to 
suppose so is to fall victim to history through failing to confront it squarely, mistaking the circumstance 
of the emergence of evolution, as a replacement to older, God- and creation-oriented views, for a
43 As it will be patiently expatiated in Chapter 7, like entropy, the gradation dis-embodiment is a qualitative one. At the disembodied end, 
the quality of this gradation has dwindled away to mere matter. M atter is a residue of disembodiment, in line with the expression 'what's 
the matter?' as synonymous with 'what's the problem?'
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proper, in-depth investigation of the scope of the concept itself.44
The third figure or transposition of the spirit/matter hyposition is, we assert with certain 
aplomb, not materialism but embodiment. "The universe is made of stories [and embodied 
forms], not of atoms" (Muriel Rukeyeser quoted in Caputi 2001: 3). Unlike atoms, embodied 
forms are utterly irreducible. It is them that register and thus carry the entire gamut of 
personal, social and political meanings as well as the denials thereof. Materialism as an 
immanent backdrop, in lacking adjudicative faculties, allows for the masculinist construction 
"angel-mom/monster-mom" (ibid: 7) -namely, "madonna/whore" (Salleh 2010: 185). 
Embodiment registers every transgression of "the unsplit, original Mother [,matrice as] 
equally and always creator, preserver, destroyer, and transformer" (ibid). Materialism -qua  
a hypo-position of idealism— is deprived of such adjudicative faculties. The cultural matrix, 
to be sure, pooh-poohs materialism as it discloses it as an unfiltered ghost of the 
epistemological tradition, partner and counterpart of idealism. "Those two species of 
superstition, these rival epistemologies, the supernatural and the mechanical feed each 
other... And both are nonsense" (Bateson andBateson quoted in Curry 2004g: 112).
The association of immanence with materialism is not only a false move; it is above all a 
sterile one. It obstructs one of the 'utopian' remits of the post-Kantian critique of reason -  
that of taking philosophy as epistêmê to new horizons by transposing it. It impedes the 
development of an analytics of the present-day, "a historical ontology of ourselves" 
(Foucault 1997: 309) in a present fraught with material 'bads', as ecological economists 
name the goods that are produced to clean up the sequels of industrial societies such as oil 
spills. It further prevents the post-Kantian critique from realising itself in its complementing 
utopian facet of transformation, and thus undertaking "at one and the same time the 
historical analysis of the limits imposed upon us and an experiment with the possibility of 
going beyond them" (ibid: 319). Materialism offers no viable horizon where to firmly anchor 
a practicable transposition of industrial capitalism. Given precisely the mainstream 
un reflexive association of industrial materialism with progress both in the West and in 
increasingly Westernised cultures, (cf. Fromm 1978; Nisbet 1980; Jackson, 1996, 2006a;
44 Cf. Chapter 10, Section 3, Subsection IV below.
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Guha 2000b [1997]; Brennan 2000; Kasser 2002), our contemporaneity loudly enjoins the 
discrimination of the material from the embodied.
When the anthropologist Tim Ingold brings out that "the claim that nature is 'only' a cultural 
construction is fatally incoherent" (Curry 2010c: 86), scorning constructivists, it is 
emphasized that nature is far more than a cultural construction. Yet such a statement should 
not be the back door for realism's re-entrance and unconcerned re-performance as in 
Soper's What is Nature? (2001 [1995]). The reproach against constructivism that there is a 
nature beyond discourse is not transcended by bringing back in the Cartesian res extensa in 
the form of a monolithic material nature. Rather, beyond mental and discursive images lie a 
whole constellation of irreducible embodied forms -rocks, trees, rivers, animals, the skies, 
plants, the atmosphere, clouds, soil. The third figure or transposition of the spirit/matter 
splitting, it shall be repeated, is embodiment. To put it plainly, a material nature isn't a 
politically-relevant term. What must be problematized are embodiments and their atrocious 
distortions in the form of disembodiments as well as the preoccupying residues that ensue 
thereof in the form of mounting matter.
It is embodiment and not materiality which denotes that culture -as defined in Chapter 3— 
is "cuffed into shape" (Eagleton 2000: 6). What is abundantly filled with meaning and form is 
the somatic space -as distinct from the material one. The challenge of the post-Kantian 
critique of reason in the dystopian -ecocidal- present precisely resides in conceptually 
distinguishing between these two conditions -viz. materialism vs. embodiment.
In sum, save Merleau-Ponty's and largely overlooked ecofeminist contributions who yet 
contaminate the rubric with a phantasmagorical materialism, the post-Kantian critique of 
reason operates under a disembodied plane. It is this condition that tacitly authorizes the 
commensurability of immanence with materialism. The disembodied character of post- 
Kantian philosophies sanctions the unproblematized reversal from idealism into materialism.
IV
Immanence As Asymmetric Expanse Vis-à-vis Transcendence -  As a result of bringing the 
immanent on a level with the material, some practitioners of the post-Kantian critique of
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reason have been forced to resort to the construction of a "transcendental physical subject" 
(Alliez 2005: 67), or "a 'kind of transcendental argument' that discloses the indispensable 
conditions of experiencing a world, that is, of intentionality" (Baynes et al. 1987: 461). Or like 
Heidegger who affirms that "[wjorld-entry happens when transcendence happens" (quoted 
in Allen, 1993: 91). The clarification of this point is pivotal for the progressive build-up of the 
cultural matrix. Under cultural conditions -i.e ., when immanence is dissociated from 
materialism— the immanent plane gains some of the attributes habitually associated with 
transcendence. In so proceeding, immanence's prophecy not to exceed itself -so "that all 
normativity, all source of binding value be anchored within the actual world" (Yovel 1989b: 
7)— is fulfilled. To illustrate how the plane of immanence comes to re-absorb the properties 
associated with transcendence, two intertwined meanings shall be outlined -viz. divine and 
human transcendence. Latour (1993:142) aptly suggests that when "[t]he question of God is 
reopened, [...] the nonmoderns no longer have to try to generalize the improbable 
metaphysics of the moderns that forced them to believe in belief." Immanence is precisely 
the spatiality where that which was forced into hiding finds an open place for expression.
One of the forms in which transcendence presents itself is theologically. Divine 
transcendence is to be found in Aristotle's philosophy-God as a prim e-mover, non-material 
and self-conscious entity. It is also a leading trait in monotheisms -Judaism, Christianity and 
Islam (cf. Curry 2003: § 7 et passim) in charge as they are of "centralizing all spirit and grace 
in a remote monotheistic deity and stripping it from the immediacy and particularity of 
earthly life and place" (Plumwood 2002: 221). Transcendence of this persuasion, to be sure, 
establishes that God and a constellation of positively connoted attributes such as perfection, 
goodness and excellence are positioned beyond the mundane world. This is "nothing other 
than the metaphysical unity of man and God, the relation of man to God, the project of 
becoming God as the project of constituting human-reality" (Derrida 1984 [1972]: 116).
Two prominent figures in the modern world -Karl Marx and Abraham Maslow— retake the 
theme of divine transcendence, and present it with a secular façade. As noted above, the 
fulcrum of Marxist philosophy lies in the proclamation that the homo faber may transcend 
his own alienation by performing labour of his own choice, by undertaking "[t]he 
transformation of labour into self-activity" (Marx and Engels 1976 [1845]: 88). In Marx,
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therefore, transcendence or the acquisition of a secularized godly status is conterminous 
with the overcoming of one's historical situation. In such propitious historical context, "self­
creation" (Avineri 1969: 85) is no longer co-extensive with self-alienation but, to use 
Abraham Maslow's own terms, with 'self-actualization'. Marx's vision of the future society 
presupposes capitalism's triumphant transition towards communism. In this new world the 
homo faber is no longer expected to be forced to sell his labourpower to capital. Instead, he 
grows in the position rigorously sculpting himself by performing tasks duly suited to his 
nature. No wonder that on this count Marx has been read as a religious thinker or 
metaphysician. Marx's "religious conception of the world can be traced back, through 
Feuerbach, to Hegel - to  the idea of man's self-realization as divine being [...] in a secular 
form" (Bottomore 1963: xii; cf. also Yovel 1989b: 173). An unalienated humanity is Marx's 
eschatology of salvation.
Dispossessed of the historical setting, Maslow's conception of a self-actualizer is cognate 
with Marx's non-alienated homo faber. Whatever the set of extant parallelisms and 
disparities between the two human prototypes, pertinent to our purposes here is the fact 
that Maslow associates the figure of, and set of values treasured by, the self-actualizer with 
a "psychology of transcendence" (Maslow 1993 [1971]: 4; cf. also Part VII). Namely, what is 
good, omniscient and replete with godly attributes falls beyond reach, the area where the 
self-actualizer displaces herself when she undergoes periodic -though unexpected— "peak 
experiences" (Maslow 1999 [1968]: Ch. 6 and7).
Advancing material that will be considered in more detail in Chapter 8 , 1 would further like to 
venture that both Marx and Maslow resort to this highly literal meaning of transcendence -  
'climbing over and beyond'— predominantly because the plane of immanence has been 
historically treated as yet another monist essentialism -as an absolute and static plane, in 
the ontological family of idealism/materialism. Kerslake (2002:10) assumes that immanence 
is rigorously subsumed to ontology in claiming that "[ojntologically [...] in a philosophy of 
immanence, thought is shown to be fully expressive of being." Attesting to his Western 
tradition, Kerslake, it seems to me, confounds the absence of moments of transcendence 
proper to the plane of immanence with an ontological transcendence. "'Translating actions 
and qualities into substances (translating doing and having into being)' is to start from the
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wrong place" (Campbell quoted in Curry 2010c: 112). Or in Nietzsche's (1967c: §51) own 
phrasing, transcendence too suffers from "the 'beyond' corruption: as if outside of the 
actual world, that of becoming, there were another world of being." By contrast, once the 
immanent space stops being confounded with materialism and is dynamically 
contextualized45, the non-alienated -o r  self-actualized— homo faber will cease to transcend 
himself to start engaging his multidimensional inherent immanence. "There is no wholly- 
other paradise from which we are excluded -th e  only transcendence that can be real to us is 
an 'immanent' one" (Hepburn quoted in Curry 2008: 62).
On this reading, with feminist Kathi Weeks (2007: 247) we may contend that Maslow's 
"critical standpoint and [Marx's] political project thus require[...] not the discovery of a space 
[...] that is outside, but the struggle for a different quality of experience," where at issue it is 
not so much the 'quality' as the-appositely-falling-into-place experience. This space that 
registers difference in the experience corresponds to the plane of immanence. In this light, 
and insofar as the purpose of "[t]he Kantian critique [equally endorsed by post-Kantianism] 
is surely to ask how  immanence is to be achieved, to ask how it is possible, and to secure it 
by right against the transgressions of theology and metaphysics" (Kerslake 2002: 10). 
Progress in philosophy is far from an ongoing march forwards in search of transcendence. A 
progressive movement that in Our Common Future is translated as development: 
"'environment' is where we all live; and 'development' is what we all do in attempting to 
improve our lot within that abode" (WCED 1987: xi). Rather, "[p]hilosophy, in so far as it is 
mindful of its nature, does not move forward at all. She steps into her place and marks time 
so that she may ceaselessly think of one and the same thing. Moving forward, that is, away 
from this place, is an error that follows thinking, like a shadow thrown by thinking itself" 
(Heidegger in 'Letter on Humanism' rephrased by Metha 1971: 135). It is further worth 
noting that this understanding of philosophy exhibits major resonances with Nietzsche's 
(1989b [1967]: V, § I) characterization of 'freedom:' "The term 'free spirit' [...] is not to be 
understood in any other sense; it means a spirit that has become free, that has again taken 
possession of itself". It is not about undertaking Heidegger's Schritt zurürck to reach out to 
pre-Socratic philosophy and grapple with the Seinsfrage -th e  question of being (Allen 1993: 
ch. 5) but acknowledging that the plane of immanence, we may provisionally conclude,
45 In regimes of constrained-engaged immanence. Cf. Chapter 8, Section 4 below.
-99-
involves an appositely qualitative falling into one's own liberating abode. Spinoza had 
already "discovered that freedom only exists within immanence" (Deleuze and Guattari 2003 
[1994]: 48).
Analogously, we may say that immanence not only refigures the idealist-materialist binary 
opposition thereby transposing it, it also reinscribes transcendence. Just as an etymological 
rendering of culture suggests that nature/culture conforms to an asymmetrical antinomy, so 
too immanence is in asymmetrical relationship with transcendence; no longer the 
companion and counterpart of transcendence but the only possibility of the latter. 
"Transcendence is always a product of immanence" (Deleuze 2001 [1995]: 31). This novel 
ability gained by this plane follows from the new kind of immanence put to use, namely, one 
recoded via the cultural matrix, which no longer lends to the subjugation of materialism. Far 
from being a totalizing plane competing against another monolith called 'transcendence/ 
here immanence appears as a contingent by-product, where qualitative engagement is at 
stake.46 With Latour (1993: 62), "let us move on to other things. Or rather, let us retrace our 
steps. Let us stop moving on."
V
The Immanent Turn As An Unfinished Transposition - As long as the plane of immanence is 
rendered immanent to materialism "the death of God [remains] an event that awaits its 
meaning and its value" (Deleuze 2001 [1965]: 81). We remain stuck with logos and 
ontological predicates. Materialism has replaced idealism, sustainable development 
productivity, but both have failed to do away with the place -position— that accommodates 
the two anterior spatialities. Materialism and sustainable development alike fall short of 
corrosively upsetting the established logocentric order: "where you see ideal things," 
(Nietzsche 1989b [1967]: V, §1) and, for that matter, material and sustainable ones "/ see 
what is -human, alas, all-too-human!" (ibid). Namely, I see the tragic plane of immanence 
pervaded with human (and, via the cultural matrix, non-human) relations.
The seventeenth-century rationalist thinker by the name Baruch Spinoza is said to have 
enacted a "philosophical revolution" all his own by rendering the transcendent God a figure
46 For the further development of the plane of immanence as a qualitative space cf. Chapter 8 below.
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only immanent to nature (Yovel 1998b: ix et passim; Deleuze 1997 [1968]; 2001 [1965]: 
passim; Kerslake 2002; Fourtounis 2005). Spinoza's Ethics "was nothing less than 'the most 
systematic treatise of atheism ever w ritten / [...] advanced in the mask of the proof of God's 
mere existence" (Montag 1999: xvi). Spinoza's intellectual move was, at bottom, the 
execution of a theocide -h e  subverted the old place of God qua the metaphysical device that 
reverts multiplicity back to One and becoming to Being. The enactment of such a murderous 
deed is more of an insidious act than the self-avowal of atheism. To be more precise, the 
assertion that 'God doesn't exist' is susceptible to the charge of conforming to a binary pair, 
a hyposition -companion and counterpart— of transcendence. "Atheism changes nothing in 
th[e] fundamental structure" (Derrida 1984 [1972]: 116) where man is united to God or 
where man moves in God's house without duly suffocating the entangling theist texture 
(Deleuze 2001 [1965]: 71).
The proactive partaking in God's death, contrastingly, "acquires an even more profound 
meaning in view of its birth out o f -o r  its giving birth to— the spirit of tragedy [...] -th e  birth 
of tragedy is the death of God" (Plotnitsky 1996: xiv, xiii). 'Tragedy/ is here at antipodes with 
the "intellectual cleanliness" that Nietzsche (2005 [2001]: § 357) chastises in the scientific 
method. 'Tragedy/ rather, is understood as both a metonymy for the plane of immanence -  
attesting to some of its registers (Deleuze 2001 [1965]: 85), and as synonymous with the 
category grey. For grey, in Nietzsche's philosophy (1989a [1967]: Pr, 7), is "what is 
documented, what can actually be confirmed, and has actually existed." Grey is the expanse 
of lived out experience, where events take place, namely, where the immanent mode 
unfolds, bespeaking again the existing complicity between idealism -pure white— and 
materialism -pitch black. Neither of the two hues, one absorbing the rest whilst the other 
repels them all, stages the modulations of life.
A conscientious theocide is a great deal more revolutionary and radical an act than "most 
forms of Marxism and related developments" (Plotnitsky 1996: xiv) -namely, than the mere 
enlistment of materialism. Plotnitsky further declares that the philosophical and political 
implications of such a murderous activity, while being tremendous and far-reaching, have
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been barely explored.47 In the case of our study, the dethroning of God's abode in the 
metaphysical edifice that the former sanctions and holds together, and the subsequent 
emergence of the plane of immanence which finds as its suited repository, both entail 
further efforts and offer a greater number of possibilities than the facile denial of both the 
One and the mode of being. The this-worldiness element of immanence should not quite be 
confounded with "something that can be immediately affirmed, without any prior 
investigation into its possibility" (Kerslake 2002: 10). Instead we need to conduct an inquiry 
into the conditions of transitivity of this plane which is "never unconditional, never simply 
given" (Allen 1993: 85), addressing thereby research question (3) as set out in Chapter 1 
above. Each transposition in the present work develops one of the philosophical and political 
implications of an irreversible theocide.
a a a a
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47 Cf. Chapter 7, Section 1, Subsection II for a continuation of the topic.
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Chapter 5
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Transposition As S ituated  Structure: 
From The Modern/Postmodern 
Hyposition into Cultus
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"One of the most remarkable achievements of the epistemology that has dominated 
social science has been to eliminate TimeSpace from the analysis. It is not that 
geography and chronology were never talked about. Of course they were, and quite 
extensively. But they have been considered to be physical invariants, and hence 
exogenous variables/rather than highly fluid social creations/and hence variables 
not merely endogenous but critical to the understanding of social structure and
hi s torical trans formation". 
-Immanuel Wallerstein48
"Knowledge, power, this is only a grid of analysis"
—Michel Foucault49
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Synopsis - Chapter 5 takes issue with the unit of cultural analysis. To this end, two relevant 
approaches are reviewed. First, the four timespace continua set forth by the annalist 
historian Fernand Braudel. Namely, the world of events, decades-long political conjunctures, 
la longue durée -'long duration' determined, according to Braudel, by environmental 
factors— and the pronouncedly outstretched very long-term. By discussing the work of a 
few environmental historians, it is argued that the ecocidal mode of engagement conforms 
to a longue durée by itself. Yet the latter, far from being ruled by a changing, devastating 
environment, is criss-crossed by multiple destabilizing cultural factors.
Second, against the universalism claimed by modernity and the unmitigated contextualism 
reclaimed by postmodernity, Foucault's knowledge-power grids of analysis are re-read as
48 Wallenstein 2001:3.
49 Foucault 1996: 394.
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situated structures -as historicized culture, that is. Thus whilst modernity and 
postmodernity are irreducibly identified as conforming to a hyposition, Foucault's structures 
of knowledge-power are posited as conforming to the third figure or transposition of the 
former. To facilitate the fashioning of a normative horizon, required with an eye towards 
overcoming the ecocidal mode of being -and more specifically necessary for the 
development of Chapters 8 to 10— it is further signalled that knowledge-power can take 
either a repressive or an emancipatory direction.
In the last section of this chapter the transposition 'situated structure' is renamed cultus. 
Like culture, cultus comes from the Latin form colërë -'attending to', 'cultivating', 
'respecting'. Yet cultus -which signifies cult— emphasizes more strongly the constructivist 
dimension of the situated structure. Culture covers the whole gamut of possibilities; cultus 
speaks for the actual number of elements cultivated. Cultus, that is, is a relative whole.
1. La Longue Durée In Environmental History
l
Four Timespace Continua- Fernand Braudel's theoretical contributions in the field of history 
have been far-reaching (Black and MacRaild 2000: 66-69, 73-75, 77-78; Gilderhus 2003 
[1987]). Braudel is particularly interesting as he discriminates between four time horizons in 
which change may possibly take place (Sinclair 1999 [1996]: 4-5; Cox 1999 [1985]: 55; 
Wallerstein 2001: passim). These temporal sequences roughly coincide with the ideas of 
short- medium- long-term and the eternal with which we all are on familiar terms. The issue 
of history -stability and change— and its representation attends to one of Nietzsche's 
(1967c: § 408) demands for a philosophy of the future proper, viz. the sense of history. Let's 
see the lessons that can be drawn from Braudel's propositions.50
We first encounter the horizon of immediacy or "world of events" (Sinclair 1999 [1996]: 4). 
This is the dimension of time assimilated in traditional history. One "that always encourages 
subjective recognitions" (Foucault 1998 [1971]: 379) and is thus accustomed to narrating 
royal affairs, "a world of strong passions certainly, but one that is blind and unconscious of
50 Cf. Chapter 2, Section 2 above.
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the deeper realities of history" (Braudel quoted in Arnold, 1996: 41). Similarly, the 
significance of a factual world filled with daily routines may be rich in descriptive data 
concerning human attitudes towards the environment - to  preserve the Cartesian divide for 
a little longer,51 albeit probably only partially relevant in terms of explanatory keys for the 
ecological riddle. A 'world of events' in 'environmental' issues could signify, to give an 
example, an x-amount of C02 emissions of a y-number of cars commuting in and out of 
London or Barcelona on a weekday. Just as the narration of royal affairs fails to account for 
the ascendancy of monarchy as a political and diplomatic body of a territory; so too the bare 
description of nature-matricidal habits in the modern technologically-developed world falls 
short of elucidating the adoption of such (well irrational!) practices in the first place. In a 
similar manner, this ephemeris-oriented level of history leaves undisclosed the reasons why 
the phenomenon referred to as "anthropogenic climate forcing" both comes to be circulated 
under this banner -instead of under that of 'climate justice;' and is primarily problematized 
as an issue of C02-equivalent emissions -instead o f one o f equity and responsibility in 
prosecution of those responsible for this multiple ecocide.
Second, there is l'histoire conjoncturelle. This covers phenomena extending over a time span 
of between one and five decades. In the domain of international relations, the Cold War is 
portrayed to have drawn a 'conjunctural' horizon of its own. We may expect that the 'Age of 
Sustainable Development,' qua a regime establishing a relatively consistent set of national 
and international policies may mark another conjuncture of its own.
Third, beyond the two temporal horizons of short-lived facts and decades-long political 
conjunctures lies the Braudelian longue durée as the time spatiality proper to Yhlstoire 
structurelle. This refers to those socio-political practices which endure throughout centuries, 
having been barely subject to any modification, and which therefore come "to be regarded 
as fixed attributes of human nature and social intercourse" (Cox 1999 [1985]: 55)52. In 
cultural history, one such paradigmatic example is the dressing in black for certain types of 
mourning. Yet significant for our storyline is the fact that the initial Braudelian longue durée
51 This chapter is primarily focused on time-spans. The Cartesian dispensation originally endorsed in the work under scrutiny is respected.
52 For a description of this concept at length, see for instance the essay by Fernand Braudel (1958), 'History and the Social Sciences: The 
Longue Durée', in Fernand Braudel (1980 [1982]), On History, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press; translated by Sarah Matthews; pp. 
25-63.
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had an explicit physical dimension.
Finally we have to register a fourth time-span: the very long-term. This timespace continuum 
is so pronouncedly outstretched that it is scarcely amenable to analysis. "[I]f it exists, it can 
only be the time period of the sages" (Braudel quoted in Wallerstein 2001:137), and yet it is 
relevant for the articulation of the cultural matrix. We return to it in Chapter 6.53
II
La Longue Durée And The 'Natural Environment'- Fernand Braudel (1902-1985) was second 
generation in the French Ecole des Annales, named after the journal Annales: Economies, 
Sociétés, Civilisations, which was founded in 1929 by Lucien Lefebvre and March Bloch. The 
Annalistes path-braking approach to historiography was their holistic conception of human 
affairs. Hence their call for a full orchestration of the humanities in the writing of history, 
albeit placing always the greatest emphasis upon the ambits of geography and economics. 
These overt attempts at a grand history, l'histoire totale, which inaugurated the path to 
modern historiography, entailed at the same time a break with the antiquated conception of 
history as that of people alone. Whether concerned with monarchs, military personalities or 
the common folk, traditional historiography dispensed with any binding contextual factor, 
allowing instead the life spans of the great figures to dictate the scales of historical 
periodization. Indeed, this is how the-world-of-event-oriented history has been depicted 
above.
In stark contrast, the Annalistes endeavoured to chart the course of events by growing 
attentive to the deeper, outstretched dominant currents. This shift in temporal perspective 
would permit the uncovering of the larger patterns drawn by human groups interacting with 
their natural environments. Braudel conspicuously exhibits in his work a sustained interest in 
evoking nature to explain the course of human affairs. In keeping, his salient studies in the 
Mediterranean world and the France of the fourteenth up to the mid-eighteenth centuries54 
led the French historian to conclude that the time, space and culture under study formed a 
"relatively stable and enduring set of relations between people and nature," a setting where 
the "environment gives history its underlying structure" (Arnold 1996: 42). In this context,
53 Cf. Chapter 6, Section 1, Subsection I below.
54 Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean World in the Age o f Philip. II
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the vindication of la longue durée follows as a logical conclusion. The reader should further 
note the strong resonances between the notion of the long duration and Gaia theory. In the 
latter theoretical framework the "Earth's atmosphere" is regarded as "an extraordinary and 
unstable mixture of gases" that is yet "constant in composition over quite long periods of 
time" (Lovelock quoted in Capra 1996:102).
Related to the fact (interesting in its own rights) that Braudel has been severely scorned for 
the intense physical determinism that underwrites his accounts, two additional remarks are 
in order. First, independently of whether we partially critique or embrace tout court, the role 
played by a thorough Cartesian nature in Braudel's histories, la longue durée is contingent 
on the time, space and culture which brought this concept to life. The long-term treatment 
of history as a coherent time-span closed in itself, with the solidity supplied by a regularly- 
behaving environment as a backbone, may well have suited the events as they occurred in 
the central Europe of the fourteenth to the mid-eighteenth centuries, yet it does not 
necessarily capture human affairs as they play themselves out in different places and times. 
La longue durée must be rigorously historicized, instead of permissively freeing it to a 
process of unaccountable universalization. Environmental historian David Arnold (1996: 44) 
is remarkably vocal in this respect: "And while the idea of a longue durée, extending over 
some four or five hundred years, might be of value for the Mediterranean world and France, 
is it equally valid for other societies -such as the Americas, for instance, in the wake of 
Columbus?"
Belatedly, Braudel's studies were situated in an epoch prior to the advent of the agrarian 
and industrial revolutions. These decisive events are, to a large extent, responsible for the 
agitated rate at which ecosystems repeatedly flip over to a new state. The (environmental) 
historian will probably face great hardships in attempting to trace an ecological 'long 
duration' in either Old or New Europe in the aftermath of these revolutions. Nature's grip on 
human affairs, as entailed by la longue durée, has "rapidly diminished [...] the closer one 
comes to the present day" (Arnold 1996:47).
The second remark relates to modern eco-history's intention to integrate the Braudelian 
category into its fundamentals. To this end, the modern environmental historian has been
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attentive to discover whether the environment conforms to a phenomenon of longue durée. 
Conclusive positions seem to reason that when an ecosystem reaches a mature stage, it 
tends to stabilize itself and endure through time without undergoing dramatic changes in 
form or structure (cf. Brown 2003: ch. 2). On this account, Joachim Radkau (1993: 121; own 
rendering from a Spanish translation from the original German) has sketched environmental 
history's brief as "the research which inquiries into the long-term evolution of the human 
conditions of life and reproduction."55
To recapitulate, the idea that the 'environment' and la longue durée may be linked up 
together is initially persuasive. At a closer look, the exclusive association of long-term with 
the life-span of ecosystems falters. Critical voices come from both extremes of the temporal 
spectrum. "[F]or some historically minded ecologists and anthropologists, the Braudelian 
longue durée would appear far too short of allowing for the most significant continuities and 
changes to manifest themselves" (Arnold 1997: 44-45). Conversely, in the eyes of the human 
ecologist attentive to human institutions, Braudel's long duration proves exceedingly 
prolonged. The human ecologist adduces that in some periods of the past, "the ecology was 
changing at a faster rate than the economy and politics did" (Martinez-Alier 1993: 28).
This cursory study on Braudel leads us to hypothesize that the ecocidal mode of engagement 
somehow lends to a grand longue durée of its own. The environmental historian's 
application of this category, as seen above, specifies that we should retain exclusively the 
temporal aspect from the early Braudelian extended expanse. This view resonates with 
environmental historian Jason Moore's (2002: 146) "locating [of] the origins of modern 
ecological degradation [...] in the logic of capital itself," suggesting with eco-Marxism 
(O'Connor 1994a; O'Connor 1998a) that we are faced with an ecocidal mode of production 
ruled by capital. Hence the necessity to see la longue durée as a kind of structure pervaded 
with interpenetrating factors, akin to Toynbee's characterization of 'environment' in Chapter 
2, where "[t]he same structural categories persist despite the geopolitical relocations" 
(Wallerstein 2001: 143). In sum, the ecocidal mode of engagement seems to conform to a 
grand longue durée in itself. Its backbone can in no possible way be the environment but an
55 It further reads: "It raises queries as to how the very human agency has influenced these conditions and how it has reacted in the face of 
modifications." (ibid)
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amalgam of factors of multifarious cultural character. This begs the questions: Which traits? 
Are these parameters uniform across cultures, ethnic groups, gender and age groups? 
Namely, which shall be the timespace continuum or unit of analysis that shall allow us to 
penetrate into the ecocidal mode of engagement and further transpose it? This set of 
queries frame the initial addressing of research question (1) on the nature of the ecocide. 
The point we have elucidated hitherto in relation to this research query is the multifactorial 
character of the ecocidal long duration (cf. also Thomas-Pellicer 2008). Dealing with this set 
of queries would detract our attention from the further development of the cognitive 
conditions of possibility that are to guide the questions at issue.
2. Foucaudian Power-Knowledge Relations As Situated Structures Of 
Repression And Emancipation
I
Postmodernism And Unmitigated Relativism - The notion of 'structure' is one closely linked 
to developments associated with post-epistemological history. Poststructuralism, the 
anteroom of postmodernism, was largely a reaction against the anthropological 
structuralism of Lévi-Strauss (Derrida 1978f), which, in turn, came to contest Jean-Paul 
Sartre's humanism. Where Sartre reduced the social body to individual freedom, 
structuralists sought to adopt a scientific approach to human activity by mapping out the 
various basic elements and laws that define and regulate them (cf. Dreyfus and Rabinow 
1983: xvii-xxvii). Despite its own crisis, postmodernism is the most contemporary of these 
currents. It exhibits a penchant for detracting stabilities -conceptual and otherwise, 
conveying the message that allegiance to structure is an outmoded practice.
The most vocal strands of postmodernism -such as the voices of Jean-Françoise Lyotard 
(1992) and Richard Rorty (1980, 1987)— call for an "unmitigated relativism" (Schrift 1990: 
passim) freed from "pre-established rules" and"determinant judgement" (Lyotard 1992: 24). 
Postmodernism is "historicity and contingency of existing" (Vattimo 2002: 7) brought to the 
extremes. There are grounds to suspect that such strong preference for that which is so 
emphatically contextualized and situated, that does away with the texture of its own setting, 
is in complicit continuity with the affairs of science as epistêmê. "Radical contextualism itself
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thrives on a negative metaphysics, which ceaselessly circles around that which metaphysical 
idealism had always intended by the unconditioned but which it had always failed to 
achieve" (Habermas 1996 [1992]: 400). Both the epistemological tradition and 
postmodernism fail to carefully distil the structural and enduring out of the fleeting and 
ephemeral (Foucualt 1997). "Postmodernism is a symptom, not a fresh solution [...] It senses 
that something has gone awry in the modern critique, but is not able to do anything but 
prolong that critique" (Latour 1993: 46). With Hegel, one must be wary of not only "an 
uncritical (which is also ahistorical) formalism" (Plotnitsky 1996: xii), in line with the 
postmodern attitude, but also "an uncritical (which is also aphilosophical) historicism" (ibid), 
the pitfall where the postmodern thinker falls.
II
An Inquiry Into Foucault's Power-Knowledge Relations - In this context where a facile pooh- 
poohing of context is severely upbraided, we should proceed to address the following query: 
Do some sectors of the post-Kantian critique of reason, "which sees itself condemned to 
creating its self-awareness and its norms out of itself" (Habermas 1991 [1986]: 106), usher in 
a truly poststructuralist age?
Foucault's work, as Derrida's, is indeed assumed to be of poststrucuralist filiation. Typically, 
those who characterize Foucault as such argue that the French thinker's eclecticism (Kant, 
Marx, Nietzsche, Weber, Bataille, Canguilhem, Althusser) inexorably thrusts him beyond the 
linguistic structuralist contours (Ritzer and Goodman 2003: 585). In this light, there are 
grounds to suspect that 'poststructuralism' as a denomination for Foucault's work is a 
category disclosed in 'negative' fashion - i t  chiefly denotes negation of linguistic 
structuralism. Has the rubric 'poststructuralism' got any authority over Foucault's work in 
the positive?
There is one passage in the remarkable essay 'Qu'est-ce que la cr\t\que?/Critique et 
Aufklarung/' where Foucault (1996: 394) supplies a reliable lead to proceed with our 
probing. This reads:
One can use two words that do not have the function of designating entities, forces, or such things
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as transcendentals [...]: the word knowledge [savoir] is used to refer to all the procedures and all 
the effects of knowledge [connaissance] that are acceptable at a given moment and in a defined 
domain; and second, the term 'power' does nothing other than cover a whole series of particular 
mechanisms, definable and defined, that seem capable of inducing behaviors or discourses. One 
sees immediately that these two terms only have a methodological role.
'Knowledge', 'power' two non-transcendental categories to which Foucault assigns the 
exclusive role of "framework" (Poster 1985 [1984]: 146) in the unfolding of his 
methodologies. "We could say that all Foucault's histories are histories of truth or, which is 
the same thing, histories of power/knowledge relations" (O'Leary 2002: 98). To bring it to a 
simple point, Foucault "maintains] that history is a morphology of power/knowledge" 
(Poster, 1985 [1984]: 155). Yet, how do these two axes relate to 'historical facts'?
Defying Marx and avowing his allegiance to Nietzsche's 'will to power' (Nietzsche 1967c), 
Foucault holds that the loci of power are no exclusivity of either the state or the propertied 
classes. "By power, I do not mean 'Power' as a group of institutions and mechanisms that 
ensure the subservience of the citizens of a given state[, nor] a general system of 
domination exerted by one group over another, a system whose effects, through successive 
derivations, pervade the entire social body" (Foucault 1979: 92). Power is no monopoly of 
political or economic classes. Foucault equally rebukes a kind of phenomenology by which 
the constituent subject would exert their assertiveness autonomously through the social 
field (Foucault 2000 [1977]: 117-118). The French thinker is further impervious to the liberal 
notion of centralized power conceived always in juridical terms, a concept which revolves 
around a constitution, a sovereign, a social contract. "It is this image that we must break free 
of, that is, of the theoretical privilege of law and sovereignty, if we wish to analyse power 
within the concrete historical framework of its operation. We must construct an analytics of 
power that no longer takes law as a model and a code" (Foucault 1979: 90).
Foucault thus shows a reluctance to conceive power as an Archimedean point that 
encapsulates the entire social body, and comes to approach it as a relational affair, quite in 
line with Toynbee's delineation of 'environment' above.56 Such approach to power finds a 
precedent in Spinoza. Against the grain at the very time when the foundations of liberalism
56 Cf. Chapter 3, Section 2, Subsection III above.
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were being established, and "an atomistic construal of society as constituted by [...] 
individual purposes" (Taylor 1987: 471-2) was advanced, Spinoza asserted that the social 
body far from being "characterized by a given set of rights or laws" conforms to "a relation 
of conflicting forces" (Montag 1998a: x; Negri 2003 [1991]).57
Ill
The Character Of Situated Structuralism - Foucault's strategy is for sure far from the 
teleological structuralism common in both Hegelianism and Marxism (Foucault 1998 [1971]: 
380) that codes epochs on the basis of their pertinence to thesis (or abstract), antithesis (or 
negative), or synthesis (or concrete); or to their successive modes of production (Marx and 
Engels 1976 [1845]), respectively. Foucault's strategy also defies the transhistoricism 
characteristic of linguistic and anthropological structuralism. The grids of power-knowledge 
are at odds with the alleged social structures that follow from the formal laws of langue 
(Sausurre) or mind (Lévi-Strauss).
In so far as Foucault articulates his historicophilosophical analyses through the irreducible 
'fields/ 'grids/ 'networks' of power/knowledge relations, the assumption that his work is of 
poststructuralist persuasion has to be bracketed out and suspended. Such an appellative 
denotes fully-fledged deconstructions exempt from structural residues, which is a path that 
Foucault explicitly refuses to go down. "[T]he task of contextualization is consonant with 
Foucault's main intellectual strategy" (Poster 1985 [1984]: 157). Foucault (1997: 310) 
encourages the philosophical attitude "consisting in recapturing something eternal that is 
not beyond the present instant, nor behind it, but within it." Against this background, I 
wonder whether we should not firmly come to name Foucault's coherent sets of power- 
knowledge -in  his early work called epistemes— 'situated structures'. In salvaging power- 
knowledge as a grid of analysis, Foucault fulfils the requirements of "a post-Kantian culture, 
one in which there is no all-encompassing discipline which legitimizes or grounds the others" 
(Rorty 1980: 6). Yet Foucault equally evades falling pray to the intemperate relativism by 
which poststructuralism and postmodernity characterize their endeavours.
57 This gives birth to Spinoza's "political theory of the constitutive power of the multitude" (Montag, 1989a: xiv), upon which Antonio Negri 
subsequently builds.
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Subverting Marx's negative conception of power concentrated on the hands of both the 
state and the propertied classes, Foucault's outlook on power is remarkably constructive. 
For the French thinker, power is a source of production and generation of culture. At the 
bottom, and this is the concluding remark to which I have been intending to draw the 
reader's attention from the outset, power-knowledge configurations are Foucault's 
irreducible cultural elements. Each (sub)culture, whether that of the psychiatrists, the penal 
system, political economy, or for that matter, sustainable development, is ineluctably 
traversed by power-knowledge relations -o r, if I may, power-knowledge situated structures.
Given the productive and stable character of Foucault's situated structures — his alleged 
'poststructuralism,' we must distinguish between a temporal postmodernity that 
ideologically attempts to contest the modern critique "but it is not able to do anything but 
prolong that critique" (Latour 1993: 46) and a postmodernity -o r  non-modernity— that 
bespeaks a project utterly unrelated from that of the Modern Age -albeit these two projects 
sometimes seem to overlap. Situated structuralism, as the backbone of a post-modernity 
that has no historical continuity with the Modern Age, may be defined as a number of traits 
that appear constant in a given time and space. Like in Foucault's case, one may conceive of 
some of these traits as being part of the configuration of any situation. This certainly means 
that the selected traits are regarded as the universals that invariably structure contexts. 
However, Foucault culled the variables 'power-knowledge' from his studies in a contingent 
fashion. Foucault's studies in the fields of psychiatry (2001 [1967]), the historical 
constituents of the penal system (2000 [1973]), the surfacing of governmental rationality 
(1978), and the history of sexuality (1979a; 1986; 1988 [1986]) led the French thinker to 
state that the social body and the production of knowledge are inextricably pervaded with 
power relations. "Nothing can appear as an element of knowledge if, on the one hand, it 
does not conform to an ensemble of rules and constraints characteristic, for example, of 
some kind of scientific discourse in a given epoch" (Foucault 1996: 394). Moreover, as the 
actual contents of the power-knowledge relations are in each occasion contigently defined, 
situated structuralism can't be charged with the objectivity assumed in structuralism that is 
completely deterministic of behaviour.
Nietzsche has been retrospectively associated with the opening of the temporal postmodern
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condition (cf. Habermas 1987c; Vattimo 1991 [1988]: 164; Plotnitsky 1994: 2 et passim). Yet 
perhaps his greatest role is in the foundation and practice of non-modern situated 
structuralism (Plotnitsky 1993a: 150-3). The distinction between a temporal postmodernity 
and a philosophical non-modernity is crucial in any events. To the extent that we may claim 
that situated structuralism, qua a non-modern practice, promotes a deconstruction and 
reconfiguration -a  transposition, that is— of two extremes -o f  a logic that complements one 
another and forms a hyposition. It transfigures philosophy and science as epistêmê as 
represented by Hegelian-Marxist teleological structuralism, and Sausurrian, LevhStraussian 
linguist structuralism, on the one hand, and ultra-contextualized postmodernism as in 
Lyotard and Rorty, on the other.
Situated structuralism resonates with neither that which suffocates difference in the name 
of unity nor that contextualism which is so extremely reductionist that relinquishes the 
texture of its own context. With Latour (1993: 62) we may conclude that "the postmoderns 
in fact finish off modernism." Yet the grounds of this derogative statement, against Latour, 
are not their having "definitively taken away the mainspring that had been the source of 
tension" (ibid) between Nature and Society, but for their having annulled any valid 
alternative on which to stand.
IV
Repressive Vs. Emancipatory Grids Of Power-Knowledge -Power-Knowledge asserts that 
there is no innocent science or discourse. Rather, all claims to knowledge exert pronounced 
effects throughout the cultural spatiality. Or, what amounts to the same thing, all claims to 
science are endowed with a marked political dimension -they  irreducibly direct the polity 
into specific directions.
As announced in Chapter I , 58 Foucault's The Order of Things: An Archaeoiogy o f the Human 
Sciences (1980 [1970]) exhibited a disconcerting finding. Namely, our disproportionate focus 
upon the question of the constituency of the human being is a trait characteristic of 
modernity -a  historical formation which comes into being in the West as of the early
58 Cf. Chapter 1, Section 2, Subsection I under the heading '1 / The Analytic Of Finitude, Man andThe Environment' above.
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nineteenth century (Deleuze 1988: 126-129).59 This intellectual tendency goes back to 
Immanuel Kant's Logik, where the query 'Was ist der Mensch?' (Foucault 1980 [1970]: 341) 
was formulated, marking thereby the threshold of the Modern Age. In this context, Foucault 
repeatedly expresses his overt inadvisability to hastily assume that the proliferation of the 
human sciences in the Modern Age may have proven emancipatory to the individual. His 
studies seem indeed to point to a reverse process. Parallel to the instauration of these "so- 
called sciences," a variety of "technologies of power" (Foucault 1988:18) have been steadily 
unfolding their tentacles. Grids of power-knowledge, that is, have passed down the annals of 
history as being of a repressive sign.
Foucault paid undue attention to the putative existence of emancipatory grids of power- 
knowledge in his early writings. "[F]rom his very first work [Foucault] sought to demonstrate 
how every victory of enlightenment was also a triumph of a new and insidious form of 
domination" (Schmidt 1996: 27). In Foucault's archaeologies as much as in his essayistic 
reflections (cf. Foucault 1998 [1969]), discursive practices emerge as chiefly generating 
social relations of domination. "[P]ower is co-extensive with the social body; there are no 
spaces of primal liberty between the meshes of its network" (Foucault 1980: 142). It is only 
in his latter-day works (Discipline and Punish and History of Sexuality) where Foucault's 
conception of the nature of power is punctuated with more sanguine overtones. Whilst he 
keeps emphasizing the ever perilous and frequently destructive dimensions of power, in the 
works towards the end of his career Foucault equally highlights the creative potential of 
power in the formation of truth and knowledge (Gutting 1991 [1989]: 6). On this basis and 
reverting to the works of Foucault's predecessor and distinguished master, Friedrich 
Nietzsche, the case shall be mounted to keep open a conceptual spatiality to the advantage 
of power-knowledge grids leading to liberation. With this distinction in hand well marked, 
and despite the repeated lessons from history pointing to the opposite direction, the 
analytics of transposition resists sanctioning the standard equation of 'civilization' with -  
'iron cage,' to use the metaphor by which Max Weber characterized modernity. When 
succumbing to such equation, there would be no hope left for relevant research question (4) 
on the potential exit from our ecocidal dystopian contemporaneity.
59 As Patrick Curry in a personal communication notes there are scattered earlier manifestations of such an anthropocentrism. Curry asserts 
that Alexander Pope influentially averred in 1734 that 'The proper study of Mankind is Man'.
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One finds, to be sure, the genealogical provenance of 'power-knowledge' in Nietzsche's 
philosophical corpus. Contra Foucault, Nietzsche qualified the "will to power" as tending to 
either affirmation or denial of life (Schrift 1990: 191-3; Deleuze 2001 [1965]). By the same 
token, it can be argued that there are claims to power-knowledge tending to either 
emancipation or repression. Characteristically, repressive claims to knowledge, as Foucault 
would have liked us to have comprehended, generate a regressive social context pervaded 
with inequities. Emancipatory claims to knowledge, as Nietzsche would have liked us to have 
apprehended, are a call for life.
3. From Situated Structures Into Culti
l
Cultus As Transposition - Above in Chapter 2 the rubric 'culture' was suggested in 
asymmetrical opposition to nature and therefore as a valid spatiality wherein to encompass 
the more-than-human drama characterized as it is by multiple relations. In Chapter 3, 
culture was brought on a par with the immanent expanse. In the preceding sections, it was 
intimated that the multiple ties that criss-cross the cultural matrix are pervaded with either 
repressive or emancipatory power-knowledge relations. This section provides culture with 
an additional attribute - i t  endows it with 'historical corporeality.' This is the point where 
culture meets with situated structure and resolves into plural culti.
Both cultus and culture come from the same etymological root -c o lè re ' ('to attend', 'to 
cultivate', 'to respect') and thus both rubrics integrate in them the notion of nature in a 
manner that the latter rubric is dissolved. That said, cultus, the Latin form for 'cult,' conveys 
more forcibly than culture the idea of 'devotion or homage paid' to a set of beliefs -  
knowledge— and a set of social practices -power. Cultus conforms to the set of preferences 
socially selected in any given cultural configuration, "form or epoch" (Derrida 1984a [1968]: 
16). These cultural schemes, in turn, conform to the true a priori of all actions. The reader 
should note that this contingently defined set of a prioris is at odds with logocentrism, 
where truth is assumed to transcend regional structures of power and history. It is worth 
noting that the definition of culture adopted by Arnold J. Toynbee equally emphasizes the
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worshipping element in cultus's etymology. Culture is for Toynbee (1977 [1972]: 43) the set 
of "regularities in the behaviour, internal and external, of the members of a society, 
excluding those regularities which are clearly hereditary in origin."
The notion of cultus has enjoyed its pool of variants within post-Kantian authors. Foucault, 
for instance, spoke of epistemes (Foucault 1980 [1970]: xxii) or "regimes of 'truth'" [ibid, 
2000 [1977]: 132) to refer to the homogeneity of "the mode of being of things" [ibid, 1980 
[1970]: xxiii) across time and space. These epistemic homogeneities largely correspond to 
the situated structures visited in the previous section. Antonio Gramsci (1991 [1971]: 366), 
for his part, coined the term blocco storico —'historic bloc,' a solid structure represented by 
state and society which is only replaced with a new one once the prevailing one exhausts its 
full potential (Cox 1999 [1996]: 131-133). Similarly, Wendy Wheeler (2006: 29) characterizes 
"the moment that a collection of individuals becomes a group" when one detects the 
emergence of a "collective identity in which the group has a life and emergent intelligence 
of its own" -w hen common elements are cultivated.
To name another example from the realm of the philosophy of science, we must register 
without fail Thomas Kuhn's (1996 [1962]) reading of the history of science as a not 
necessarily evolutionary succession of scientific paradigms. Kuhn accomplished a 
systematization of history akin to that of Foucault's but with its repercussions confined to 
the realm of natural science and physics. In his later works, Kuhn transfigured the 'scientific 
paradigm' into a 'disciplinary matrix' to emphasize the homogenizing pull of the dominant 
scientific situated structures. The theorist of systems theory, Fritjof Capra (1988: 145), 
subsequently speaks of a 'social paradigm' as a "constellation of concepts, values, 
perceptions, and practices shared by a community, which form a particular vision of reality 
that is the basis of the way the community organizes itself". In the realm of biochemistry, a 
concept akin to culti can also be found theorized. Manfred Eigen found that self-organization 
in chemical systems occurs on the basis of closed loops also called catalytic cycles. Such 
cycles "are remarkably stable and can persist under a wide range of conditions" (Capra 1996: 
94). The enzymes or catalysts of one cycle were further observed to turn into catalysts of the 
subsequent cycle, suggesting thereby that new culti build on the shambles of the old. Eigen 
named this concatenation of cycles, 'hypercycles.'
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The transition from 'situated structure7 to cultus, on the other hand, mediates the 
differences between a nomothetic and an idiographic approach to knowledge. The 
nomothetic method exhibits a tendency to generalize and derive laws that speak of eternal 
truths, as expressed in the natural and social sciences. /7[S]ociologists almost invariably 
escape [from the historical constraint]; they flee either to the perpetually fixed moment, 
which is, as it were, suspended above time, or to recurrent phenomena that belong to no 
single age7760 (Braudel quoted in Wallerstein 2001: 138). The ideographic outlook, by 
contrast, is based upon a tendency to specify and accord relevance to single events as it is 
the case in traditional historiography. "The facts are out there, waiting as it were to be 
uncovered by the historians who seek the primary data, which are the only true data" (ibid: 
137).
These apparently antithetical trends complement each other, forming an ahistorical 
hyposition, "since they are but two modes of trying to escape from the constraints of 
historical reality" (ibid: 138). Idiographic and nemothetic work alike is of realist nature. By 
contrast, the situated structure that provides the backbone of a cultus historically 
contextualizes the cultural matrix lending it to scrupulous analysis. Culture represents all the 
gamut of possibilities, cultus the concrete set in a specific place and time. Culture is the 
abstract, what never is; cultus the concrete, what is manifest, "history's intelligible aspect" 
(Toynbee 1977 [1972]: 43). A cultus is a mesh of relations constantly fluctuating. In the 
following chapters but in particular in Chapter 9 we will see how the internal components of 
a living cultus allow for different temporalizations.
II
Cultus As Relative Whole -  Premodern thought was typically organismic. The spectrum of 
organismic philosophies shares the belief that all parts of the cosmos are intertwined 
forming a living unit. Modern mechanicism, for its part, turned this unity on its head and 
proclaimed the independence of the parts (Merchant 1980; ch. 4; Bohm 1988: ch. 3). Now 
postmodern science reverts to the holistic approach (Griffin 1988a; Kitchener 1988). To be 
sure, one may well argue that, for all their differences, two of the competing paradigms in 
physics -viz. Newtonian vs. quantum mechanics— feed on the Aristotelian logic
60 In relation to the four times outlined by Braudel, as set out above. Cf. Chapter 5, Section 1 above.
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foundational to philosophy and science as epistêmê. Aristotelian logic is one grounded on a 
disjunctive "either...or..." (Schrift 1995: 17; cf. also Derrida 1997: 179, 215; Kosko 1994; 
1999). Newtonian logic is atomistic: rephrased in Nietzsche's terms (2005 [2001]: § 112; cf. 
also Cox 1999 [1981]: 88), "[w]e are operating only with things that do not exist -w ith  lines, 
surfaces, bodies, atoms, divisible times, divisible spaces". Quantum physics, by contrast, 
emphasizes the whole over the parts, rendering the distinction of one of the axioms of its 
paradigm61. "In twentieth-century science the holistic perspective has become known as 
'systemic'" (Capra 1996:17).
Vitalism, organicism and subsequently systems theory, are opposed to the reduction of 
biology to physics and chem istry-to mechanism, that is. The first two schools maintain that 
although the laws of physics and chemistry are applicable to organisms, they are insufficient 
to fully understand the phenomenon of life. The behaviour of a living organism as an 
integrated whole, it is argued, cannot be understood from the study of its parts alone. As 
systems theorists would put it several decades later, "the whole is more than the sum of its 
parts" (ibid: 25). The systems view in particular emphasizes that the key properties of an 
organism -a  living system— are properties of the whole, which none of the parts have. The 
position that animates the treacherous dualism is nonetheless Aristotelian binary logic. "In 
the new paradigm, the relationship between the parts and the whole is reversed. The 
properties of the parts can be understood only from the dynamics of the whole. In fact, 
ultimately there are no parts at all" (Capra, 1988:147; emphasis added).
In the pendular movement wholeness-parts-wholeness, it seems therefore that we are 
facing another hyposition. The logic that informs this pair of opposites has survived the 
reversion, and "[t]he basic tension [remains] one between the parts and the whole" (Capra 
1996:17). Parts and wholes, therefore, operate as two idealizations or essentialist monisms. 
As such, they may be suspected to fail to politicize the agenda of any specific times. In 
Chapter 4 we have already dismissed materialist mechanicism on the count to merely revert 
to and complement idealism. The postmodern scientist David Bohm (1988: 65) puts his 
finger on the task to be undertaken at the present juncture: "The question is then how to 
understand [...] wholeness." This is equal to saying, 'the question is how to make sense of
61 Attested by the title of Werner Heisenberg's autobiography DerTeil und das Game (The Part and the Whole) (2000 [1996]).
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the plane of immanence/ which stands for an all-indwelling whole.
The notion of 'absolute whole' is politically ineffective, whilst all theory is political in line 
with the first transposition endeavoured in Chapter I . 62 Instead, we may claim that the 
operation of a 'relative whole' is endowed with a political edge. Cultus, which is one 
instantianation of such relative whole, is political precisely on the count that it is a situated 
structure. As opposed to the decontextualized whole, a cultus is positioned within a setting 
determined by utterly contingent socio-political factors. Cultus deprives us from further 
speaking of parts and wholes in absolute terms. Whenever we try and pinpoint the parts or 
wholes at issue, we find them conforming to relative wholes irreducibly entangled in a socio­
political mesh. It is this set of socio-political contingencies that characterizes the relative 
whole which positions the latter as the third figure or transposition of the part/whole 
hyposition.
H H H
HHHHH
62 Cf. Chapter 1, Section 1, Subsection II above.
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Chapter 6
HHHHnnnnHHHHttttttMMHHHnHHMttHHHnnHHMttHH 
a x t a o a o o o
Transposition As Simultaneous 
Correlation And Dynamism: 
Low-Culture As Dis-Embodimentf 
Middle-Culture As Dis-Embeddedness 
And Hish-Culture As De- 
Contextualization
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"If the truth is the whole, as Hegel claimed, then our current splintered knowledge 
is so far from truth that it is hardly worth learning [...] Ecology is whole. It 
brings together the broken, analysed, alienated, fragmented pieces of man's [sic] 
image of the world [...] Unless the physical, the social and the moral dimensions 
of our knowledge are integrated in a unified paradigm offering a vision of
wholeness, no solutions to our problems are likely."
-Herman Daly63
"The study of human affairs is, in truth, monolithic. The dissection of this mental 
monolith into the so-called disciplines is, at the best, a convenient operational 
device, while at its worst -that is to say, if it is taken as being a reflexion of
reality —it is a distortion of truth."
-Arnold J. Toynbee64
HHHHHHHHRBHHHHHHHHHHHH HHHHMHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH HHHHHHHHHHHBHHHHHHHHHH
Synopsis - Having historicized the cultural matrix by way of the rubric cultus in Chapter 5, 
Chapter 6 proceeds with an initial exploration of the conditions of possibility of knowledge 
within culture. By mingling Foucault's attributed situated structures with Georgescu- 
Roegen's work on the entropy process, Chapter 6 proposes a reshuffling of the atomized 
disciplines into three main domains. Entropy, subsequently reread as re-production on pain 
of reductionism, is seen as a sine qua non cognitive sphere that comes to complement 
Foucault's power-knowledge grids of analysis. The spheres of power and knowledge are
63 Daly 1973b: 173.
“  Toynbee 1992 [1966]: 137.
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further regarded as largely coincident with Georgescu-Roegen's economic variables 
"purposive activity" and "enjoyment of life", respectively. These three proto-transpositions 
are aligned with the cultural matrix and turn into low- middle- and high-culture.
Low-culture speaks of the conditions of re-production, middle-culture of the collective 
sphere, high-culture of the processes of nomization. Low- middle- and high-culture register 
one single phenomenon from three complementary perspectives. Correspondingly, they are 
called the correlative transpositions. The latter subvert the principle of causality and are 
instead presented along a qualitative—which eventually is also quantitative— gradation of 
dis-embodiment, dis-embeddedness and de-contextualization. Given that the degree in the 
continuum is not fixed but, as it will be further revealed in Chapter 8, susceptible to constant 
fluctuation, dis-embodiment, dis-embeddedness and de-contextualization are named the 
dynamic transpositions.
Flowchart of the cognitive division presented in this chapter
LOW- MIDDLE-AND HIGH-CULTURE
Objective Reunification of the disciplines.
Modus
operand!
Tripartite; without overlooking the remaining two dimensions when 
focusing upon one.
Dimension Highlighted Aspects Analytical Relevance
High-
culture
Embodiment; reproduction; 
production
Degree of reproductive 
dis-embodiment
Middle-
culture
Embeddedness; power; public 
polity
Degree of political 
dis-embeddedness
Low-
culture
Context; knowledge; meaning; 
philosophy
Degree of cognitive 
de-contextualization.
1. The Proto-Correlative And Dynamic Transpositions Of Culture: 
Knowledge—Power—Reproduction
l
Knowledge-Power-Entropy And Its Implications Over Both Sustainable Development And 
The Very Long-Term Spacetime Continuum- Above, Toynbee's suggestion to read the
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environment as a relational grid was assumed as a proto-cultural matrix.65 Subsequently it 
was suggested that the non-transcendent character of the immanent plane shouldn't be 
confounded with immediacy. Rather, an investigation into the conditions of possibility of this 
plane is in order in line with research question (3) of this study. In the previous chapter, a 
situated structure was posited as one such condition. Subsequently rebaptized cultus, the 
category "situated structure" was proposed as a way to historicize the cultural matrix while 
preserving weighty structural factors. In the present chapter, the focus falls upon the 
organization of the elements that make up situated structures.
In Chapter 5, power-knowledge was presented as Foucault's irreducible elements of culture. 
Yet, as it was noted above, this grid excludes the body as a core part of culture. Power- 
knowledge appears as reductionist for the articulation of an immanent spatiality that is to  
grapple with the ecocidal mode of engagement. I would next like to present the idiosyncratic 
work of Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen as complementing Foucault's power-knowledge 
situated structures -fo r  the sake of convenience we shall henceforth refer to the latter as 
knowledge-power.
Georgescu-Roegen has been retrospectively recognized for his pioneering work in ecological 
economics (Martinez-Alier 1994 [1990]: 1-2; Faber et al. 1998c [1996]: 105; Valero 1998). 
Whilst the breadth of his scholarship is commendable, arguably, the most original part of 
Georgescu-Roegen's work corresponds to the application of thermodynamics to the 
economic process66 —in particular its second or entropy law. One of the categorical 
conclusions of Georgescu-Roegen's research is that ""the economic process [...] is entropie in 
each of its fibres [...] [It] consists of a continuous transformation of low entropy into high 
entropy, that is, into irrevocable waste or, with a topical term, into pollution" (Georgescu- 
Roegen 1974 [1971]: 282, 281; emphasis in the original). Georgescu-Roegen aims to clarify 
that it is not only the case that the environment -indeed, a Cartesian environment— tends 
by itself to disorder. Rather, human interference in nature for the production of artifacts 
further enhances this relentless thermodynamic process. Or, to reverse the statement, "the 
full meaning of the Entropy Law is not that the qualitative degradation occurs only in
65 Cf. Chapter 3, Section 2, Subsection I above.
66 For an explanation of the implications of this law, see Part III, Section [6.5.] 'A Failure in Modern Forms of Agriculture: Industrial, 
Biotechnological, Nanotechnlogical' below.
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connection with mechanical work, performed consciously by some intelligent beings [...] 
[T]he free energy of a piece of coal will eventually degrade into useless energy even if the 
piece is left in its lode" (Georgescu-Roegen 1974 [1971]: 6).
In response to the inexorability of the entropie process, perhaps as a ruse to render its 
unpalatable implications tolerable, Georgescu-Roegen contends that in his economic world 
two additional variables deserve superlative attention. One is "purposive activity," the other 
"the enjoyment of life" (ibid: 281-283; Georgescu-Roegen 1996 [1971]: 80). 'Purposive 
activity" is characterized as "the activity of human individuals which [...] sort and direct 
environmental low entropy according to some definite rules -although these rules may vary 
with time and place" (Georgescu-Roegen 1974 [1971]: 282). By purposive activity 
Georgescu-Roegen is of course alluding to the polity; the set of decisions taken by civil 
society -o r  more specifically, politico-economic elites, which wield an irreducible bearing 
upon the fate of low entropy. On the other hand, the ecological economist characterizes the 
"enjoyment of life" as economic value or the "value that life has for every life-bearing 
individual" (ibid):
The statement made earlier -th at, from a purely physical viewpoint, the economic process only 
transforms valuable natural resources (low entropy) into waste (high entropy) -is thus completely 
vindicated. But the puzzle of why such a process should go on is still with us. And it will remain a 
puzzle as long as we do not see that the true economic output of the economic process is not a 
material flow of waste, but an immaterial flux: the enjoyment of life. If we do not recognize the 
existence of this flux we are not in the economic world. Nor do we have a complete picture of the 
economic process if we ignore the fact that this flux -which, as an entropie feeling, must 
characterize life at all levels— exists only as long as it can continuously feed itself on 
environmental low entropy (Georgescu-Roegen 1996 [1971]: 80).
In this light we can conclude that in Georgescu-Roegen's economic world, value is codified 
via processes of meaning-creation. These processes in turn inform specific purposive 
activities which determine the fate of low entropy.
It is important to observe that Georgescu-Roegen (1974 [1971]: 282) resolves to culturalize 
the inexorable "entropie march of the material environment". This ecological economist 
doesn't limit himself to the embedment of productive processes in their ecological basis. 
Georgescu-Roegen simultaneously exposes those processes to the socio-political reality and
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worldview that feeds them. On this reading, this leading ecological ecologist is in relation to 
ecological studies what Marx was to liberal political economy. Marx endeavoured to 
deconstrue the surplus fallacy naturalized in John Locke's and Adam Smith's work (Pearson 
1971 [1957]: 331-334; Dobb 1977 [1970]) by embedding it in its larger cultural setting. In so 
doing, Marx turned the theory of surplus-value, "this very Eden of the rights of man [where] 
alone rule Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham" (Marx 1983 [1867]: 172), into a theory 
of exploitation. Marx introduced political economic perspectivism into the naturalization of 
what, at bottom, were unequal social relations of production.
In a similar fashion but on the basis of the inexorable march of entropy, Georgescu-Roegen 
urges us to culturalize the concept of entropy. It is therefore no longer suited that we 
measure the unsustainability of an industrial cultus, let alone that we pretend to render it 
fully sustainable. Once instrumenta movendi are either considered -as in the Brundtland 
Report— or detected -as in the cultural matrix— as irreducible cultural elements, the 
starting point of the economic world is its conspicuous unsustainability. This truism indicates 
that the perspective of durability, perpetuity may be a fully equivocated variable of analysis; 
one which obscures the power relations implicated in the development of instrumenta 
movendi. A credible post-ecocidal critical theory may instead have to begin by posing 
queries on whose interests the purposive activities that enhance the entropie rate serve. 
"Cities are never self-contained or self-sustaining. If you want practically endless 
sustainability, you have to go back to the farming culture of the time before cities. Cities are 
big parasites, major ecological stains on their environment" (Allen 2004: 235). The 
development of urban sprawls lets us formulate the following set of queries: under which 
understanding of the enjoyment of life, which purposive activities are being informed, to 
justify the dissipation of which amounts of low entropy? When we affirm the sustainability 
of existence, these critical queries on the knowledge-power relations that determine the 
fate of entropy are unduly asphyxiated. In reconciling the notion of sustainability with the 
development of industrial instrumenta movendi, as Our Common Future intends, industrial 
life is sanctioned and positioned as a sine qua non stage of the civilizational teleology.
To carry on with our task of organizing the elements that compose a cultus, the insight that 
must be retained at this stage is the following. The intrinsically unsustainable, self­
destructive character of industrial culti is one of the reasons that renders a crude ecological
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economic world absurd. To the entropy law, the two variables 'purposive activity' and 
'enjoyment of life' must be added. Interestingly, there is considerable affinity between these 
two variables and Foucault's characterization of 'power' and 'knowledge', respectively. 
Purposive activities are always political; their characterization is well steeped in power 
relations. The manner life is enjoyed follows, for its part, from a set of values inscribed in a 
worldview; there is a cognitive process implicated in it. Georgescu-Roegen's economic world 
is tripartite. It is made up of enjoyment of life, purposive activity and entropy. Once we 
agree to equate Georgescu-Roegen's 'purposive activity' with Foucault's 'knowledge', the 
ecological economist's 'purposive activity' with the French philosopher's 'power', we 
immediately realize that Foucault's knowledge-power grid of analysis ought to be 
complemented with the category 'entropy'. We may therefore tentatively consider 'entropy' 
as the embodied completion of the knowledge-power situated structure.
It must be noted that the splitting of culture into building blocks finds a precedent in the 
work of Martin Heidegger. "Being-in-the-World stands for a unitary phenomenon [and tjhis 
primary datum must be seen as a whole" (Heidegger 1962: § 53). Similarly, culture forms a 
continuum of its own. "But while Being-in-the-world cannot be broken up into contents 
which may be pieced together, this does not prevent it from having several constitutive 
items in its structure" (ibid). The manifestation of each situated culture -o r  cultus— is no 
hindrance to the existence of three correlative elements, namely, knowledge-power- 
entropy.
II
From Entropy Into Re-Production - Georgescu-Roegen has been accused of adopting an 
overly pessimistic approach to the entropy law. Alternative outlooks on this process point to 
a more sanguine picture. Ilya Prigogine’s dissipative structure theory, to name another noted 
contribution, places the emphasis upon the organizational, creative and complexity-building 
dimensions of the entropie process (Prigogine and Stengers 1984: ch 5; Jackson 1996: 7-21; 
Faber et al. 1998c [1996], 1998d [1996]).
Whilst Prigogine’s work is overall relevant for informing the cultural matrix, the charges 
against Georgescu-Roegen's bleak outlook concern us only tangentially. They don't quite
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stop entropy from being a restrictive factor in the productive process. This law is most 
clearly restrictive in industrial culti, where its dissipative and therefore polluting capacities 
are foremost apparent. Contrariwise, culti which have omitted the use of industrial 
technology have most ostensibly benefited from the organizational and creative facets of 
the entropie process. This fact owes explanation to the scale and pace at which artefacts are 
being manufactured, which in non-industrial culti tend to fall in step with eco-cycle rhythms. 
In highly explicit terms, the field of ethno-ecology has designated the inhabitants of such 
culti 'ecosystem people' (Toledo 1999: 6).
There is an additional weighty argument in favour of virtually overlooking the pessimistic 
charges to which Georgescu-Roegen's entropie approach has been subjected; namely, a 
more optimistic understanding of the second law of thermodynamics, which still renders this 
law an insufficient basis on which to build a theory of value (Martinez-Alier 1994 [1990]: 92; 
Hornborg 1998:134; 2001: 47). Even when we endorse, as we should, the organizational and 
creative dimensions of the entropie process, the equation of the whole of culture with 
entropy remains unsatisfactory. "Low-entropy [...] is a necessary condition for a thing to 
have value. This condition, however, is not also sufficienf' (Georgescu-Roegen 1974 [1971]: 
282).
It follows that the knowledge-power-entropy formula arrived at above is in need of 
correction. I have attempted to make the point that the manifestation of industrial 
production is the factor that accelerates entropie processes. It follows that it may be 
advisable to replace the variable 'entropy' with that of 're-production'. Re-production is less 
restrictive a term than entropy. This banner captures the decisive factors in the entropie 
process. Culti oriented towards the reproduction of life benefit from the creative dimension 
of the entropie process. By contrast, culti geared at industrial production enhance the 
entropie process.
3. The Correlative And Dynamic Transpositions Of Culture
I
From The Principle Of Causality Into A Continuum -  Nietzsche confronts head-on the
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principle of causality endemic to the epistemological trajectory.67 The German philosopher 
(Nietzsche 2005 [2001]: § 112) sees modern science as a "humanize[d]" construction of 
cause and effect. Hence his call to regard these two variables "as a continuum," instead of 
"as arbitrary division and dismemberment" (ibid). In seeing the entire "stream of the event," 
Nietzsche contends, we can "reject the concept of cause and effect and deny all 
determinedness [...]; there is probably never such a duality" (ibid). The German 
philosopher's transvaluation resonates well with quantum teachings, where both 
anticausality and indeterminacy have been proclaimed. "A decisive feature of the quantum 
postulate [...] is that it also implies the acausal character of the quantum behavior of light, as 
against the acausal character of the wave or continuous theory of light. Thus the quantum 
postulate leads to the anticausality and indeterminacy of quantum theory" (Plotnitsky 1994: 
7).
Nietzsche (2005 [2001]: § 112) further informs us of the modus operand! of the "continuum 
[that] faces us [but] from which we isolate ourselves". It only admits "a diverse succession" 
or "many degrees and many refinements of gradation" (ibid; Nietzsche 2003: § 23). The 
continuum "recast[s] all substantive differences in kind in terms of differences of degree of 
will to power" (Schrift 1990: 224 n 17)—of degree of immanence, that is. 'Differences in 
kind' denote absolute perspectives: 'The car is red', 'This exercise is tough', 'An unfair 
decision'. By contrast, the plane of immanence only manifests grades of a quality-redness, 
toughness, fairness— as it relates -relative— to other qualitative degrees.68 In undoes any 
statement made in absolute terms, by "deploy(ing) the space of a dispersion" (Foucault 
1972:10).
Now, above we have learnt that culture is tripartite. One of its dimensions relates to re­
production, another to power, and a third one to knowledge. We need three corresponding 
spaces that mark the immanent dispersion now mentioned. In the following sections, dis­
embodiment will be presented as the continuum of re-production, dis-embeddedness as 
that of power, and de-contextualization as that of knowledge. Given that the degrees 
registered in these continua are not fixed but dynamic, we shall call these three continua the
67 Cf. Chapter 10, Section 3 below.
68 For the development of this topic cf. Chapter 10, Section 3 below.
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dynamic transpositions. To further give more coherence to our conditions of in-transitivity, 
the correlation re-production, power, knowledge will be renamed low-culture, middle- 
culture and high-culture, respectively. These will be concordantly named the correlative 
transpositions.
II
Low-Culture As Conditions Of Re-Production And Dis-Embodiment - Reproduction is a 
central topic among ecofeminist quarters (Mellor 1997; Salleh 1997; Shiva 2002 [1989]). Karl 
Marx and Karl Polanyi are two authors who extensively deal with the issue of production. 
Subsequently, a number of predominantly eco-Marxists have reworked Marx's and Polanyi's 
initial contributions (O'Connor 1998e; Block and Somers, 1987 [1984]; Block 2001). Albeit 
not systematically, Karl Marx mentions three types of productive conditions. Namely, [i.] 
"the personal conditions," [ii.] the "communal, general conditions of social production" and 
[iii.] the "external physical conditions" (O'Connor 1998e: 146). Simply put, Marx refers to [i.] 
laborpower; [ii.] social and physical infrastructure (such as education and roads); and [iii.] 
'natural1 conditions. The latter in turn bifurcate into conditions which operate as means of 
subsistence (fruitful soils, waters teeming with fish, etc.), and conditions which are turned 
into instruments of labour (waterfalls, navigable rivers, wood, metal, coal, etc.) (ibid).
Karl Polanyi, for his part, conceives of labour, land (and, although less relevant for our 
purposes here, money) as "fictitious commodities." To fathom the reason why he regards 
these as dubious commodities we must indeed proceed with a brief distinction between 
'use-value/ and 'exchange-value' or commodity. In Marxist parlance, a product is endowed 
with use-value or/and exchange-value. An artefact is a value in use when it is "capable of 
satisfying human wants" (Marx 1983 [1867]): 76). A use-value turns into an exchange-value 
when through its selling in the market the worth of the manufactured article is "greater than 
the sum of the values of the commodities used in its production" (ibid: 181). To grasp the 
intricate rapport between use- and exchange-value, and, most importantly, the taking over 
of the former by the latter in a capitalist mode of production, we must understand that "use- 
values are only produced by capitalists because, and in so far as, they are the material 
substratum, the depositories of exchange-value" (ibid).
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To resume the construal of the link between conditions of production, fictitious 
commodities, use-value and exchange-value, we should spell out a truism which often goes 
unnoticed. The interpenetration between conditions of production and manufactured 
products (in either use- or exchange-value) is an inexorably hierarchical one; the former is a 
sine quo non of the two latter. Conditions of production are a prerequisite for the existence 
of a product in use- or exchange-value. In a similar manner, fictitious commodities (land and 
labour) are a priori elements in the productive process. Yet in order to exercise this function, 
the conditions of production and the 'fictitious commodities' alike must be conditions of 
reproduction. The "enthusiasm for making and having forgot that the reproduction of life 
itself, not the production of visible goods, is always already the first historical act" (Salleh 
1997:139).
One of the major contributions of Polanyi to the fields of economic anthropology has been 
that of ushering in historical perspective. Polanyi distinguishes between regulated and self­
regulating market economies on the basis of their respective treatment of "fictitious 
commodities." The economic anthropologist found that the regulated market economy, 
proper to the feudal guild-system and to the subsequent mercantilist era when guilds were 
'nationalized' (Polanyi 2001 [1944]: 72-73), kept land, labour (and money) extra 
commercium. It is only with the advent of the self-regulating market economy in nineteenth- 
century England that these elements are treated as sheer commodities. In Polanyi's 
historical anthropological research, the disembeddedness of economic institutions from the 
social fabric emerges as an unprecedented practice in human history:
True, no society can exist without a system of some kind which ensures order in the production 
and distribution of goods. But that does not imply the existence of separate economic 
institutions; normally, the economic order is merely a function of the social order. Neither under 
tribal nor feudal nor under mercantile conditions was there [...] a separate economic system in 
society. Nineteenth-century society, in which economic activity was isolated and imputed to a 
distinctive economic motive, was a singular departure (ibid: 74).
In sum, Polanyi and his research group (Polanyi et al. 1971 [1957]) have credibly 
demonstrated that the arrival of the self-regulating market represented the deprivation of 
the reproductive dimension to the conditions of production as they were being incorporated
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into the economy. As stated above, it was brought to light the fact that the ecocidal mode of 
engagement exacts a normative horizon. Echoing the "ecofeminist revaluation of the mode 
of reproduction" (Salleh 1997: 140), the cultural matrix takes this mode as prescriptive over 
that of production.
Fields of knowledge that deal with the reproductive dimension of culture, such as ecology, 
ecological economics and political ecology, place enormous emphasis upon the variables 
'energy' and 'matter.' These two rubrics are also decisive in thermodynamics. Edward 
Goldsmith, on the other side, condemns the conceptual simplifications that serve as a 
scientific basis for the mainstream quantitative method. For this eco-philosopher, ecology 
proper conforms to a multifactorial science: "Why should energy be the currency of nature? 
Why not resources, or information, or organization? Why should we not seek to understand 
nature in terms of a model that makes use of all these and many other relevant variables?" 
(Goldsmith 1998: 65). Ecologists B.C. Patten and Eugene Odum further suggest that 
reductionism must be questioned if only on grounds of the intrinsic precarious character of 
any single variable: "every ecologist who has ever made an energy or material flow model of 
an ecosystem is painfully aware of its deficiencies in terms of relevant information omitted" 
(quoted in Goldsmith 1998: 67). Similarly, Hornborg (2001: 118) points out that "matter" 
and "energy" are "culture-specific 'arbitrary fixings'". When pitted against, say, "Eastern 
philosophy," these two variables could well appear as "different aspects or manifestations of 
a single existence" (ibid; cf. also Talbot 1996 [1991]). Not surprisingly, expressions in the 
direction of postmodern science have reacted against the choices inherent to the modern 
paradigm -science as epistêmê- and have conflated "the energy-information-matter 
continuum [...] into concepts such as negative entropy and negentropy [...] and the cognate 
form exergÿ’ (ibid).
The analytics of transposition begs the questions: do these two variables assist us in the 
casting of light upon any of our research questions? Do they account for the ecocidal mode 
of engagement? And if so, should these rubrics be part of the conditions of in-transitivity of 
that knowledge that is to walk us out of this lethal mode of engagement? As discussed in 
Chapter 4, the cultural matrix advances the rubric 'embodiment' to capture the physical 
dimension of existence. Embodiment privileges bodies as the unit on the basis of which
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relations are established. Bodies are inviolable constituents of reality. Their shapes, rhythms, 
colours, textures don't lend to atomic reductionism. From this perspective it follows that the 
cultural matrix can't proceed to register the rubrics 'matter' and 'energy' as defined in 
science as epistêmê. These variables shatter the body. What is more, the codification of 
'matter' and 'energy' as valuable scientific variables leads to the atomic bomb and to nuclear 
energy. When we aim to privilege a non-ecocidal perspective, there seems instead to be 
some worth in attending to the materialism identified in socio-psychological studies. In the 
context of this research, materialistic values are associated with the primacy lent to 
consumer goods. It follows that matter is regarded as the exclusive stuff of manufactured 
products. "'[MJaterialism' [...], its physical enactment with its physical effects, has 
increasingly made itself into a determinant reality, a reality that overrides that of nature," to 
quote again Brennan's (2000: 178) telling passage. It is this matter that obstructs eco-cycles 
the one registered in the cultural matrix.
Contra matter and energy, the cultural matrix pays heed to embodied forms. It is interested 
in establishing the degree to which a cultus respects the qualitative aspects of these 
embodied forms. We may establish a gradation of dis-embodiment. The modes of 
production and reproduction relate in very specific ways to this continuum. A cultus that 
runs on the mode of production will mark a high degree of disembodiment. One that runs on 
the mode of reproduction will present a high degree of embodiment.
Dis-embodiment conforms to a dynamic gradation or continuum. In so far as it is embodied 
and concerned with re-production, it is the most visible dimension of culture, with, as it 
were, its feet on the ground. W e may therefore call the reproductive dimension of culture 
low-culture.
Ill
Middle-Culture As Collective Institutions And Dis-Embeddedness - Many of the authors 
who endorse holistic horizons question the academic independence bestowed on economic, 
political and social affairs. In his epoch-making Stone Age Economics, the cultural 
anthropologist Marshall Sahlins (2004 [1972]: ix) indicts the division at issue by appealing to 
the reality of vernacular culti. In non-Western(ized) culti, "rather than as separate sphere of
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existence, economic activity is perceived as encompassed in cultural order. Hence it needs to 
be understood as in the relative terms of a given mode of existence." Sahlins's integral 
outlook sets an apposite direction into which to take the cultural matrix: 'economic activity 
is perceived as encompassed in cultural order.1
The Marxist sociologist, Immanuel Wallerstein, for his part, draws a historical parallel 
between the ascendancy of liberalism and the atomization of knowledge. "The 'naming' of 
the disciplines -th a t is, the structure of the presumed division of intellectual labour reflected 
very much the triumph of liberal ideology" (Wallerstein 2001: 19). The new forces in the 
production of meaning and organization of knowledge supplanted those of the Antic 
Regime, where preponderance was rather given to the university faculties of theology, 
philosophy, law and medicine (ibid: 18).
The transition from the Antic Regime to liberalism is customarily associated with the advent 
of the French Revolution. Wallerstein contends that the substantive turning point brought 
about by this historical event was the demonstration that change within the world-system 
(or globally dominant cultus)69 had turned into a palpable menace (ibid; 2004a). The very 
real possibility that oppressed quarters could instigate a modification of the balance of 
forces within the world-system conduced the world bourgeoisie to develop a highly effective 
counterrevolutionary strategy. This consisted of appearing tolerant of change, thereby co­
opting the revolutionary banner while repelling its agenda. The world bourgeoisie would 
henceforth unscrupulously absorb the signifier of change, while disposing of its signified. "It 
was only by accepting the normality of change that the world bourgeoisie had a chance of 
containing it and slowing it down" (ibid: 15).
The exigencies of tolerating change by controlling it generated a patent urge within the 
liberal world-system to obtain variegated data of contemporary realities. State 
bureaucracies grew in need of statistics ('the science of the state') in order to manage 
populations and their resources, duties with which the emerging officialdom was steadily 
charged (Foucault 2000 [1978]: 211-222). Liberal ideology started seeking information 
regarding the market, the state and every-day life. Hence the birth of economics, political
69 In this study the capitalist world-system to which Wallerstein refers is named, in chapter 9, cultus of Leviathan.
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science and sociology.
In keeping with Sahlins's position, Wallerstein (2001: 4) vividly calls for a questioning of the 
disciplinary boundaries established between the economic, the political and the social 
spheres: "the most enduring (and misleading) legacy of nineteenth-century social science -  
the division of social analysis into three arenas, three logics, three 'levels' —the economic, 
the political, and the socio-cultural [—...] stands in the middle of the road, in granite, 
blocking our intellectual advance." Echoing Sahlins's and Wallerstein's holistic turn, the 
cultural matrix shall lump the economic, the social and the political logics together into just 
one cultural dimension: namely, middle-culture. The three logics speak of the collective 
arrangement of culture, of its decision-making capacities.
Middle-culture testifies to the actual existence of the Aristotelian zoon politikon ('political 
animal'). Yet in the cultural matrix, the political animal exceeds anthropocentrism. The 
cultural zoon politikon not only speaks for the corporate action undertaken by the human 
species, but it also testifies to an extant political horizon across all actors in the fauna, flora, 
mineral and other kingdoms. In the cultural matrix all embodied forms are endowed with 
politics of their own. "No doubt Man [sic], like the Ant and the Bee, is a social animal by 
nature, and would be going against his own nature if he were to refuse to express himself in 
social action. Indeed, any act of self-expression is bound to be a social act as well, since 
there can be no self-expression without an audience" (Toynbee 1956: 5 9 )/°
From a pronounced anthropocentric position Sergio Sismondo (1993: 519) confidently 
deprives "natural" entities such as "water, rocks, trees, and newts" from participating in 
"institutions" on the grounds that the latter "have to be human products". From the 
perspective of the cultural matrix it is instead asserted that 'water, rocks, trees and newts' 
also enjoy their own public sphere or middle-culture. These entities are corporatively aligned 
and organized in a prominent manner. "[0]rganisms are no longer understood as passive 
subjects of random mutation but as active construers of their environments" (Wheeler 2006: 
28). Unlike many forms of human organization, water, rocks, trees and newts know no 
privacy; their expression and organization are always communitarian. This is how their
70 Fora continuation on the topic of the subject cf. Chapters, Section 2.
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institutional dimension manifests. To the extent that institutions erected and manned by 
some segments of the human species fail to respect water, rocks, trees and newts, or 
instrum entale the latter for their gain and advantage, evinces against Sismondo's position, 
even more spectacularly the extant institutional dimension of these embodied forms.
Each move endeavoured by each actor exceeds individuality. This is the message of middle- 
culture. There is a transpersonal aspect to all actions and intentions. With their regular and 
habituated behaviour, the entirety of embodied forms is engaged in the ongoing process of 
weaving the collective cultural fabric. On this grounds Sismondo (1993: 519) characterizes 
the category Institution/ as he comments on and borrows from Peter Berger's and Thomas 
Luckmann's The Social Construction of Reality: "when habitualized actions are recognized 
and involve interactions of more than one type of actor, then there exist institutions."
In the previous section we saw how low-culture gains a continuum along which to mark 
qualitative gradation with the category dis-embodiment. Dis-embodiment was the dynamic 
transposition of low-culture. Middle-culture also needs its corresponding dynamic 
transposition to mark the extent to which the collective aspects of a cultus are respected. 
Karl Polanyi uses "[t]he term 'embeddedness' [to] express[...] the idea that the economy is 
not autonomous, as it must be in economic theory, but subordinated to politics, religion, 
and social relations" (Block 2001: xxiii-xiv). By extension we may say that economic, social 
and political institutions are embedded in a cultus to the extent that they respect its middle- 
culture or autochthonous traditions. These institutions should be considered as largely 
disembedded, when they are alien to the ancestral traditions of the cultus where they are 
implemented. Dis-embeddedness shall thus be adopted as the dynamic transposition of 
middle-culture.
There are a number of factors that determine the degree of dis-embeddedness. After 
Ferdinand de Tonnies's noted distinction, the cultural matrix is sensitive to the implications 
of middle-culture as Gemeinschaft -community— and middle-culture as Gesellshcaft — 
society— (cf. Polanyi 1971 [1957]: 69-70). Issues of ownership, such as distinct regimes of 
property: private, state, common and open (Hardin 1968; Martinez-Alier 2002: 74-78) also
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affect the degree of dis-embeddedness. Legal bodies such as Roman, Anglo-Saxon and 
customary law (cf. Benson 1999) are also registered in middle-culture -they determine the 
extent to which a cultus is more or less dis-embedded. Finally, modes of distribution such as 
exchange, reciprocity and redistribution (Polanyi 2001 [1944]; 1971 [1957]: 70) also fall 
within the purview of middle-culture -they  too are decisive factors in the establishment of 
the degree of dis-embeddedness.
In the wake of John Maynard Keynes and Georg Simmel, Anthony Giddens (1992 [1990]) 
speaks of 'disembedding' as a salient trait of modernity. Giddens mentions two forms of dis- 
embeddedness: capital and specialized expertise. Both are forms of distancing of space­
time. Money conforms to symbolic tokens, "a medium of exchange which negates the 
content of goods or services by substituting for them an impersonal standard" (ibid: 22). 
Professionals -lawyers, architects, doctors, engineers, computer scientists— are consulted 
by the lay masses upon a periodic or irregular basis for aspects of life -divorce, housing, 
health, road traffic, computers— that influence us upon a continuous basis. Expert systems 
are disembedding mechanisms in view of the impersonal nature of tests applied to evaluate 
technical knowledge, which "remove social relations from the immediacies of context" (ibid: 
28).
Yet Giddens is for us more relevant for what he leaves unrelated -namely, the link between 
dis-embeddedness and dis-embodiment. The theorist mentions that sooner or later social 
relations exact re-embedding rituals. It is for this reason that businesspeople or academics 
travel long distances "to see the whites of the eyes of colleagues and enemies alike, to 
reaffirm and, more centrally, update the basis of trust" (Deirdre Boden quoted in Giddens 
1992 [1990]: 87). What must be noted is that this long-distance travel in order to re-embed 
social relations is at a high low-cultural price: it entails the disembodiment of a good number 
of ecocycles and biorhythms. It is in this light that we may claim that Giddens cross- 
disciplinary sociology remains unsuited -low-culturally disembedded— to address the 
ecocidal mode of engagement.
IV
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High-Culture As Processes Of Nomization And De-Contextualization- In the previous two 
sections we have seen how the categories 're-production' and 'power' have been resolved 
into two conditions of in-transitivity. Re-production has been renamed low-culture. The 
dynamic space which registers the extent to which a cultus runs on the mode of production 
or that of re-production has been called 'dis-embodiment'. Power has been tallied with 
middle-culture. The extent to which social, political and economic institutions abide by the 
traditions common in a cultus, is captured in a continuum called 'dis-embeddedness'. Here 
we are to convert the category 'knowledge' into its corresponding correlative and dynamic 
transpositions. If re-production is reread as low-culture, and power as middle-culture, by 
default, the remaining building block must be associated with high-culture.
High-culture denotes a constellation of cognitive processes developed in relation to a set of 
values. The key message that high-culture intends to convey is that knowledge isn't value- 
free. It inexorably emanates from a specific cultural configuration with middle- and low- 
cultural dimensions. "The simple fact is that no measurement, no experiment or observation 
is possible without a relevant theoretical framework" (D.S. Kothari quoted in Prigogine and 
Stengers 1984: 293), where theoretical framework is a conspicuous reference to high- 
culture. Assumptions on life and death (Becker 1998), the good life, the ethical and the 
immoral, the sacred and the profane (Durkheim 1965 [1912]) codify a "universe of
discourse" (Bourdieu 2005 [1997]: 159-171) or "disciplinary matrix" (Kuhn 1977) or, in our 
own terms, a cultus. This forms the basis for the production of knowledge. High-cultural 
processes largely correspond to those of nomization as characterized in the field of 
anthropology. Processes of nomization are defined as creation and maintenance of meaning 
to placate anomie or personal and social nihilism (Jackson 2006d: 368-369 et passim).
Above, Bateson's proposal for an ecology of mind was mentioned in passing.71 Bateson 
interprets all systems of the living natural world "as being 'minds' or 'mental processes'" 
(Charlton 2008: 2). The proposal of this theorist points to the fact that plants, trees, rocks, 
the skies, rivers, in sum all embodied forms, enjoy a high-culture.
High-culture also operates along a spatiality where at one end adequate knowledge is 
registered and at the other inappropriate cognition. Adequate knowledge is associated with
71 Cf. Chapter 3, Section 3 above.
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those cognitive clusters that spring from a set of values endogenous to a given cultus. We 
say that this knowledge is contextualized. The term mythos indicates both statement and 
story. In a contextualized high-culture, there is no split between tale and statement, story 
and fact. There is no distinction between objective knowledge, discursive story and ethical 
considerations (De Lucia 2008). Indigenous communities emerge as conforming to highly 
contextualized culti. It is only science as epistëmê that intends to extricate fact from 
narrative and value-laden considerations. However, as the cultural matrix intends to exhibit 
with the transposition high-culture, all statements are shaped by a set of beliefs. It follows 
that when 'objective scientific research' is said to be conducted, it is the mindset of the 
scientist and that of the school of thought where she or he belongs, that are informing the 
production of knowledge. This set of statements is therefore decontextualized from the 
values and beliefs that inform the culti to which this knowledge is attributed.
Decontextualization occurs "when the thinker fails to realize that the framework to which 
they belong is a particular viewpoint" (Welburn 2004: 41-2). This is nonetheless used to 
orient the production of knowledge that passes as universal. Against this backdrop, with 
Welburn, we may claim that objectivity only follows from restricting claims to truth to all 
members of that community who hold the same set of values. "Putting it simply, we attain 
objectivity not by stepping outside our perspective as knowers to see what things 'are really 
like/ but by understanding the angle of your vision from within, and the conditions it entails" 
(ibid: 46).
[...]
A pertinent way to wrap up this section is by applying a low- middle- and high-cultural 
analysis to a topic with an immediate link to the ecocidal mode of engagement -viz. the 
formation of civilizations. At the end of his discussion of 'The Civilizing Process/ Barry Allen 
(2004: 229) concludes that "civilization is a socializing process set in a city, responding to and 
assuming the effects of the city on those whom it shelters". From the perspective of the 
correlative transpositions of culture, this is a middle-cultural approach to 'civilization'. Allen 
then goes on to define civilization by another of its aspects: a city is as "an immensely 
complex and demanding architectural, artifactual, physical actuality." This is a low-cultural
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characterization of civilization. Entrenched in his firm middle- and low-cultural positions, 
Allen castigates Norbert Elias's excessive "psychologistic approach" (ibid). Elias notes that 
civilizing processes change "the way in which people are bonded to each other. This is why 
their behaviour changes, and why their consciousness and their drive-economy, and, in fact, 
their personality structure as a whole change" (quoted in Allen 2004: 229). Far from siding 
with Allen's rebuff of Elias's position, the cultural matrix acknowledges Elias's perspective as 
one that focuses on the interplay between middle-culture and high-culture. W e may 
therefore say that the correlative transpositions of culture assert themselves in two related 
moves. First, they dissolve disciplinary boundaries erected within the epistemological 
tradition. Second, they facilitate detailed analysis of any of the three dimensions of culture 
without losing sight of the remaining two.
a a a a
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Chapter 7
Transposition As Différance-f/jfect; 
Loci Standi vis-à-vis Instrumenta Movendi
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In the m yth o f th e  cavern in the seventh book o f Plato's Republic, "the sun [...] turns into th e  tru th  of 
science, which alone seizes not upon illusions and shadows but upon th e  tru e  being"
— M ax W e b e r72
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Synopsis - Chapter 7 introduces the irreducible transpositions of culture -viz. loci standi and 
instrumenta movendi. Loci standi, or places of secure stay emerge as the simultaneous 
transposition of three hypositions -viz. living organism/inert matter, theism/atheist and 
anthropocentrism/ecocentrism. To be sure, the habit of classifying things on the basis of a 
chemical component -carbon— is deemed as a mere scientific convenience. It is instead 
claimed that the cultural matrix requires a perspective capable of discerning between non- 
ecocidal entities and processes, and ecocidal ones. These plural non-ecocidal places of 
secure stay equally decentre both the belief in a foundational objective figure -God, 
theism— and the facile denial of the latter -atheism. The originality and plurality of loci 
standi, it is claimed, rival an atheism which fails to dethrone the place of God. In bespeaking 
plurality, loci standi equally transcend both anthropomorphic and ecocentric perspectives.
It is further contended that the contingent development of civilizations and the 
development of metallurgy-related trades, drives us to pay heed to an additional irreducibly 
menacing cultural element -th e  instrumenta movendi. In relation to loci standi, instrumenta 
movendi are double-edged devices. They perform the role of tools of additional mobility and 
that of instruments of agitation at a time. This is why, building upon a key undecidable of
72 Weber 1964 [1948]: 140.
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Derrida's ensemble, it is claimed that instrumenta movendi exert a différance-effect over loci 
standi -they mediate and differ the latter. In so doing, they stop a cultus from running on a 
fully embodied, embedded and contextualized mode -they open the median space and 
mark specific degrees of dis-embodiment, dis-embeddedness and de-contextualization. In 
view that eventually they also come to receive the effects that they have initially wielded 
upon loci standi, it is said that instrumenta movendi undo the notions of activity vs. passivity, 
cause-effect. By way of the différance-effect they exert, instrumenta movendi obstruct the 
transitivity of loci standi -th a t is why they are conceived positions instead of transpositions. 
These two irreducible categories -loci standi and instrumenta movendi- simultaneously 
embody, embed and contextualize binary pairs. In this light, we learn that sustainable 
development as productivity differed and deferred means that we are settling for eco- 
efficiency.
1. The Cultural Irreducibility Of Loci Standi
I
From The Living-Organism/lnert-Matter Hyposition Into Loci Standi — Within ecological 
thinking, there is a strong -orthodox— and a weak -defiant— approach to the scientific 
habit of extricating 'living organisms' from 'inert matter.' The orthodox variant is utterly 
anthropomorphic. It presupposes a purposive stratification by which inert matter is 
presented as subservient to the needs of the more 'complex' creatures. In this ethos, a 
handbook of ecology is in the position to set out -and stir minimal controversy— that in the 
chemical cycle "[e]ach chemical element required for growth and reproduction must be 
made available to each organism at the right time, in the right amount, and in the right ratio 
relative to other elements" (Botkin and Kellner 2005: 100). Similarly, the mainstream 
approach to the ecocidal mode of engagement, as captured in the official project of 
sustainable development, along Cartesian-Newtonian lines, construes an inert subservient 
backdrop called environment. "Environment and development are not separate challenges; 
they are inexorably linked. Development cannot subsist upon a deteriorating environmental 
resource base; the environment cannot be protected when growth fails to take into account 
the costs of environmental destruction" (WCED 1987: 37).
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These initial aporias are aggravated when the scientific body remains utterly 
anthropomorphic. Ecological economics too is orthodoxly anchored in the living/inert 
chasm. This domain of knowledge has, on the one hand, achieved a major cognitive 
synthesis in embedding self-regulating markets in their ecological substratum. This 
theoretical achievement notwithstanding, ecological economics works within a framework 
which still speaks the language of "environmental resources and sinks" and "natural 
resources and services" (Martinez-Alier 2002: 44, 70, 216), responding thereby to the logic 
of the market not to that of the commons (lllich 1982b). The anthropocentric and utilitarian 
resonances are conspicuously evident: "Such approaches are united in maintaining and 
propagating the idea of the "environment" [...] as essentially a mere setting for the human 
drama, most of which comprises a set of passive resources for the advancement of human 
interests, with the latter being the most, or even only, ethically considerable kind" (Curry 
2003: 338).
It seems thus that the militant division between the living and the inert provides a metaphor 
for the 'natural world' by which allegedly higher forms of life operate against a passive 
receptacle which they transform at will and to the former's complete advantage. The 
primacy of logos -only intelligibly decoded by Man— renders anthropomorphic forms 
immediately superior to non-anthropomorphic ones. In this respect, those strands of 
evolutionary theory that "argue[...j that all sensible criteria of evolution must bear out the 
superiority of man" (Theodosius Dobzhansky quoted in Georgescu-Roegen 1971 [1974]: 128, 
n35) must be read as deleterious spinoffs of philosophy and science as epistêmë. Evolution is 
not conterminous with outright superiority of the latter-day forms over the former-day 
ones; it simply bespeaks one of the multiple roads that securely guarantees diversity -  
another road indeed being Man's respect for this pulsating diversity. "It seems remarkably 
species-chauvinistic of psychologists to reserve for the human psyche qualities that are 
found everywhere outside it" (Sean Kane quoted in Curry 2004h: 126-7). Moreover, the 
Darwinian and Darwinistic premise on natural selection, according to which the more gifted 
individuals are prone to draw more correct conclusion about the nature of the world, and 
are more capable of surviving and reproducing themselves, in a way that they will become 
automatic models to the rest of the human species, (cf. Hawking andMlodinow 2005: 23) 
needs multiple qualifications. Geniuses of the highest calibre are often exposed to the most
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strident forms of ostracism, only on occasions enjoy a reduced following while alive, and 
their work may go utterly unrecognized if, say, it challenges the interests of the politico- 
economic cliques.73 Selection doesn't rigidly stick to a logocentric pattern such as 
physicalism, "the thesis that all things that exist in this world are bits of matter and 
structures aggregated out of bits of matter, all behaving in accordance with laws of physics" 
(Kim 2006: 129). Rather, selection takes on marked cultural overtones and is the result of a 
number of contingent interactions.
The search for repeated patterns, the quest for a logocentric science, is in itself the cultural 
result of paying attention to causal relations. The logocentric quest derives from an urge to 
control and manipulate processes. It further construes evolution on the basis of an 
anthropocentric understanding of consciousness, rendering inferior those forms of 
embodiment that fail to articulate themselves logocentrically. Yet those non-logocentric 
forms appear to be the ones that enact the plane of immanence in the most impressively 
immediate manner. Schopenhauer (quoted in Bucke undated reprint [1905]: 20) puts it in a 
nutshell:
The animal lives without any Besonnenheit [level-headedness]. [It] "remains constantly 
subjective, never becomes objective: everything that it embraces appears to exist in and of itself, 
and can therefore never become an object of representation nor a problem for meditation. Its 
consciousness is thus wholly immanent. The consciousness of the savage man is similarly 
constituted in that his perceptions of things and of the world remain preponderantly subjective 
and immanent. He perceives things in the world, but not the world [—its objectification]; his own 
actions and passions, but not himself.
All in all, non-logocentric entities seem to form, in a more prominent manner than 
logocentric ones, the communion of saints that Toynbee considers a sine qua non for the 
overcoming of the quandaries that the historian identified as assailing his own 
contemporaneity; quandaries which include the ecocidal mode of engagement. In a fairly 
evolutionary vein, Toynbee associates the ascendancy of the human species from the pre­
humanoid one with the former's acquisition of consciousness and will. It was this critical 
breakthrough that ushered in a critical "intellectual and moral relativity [that renders e]ach
73 Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart died at a young age in dire poverty. Antoni Gaudi-Cornet didn't design a single building in his birthtown and 
left no descendants.
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of us [to] see[...] the Universe divided between himself (sic) and all the rest of it" (Toynbee 
1977 [1972]: 87).74 Only the spiritual athletism of the saint, according to Toynbee, is capable 
of transcending such dualism and, in my own parlance, re-engage immanence. The point to 
which I wished to draw the attention of the reader to all along is whether, in light of the 
quotation above, non-logocentric entities such as those reigning in the mineral, plant and 
animal kingdoms alike are not intrinsically wholly immanent. Hence their inability to plot a 
concatenation of ecocides while fully able to reproduce cycles.
Be this as it may, let us resume our storyline. Somewhat surprisingly, Edward Goldsmith's 
Ecological Way (1998: 443) also constitutes a representative of the strong, orthodox 
approach. Goldsmith proposes drawing a dividing line between "living things" and "simpler 
things." The former group, the ecological thinker goes on to contend, is "capable of 
overcoming many of the constraints applying to the behaviours of" (ibid) the latter. One 
such constraints constraint is the entropy law. In Goldsmith's analysis, the second law of 
thermodynamics should be excluded from the realm of ecology (ibid: Appendix One), 
thereby preventing ecology from "slavishly imitating the methodology of the physical 
sciences" (ibid: 444).
Gaia Theory, conversely, represents the weak approach. Lynn Margulis, intellectual mother 
of this strand of ecologism,75 argues that Gaia erases the animate vs. inanimate boundary 
drawn in the 'natural' realm. The animate/inanimate splitting is disparagingly assessed as a 
scientific convenience. Margulis sustains her argument by building upon Aristotle:
Soil is not unalive. It is a mixture of broken rock, pollen fungal filaments, ciliate cysts, bacterial 
spores, nematodes and other microscopic animals and their parts. 'Nature', Aristotle observed, 
'proceeds little by little from things lifeless to animal life in such a way that it is impossible to 
determine the exact line of demarcation'. Independence is a political, not a scientific term  
(quoted in Midgley 2001:17).
In living systems we have yet another instance where the distinction at stake is effaced.
74 A good number of myths refer to the birth of the human condition as the moment when reason sets in and innocence is lost (Pannikar 
2009: 81).
75Along with James Lovelock -its  intellectual father.
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Above we have visited Eigen's biochemist 'hypercycles'76. Allegedly inert, chemical 
hypercycles present the same pattern of self-organization and originality as living systems. 
"[S]elf-replication—which is of course, well-known for living organisms -m ay have occurred 
in chemical systems before the emergence of life, before the formation of genetic structure 
[...] The lesson to be learned here seems to be that the roots of life reach down into the 
realm of nonliving matter" (Capra 1996: 94). An immediate interpretation of Capra's remark 
suggests that the living organisms-inert matter hierarchizing polarity is far too random to 
keep paying much attention to.
Partially endorsing the direction of Gaian thinking, partially in view that "in the Age of the 
Industrial Revolution, human love needs to be extended to include all components of the 
biosphere, inanimate as well as animate" (Toynbee 1976: 594), the cultural matrix finds the 
hyposition at hand too reductionist -and for that matter irrelevant— to endorse it at all. At 
bottom, this division is exclusively grounded in the presence of a chemical element, namely, 
carbon. It is thus a dualism immediately ruled by chemistry in the more extensive context of 
science as epistëmê. Its rigorous obedience entails overlooking other perspectives perhaps 
more pertinently relevant in a cultural matrix that is wary of the imperturbable laws of 
Cartesian-Newtonian nature to start with. The cleavage at hand imperturbably discriminates 
entities that approached from distinctive perspectives have important traits in common. 
Feyerabend (1987:125) appositely proposes the way out of the quandaries posed by realism 
by "call[ing] quarks and gods equally real, but tied to different circumstances." Yet the 
indiscriminate acknowledgement of all possible entities leaves us with research question (4) 
on the putative exit from the ecocidal mode of engagement unaddressed. There is an urge 
for us to tie the real to non-ecocidal entities and processes. In keeping with Gaia Theory 
teachings, "[w]e can no longer think of rocks, animals, and plants being separate. [...] There 
is a tight interlocking between the Planet's living parts — plants, microorganisms, and 
animals -and its nonliving parts -rocks, oceans, and the atmosphere" (Capra 1996: 104). All 
these elements share their capacity to provide secure stay to culture. They are all irreducible 
backbones that keep culture -perhaps magically— suspended in the cosmos. Let us thus 
note that a cultural reading of the living-inert hyposition is conducive to its transposition into 
a multiplicity of secure stays. Honouring its peculiar traits of 'necessity/ 'irreducibility/
76 Cf Chapter 5, Section 2.
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'security/ and having again recourse to classic Latin -as against English— as a lingua franca 
for a post-ecocidal age, we shall designate this transposition under the signifying phrase 
locus standi, in the singular, and loci standi in the plural. Plants, microorganisms, animals, 
rocks, oceans and the atmosphere have in common that they all are loci77 standi78 'places of 
(secure) stay' of culture.
To illustrate this key transposition, we may proceed by the re-inscription of Gaia Theory in 
the cultural matrix:
Simply stated, the [Ga ia-Hypothesis] jzu'tural matrix says that the surface of the Earth, which we 
have always considered to be the environment of life, is really part-of life h locui standi. The 
blanket of air -th e  troposphere— should be considered a circulatory system, produced and 
sustained by We focf [...] When scientists tell us that life adapts to an essentially passive
environment of chemistry, physics and rocks, they perpetuate a severely distorted view, tife
actually makes and forms and changes the environment R M M  to which it  they adapts.
Then that 'environment' W Ê Ê  feeds back on the We ^âqjtandf that is § f | |  changing and acting 
and growing in it. There are constant cyclical interactions (Lynn Margulis quoted in Capra, 1996:
106).
Yet loci standi are no mere low-cultural affairs. The correlative transposition of culture is a 
reminder that there is always a middle- and high-cultural manifestation to any low-cultural 
affair. Like low-cultural loci standi, middle- and high-cultural ones are sites of secure, 
necessary and irreducible repose. In the following we proceed towards their 
characterization.
II
A Transposition Of The Theist/Atheist Hyposition— There are many possible avenues to 
characterize low-cultural loci standi. The domain of ecology,79 to name one possibility, sets 
forth a taxonomy based upon the different components of the Earth: the lithosphere (rocks
77 The meanings of the noun 'locus, loci' relevant to us are 'seat, rank, position; place, territory, locality, neighbourhood, region; position, 
point, site; part of the body; region, places (pl.); places connected with each other.'
78 'Sfo'the infinitive form of ‘standi’ means 'to stand, to stand still, to stand firm; to remain, to rest.' ‘Standi’ is the future passive participle 
form of ‘sto‘ in genitive form. A literal translation would be 'will have stood firm .' In a language like English that no longer inflects either 
nouns, adjectives or pronouns through their different cases, one rather says 'of firm stay.'
79 Namely, the discourse on the self-sufficient household.
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and soils), the atmosphere, the hydrosphere (oceans, rivers, lakes, groundwaters, and 
glaciers), and the biosphere (plants and animals) (Botkin and Keller, 2005: 74-78). Ecologists 
may alternatively concentrate upon the tenets of distinct biomes and speak in terms of 
tropical rainforests, the tundra in Arctic regions, and the evergreen trees in the coniferous 
forests. The analytics of transposition, on the other hand, deflects "the helpless enterprise 
of arriving at a philosophically (or, for that matter, scientifically) impeccable theory which 
will command the assent of all rational beings" (Curry, 2006: 67). This analytics is an 
irreducibly incomplete philosophy (of the future) that aims to lay bare - I  will specify: 
politicize— a number of cultural aspects of our contemporaneity so that the ecocidal mode 
of engagement may be significantly reversed.
With a view towards politicizing certain (long lost) dimensions of our present times, we 
rather initially characterize loci standi as those sites from which culti have ancestrally 
derived meaning. Victor M. Toledo's (1999: 6) description of vernacular peoples' cosmology 
sets the initial definition of loci standi into the apposite context:
Indigenous people do not consider the land [a locus standi] as merely an economic resource. Under 
indigenous cosmovisions, nature [a pool of loci standi] is the primary source of life that nourishes, 
supports and teaches. Nature [a pool of loci standi] is therefore not only a productive source but the 
centre of the universe, the core of culture and the origin of ethnic identity. At the heart of this deep 
bond is the perception [a high-cultural locus standi] that all living and non-living things and natural 
[an abundance of low-cultural loci standi] and social worlds [a plethora of middle-cultural loci 
standi] are intrinsically linked.
Toledo points to one of the cornerstones of loci standi. Throughout the millennia, 
communities have approached the latter with a profound sense of the sacred. This reverent 
attitude explains the reason why loci standi have recurrently performed their multifaceted 
roles as 'sites of secure stay' of culture. Voluminous bodies of evidence in ecological 
anthropology and eco-ethnicity are conclusive in this respect (Toledo, 1999; Goldsmith, 
1998: ch. 63). In this context it is easy to understand that Foucault (1980 [1970]: 373-87), 
Derrida (1978f: 282) and Latour (1993) claim that ethnology, the science that studies non- 
Western culti, is in the position of outsider with respect to the remaining human (and 
natural) sciences. "[Ejthnology situates itself in the dimension of the historicity [...] which is 
the reason why the human sciences are always being contested, from without, by their own
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history" (Foucault 1980 [1970]: 376). Ethnology is an incoming source of non-Western 
assumptions, which destabilize the certainty of science as epistëmë.
Social philosopher of religion Peter Berger (1990 [1969]: 279) exposes, for his part, the 
reason why "viewed historically, most of man's [sic] worlds have been sacred worlds: [...] it 
appears likely that only by way of the sacred was it possible for man to conceive of a cosmos 
in the first place." Curry (2007: 284) further expounds on the reasons for this historical 
constant. The immense variety of loci standi can "never be exhausted, finally or 
comprehensively explained, or completely mastered. This entails an ultimate mystery which 
constitutes the source and terminus of all meaning and value." On this count, the cultural 
functions of loci standi largely overlap with those of mythoi. Philosopher of religion Raimon 
Panikkar (2009: 115; own translation from the Catalan translation) attributes to myth a 
plural, original and ultimate source of meaning. "We live on myths' shoulders." Just as we 
characterise locus standi as an 'irreducible place of secure stay', so too Panikkar portrays 
myth as the enactment of the original and primal —albeit not necessarily foundational. From 
this exposition it follows that myth does not lend to seizure, let alone manipulation. "The 
transparency of myth consists in the fact that we see through the myth, but we cannot see 
it" (ibid: 117).
The irreducibility of loci standi and mythoi exempts both from the need to be proven -  
neither of them are objects of either demonstration or proof. Rather, both inexorably exact 
overt acknowledgement and inviolable respect. Inextricably plural, neither loci standi nor 
mythoi are amenable to their reduction to a common denominator. Each generates a 
constellation without any stable centre or hierarchy. Loci standi and mythoi are irrevocably 
incommensurable. In this context, Fred Block's (2001: XXV, XXVI) vocal indictment of the 
secular character of modern societies is wholly vindicated, on account that the latter no 
longer exhibit the ancestral reverence for what we have come to name loci standi:
It is simply wrong to treat nature and human beings as objects whose price will be determined
entirely by the market. Such a concept violates the principle that have governed societies for
centuries: nature and human life have almost always been recognized as having a sacred dimension.
It is impossible to reconcile this sacred dimension with the subordination of labour and nature to
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the market.
It is in this ethos that the urgent call above to irreversibly commit a theocide must be 
understood.80 The mere adoption of an atheist attitude is insufficient. The denial of a 
monotheist figure fails to contest the ontologically objective structures that God's presence, 
qua ultimate foundation of reality, keeps steadfastly in place. Atheism irremediably operates 
in theism's shadow - i t  is its hypo-position. "When [...] God appears as unnecessary for 
modern science, atheism is around the corner [...] the world is ruled by laws where God does 
not intervene, except at the beginning" (Panikkar 2009: 99; own translation from the Catalan 
translation). Once we dare inscribe the hyposition theism/atheism in the cultural matrix we 
automatically grow aware of the untenability of the ontological edifice sustained with God's 
objectivist metaphysics. "[Wjhat is put into question is precisely the quest for a rightful 
beginning, an absolute point of departure, a principal responsibility" (Derrida 1984a [1968]: 
6). This suspicious questioning conduces us to a theological decapitation -th e  cultural matrix 
is an immanently caustic substance. This murderous act releases the historical -situated— 
and analytical space. That "who announces that he has killed God [is] situating his language, 
his thought, his laughter in the space of that already dead God" (Foucault 1980 [1970]: 385). 
It is in this decompressed -as opposed to repressed— space that we are free again to 
appreciate the inextricable plurality that originally supports culture, and by which culture is 
created and experienced. "[N]ew gods, the same gods, are already swelling the future 
Ocean" (ibid.) We are free again to engage in animist worshipping practices. "[T]he end of 
metaphysics and the death of God [is] above all the rebirth of the sacred in its many forms" 
(Vattimo 2002: 21, 23). In the shambles of Western metaphysics, we find the places of 
secure stay shining in a plurality of sanctuaries. "When the origin has revealed its 
insignificance, as Nietzsche says, then we become open to the meaning and richness of 
proximity" (Vattimo 1991 [1988]: 177), namely, to the plural /oc/ standi. As Nietzsche further 
claims, it is the religious spirit that has forcefully beheaded the metaphysical God. "The 
death of God [...] is an effect of religiosity" (Vattimo 2002: 26).
Bateson speaks of the ecology of mind by reversing the "traditional God-down hierarchy of 
being/' (Charlton 2008: 35) that operates as the transcendent divine mind which bestows
80 Cf. Chapter 4, Section 3 above.
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identity upon the natural world. In step with the panpsychist tradition proper to the likes as 
Teilhard de Chardin, Bateson claims that mind, chiefly in the form of "perception and 
awareness" (ibid: 32) is present in "all the processes that produce, for instance, healing in 
organs, growth in organisms, development in societies, or balance in large ecosystems" 
(ibid: 32). This indissociability of the mind from the remaining bodily processes strongly 
supports the modus operand! of the correlative transposement that goes by the name of 
high-culture.81 Yet Bateson is relevant for our purposes here in so far as he undertakes a 
metaphysically immanent U-turn. He disregards Being and speaks of a multiplicity that far 
from conforming to static attributes are dynamically defined. In many senses, Bateson's 
mental processes incarnated in palpable physical forms prefigure loci standi. Like Bateson's 
mental processes, loci standi gain their identity autonomously -liberated from a 
metaphysical objective figure. Batesons's emphasis upon the mental or the 'processes of 
informational interaction between components' may be seen as one aspect of the securing- 
stay feature proper to loci standi. It further emphasizes that there is a high-culture to each 
low-culture or embodied entity.
Some examples of low-cultural loci standi are the genome; local species; non-GM seeds; 
macronutrients such as nitrogen, phosphorous and water; ecosystems; the hydraulic cycle; 
the Earth's carbon-cycling capacity; low entropy. Instances of middle-cultural loci standi are 
customary law, and local and bioregional politics. Animist worldviews are a form of high- 
cultural loci standi. So is any philosophy or worldview that does away with provincialism, 
while preserving that which is autochthone.
Ill
Loci Standi And Their Naturae -  Loci standi enjoy the self-direction for self-maintenance, 
development and self-replication (Faber et al. 1998e [1996]: 175; Allen 2004: 63). In a 
bicycle, "the link between pattern and structure is in the mind of the designer" (Capra 1996: 
1960). In a locus standi, "the pattern of organization is always embodied in the organism's 
structure, and the link between pattern and structure lies in the process of continual 
embodiment" (ibid). With Murray Bookchin (1994: 62-63) we can assert that the cosmic 
drama "is 'directed' not by a deity exogenous to it or by a divine 'architect' who fashions it;
M. Cf. Chapter 6, Section 3 above.
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rather, it would be a se//-directed and se\f-unfolding drama, whose 'finality' is as much an 
inherent property of substance as is motion, [altogether] yielding] to the world particulars 
[i.e., loci standi] in their wholeness and fullness as a rich unity of diversity." Yet ioci standi 
are neither origin {archè) nor telos, rather, they are above all original -in  the sense of 
'creative'— places of repose. Whilst myths "speak of and to the original" (Caputi 2001:5), 
loci standi embody, embed and situate the original. They sustain the cosmos by rendering it 
perennially original. Qua a constellation of sites where a cultus stands firm or reposes, these 
cultural transpositions enact the highest form of embodiment, embeddedness, and 
contextualization at the low- middle- and high-cultural levels, respectively. Their unique 
ability is to play out the original and primal gifts loci standi with creativity and originality 
(Prigogine and Stengers 1984). We shall say that these are transpositions endowed with a 
natura82 of their own or a capacity to willingly come into being, create, preserve, destroy, 
and transform. Loci standi unrestrictedly cut across the Cartesian monolithic res extensa, 
purportedly made up of logocentrically realist, natural essences. Qua primal sources, loci 
standi recurrently transpose "go back to" (Caputi 2001: 4) a spatiality that is not so much a 
spacetime experience as a qualitative -and quantitative—"a realm of wild, inimitable, and 
[in principle] inviolable reality" (ibid). Such reality "represents the eternal, the infinite, 
mindful primal potency and potential" (ibid: 9).
We have already announced above that the cultural matrix disregards the very long-term , 
characterised as it is by the unidirectionality of time within the cosmos we inhabit 
(Prigogine and Stengers 1984)83. Automatic entropie processes fall beyond the concerns of 
the cultural matrix, as they fail to be determined by transpositions contextualized within 
Tellus. Yet the cultural matrix does reinscribe epistemological notions of time and space in 
its bosom. Each locus standi transposes abstract -read: desituated— notions of space and 
unidirectional time into irreducible and repetitive shapes and rhythms of secure stay. In this 
respect, we can draw a telling simile between loci standi and the artisans in Buddhist 
traditions who, generation after generation -conveying a sense of timelessness, are in 
charge of reproducing the image of the Buddha. Like these committed workers, loci standi 
are "steps in a chain that resist [unidirectional] time through which sacred forms manifest
82 Natura, nascor, nasci, natus sum, 'to be produced spontaneously, to come into existence/being, to spring forth, to grow, to live, to be 
born, begotten, formed, destined.
83 Cf. Chapter 5, Section 1 above.
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themselves" (Shearer 1993: 88). What is more, the irreducibility of loci standi re-reads 
unidirectional cosmic time as the pace proper to the cosmos qua a locus standi all its own.
The transposed Derrida84 makes a prescient allusion to this irreducible transposition that we 
have come to name locus standi. "The speculary dispossession [of presence] which at the 
same time institutes and deconstitutes me is also a law of [the cultural matrix]. It operates 
as the power of death in the heart of living [nature]:85 a power all the more redoubtable 
because it opens as much as it threatens the possibility of [natural phenomena]" (Derrida 
1997: 141). While loci standi certainly are sites of secure stay for and within culture, these 
sites fail to reproduce the notion of presence and for that matter of nature, which only 
emerge and develop under the conditions of philosophy and science as epistêmë. 
Logocentrism turns natura into a passive, feminine monolith criss-crossed with repetitive 
and universal laws (Salleh 1997, 2010). The cultural matrix, by contrast, embodies, embeds 
and contextualizes natura, acknowledging thereby the multifarious naturae intrinsic to ioci 
standi. So "[i]f the displaced presentation" (Derrida 1984a [1968]: 20) in the form of loci 
standi "remains definitively and implacably postponed, it is not that a certain present 
remains absent or hidden" (ibid), it is that such an idealization resolves into loci standi as 
soon as the cultural matrix is inhabited. Loci standi no longer speak the terms of the 
epistemological tradition. They are not another name for presence; rather, they transmute it 
into multiple 'sites of secure stay/
Derrida goes on to make a direct allusion to loci standi as transpositions of 
presence/absence, culture/nature. "Without the possibility of difference, the desire of 
presence as such would not find its breathing-space. That means by the same token that this 
desire carries in itself the destiny of its non-satisfaction" (Derrida 1997: 143). Namely, it is 
loci standi and other cultural transpositions that allow the expression of presence, for it is 
only these transpositions that enable expression in the first place. Hence, too, presence 
ultimate silence —the expression of 'presence' occurs by way of loci standi. "If the displaced 
presentation [...] in the form of [loci standi] remains definitively and implacably postponed,
84 Namely, the Derrida who by way of his work first shatters the metaphysics of presence and whose equation of the immanent spatiality 
with language is subsequently transposed -reinscribed— into the cultural matrix. In other words, Derrida's post-metaphysical tools are 
used within the context of the cultural matrix. Cf. Ch 3, section 3 above.
85 'Speech' in the original.
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it is not that a certain present remains absent or hidden" (Derrida 1984a [1968]: 23). 
Presence —like nature, is an idealization that automatically dissolves when cultural terrain is 
crossed. Instead, loci standi, which, in enacting culture deflect full presence, emerge. To be 
sure, one should stop short of regarding presence continuous with embodiment, 
embeddedness and contextualization. Loci standi firmly anchor low- middle- and high- 
culture and in so doing they uproot presence as much as they dislocate nature. In relation to 
the dynamic transpositions, loci standi reside at the embodied end of dis-embodiment, at 
the embedded one of dis-embeddedness and at the contextualized one of 
de/contextualization.
Reversely, transposed nature into plural naturae appears always insufficient in the face of 
presence — it promises no universals. Derrida exhibits how the presumption and assumption 
of such nature carries along a plethora of supplementary elements which lay bare the weak 
stability of its presence -w hether on grounds of its deficiencies or exceeding plenitude. 
Nature, the nature of Newton with its set of predictable laws, is another name for presence: 
"[R]eappropriation of presence, that is to say [...] of Nature[...]" (Derrida 1997: 144). In line 
with the anticausality or indeterminacy postulate of quantum theory, the cultural matrix 
declines the postulation of universal laws -o r  positions— within culture: it only adumbrates 
an ensemble of transpositions that assists us in the politicization of contemporary affairs for 
a post-ecocidal age. Not surprisingly, nature constantly exhorts "supply
[suppléer]...[what]...is lacking" (ibid: 146), namely, a matrix such as culture by which nature 
can readily express itself; and by which nature is silenced -only its transposition in the form  
of multifarious naturae enacted by loci standi survives.
IV
A Transposition Of The Anthropocentrist/Ecocentrist Hyposition -  Loci standi not only 
subvert the living organisms/inert matter splitting and the theistic/atheistic one. 
Additionally, these are strategic transpositions of the anthropocentric vs. ecocentric 
hyposition. In two passages of his Ecological Ethics, Curry manifests the cognitive (and, for 
that matter, axic, ethical) aporias that holding to the divide entails. One is a reflection on the 
part of the author, whilst the other comes in the form of a few remarks on the ecocentric 
ethical body of J. Baird Callicott. In having laid out the tenets of ecocentrism, Curry (2006:
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46) prudently cautions us against the fact that "an appeal to anthropocentric value (human 
self-interest) may be an unavoidable part of the argument for an ecocentric outcome. It 
follows that an ecocentric ethic alone will probably not suffice to save an Earth fit for life as 
we know it; but that also won't happen without one." Subsequently, Curry (ibid: 66) 
approvingly quotes Callicott's reflection upon the vast dimensions of —to convey it in 
cultural terms— low-culture. Interestingly, these appear hard to theorize precisely given the 
Cartesian dividing line meticulously traced between a human realm and an alleged wild 
natural one: "As Callicot has rightly pointed out, any distinction between 'inner' and 'outer' 
or 'self and 'other' is strictly relative and never ultimate, except as a modernist fantasy: 'it is 
impossible to find a clear demarcation between oneself and one's environment...The world 
is, indeed, one's extended body'". The manifold resonances with Abram's phrase 'the more- 
than-human-world' are conspicuous. Yet so are its aporias.
In Hebrew and Christian ethics the blurring lines between anthropocentrism and 
ecocentrism are also loudly voiced. "[Wjhen individuals pursue their own goods without 
regard for the common good, then ultimately both the common good and the good of those 
individuals who neglect their duties to the community of persons and the community of the 
non-human world are threatened and subverted" (Northcott 1996 [1999]: 265). Hence the 
need to recentre technological processes upon the land and develop "a form of economics 
which treats the land as the central resource in relation to human and non-human welfare" 
(ibid). Land is, no doubt, a low-cultural loci standi.
To be sure, loci standi bring Curry's problematized partition of anthropocentric contra 
ecocentric value, Callicott's tentative characterization of low-culture - to  which Curry 
subscribes, and the utilitarianism prevalent in ecological economics mentioned several 
paragraphs above to a new horizon. The low- middle- and high-cultural analytics of 
transposition is neither ecocentric nor anthropocentric; rather, it is cultural, and, for that 
matter, polycentric. 'Oneself (an anthropocentric entity), 'one's environment' (in the quote 
above meant as an ecocentric entity)86 and 'environmental resources and sinks' are 
'irreducible places of secure stay' or 'sites of firm repose' that most immediately correspond 
to low-culture. Human, animal, plant, mineral bodies are low-cultural places of firm stay for
86 However, one's environment may equally be an 'anthropocentric' entity. It all depends on whether the environment at issue is filled with 
instrument! movendi or loci standi.
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a human being, an animal, a plant, and a mineral, respectively. The Earth in its physical 
dimensions is another low-cultural site of solid repose; so is the universe in its physical 
aspects. They all conform to loci standi of culture, which relate to one another in a network. 
The correlative transpositions of culture make us cognizant of the fact that these low- 
cultural loci standi of a human being, an animal, a plant, a mineral, the Earth and the cosmos 
enjoy their respective middle- and high-cultural loci standi.
The Christian ethicist Michael Banner, for his part, cuts across the anthropocentric non- 
anthropocentric divide via the overarching banner 'sustainable development'. Banner claims 
that this rubric accords priority to the simultaneous concepts of development, equity and 
environmental protection. It is this irreducibility, and not the unification of values to a single 
number, as it occurs in cost-benefit analysis, what promotes due "political thought, 
deliberation, judgement and practice, whereby a society identifies the objectives which 
technocratic and expert thinking cannot themselves determine" (Banner 1990: 203).
2. The Historical Necessity To Register Instrumenta Movendi
I
The Advent of Metallurgy And The Historical Necessity Of Instrumenta Movendi - Above, it 
was announced that Goldsmith positions himself against the validity of the entropy law in 
ecology. This is a polemical position to say the least. Arthur Eddington noted that "if your 
theory is found to be against the second law of thermodynamics I can give you no hope; 
there is nothing for it but the collapse in deepest humiliation" (quoted in Faber et al. 1998c 
[1996]: 95). Conceivably, though, there is no need to engage in this controversy. Our 
scientific evasion may be compensated for the following observation. One of the arguments 
on which Goldsmith (1998: 440) sustains his entropie repugnance lies in the fact that "[l]ife 
probably began on this planet three thousand million years ago and since then [...] it has 
developed in complexity, diversity and stability." This tendency towards more complex life- 
forms, Goldsmith goes on to argue, discomfirms the appearance of chaos -so profoundly 
characteristic of the entropie process (Prigogine and Stengers 1984) — and with it the 
existence of the entropy law in 'nature.'
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It is true that Goldsmith's anti-entropic argument fails to disprove the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics. Indeed, Georgescu-Roegen (1974 [1971]: 128) regards the entropy law as 
"the only clear example of an evolutionary law". On the other hand, his statement is of great 
pertinence for our purposes here. Goldsmith's sweeping statement on the sustained 
development of diversity and complexity is largely accurate. In the implied lifespan, either 
human forms of life were nomadic or most culti were tilling the soil with only moderate 
levels of artifactual complexity while informed by relatively localized sources of information. 
Culture, as, in its most immediate meaning, the tilling of the land, emphasizes the following 
nodes of conflict: In which different fashions -under which understanding of agriculture, 
under which property regimes of land and by means of which artifacts and techniques, is 
culture being created?
Goldsmith's position lends to controversy from the moment when artifacts gain in 
complexity and the sources of information stop being exclusively local. Historically, this is 
known as the Neolithic Revolution and a fortiori the practice of metallurgy. The Neolithic 
Revolution is the moment when sufficient surplus is created and the division of labour as 
well as centralized forms of control are technically possible. "In a society which produces an 
economic surplus, a division of labour is possible. Specialist minorities, freed from the work 
of food production, can monopolize social tasks which were formerly the responsibility of all 
participants in a society" (Toynbee 1977 [1972]: 44). Yet it appears that "[prim itive  
agriculture had produced no surplus food and therefore no reserves for maintaining 
specialists; the only division of labour had been between men and women, and each local 
community had been self-sufficient" (ibid: 48). While technology was already apparent in 
the Upper Palaeolithic, progressively, it marks a relevant cultural trend that comes to 
characterize the ecocidal mode of engagement, "[improvements in tools of all kinds have 
accelerated, and, though there have been local and temporary pauses, and even relapses, 
acceleration has been the paramount tendency in the history of technology" (Toynbee, 
1976: 39). Amongst the abundance of sophistications and turning points in the technological 
exponential course, a number of authors (Toynbee, Derrida, Georgescu-Roegen) emphasize 
the advent of metallurgy. It is metallurgy, "a full-time occupation" (ibid), that spawns low- 
middle- and high-cultural artifacts. "Metallurgical lore is the first approximation to
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international science, and metallurgy destroys Neolithic self-sufficiency -requiring, as it 
does, not only smiths but miners, smelters, and carriers" (ibid). Jacques Derrida (1997: 149) 
associates the constitution of society with the metallurgical penetration of the Earth. "[T]he 
violence that takes us toward the entrails of the earth, the moment of mine-blindness, that 
is, of metallurgy, is the origin of society [and] of the supplement." With the birth of 
civilization, nature must be replaced with its supplements or transpositions. Culture 
"destroys very quickly the forces that Nature has slowly constituted and accumulated" (ibid, 
151) - i t  resolves a generic Nature into loci standi with naturae all their own. Basically, this 
first offshoot of this cultural turning point marked chiefly by the advent of metallurgy is 
crucial to address research query (4) on a putative exit from the ecocidal mode of 
engagement. It indicates that there are two bases on which to build a culture. A nonecocidal 
one and an ecocidal one. Each is largely determined by the intensity of technology and its 
plethora of cultural implications.87
Metallurgy represents an assault upon loci standi. "In agriculture and animal husbandry, 
Man's technological power and Nature's productivity are in equilibrium. With the invention 
of metallurgy, Man's technological ability began to make a demand on Nature that she is not 
capable of satisfying throughout the time for which the biosphere can still continue to be 
habitable" (Toynbee 1977 [1972]: 44). Toynbee's allusion is not to the very long duration 
doomed to thermal death. Rather, Toynbee retells that the practice of metallurgy represents 
a major disruption of the low- middle- and high-cultural loci standi. "If we think of the last 
10,000 years of human history in terms of the 2,000 million years of mankind's potential 
expectation of life, we may perhaps conclude that it would have been better for our 
descendants if metallurgy had never been invented, and of Man, after having attained the 
Neolithic level of technology, had not succeeded in raising himself higher in terms of 
technological achievement" (Toynbee 1976:44).
Toynbee's concerns are in line with the findings of the entropy law in the economic process. 
"[T]he fact remains that the higher the degree of economic [financial] development, the 
greater must be the annual depletion [of the present stock of terrestrial low entropy] and, 
hence, the shorter becomes the expected life of the human species" (Georgescu-Roegen
87 Cf Chapter 9 below.
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1971 : 85). Since the dawn of metallurgy there is, along with loci standi, a second category 
within culture that turns irreducible. "Those who are incapable of explaining the irruption of 
objects into the human collective, along with all the manipulations and practices that objects 
require, are not anthropologists, for what has constituted the most fundamental aspect of 
our culture, since Boyle's day, eludes them" (Latour 1993: 21). On the basis of our account, 
we shall extend Latour's statement till the day of metallurgy. The objects at issue are low- 
cultural tools that operate at the detriment of low-cultural loci standi, middle-cultural forms 
of control that uproot regionally-embedded governance, and high-cultural processes of 
nomization that are foreign to contextualized-to-an-ecoregion worldviews. These artifacts 
now described seem to have one element in common. Namely, they all seem to conform to 
tools that offer a kind of mobility that is both additional and supplementary to that provided 
by loci standi. We may also refer to these tools of mobility by way of their Latin equivalent, 
namely, instrumenta movendi in the plural and instrumentum movendi in the singular. Below 
we proceed to a more detailed characterization of this cognitive category.
Let us at this stage note that the irreducibility of instrumenta movendi determines, no 
doubt, our inquiry into history. It seems that, since the advent of the Neolithic Revolution 
and metallurgy, world history must be broadly guided by the following queries: under which 
processes of nomization or high-culture, through which collective -both public and private— 
institutions or middle-culture, which actors provoke and justify which rates of dis­
embodiment? In which different fashions-by means of which low- middle- and high-cultural 
loci standi and instrumenta movendi— are culti attending to, respecting, inhabiting and 
worshipping the soil? This is -literally so— the crux of the matter. The greater the amount 
of low- middle- and high-cultural instrumenta movendi in circulation, the more troubling 
matter is produced, and the lesser number of loci standi are left to secure stay. Given that 
these queries are positioned against an utterly immanent setting-there are no interstices of 
transcendence within the cultural matrix— the suggested set of analytical queries neatly 
comes to capture the existential challenge of the West. This can be further characterized via 
Nietzsche's provocative hypothesis of eternal recurrence, according to which one's choices 
return in distinct ways: "Are you living your life in such a way that you would will to live 
everything again the same way for all eternity?" (Schrift 1990: 71).
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Some examples of low-cultural instrumenta movendi are automobiles such as cars and 
trucks. Middle-cultural ones are centralized -in  contrast with federal and a fortiori 
bioregional— forms of governance such as state governments, central banks, the European 
Union, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization. High-cultural forms of 
instrumenta movendi are ideologies with ecumenical intentions such as liberalism, Marxism, 
Islam and Christianity88; all concepts, idealizations definitory of philosophy and science as 
epistëmë such as subjective idealism89 and hypositions -namely, coercive hierarchies appear 
as another form of high-cultural instrumentum movendi.
II
The Industrial Mode Of Production and The Cultural Lessons From The Entropy Law -
Polanyian economic anthropology (Polanyi 1971 [1957]: 64-94; Polanyi et al. 1971 [1957]; 
Baum 1996a) retells that the self-regulating market economy of the nineteenth century 
emerged as a novum in human history. Societies ruled by self-regulating markets constitute 
culti which lend priority to productive processes, and thus exhibit prominent levels of 
disembodiment, disembeddedness and decontextualization. These culti are systematically 
brought to bear upon tools of mobility or instrumenta movendi. Or, to phrase it reversely, 
when a cultus exhibits heightened levels of disembodiment, disembeddedness, and 
decontextualization, we shall say that it is instrumenta-movendi oriented and that it runs on 
the mode of production. Correlatively, when a cultus exhibits full embodiment, 
embeddedness, and contextualization, we shall say that it is loci-standi oriented and that it 
runs upon the mode of re-production Against Goldsmith but with Georgescu-Roegen and 
other ecological economists (Jackson 1996: ch. 1; Faber et al. 1998c[1996], 1998d [1996]), 
one must contend that in instrumenta-movendi-orlented culti the entropy law turns into a 
visibly restrictive parameter to be carefully taken into account. Tim Jackson (1996:12) puts it 
in a nutshell: "the second law of thermodynamics is [...] a startling and important piece of 
physics for the industrial economy." Jackson also accounts for the reason why the dissipative 
effects of this law apply to instrumenta-movendi-onented culti, but appear dormant in loci-
88 It should be noted that the ideology should be dissociated from the original thinkers or prophets.
89 Kant brings to bear the objective order of the world upon subjective reason. Yet "admittedly, the old problem of idealism, how mundus 
intelligibilis and mundus sensibilis are to be mediated, returns [in Kant] in a new form." (Habermas 1992:401) Subjective idealism as a form  
of immanent mediation is consecrated as a conspicuous instrumentum movendi.
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standi-onented ones. 90 The "self-regulat[ing]" property common to the entropie process "is 
being threatened, in many cases, by the impacts of the industrial economy" (ibid: 16).
There is a parallel reading to the last statement. Namely, the laws of thermodynamics are 
rooted in the mode of production -as opposed to that of re-production. "Thermodynamics 
sprang from a memoir of Sadi Carnot in 1824 on the efficiency of steam engines" 
(Georgescu-Roegen 1974 [1971]: 129). The birthplace and whole raison d'être of 
thermodynamics orbits around industrial productive processes. Not surprisingly, it is meta­
industrial work, Salleh (2010: 194) incisively retells, that "whether domestic care or organic 
farming [...] generates a vernacular [cognitive body] replicating and reciprocating the 
thermodynamic circuits of nature." Industrialization represents a phenomenon only to be 
put on a par with the Neolithic Revolution at the technological level, and with metallurgy at 
the larger cultural one. "The Neolithic technological revolution [...] was a technological 
change of the same order of magnitude and momentousness as the modern Western 
Industrial Revolution [...] There was no comparable technological change during the 
intervening age" (Toynbee 1977 [1972]: 50-1).
The entropy law is instructive in a second sense. In view of the constraints that it imposes 
upon culti ruled by the mode of production, "any use of the natural resources for the 
satisfaction of nonvital needs means a smaller quantity of life in the future. If we understand 
well _the problem, the best use of our iron resources is to produce plows or harrows as they 
are needed, not Rolls Royces, not even agricultural tractors" (Georgescu-Roegen 1974 
[1971]: 21; cf. also Martinez-Alier 1994 [1990]). In other words, on the one hand, the 
productive factory provides the wholesale artillery to formulate the entropy law, and on the 
other, it jeopardizes a kind of 'living structure' which is not related to those 'living organisms' 
that gain their meaning out of the living organism-inert matter hyposition proper to 
ecology's Cartesian nature. Rather, disembodied, disemebedded and decontextualized culti 
that run on the mode of production represent a threat to loci standi. This is one of the 
capital messages advanced by thermodynamics. The increasing number of menaces posed to 
loci standi and their actual disappearance have taken to bits the Cartesian metaphor,
90 Highly embodied, embedded and contextualized culti, or what amounts to the same thing, culti that run on the mode of re/production.
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according to which the physical world is the inert backdrop to an irrestrictively productive 
factory. There is no inert backdrop, but multiple, necessary and irreducible loci stondi that 
are altered as instrumenta movendi are deployed in varyingly amounts.
At the zenith of modernity Hanna Arendt spoke of humankind's earth alienation to attest 
precisely to humankind's urge to evade its own low-cultural loci standi, which automatically 
correlate with middle- and high-cultural ones, as the deployment of instrumenta movendi 
proliferates. According to Arendt, this escapist attitude was initiated with the invention of 
the telescope, symbolized by the satellite and epitomized in the photographic image of the 
Earth. "In this whole-earth image, an ironic creation of a fractured and fragmented culture, 
we have located perhaps not simply another picture of the place we inhabit, but have 
attempted to re-place, via a universalized technological substitute, our distinct and 
multifarious senses of place and purpose which have been lost as we have transformed the 
environment" (Macauley 1996: 112). Undoubtedly, Arendt's conception of modern times is 
of marked Heideggerian resonances. Heidegger conceived the present era of technology as 
responsible for the "loss of man's ability truly to dwell in [the world] as in a home" only a 
manifestation "of the whole western past which has worked itself out in the present" 
(Metha 1971:126; cf. also Heidegger 2000e [1993]). The development of philosophy into the 
independent sciences is for Heidegger the culmination of philosophy as epistëmë 
(Heidegger, 2000f [1993]) as it was noted in Chapter I . 91
Martin O'Connor (1994c: 126), for his part, explains how in instrumenta-movendi-onented 
culti, loci standi drop their reproductive edge to be conceived as productive conditions 
alone. "The degraded production conditions and nonavailability of required services that [in 
natural capitalism] appear, abstractly, as a threat to the accumulation of someone's capital, 
are also, materially, 'the means of life, means of survival and consumption, and, in the case 
of labourpower, life itself." In light of the dislocation effected by the analytics of 
transposition, "materiality" must be supplanted by "low-cultural loci standi/'92 Thus Martin 
O'Connor's passage, in short, comes to say that, in natural capitalism, what appear as 
degraded conditions of production to capital are dislocated loci standi to many peripheral
91 Cf. Chapter 1, Section 2, Subsection I, under the heading '2/Rationalism' above.
92 Cf. Chapter 4, Section 2 above.
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communities.
3. Différa nee: The Modus Operandi Proper To Instrumenta Movendi
Instrumenta movendi are the instruments or artifacts developed as multifarious extensions 
of the possibilities offered by loci standi. In line with the anti-Cartesianism inbuilt in the 
cultural configuration, the development of artifacts is far from regarded as an exclusive 
ability of the human species. "The non-human agencies that have shaped the Oikoumenê 
[inhabited part of the world] have been predominant over human action until within the last 
10,000-12,000 years" (Toynbee 1976: 29). After this threshold, artifacts developed by the 
human species have exponentially gained in complexity. "Every species of living being, and 
every specimen of each species, is affecting and modifying the biosphere by its efforts to 
keep itself alive during its brief lifetime. However, no pre-hominid species has ever had the 
power to dominate the biosphere or to wreck it" (ibid 1976: 38). Hence the need to start 
speaking of instrumenta movendi. As opposed to benign artifacts, instrumenta movendi 
heavily intercept the running courses of loci standi.
This preliminary discrimination is not complicit with the view that places of secure stay 
impede mobility. Nothing could be further from the implications of this initial 
characterization. When we say that loci standi are 'sites of secure stand or repose' it is 
chiefly implied that relentless motion within culture occurs solidly, with stability. The global 
cultural matrix, which registers the activities of Tellus (including those with outer space), is 
made up of a tight interlocking -a  mesh— of cycles in which various pools of loci standi 
actively partake —each cycle itself conforming to a locus standi. Toynbee (1976: 44) conveys 
plainly the menacing danger that instrumenta movendi has come to pose upon the security 
furnished by loci standi as of the advent of metallurgy: "If Man's progress in the technique of 
tool-making had stopped short of the utilization of metals, mankind's numbers and material 
wealth [low-cultural instrumenta movendi] would, no doubt, today be only a fraction of 
what they actually are. On the other hand, mankind's survival would be far more secure; for 
we should be in no danger of exhausting irreplaceable resources." The assertion that loci 
standi conform to the sites where all mobility initially depends and eventually comes to
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reside and repose is vindicated. Loci standi open up routes of mobility which subsequently 
may become enhanced -b u t eventually always obstructed— by the operation of 
instrumenta movendi. Movement is an impossibility without the anterior existence of loci 
standi -th e  latter are its conditions of possibility or, better still, of transitivity. Instrumenta 
movendi are only isolating positions; to circulate within the cultural matrix they need to 
parasitically run upon the transposition locus standi. Instrumenta movendi mediate the 
embodiment, embeddedness and contextualization of loci standi; in so doing, the former 
alters the composition of the latter. We say that instrumenta movendi exert a différance- 
effect upon loci standi.
The différance-effect that instrumenta movendi exert over loci standi can be defined in the 
following six points:
1 /  Différence Is A Positive Feedback Loop Reinscribed In The Cultural M atrix As A 
Transposition
Living systems theory contends that processes of amplification occur via positive feedback 
loops. Feedback loops are relational processes. Différence may be portrayed as the 
characteristic feedback loop that links up instrumenta movendi to loci standi. It is an 
ambivalent loop in that it both alters loci standi in a creative manner but it simultaneously 
deforms them in a destructive way. Instrumenta movendi are both situated upon loci standi 
and desituating of the latter.
Différence is a coinage by the father of deconstruction, Jacques Derrida, to register the fact 
that a contingent signifier differs in meaning from and defers its alleged original signified. It 
is a rubric derived from two polysemes. The present participle to différer, namely différant, 
and the ending -once. To render Derrida's work operative, we must subject différance to a 
process of réinscription in the cultural matrix.93 In so doing, différance ceases to be an 
undecidable and turns into one of the transpositions that operate within the cultural matrix.
Derrida announces that “différance is not [...] It derives from no category of being [...] Not
93 Cf. Chapter 3, Section 3, Subsection II for an account of the reasons why Derrida's work must be reconfigured in the cultural matrix.
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only is there no kingdom of différance, but différance instigates the subversion of every 
kingdom" (Derrida 1984a [1968]: 21, 6, 21-2), be that of exclusively loci standi or 
instrumenta movendi. Différance repeatedly succeeds in rendering the links of dependency 
that instrumenta movendi establish with loci standi visible. This is no trivial task. There are 
still many bodies of knowledge that, while focusing on one of the two elements, fail to see 
the interpenetration between loci standi and instrumenta movendi.
To take an example, Fritjof Capra (1988: 151-152) claims that the theory of self-organizing 
systems provides an ideal framework for an ethics that takes into account ecological issues. 
Yet, as its name attests, this theory pays exclusive heed to loci standi; it is thoroughly 
impervious to the pervasive différance effect ignited by instrumenta movendi. In 
characterizing reality as "a network pattern in which the function of each component is to 
help produce and transform other components while maintaining the overall circularity of 
the network" (Capra 1996: 96), living systems easily lends to the severe charge of being a 
distorted idealization of loci standi. This theoretical framework deceivingly embarks upon a 
neat representation of that which has no longer been taking place on a virtually global scale 
ever since the advent of metallurgy. With the proliferation of instrumenta movendi the 
course of loci standi is dramatically interfered. In line with Latour's claims in We Have Never 
Been Modern, différance reminds us of the fact that loci standi don't inhabit a purified plane. 
Rather, they are incessantly penetrated by the presence of instrumenta movendi. In linking 
these two irreducible entities, différance shatters the would-be idealized kingdoms of 
instrumenta movendi or loci standi. These two entities cohabit in the same spatiality not 
under conditions of equality, but by establishing hierarchized relations.
Postmodern debates on the end of history, for their part, err on the opposite side. They 
assume that progress is possible on the exclusive basis of instrumenta movendi. The 
postmodern condition assumes that history dissolves its course the moment that the 
'progressive advances' brought about by instrumenta movendi become routine. "[HJhuman 
capability to order nature through technology has increased and will continue to increase to 
such a point that, even while ever-newer achievements have become possible, the increased 
capability to order and arrange simultaneously makes them ever less 'new'" [...] (Gehlen 
quoted in Vattimo 1991 [1988]: 7). In so postulating, postmodernity testifies to its
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disembodied, disembedded and decontextualized condition. Whichever the frequency of 
technological innovation, the pervasive operability of différance-effects remains implacable. 
It is the non-postmodern category instrumenta movendi that alerts us to this fact. Routine 
on the basis of loci standi, by contrast, leads both to security and novelty.
"Différance is no more static than it is genetic, no more structural than historical" (ibid: 12). 
This transposition decentres both antagonisms and on this basis facilitates part of the modus 
operandi of the cultural matrix. Différance exhibits how instrumenta movendi gain their 
embodiment, embeddedness and contextualization by disembodying, disembeding and 
decontextualizing loci standi. This mechanism is both static and genetic at once. It speaks of 
a state -th e  embodiment, embeddedness and contextualization of instrumenta movendi— 
but also of a process-the disembodiment, disembeddedness and decontextualization of loci 
standi. It both outlines structures -th e  loci standi and instrumenta movendi themselves— 
and denotes processes extended over time — the disembodiment, disembeddedness and 
decontextualization of loci standi.
2 /  The Mediation and Alteration o/Loci Standi
Culti that exclusively operate on the basis of loci standi, such as the case of indigenous 
communities, are low-culturally fully embodied, middle-culturally fully embedded and high- 
culturally fully contextualized. It is instrumenta movendi that exact the continua dis­
embodiment, dis-embeddedness and de-contextualization; their deployment renders a 
cultus disembodied, disembedded and decontextualized to a certain extent. Différance, 
which captures the mediation and alteration of loci standi on the part of instrumenta 
movendi, attests to the inhabitation of these median spaces. These median spaces are 
indeed the spatiality where life operates once a community, society or civilization -a  
cultus— decides to run on the basis of instrumenta movendi.
In so far as in a cultus an abundance of instrumenta movendi are put into circulation, culture 
"lives in and on différance, thereby binding itself to the same, which is not the identical" 
(Derrida 1984a [1968]: 17). Instrumenta movendi come to occupy the same place as loci
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standi but they do so by mediating and altering the latter -b y  simultaneously performing the 
role of 'tools of additional mobility' and that of 'instruments of agitation'.
Instrumenta movendi are indeed engendered as tools of additional mobility to the functions 
that loci standi readily supply. In this respect, instrumenta movendi exhibit "the envious 
desire to imitate the original, the desire to control the [locistandi]” (Teresa Brennan quoted 
in Caputi, 2001: 5). It is this eagerness to imitate "the creativity and power of the original 
[that] drives [instrumenta movendi] to deny the intelligence of nature [loci standi], and to 
impose a notion of nature [loci standi] as an allegedly mindless biological activity" (Caputi, 
2001: 9). Yet loci standi are inviolably irreducible. Instrumenta movendi as tools of additional 
mobility gain their corpora I ity by mediating -disembodying, disembedding,
decontextualizing— loci standi. In the course of such mediation, the embodiment, 
embeddedness and contextualization of loci standi are deferred ad infinitum. This is equal to 
saying that loci standi lose their embodiment, embeddedness and contextualization.
The ability of instrumenta movendi to enhance the possibilities common to loci standi is 
indissociable from the agitation and disruption that the former exert upon the latter. This 
additional role is in accordance to another of the etymological meanings of instrumentum 
movendi. 'Instrumentum'94 signifies 'means', 'tool'. 'Movendi' is the future passive participle 
form of 'moveo', the infinitive verbal form of 'to move,' which in an extended meaning also 
signifies 'to agitate,' 'to affect/ 'to provoke,' 'to disturb.' Instrumenta movendi represent a 
willing or unintended interference with the course of loci standi. They are instruments of 
agitation. Indeed, the epithets 'firm', 'solid' illustrative of the functions of loci standi are far 
from co-extensive with 'unshakable,' 'immovable;' rather, loci standi are wholly vulnerable 
to the disturbances provoked by instrumenta movendi. On this complementary function, 
instrumenta movendi register the "envious desire [...] to devour, poison and dismember [loci 
standi]/' (Brennan quoted in Caputi 2001: 5). These low- middle- and high-cultural artifacts 
pose a perennial matricide to loci standi, and yet the survival of the former is only 
guaranteed with the ongoing supply of the latter. This is the quintessence of the différance- 
effect. In this respect, with Weber (194 [1964]: 141), we may conclusively state that
94 The Latin noun 'instrumentum, instrumenti’ means 'tool, tools; equipment, apparatus; instrument: means (and also document; deed)'.
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"genuine reality is pulsating" in the loci standi; "and the rest [instrumenta movendi] are 
derivatives of life, lifeless ghosts, and nothing else" (ibid), which anyway interfere in a lethal 
manner with the course of loci standi.
As instruments of agitation, instrumenta movendi disengage loci standi from cultural cycles 
and turn them into a 'standing-reserve'. The birth of instrumenta movendi is the 
instrumentalization of loci standi. "Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be 
immediately on hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may well be on call for a further 
ordering. Whatever is ordered about in this way has its own standing. We call it the 
standing-reserve [Bestand][...] Seen in terms of the standing-reserve, the machine is 
completely nonautonomous, for it has its standing only on the basis of the ordering of the 
orderable (Heidegger 2000e [1993]: 322, 323), namely, on the basis of loci standi.
Let us next illustrate the two-pronged functions that instrumenta movendi qua tools of 
mobility and instruments of agitation perform. The development of roadways for 
automobiles, buses, taxis, cars and trucks operate, on the one hand, as embodied, 
embedded and contextualized tools of additional mobility to those means of movement 
enabled by loci standi such as walking and running across fields and within the commons as 
animals, hunter-gatherers, aboriginals do or exterminated civilizations such as the Cathars 
would do across the Pyrenees (lllich 1982). Yet in so far as roads gain their embodiment, 
embeddedness and contextualization from the very loci standi-the  fields, the commons, the 
animals, the hunter-gathers, the aboriginals— they are uprooting, roads inescapably turn 
into instruments of agitation of the latter. This is equal to saying that roadways are 
disembodying, disembedding and decontextualizing of fields, the commons, animals, hunter- 
gathers, aboriginals. Or as Ivan lllich (1982), evoking Heidegger's reading of technology, puts 
it, the infrastructure associated with roads turns 'environment as commons' into 
'environment as resource.'
Let us take public-address systems as additional examples of the dualist nature of 
instrumenta movendi. Over the centuries, the communication systems common in villages 
and towns have been characterized by spaces of silence and a relatively equally distributed 
opportunity of speech. Perhaps prestigious figures such as the priest or the mayor may have
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unbalanced the equality in speech allocation reigning in these settlements. The reason for 
this equality in communication resides in the fact that contact amongst villagers was verbally 
established, by employing one's voice, a locus standi. With the proliferation of technology, 
loudspeakers and microphones were steadily distributed in villages and towns. Loudspeakers 
and microphones must be, on the one hand, regarded as embodied, embedded and 
contextualized tools of additional communication to that afforded by the voice. Yet the 
operability of these public-address systems takes place at the expense of the inhabitants' 
ability to use their voice at will. Loudspeakers and microphones privilege some voices over 
other ones. When the loudspeaker or microphone operates the remaining voices are 
automatically silenced. These public-address systems are instruments of agitation of a 
shared capacity amongst villagers, namely, the use of their voice. The embeddedness and 
contextualization of loudspeakers and microphones in villages and towns is the 
disembeddedness and decontextualization of the voice of their inhabitans.
3 / Positions As Instruments Of Agitation Of Transpositions
Given that philosophy and science as epistëmë "requires static, fixed, and unchanging 
objects, the myth of the [mode of] Being arose to satisfy the knowing man's need for 
possessions" (Schrift 1990: 62). The mode of being regards things-in-themselves but not in 
relation to other things. Yet the cultural matrix operates upon the mode of engagement95 
and is therefore in a position to exhibit how instrumenta movendi are parasitic upon loci 
standi. Instrumenta movendi, far from facilitating the transitivity of loci standi, prominently 
obstruct their circulation. It is for that matter that they must be regarded as mere positions. 
This is equal to saying that in the irreducible perspective that loci standi and instrumenta 
movendi usher in, the category loci standi is the one which provides the initial embodiment, 
embeddedness and contextualization, and therefore, meaning; it is the transposition. Max 
Weber is vocal in this respect. Weber suggests that the direction in which instrumenta- 
movendi-onented culti go and the scientific statements that follow thereof are generally 
hollow. It cannot be "prove[n] that the existence of the world which these sciences describe 
is worth while, that it has any 'meaning,1 or it makes sense to live in such world" (Weber 
1964 [1948]: 144).
95 Cf, Chapter 3, Section 2, Subsection IV above andChapter 10, Section 3, Subsection VIII below.
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Instrumenta movendi are, to be sure, denied the condition of transitivity. These positions 
exist without an embodiment, embeddedness or contextualization of their own. Rather, they 
are parasitic upon those of loci standi. The existence of genetically modified organisms, to 
take an example, feeds on the embodiment of organic seeds, which are loci standi. The 
embodiment of the genetically modified seed signifies the disembodiment of the organic 
seed. Similarly, the political structures that European settlers left in Africa during the first 
half of the twentieth-century were middle-cultural instrumenta movendi in relation to 
customary law and tribal forms of decision-making reigning in those territories prior to the 
arrival of the Europeans. The foreign polities only started being operative as they fed on the 
space that the tribal structures were occupying, which may be considered as middle-cultural 
loci standi. The embedment of the former signified the disembedment and alteration of the 
latter. The legal and political structures brought about by the metropolises were 
conspicuous instruments of agitation of the local polities. The différance-effect that 
colonizers exerted upon autochthonous forms of organization of the public sphere was 
prominently evident.
A paramount high-cultural instance of instrumentum movendi is the modus operandi of 
philosophy and science as epistëmë. From the perspective of the cultural matrix, the 
currency of this scientific and philosophical trajectory is, as has been mentioned in various 
passages, at the low- middle- and high-cultural levels, the position. Max Weber (1948 [1964]: 
141) refers to high-cultural positions as 'concepts':
Plato's passionate enthusiasm in The Republic must, in the final analysis, be explained by the fact 
that for the first time the concept, one of the greatest tools of all scientific knowledge, had been 
consciously discovered. [...] the eternal truth that never would vanish as the doings of the blind 
men vanish. That was the tremendous experience which dawned upon the disciples of Socrates.
And from this it seemed to follow that if one only found the right concept of the beautiful, the 
good, or, for instance, of bravery, of the soul -o r  whatever— then one could also grasp its true 
being (Weber 1948 [1964]: 141).
It must be noted that the universalized and idealized concepts of the beautiful, the good, of 
bravery, of the soul gain their contextualization by uprooting or decontextualizing local 
notions of the beautiful, the good, of bravery, of the soul. "The myth o f the concept as a
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faithful representation of reality is a Western myth [...] The reference of the concept is an 
abstraction" (Panikkar 2009: 101, 91; emphasis in the original; own translation from the 
Catalan translation) in relation to high-cultural loci standi or definitions of things 
contextualized in space and time. Take for instance the rubric 'justice/ Justice is a high- 
cultural position or concept. It started gaining preponderance as classical philosophy 
undertook a process of decontextualization whereby situated knowing was debunked to the 
advantage of prepositional knowledge. Justice came to occupy the contextualized notions of 
equity, feeding on them to gain their contextualization (cf. de Lucia 2008).
High-cultural positions may also be characterized by way of the critique that quantum 
physics levels against classical physics. The former charges the latter with the idealization of 
their findings. Processes of idealization consist in subsuming reality under one single 
element. Quantum mechanics reproaches to classical physics the idealized representation of 
light either as a wave or as a particle. Instead, quantum mechanics advocates the 
complementation of the disjunctive.
The primacy that loci standi occupies within the cultural matrix clashes with the privilege 
that instrumenta movendi enjoy in other bodies of thought. "[T]wo million years of technical 
culture have so interbred humans and artifacts that our organism is now untenable without 
their shelter" (Allen 2004: 145; cf. also Latour 1993). The cultural matrix reverses the 
statement: the technical culture in which human life is enmeshed is untenable without loci 
standi. Instrumenta movendi feed on the embodiment, embeddedness and contextualization 
of loci standi. It is the circulation of instrumenta movendi that "involves the reversal of the 
original state of affairs, together with the imitation of the original" (Caputi 2001: 2). Thus a 
"'postbiological future' where computers and other machines surpass humans in intelligence 
and render us, in a word, unnecessary" (ibid: 15) is a capital fantasy. Computers are, low- 
middle- and high-culturally, wholly dependant upon loci standi. Instrumenta movendi gain 
embodiment, embeddedness and contextualization, namely, transposition or transitivity 
within the cultural matrix, by disembodying, disembedding and decontextualizing loci standi. 
The former operation explains their role as tools of additional mobility, whilst the latter 
renders them instruments of agitation.
-170-
4 /  Transposition Of Activity Vs. Passivity into Three Continua
Instrumenta movendi are tools of mobility and instruments of agitation at a time. They 
proceed "in one divided but coherent movement. We must try not to lose sight of its strange 
unity," (Derrida 1997: 142) which is the one captured by the différance-effect. Instrumenta 
movendi are immobile, static, fixed positions. They gain their transitivity when they have 
recourse to the embodiment, embeddedness and contextualization of loci standi, which is an 
utterly autonomous cultural transposition. However this process of gaining autonomy isn't 
free of consequences. Qua tools of mobility that mediate the embodiment, embeddedness 
and contextualizon proper to loci standi, instrumenta movendi actively cause and determine 
the fate of loci standi. Yet qua instruments of agitation that disembody, disembed and 
decontextualize loci standi, instrumenta movendi also come to passively receive the effects 
of its loci-standi-dependant mobility.
Let us illustrate this characterization with an example. The operability of a computer entails 
the use of certain amounts of ores and petroleum. It also signifies the redundancy of more 
traditional ways of writing texts, calculating and designing. When the computer breaks down 
or dies the consumed amounts of ores and petroleum to repair or replace it are no longer 
available. Similarly, the neglected traditional ways of writing, calculating and designing are 
unavailable in the wake of a computer failure or death. The computer resents all these 
losses, as without them it can no longer operate. In this intricate mesh, the classical notions 
of activity and passivity, cause and effect no longer hold. The computer is initially an active 
cause of the depletion of proportional amounts of ores and petroleum and of the loss of 
traditional forms of writing, computing and designing. Yet this artifact is soon exposed to the 
effects of such depletion and losses. Différance is the transposition that captures the 
multiple interactions that link instrumenta movendi to loci standi, instrumenta movendi as 
différance -both  mediation and alteration— of loci standi conform to "no longer simply a 
concept, but rather [...] a system that no longer tolerates the opposition of activity and 
passivity, nor that of cause and effect, or of indetermination and determination, etc." 
(Derrida 1984a [1968]: 11,16). Différance, instead, operates along three median spaces that 
have within themselves "recomprehend[ed] and redelimit[ed] the classical causality"
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(Plotnitsky 1994: 39). These three spaces were outlined in the previous chapter. They are 
high-cultural de-contextualization, middle-cultural dis-embeddedness and low-cultural dis­
embodiment. Along these continua, différance signals "a certain nontransitivity" (Derrida 
1984 [1982]: 9). The amount of instrumenta movendi circulating in a cultus renders the latter 
de-contextualized, dis-embedded and dis-embodied -nontransitive, that is— to a certain 
extent.
5 /  The Embedding Of Hypositional Logic
The leading trait of hypositions is that both the initial pole or position and the hierarchized 
one or hypo-position move within the same terrain. Derrida calls this unified area 'the 
economy of the same'. Différance is the differing-deferring movement that binds position to 
hyposition within this cohesive region. "[0]ne could reconsider all pairs of opposites on 
which philosophy is constructed [...], not in order to see opposition erase itself but to see 
what indicates that each of the terms must appear as the différance of the other, as the 
other different and deferred in the economy of the same" (Derrida 1984a [1968]: 17). In this 
light, loci standi and instrumenta movendi conform to a binary pair. Instrumenta movendi 
are loci standi mediated and differed. Yet the point most relevant to note for the 
construction of our post-ecocidal conditions of in-transitivity of knowledge is that loci standi 
and instrumenta movendi embody, embed and contextualize binary pairs.
This means that the first term or initial position of the binary pair embodies, embeds and 
contextualizes the second term or hyposition. With respect to physis-teckhnë we can then 
plausibly argue that teckhnè is physis "different and deferred" (Derrida 1984a [1968]: 17). In 
the productivity-sustainable development doublet, it is productivity that embodies, embeds 
and contextualizes the economy within which sustainable development operates. We must 
be cautious with the several implications that follow from the assertion that sustainable 
development is productivity different and differed. This means that a cultus is settling for 
eco-efficiency. Insofar as sustainable development is positioned in relation to the industrial 
productive system, it is also bound to it.96 Had historically productivity been sustainability 
different and deferred, we would now be within the parameters of a truly ecological
96 Cf. Chapter 1, Section 2, Subsection i, under the heading '5 / An Unproblematized Reversal Of Productivity In The Context Of Industrial 
Capitalism' above.
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economy, whilst we are caught within the mode of production.
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Chapter 8
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Transposement As Regimes O f 
Const rained-Engaged immanence: 
From Logocentrism in to  The A c tiv ity  
O f The M anufacturers O f Culture And 
FossiIiza tions
" [...] positivism -the supreme insult" 
-George Canguilhem97
"For so long as we continue to think in ways that have brought us to the 
brink of ecological disaster —thinking in terms of manipulation, detachment, 
looking-on from outside— we can do little more than tinker with issues that
really demand a radical approach".
—Andrew Welburn98
"People whose lives are not a 'dramatic action' but a business sit before 
the stage and look at strange creatures for whom life is more than a 
business? 'It's proper the way,' you say; 'it’s entertaining that way; it's 
culture !' Well then! In that case I all too often lack culture, for this 
sight is all too often disgusting to me. Whoever has enough tragedy and 
comedy in himself probably does best to stay away from the theatre; or, 
should there be an exception, the entire event — including the theatre and 
audience and poet —becomes the actual tragic and comic spectacle to him, so 
that the piece that is performed means little to him by comparison. What do 
the Fausts and Manfreds of the theatre matter to someone who is himself
somewhat like Faust and Manfred?"
—Friedrich Nietzsche99
Synopsis -  Chapter 8 investigates the intra-cultural relations -these are the ones that take 
place within a cultus. To this end, three major tasks are undertaken. First, the completion of 
the immanent turn as initiated by the post-Kantian critique of reason -reported in Chapter 
4. Second, the distinction between the proactive activity that follows from regarding low- 
middle- and high-cultural loci standi simultaneously and the inertia that ensues from the
97 Canguilhem 1999 [1994]: 71.
98 Cf. Welburn 2004:11.
99 Cf. Nietzsche 2005 [2001]: § 86.
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synchronous operability of low- middle- and high-cultural instrumenta movendi. Third, the 
assertion that knowledge derived from contact with loci standi is normative. With a view 
towards completing the immanent turn, it is claimed that the plane of immanence is the 
container of myths. In so far as a dialogical relationship is established between mythoi and 
the earthly communities where they spring, the plane of immanence, to realize its potential 
and further upgrade itself, must be recurrently enacted. These necessary engagements are 
engendered with the expression of feeling or pathos -as opposed to logos. They form 
regimes of constrained-engaged immanence to a certain degree. This mode of proceeding, 
utterly neglected by the epistemological tradition, is associated with that of the mythic 
Metis, daughter of the Titan Oceanus, renowned for her cunning wisdom and wise 
proceeding. It is further argued that to express that transpositions are both subjecting and 
subjected at once and undercut the subject/object divide we need to use the suffix '-ment' 
instead of '-tion' -th e  latter only denotes activity, whilst the former both activity and 
passivity. Henceforth we shall say transposement and hyposement instead of transposition 
and hyposition.
Agency is decentred by way of the subjecting-subjected activity of the manufacturer of 
culture and fossilizations. The former is an enactment of loci standi whilst the latter realize 
their embodiment, embeddedness and contextualization by way of instrumenta movendi. 
Manufacturers of culture establish regimes of engaged immanence whilst fossilizations build 
regimes of constrained immanence. A regime of engaged immanence spawns rhythms 
imbued with originality, whereas that of constrained immanence generates -'passes'— 
complex structures that exert an enormous momentum over the manufacturer of culture. 
There are relevant concomitances between Nietzsche's characterization of life-enhancing 
will to power and regimes of engaged immanence, on the one hand, and the decadent, life- 
negating impulses that follow from the will to power, on the other hand. This chapter 
illuminates some such concomitances.
Regimes of engaged immanence, prescriptive as they are, yield singularities that shape truth 
not in the direction of veritate -a  faithful representation of the facts as in the 
epistemological disposition— but as perennial fictions -repeated constructs in line with the 
etymological meaning of 'fiction'. Whilst philosophy and science as epistëmë attributes to
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veritate a universal meaning, the cultural matrix, in line with Buddhist teachings, endows 
situated -fictional—truth with a unique, absolute edge.
1. The Import of Deflowering Mythoi and 'Pathetically' Engaging the Planum 
Of Immanence
l
The Immanent Turn As An Unfinished Transposition - Continuation -  In patiently 
undertaking an inquiry into the conditions of in-transitivity of the plane of immanence, one 
soon comes face to face with the rigidity of the plane at issue. The reader was initially 
alerted to this fact in Chapter 4.100 The all-inclusiveness property of this expanse successfully 
decentres the proneness in the Western metaphysical tradition to classify the stuff of reality 
as made up of either angelical ideas or of a militant materialism that, in the leftist tradition 
descendant from Marxism, is often in tacit agreement with industrialism. The plane of 
immanence pervasively dissolves the logic of such divide. Immanence prescribes that all 
available elements remain within a single spatiality. This all-inclusiveness notwithstanding, 
the very banner 'plane of immanence' remains insufficient to capture the two subversively 
innerwordly traits that gave to the plane its initial shape, viz. multiplicity and a fortiori 
becoming (cf. Deleuze 2001 [1965]: 84).
'Plane' enjoys the same etymological provenance as plain, from the Latin form planum, 'a 
surface without elevations, flat through and through'. An even surface that contains the 
whole of existence is, in my view, in conspicuous continuity with Being. The modulations and 
multi-layers proper to tragedy -p art and parcel of becoming— are automatically expelled 
from a homogeneous expanse; the latter is unable to register the rich, changing relieve of 
the former. Formally, the planum of immanence betrays the root-and-branch theocide that 
the immanent turn sets to level against an objectified, foundational creature that 
customarily goes by the name of God, or in modern lay culti, scientism -'b ig  science' as 
expressed by critical quarters (cf. Plumwood 2002: Ch. 2, 221). Plane as the receptacle for 
the tremendous liberating power that follows from the immanent shake-up simply strangles 
the multiplicity and dynamic processes that the former is meant to welcome. What is more, 
the plane of immanence seems to keep serving the purposes of a logocentric clique in
100 Cf. Chapter 4, Section 2, Subsection V above.
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charge of establishing not any order but a pecking one, giving priority to some ways of 
proceeding over other downgraded ones as duly registered in the hypositions hitherto 
examined. In this respect, Hyppolite's claim that Immanence is complete' in Hegel, in so far 
as in Hegelianism ultimately there is nothing outside the concept -absolute idealism 
transparently expresses each aspect of being (Kerslake 2002:11), must be considered as still 
bespeaking a static plane of immanence.
In line with the acknowledgement of the birth of tragedy in the wake of our concerted 
theocide that is taking the form of a number of transpositions, immanence must embrace 
the whole of Pandora's box. Yet in acknowledging the entire gamut of existential registers 
following Pandora's spill, the cultural matrix -o u r political artifact operating in the cognitive 
sphere- restricts us to exclusively select those elements that are to critically analyse the 
ecocidal mode of engagement and victoriously steer our tread out of it. In this pick forced 
upon us out of the ill-conditions that saturate our contemporaneity, two registers exact 
selection: immanence as mythoi and pathos as activity.
II
The Plane Of Immanence As M ythoi To Be In Dialogical Contact With - The plane of 
immanence may be plausibly regarded as the container of myths. "Myth is not 
entertainment, but rather the crystallization of experience" (Curry 2004h: 120). Mythoi 
conform to a collection of sacred stories that address the creation of the world, the nature 
of the skies and hell, the vicissitudes in the Pantheon, the emergence of the first human 
forms, various adventures on the part of heroines and heroes, villain's audacity and the full 
sequence of events at the beginning and end of times (Wilkinson and Philip 2008: 14; Curry 
2004h: 118). The association of mythoi with the immanent spatiality is tantamount to 
univocally asserting that the plane of immanence is perse  Pandora's box. This mythic plane 
covers the whole range of archetypes as envisioned, preserved and disseminated by those 
culti that unremittingly hold a sense of the sacred and thus abide by loci standi101. The 
mythic plane further satiates the universal sense of meaning and belongingness. "[A] world 
bereft of radical significance [as furnished by local mythoi] is not long tolerated; it leaves 
men [sic] radically unstable, so that they will size at any myth or pseudomyth that is offered"
101,Cf. Chapter?, Section 1 above.
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(Philip Wheelwright quoted in Curry 2004h: 125). In the statement before the last, 
archetypes should not necessarily be deemed as restricted to those outlined in the work of 
Carl Jung (cf. Grof undated: 10 et passim). They should be rather regarded as a generic index 
of the very existential mesh -certainly free from existentialist overtones but not from 
contextualized and supple ones. "Myths are ambiguous and subtle, they have many 
meanings and are not fixed, but evolutionary" (Wilkinson and Philip 2008: 14; own 
translation from the Spanish translation).
For all the apparent resemblances with idealism, the mythic plane of immanence falls short 
of conforming to an isolated, self-defined sphere that must be emulated for reality to gain its 
meaning and due corporeality. Mythoi are as much informed by worldly events as they 
succeed in generating metaphors for and of the latter. "Myths adjust to the arising 
circumstances and to newly-arrived knowledges" (ibid). There is a constant dialogical 
interaction between mythical imaginary and what is considered as our four-dimensional 
reality. "Each culture has [...] the myths that create it and which in turn create the culture at 
issue" (Panikkar 2009: 98; own translation from the Catalan translation). This means that the 
metaphorical purview that mythoi purvey -which is but the plane of immanence in its 
entirety- must be enacted to both materialize in the four-dimensional world and further 
recalibrate the plane at issue. The dialectic between myth and everyday life is a fa it  
accompli. The objectification of myth -mythology—is the atrocious death of the latter. 
"Myth symbolizes, but this symbolization has got a [cognitive] status [...] that requires a 
participatory experience in the reality that myth narrates" (ibid: 86). In order to render 
mythoi material to existence, the plane of immanence must be brought to life, enacted, 
transposed. It is at this juncture where both the Enlightenment project and its fervent 
watchdog, the post-Kantian critique of reason, go hand-in-hand -both  falling short of 
realizing the immanent turn they had endeavoured to undertake. Whilst Kantianism brings 
to bear the plane at issue upon the transcendental categories of reason and post-Kantian 
writers render reason fully innerwordly, both traditions conflate in regarding the plane of 
immanence as largely an inert and static backdrop against which the nuanced tragicomedy 
of life takes place. Kantianism and post-Kantianism alike coincide in locking in the plane of 
immanence in a restful, logocentric prison.
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A leading post-Kantian practitioner that takes detailed issue with the plane of immanence is, 
no doubt, the French thinker Gilles Deleuze. Deleuze's transcendental empiricism is 
nonetheless much of a mixed bag (Deleuze 2001 [1995]; Rajcham 2001). On the one hand, 
Deleuze struggles to wed Kant's transcendental idealism to Hume's empiricism by 
overcoming the aporias of the former that "continued in the phenomenological search for 
an Urdoxa -th e  difficulties of the 'transcendental-empirical doubling' and the 'traps of 
consciousness'" (Rajcham 2001: 8). On the other, Deleuze exhibits some incipient glimpses 
of a lively plane of immanence: "[Ijmmanence is pure only when it is not immanent to a 
prior subject or object, mind or matter, only when, neither innate nor acquired, it is always 
yet 'in the making"' (Rajacham 2001: 13; emphasis added). It follows that Kerslake's (2002: 
10) characterization, already mentioned above, of a philosophy of immanence as one where 
"thought is shown to be fully expressive of being" is incomplete, for it evinces that such 
philosophy is not liberated to itself but to the logos or solipsist discourse on Being.
These initial signs in the active immanent direction notwithstanding, Deleuze is in my view 
too profoundly entangled in the same deficiency where Patrick Curry is, to successfully carry 
on with his enterprise. Just as Curry, for all the sharp insights that pervade his work, 
ultimately falls short of developing the conceptual toolkit to propose a convincing post- 
Cartesian philosophy,102 so too Deleuze lacks the intellectual instruments to set forth a post- 
logocentric immanent panorama. Deleuze (quoted in Rajcham 2001: 18) requires from us 
that we "believe in this world, in this life" by sticking to "our plane of immanence today." In 
such statement the very plane of immanence stands as a stumbling block on our way to, as 
Deleuze calls upon us in the previous quote, attain pure immanence. Rather, to make further 
progress we are in urgent need of settling the conceptual quandaries that assail the 
immanent turn in full. We need to abandon the aloof characterization of the plane 
altogether and render it as impure as our repeated engagements of it enable us to de-purify 
its immaculateness. A woman gains her fertility out of the bleeding that ensues from the 
active circulation of her ovules all the way down her uterus, not out of the holding of her 
ovules locked in, in purity, in her ovaries. In a similar manner mythoi -immanence—only 
come alive when they are entangled with every-day-life affairs. It is on this occasion that 
they gain the building basis for their metaphors in the form of varied narratives.
102=Cf. Chapter 6, Section 2 above.
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Logos has very little to say or do in the dialogical intercourse between the archetypal mythoi, 
their enactment and the re-calibration of the plane of immanence. It is feeling, pathos, "the 
Yes-saying pathos par excellence, which I call the tragic pathos" (Nietzsche, 1989b [1967]: 
296) the entity in charge of transposing -enacting— myth and the levelness inbuilt in the 
plane of immanence. As it was intimated in Chapter 5 et passim, logocentrism is 
conterminous with the postmodern condition. For the postmodern philosopher is the one 
"who acknowledges the impossibility of judging the Babel-like pluralism of world pictures 
from an external point of view -a  view from nowhere" (Vattimo 2002: 20-1), but who 
simultaneously fails to gain a view from inside. Postmodern incursions have liberated the 
plane of immanence from the outside. Yet they have fallen short of dwelling upon it. The 
postmodern immanent spatiality remains a pure, virgin, spotless space. It is the adoption of 
this metaphysical exteriority that induces the representation of the immanent plane as 
sheer contingency and historicity deprived of a contextualizing setting. Only the indwelling in 
the world makes one realize the constraining or liberating forces that traverse each 
moment. Once you try and liberate the plane of immanence from within, this automatically 
appears in regimes of engaged-constrained immanence of which you indefectibly partake. 
You are part of a regime of engaged immanence when you have successfully liberated 
yourself from the Western metaphysical edifice -a  collection of instrumenta movendi. You 
are part of a regime of constrained immanence when this edifice interferes in your 
engagements of immanence.
Ill
From Logocentrism As Inert Backdrop Into An Impurely Engaging Pathos- Three broad 
meanings can be attributed to logos:
1 / Logos as 'w ord/ 'speech'. Derrida (2004 [1968]: 84) associates this 'living logos' with the 
presence privileged by the Western metaphysical Being. Logos "is always a being (on)." On 
this reading, logos and the ontic quest are inextricable. Logos is ontology.
2 / Logos as ratio, reason, that which transcends historical and cultural contingencies and is 
rendered part-and-parcel of the architectonics of the heavenly firmament named kosmos
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('ordered world') or universe.
3 / Logos in Christianity, as the second person of the Trinity, connected to the figure of Jesus 
Christ, the son of God.
These three apparently disparate significances of logos share the communality of furnishing 
a permanent backdrop for reality to act itself out. Through logos as speech, the "guiding 
thread animating the spoken discussion" (Derrida 2004 [1968]: 83) is possible. Logos as 
reason channels the possibility of reality in many theories of knowledge. Intimate allies of 
this reasonable logos are the inclusion of inert backdrops in theoretical bodies such as Isaac 
Newton's outline of the laws of nature; the natural scientist's belief, up to the 19th-century, 
in the existence of the universal, immovable ether (Hawking and Mlodinow 2005: ch. 5); 
Martin Heidegger's (1962) philosophical sine qua non as Being-ln-The-World. Logos as the 
son of God, for its part, redeems humanity of its sins and, in so doing, facilitates the further 
existence of the latter. The figure of Jesus Christ operates, in this context, as the inert 
backdrop of humankind.
We may agree or disagree with the implications of each logos. Derrida (1997), for instance, 
takes issue with the fact that, in the history of Western metaphysics, priority has been 
accorded to speech -th e  living word or logos—over writing. Be this as it may, what is 
inextricable is the fact that the enlisting of tragedy -o f  pathos- downrightly dissolves the 
comprehensive background that logos requires to underpin reality and by way of which it 
subjects its various elements to undisturbed laws. The immanent expanse, when fully 
liberated to itself and thus in active deflowering of this very spatiality that Kantianism and 
post-Kantianism alike were unduly holding as pure, energetically liquefies any static and 
passive background that renders reality a product of ontology; a backdrop that gains its 
identity with on, 'being.' Materialism as a homogeneous backdrop ruled by matter that 
facilitates a simple, uniform reality subject to universal laws that overrides the particularities 
of bodies, appears again on a par with logos.102 Pathos only follows from the act of 
engagement. It is the engagement and not the sweeping static backdrop that turns into the 
very same glue that dynamically binds the firmament, a glue that is as impure as the
103 Cf. Chapter 4, Section 2 above.
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directness of the engagement allows it to be.
Pathos certainly facilitates plurality, one of the pre-eminent perspectives that dethrones 
God in the first place. Pathos acknowledges an original multitude that no longer subsumes 
the latter under One. However, pathos particularly emphasizes the act of becoming, the 
engagement which leads to those "impersonal yet singular" (Deleuze quoted in Rajcham 
2001: 8) intercourses that are material to the mode of engagement.104 Becoming is the 
second leading perspective responsible for that theocide that is to necessarily uproot 
Western metaphysical paraphernalia, responsible as it is for the ecocidal mode of 
engagement.
IV
After Metis's Cunning Wisdom - We are to complete the immanent turn and in so doing not 
only wholly remove the figure of God from the metaphysical scene but also his throne and 
operative artifacts; we are to fully dismantle monotheism, that is, and in so doing also 
eradicate monism. For "rigid monotheism brought to the extremes (where there is only an 
absolute Being) seems to conduce to monism, of either idealist or materialist persuasion" 
(Panikkar 2009: 99; own translation from the Catalan translation). In our attempt to 
complete the transposition of immanence we centrally busy ourselves with the removal of 
the salient trait of the epistemological trajectory, viz. being. "[Rjeality has only one property, 
the property that it is, estin," (Feyerabend 1987: 121) pronounced Parmenides in ancient 
Greece setting the tone for much of the Western metaphysical layout. Hence Derrida's 
assertion that metaphysics, wherever it operates, inside or outside philosophy, in classical, 
modern or postmodern texts is always the metaphysics of presence (Plotnitsky 1994: 226, 
231). In consonance, "Derrida has termed this belief in the self-presentation of meaning 
logocentrism'" (Johnson 2004: ix), a significance which, far from being at odds with our 
common use of this currency in the present work, complements it. Logos is that 
phantasmagoric and yet utterly self-centred entity that renders the entirety of existence 
plausible. Via an almighty anthropocentric figure that goes by the name of God or science — 
really scientism, logos is further in the position to bundle up the whole of existence.
104 Cf. Chapter 3, Section 2 above.
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The Western metaphysical tradition, to be sure, mistakes epistemology for the entire realm 
of cognition, whilst epistemology is exclusively an avenue, and a highly narrow one, of 
cognition. 'Epistëmë' refers to a truth based on abstract universal methodologically 
concocted by an elite of professional philosophers, philosophers of nature, later, in the 
modern age, called scientists. In line with Patrick Curry's (2004f) schematization of the 
ancient Greek cognitive panorama, it is worth noticing that Aristotle set epistëmë over 
against doxa ('received wisdom'), a mode of cognition, indeed, associated with the lay 
masses and thus downrightly stigmatized. Aristotle only complemented epistëmë with 
phronesis, the practical understanding that follows from and is unfolded in the crafts. 
This two-fold hierarchy of, first, prepositional knowledge and, second, practical expertise, 
conspicuously excluded the mode of embedded, situated knowing 
material to the cultural matrix. Or what comes down to the same thing, this embodied 
cognitive paradigm fails to enjoy breathing-space in the Western metaphysical trajectory 
that is to inform mainstream scientific praxis up to our days.
Curry identifies this excluded cognitive mode necessary to grow enmeshed in the immanent 
mythoi with the mythic Metis, "the daughter of the Titan Oceanus -animistic god of the great 
'river' encircling the Earth -an d  the Titaness Tethys, themselves children of Uranus (Heaven) 
and Gaea (Earth)" (Curry 2004f: 105). Metis is renowned for her ability to weather shifting 
particulars by way of her sharp cunning wisdom. This wise proceeding has never enjoyed the 
limelight in either philosophical or scientific Western praxis and it is yet central to invoke 
mythoi in our daily life and further inform back the plane of immanence that holds them in 
suspense and poised to come back in due course.105
Furthermore, ontology ('the discourse or eternal laws on being') leaves us promptly stuck on 
two stumbling stones. On the one hand, we must endorse an unwarranted 
canon that assumes that there are immovable laws in the so-called kosmos or universe (a 
unidimensional abode rightly contested by William James's pluriverse). On the other, we are 
forced to subscribe to the belief that the exploration of being is a relevant branch of 
cognition. Ontology, to be sure, speaks by way of the passive voice. It is concerned with 
things as they are -the Ding-an-sich- immaculately purveyed in epistemological
105 Cf. Chapter 10, Section 3, Subsection 1 below.
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representation, as the late Richard Rorty (1980) would bemoan. This Being is abstract and 
objective in so far as it is not tied to traditions, viz. to mythoi; it is outside both worldly 
existence and the self-same immanent spatiality where cultural traditions are kaleidoscope­
like registered. The reader should note that the attainment of such a disembodied 
Archimedean point operates in practice as a plethora of instrumenta movendi whereby the 
logocentric enlightened mind is entitled to disembody and disembed third parties.
V
From Transposition and Hyposition Into Transposement and Hyposement - The
acknowledgement of culture already evoked in Chapter 3 corresponds in itself to a relentless 
theocide -a  straight-forward transposition. Culture never is. Culture engages. Culture pays 
attention to, attends to, respects, worships in specific ways concrete tracts of soil and all 
which follows and derives thereof, namely, housing, nourishment, relationship, affection, 
healing, music, leisure and so on and so forth. Culture invariably appears in engaged forms 
within concrete parts of the world.106 So when Derrida claims that "the loss of presence has 
always already begun" (Johnson 2004: xi), it is not so much because a system of signs such as 
the linguistic be a constellation of interrelated differences (Allen 2004: 97-107) as because 
culture always ever manifests itself in an enacted form -as opposed to a statically present 
one. This engaged state is responsible for the dissolution of the Cartesian tradition that the 
category 'culture' enacts in its trail. Let us recall that Cartesianism attributes to the res 
cogitans the ability to actively issue ontological predicates while limiting the res extensa to 
the passive position of stoically receiving those ontological descriptions. Culture indeed cuts 
across such a chasm. Culture is concerned with activity. Yet this activity is simultaneously 
subjected to itself. Culture is a transposition, not a position. As such, it initiates an activity 
without generating hypo-positions upon which the activity at issue must end up being 
subjected.
It is the cultural engagement -as opposed to the subjective/objective hyposition—that is 
simultaneously engaging and engaged. Hence the need to rename transposition 
transposement. The suffix '-tion', to be sure, is added to verbs to refer to the state or 
process described by the verb, or to an instance of that process (Sinclair 1991: 85). '-Tion/
106 Cf. Chapter 3, Section 3 above.
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that is, only conveys active voice, the one proper to the anthropocentric res cogitans. The 
suffix '-m ent/ by contrast, adds to verbs to form nouns that refer to the process of making 
or doing something or the result of this process (Sinclair 1991: 109). '-Ment' denotes both 
activity (engaging) and passivity, the result of the process at hand (engaged). '-M e n t/ that is, 
is in the position to thoroughly corrode the Cartesian dualism which attributes an active 
voice to the res cogitans and a passive one to its hypo-position the res extensa.
Analogously, a position -e.g., productivity— is endowed with the ability to subject. However, 
as it forms a hyposition with its hypo-position -sustainable development— it fails to be 
simultaneously autonomously subjected. Rather, a position is subjected to the hypo-position 
or downgraded pole with which it is dependant upon relation for the completion of its 
significance. It is for that reason that the ending '-tion' of position can be respected - i t  duly 
captures its active voice. However, to mark the subjected, passive voice to which its 
dichotomous pole is put use, we must turn the hypo-position into 'hypo-posed'. Similarly, to 
mark both the active voice of the position and the passive voice of the hypo-posed we need 
to convert the hyposition into hyposement, for it is the ending '-ment' -in  contradistinction 
to '-tion'— that denotes activity and passivity at a time. To recapitulate, the central 
difference between a transposement and a hyposement is that the former is simultaneously 
active and passive, subjecting and subjected with no need to downgrade any third party. By 
contrast, the active position -e.g . subject- needs to generate an inferior category -its  
object—in order to gain its stability or hyposement. Given the lack of independence on the 
part of the position and its lethal effects upon third parties, it never gains the category of 
transposement - i t  remains caught in the hyposement for as long as a transposement stops 
short of reabsorbing it.
Let us illustrate the modus operand! now set out by way of the position instrumentum  
movendi. We said in the previous chapter that instrumenta movendi exert a différance- 
effect.107 This is because instrumenta movendi, in endeavouring to gain an embodiment, 
embeddedness and contextualization all their own need to subject loci standi to complete 
the process. Thus the assertion sympathetic with network theory that "[ajgency is [...] the 
property of the network as a whole; and as such, it can manifest anywhere in that network,
107 Cf. Chapter 7, Section 3 above.
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on the part of any item therein" (Curry 2010c: 102) needs urgent qualification. Instrumenta 
movendi, qua positions, are deprived of agency. They only exert différance-effects. This is in 
any case the point that Curry (ibid) in the same essay tries to raise by asserting that "[w]e 
are not, and no one is, in the position of being subjects who can make agency manifest in 
objects; that would be to retreat to the pathological fantasy, whether individual or 
collective, of Promethean/Faustian mastery."
However, the undercutting of the subjective/objective hyposement goes one major step 
forward: the place traditionally occupied by agency is simultaneously decentred. In the wake 
of the subject/object transposement we are no longer concerned with who affects what, but 
in addressing the query: does a given engagement conform to a transposement or to a 
position? This is equal to saying: does the engagement manufacture or does it fossilize? In 
short, just as in Chapter 7 we endeavoured to trace loci standi in relation to their 
destabilizing counterparts, instrumenta movendi, in the present unit we are interested in 
pinpointing manufacturers of culture vis-à-vis the intrusive fossilizations. Fossilizations 
perpetuate the course of instrumenta movendi whilst manufacturers of culture enhance -  
manufacture- the originality proper to loci standi.
2. The Subjecting-Subjected Activity Of The Manufacturers Of Culture
l
Overview Of The Intra-Cultural Relations -  The relations in which the analytics of 
transposement takes an interest fall into two major categories: the inter- and the intra- 
cultural ones. The inter-cultural relations occur amongst culti. They are the subject-matter of 
Chapter 9. The intra-cultural relations, by contrast, seek to unravel the links forged within 
culti. In particular modern culti, those where the circulation of instrumenta movendi is the 
order of the day and goes largely unquestioned, are ruled by two antipodal forces. One force 
fossilizes the instrumenta movendi in all their complexity thereby opening up the past -  
passed— dimension. The other force is not so much anchored in the present but in a space 
"between-times, between-moments; a space that offers the immensity of an empty time 
where one sees the event yet to come and already happened" (Deleuze 2001 [1995]: 29) and
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which facilitates the creative originality of loci standi. The first force corresponds to the 
might of fossilizations whilst the latter is that of the manufacturers of culture.
All of the manufacturers of culture's moves within the plane of immanence are assumed to 
strive to establish a connection with those of other manufacturers, relationships that may be 
only detrimentally intercepted by the appearance of destabilizing fossilizations. Instrumenta 
movendi, "the weak, the slaves, triumph not by adding up their forces but by subtracting 
those of the other: they separate the strong [loci standi] from what they can do" (Deleuze 
2001 [1995]: 75), and, in so doing, they generate a fossiiization, the sum of which Nietzsche 
referred to as "degeneration" and "nihilism" (ibid: 75-6). It follows that there are two broad 
manners to form relations: by either permitting or obstructing the engagement of 
immanence on the part of fellow manufacturers of culture. Those entities that realize their 
embodiment, embeddedness and contextualization by way of loci standi will allow their 
equals to connect with their intrinsic immanence. Again, we call these entities 
manufacturers of culture. By contrast, those entities that realize their embodiment, 
embeddedness and contextualization by way of instrumenta movendi will stop other 
manufacturers from engaging their intrinsic immanence as the operability of the former 
constrains the immanence original to third parties. This is because, to again remind the 
reader, instrumenta movendi gain their embodiment, embeddedness and contextualization 
by robbing the embodiment, embeddedness and contextualization of loci standi. W e call 
these entities fossilizations.
The intra-cultural relations are "not a certain quantitative distribution of shadow and light, 
of weakness or of force, but a signifying structure that critical reading should produce" 
(Derrida 1997: 158). To describe this structure we shall depart from Deleuze's (ibid: 130) 
formula in the formation of Man's identity: "the forces within man compose a form only by 
entering into relation with forms from the outside." The analytics of transposement signals 
that first we should submit 'man' to a cultural turn. Thus where it reads 'man' should say 
'manufacturer of culture.' Now, 'the forces within the manufacturer of culture' may take the 
form of low- middle- and high-culture in accordance to the correlative transposement.108 
These forces, Deleuze retells, 'compose a form,' which may also go by the name of 'regime
108 Cf. Chapter 6, Section 3 above.
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of constrained-engaged immanence to a degree/ This 'regime7 occurs provided that the 
manufacturer's low-, middle- and high-cultural dimensions, in the steady deployment of its 
activity, enter 'into relation with forms from the outside/ namely, with the low- middle- and 
high-cultural configuration proper to a given cultus, which may include fossilizations or n o t. 
Now, Deleuze's passage, which glosses the intra-cultural relations, rewritten in the new 
terms provided reads: 'the low-, middle- and high-culture characteristic of each 
manufacturer of culture compose a regime of engaged-constrained immanence only by 
entering into relation with the low- middle- and high-cultural configuration proper to the 
cultus it belongs to, which may or not include fossilizations/
Once a philosophical body is situated -as proposed by the analytics of transposement via the 
cultural matrix, the ontological question that revolves around being no longer enjoys the 
limelight. The question "Why are there beings at all instead of nothing?" (Heidegger 2000:1) 
is in our context supplanted by interrelated queries, which are to guide our intra-cultural 
analyses. The queries for the intra-cultural analyses have already been voiced above in 
several passages. This set of queries reads as follows when we depart from high-culture: 
'under which constellation of meanings or high-culture, by way of which arrangements of 
the collective sphere or middle-culture, at what rate are low-cultural loci standi being 
disembodied for the production of which low-cultural instrumenta movendi?' If we 
alternatively let middle-culture take the lead, our line of investigation proceeds as follows: 
'Through which collective -both public and private— arrangements and institutions or 
middle-culture, which manufacturers of culture enjoy access to which processes of 
nomization or high-culture, for the seizure of which low-cultural loci standi and production 
of which low-cultural instrumenta movendi?' Once we adopt a low-cultural approach, our set 
of queries reads as follows: 'Which rates of dis-embodiment are being provoked and justified 
under which middle-cultural and high-cultural settings?'
II
A Search Placed Well Beyond Theo- and Andromorphism -The subject has been the 
receiving end of much attention in current end-of-philosophy debates. A sovereign and 
rational agency as constructed in classical theory has been vulnerable to a number of 
rebukes. "The lessons of Darwin, Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, Wittgenstein and Heidegger have
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eroded the image of an atomistic and autonomous, disengaged and[...] potentially and 
ideally self-transparent" subject (Baynes et al. 1987b: 4). Echoing this scolding tendencies, 
the cultural matrix, in its quest to rescue the maltreated object -th e  subject's hypo- 
position— has been left with no option other than engaging in a merciless erasure of the 
subject and its position. Mark Poster (1985 [1984]: 4) claims that "[w]hatever the dangers it 
involved of a relapse into [Western] metaphysics, the question of the subject was impossible 
to avoid for critical theory. Without some theory of the subject (or subjects) it was not 
possible to account for resistance to authority". From our attempt at liberating the object 
and thus effacing the subject, the lesson that we learn is that we must re-locate the bastion 
of resistance to authority in a plausible transposement -th e  subject provides a perspective 
that has been suffocated within the cultural matrix. Let us explore the resources we count 
on to build this pivotal enclave.
Feuerbach and Nietzsche are said to be the thinkers of the death of God and the Western 
metaphysical plane (Deleuze 1988: 130). With the absence of God towards the end of the 
eighteenth century, the immanent plane gained its raison d'être. This plane in statu nascendi 
took an andromorphic shape -God was dethroned but not his place (Derrida 1978f: 292). 
Consonantly "the Man-form appealed...] only by incorporating" (ibid) God's own death. 
Thus the question remains: "can man find a guarantee of identity in the absence of God?" 
(Deleuze 1988: 130). Foucault's suspicion of the prospective disappearance of man at the 
centre of the knowledge of things and their order is closely related to a personal reflection 
upon the vicissitudes of the plane of immanence. In Chapter 4 it was already noted that for 
Foucault this plane is co-extensive with discourse. Now it should be highlighted that in his 
archaeology of the human sciences, the French thinker (Foucault 1980 [1970]: 385) observes 
that man made his appearance in the modern field of knowledge following "the 
disappearance of Discourse and its featureless reign, with the shift of language towards 
objectivity". Since the middle of the twentieth century Foucault observed that language had 
been regaining its unity once again. The French thinker (ibid: 386) consequently derived that 
the "disappearance of man -and the ground of possibility of all the sciences of man" was to 
be expected.
The analytics of transposement provides a reason quite distinct from Deleuze's and
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Foucault's outlook as regards the contemporary demise of anthropo- or perhaps more 
precisely andro-morphism if we, as we should, enlist the ecofeminist reading of the ecocidal 
mode of engagement (Shiva, 2002 [1997]; Salleh 1997, 2010; Mellor, 1997, 2010). The 
immanent plane that was released with the theocide committed at the end of the 
eighteenth century was mistaken for a materialist and materialistic paradise with 
Promethean homo faber captaining the industrial ship.109 Materialism -th e  one 
acknowledged in the cultural matrix— is the condition that follows from continuously 
disembodying low-culture for the steady production of instrumenta movendi. Sustained 
disembodiment ultimately provides the ground of possibility for a transposement towards 
re-embodiment. Hence the precariousness of man's prominent position at the centre of 
culture in the ecocidal mode of engagement -his survival hinges wholly upon his capacity to 
re-embody his tread in ecocycles and bio-rhythms alike.
At any rate, both Foucault and Deleuze associate the demise of man with the rise of 
Nietzsche's superman -o r  Obermensch in the original German rubric. Whilst both Nietzsche 
and Foucault "can only sketch in something embryonic and not yet functional" (Deleuze 
1988:130), it is Deleuze who provides a more elaborate picture of the superman. Deleuze's 
superman is, in the author's view, readily poised to grow into the post-theistic and post- 
andromorphic entity that is now to organize the field of knowledge. In light of Deleuze's 
sketch, one nonetheless questions whether Deleuze's superman overcomes the theistic and 
andromorphic stages he promises to leave behind. Deleuze appears to animate a superman 
whose Faustian manhood is even more overriding than that of man under God's providence. 
According to Deleuze and as outlined above, what turns Man into 'superman' is a shift in the 
forces from the outside with which this entity interacts. In the Deleuzian schemata, "silicon 
which supersedes carbon, or genetic components which supersede the organism, or 
agrammaticalities which supersede the signifier" (ibid: Appendix) conform to the set of 
forces responsible for Man's metamorphosis into a superman. We should note that silicon 
and genetic modification are seminal examples of instrumenta movendi. Hence the 
reservations just advanced regarding Deleuze's superman's alleged post-andromorphic 
features -Deleuze's superman remains an industrial homo faber through and through.
109 Cf. Chapter 4, Section 2 above.
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Let us note that the manufacturer of culture differs in a number of respects from Deleuze's 
'superman/ First, unlike Deleuze's superman, but in keeping with Nietzsche's sketchy 
Obermensch that is but will to power as will be outlined in a few passages below, the 
manufacturer is not a subject but the departure point and terminus of a subjecting- 
subjected activity. Second, contra Deleuze's superman who is only faced towards the 
possibilities of the future, the manufacturer can in no way escape the compound atrocities 
of the past that take the form of fossilizations. Third, despite his fondness for the future, 
Deleuze's superman appears completely impervious to both the creative possibilities of loci 
sandi and the role of instrumenta movendi qua instruments of agitation of the former. 
Hence the celebrations of silicon and genetic engineering. Contrariwise, the manufacturer of 
culture re-reads the latter material and practice by way of the cultural matrix as instrumenta 
movend/ generating lethal fossilizations.
This exploration of the extant leads for a post-andromorphic superman, means that for the 
configuration of the manufacturer of culture we only count on a legacy in denial: the 
manufacturer will neither be a theomorphic figure, nor an andromorphic one, nor a super- 
andromorphic one. Then what will the manufacturer be like? Nietzsche again provides 
worthy leadership.
Ill
'There Is No Subject -O nly  Deed' - By attacking the positions that defend the subject, 
Nietzsche clarifies that a perspective that privileges the subject is specious. For Nietzsche 
what matters is the creative process. "'There is no being', [Nietzsche] wrote, 'behind the 
doing, acting, becoming...the doing is everything'" (Bataille 2004: ix). This is indeed a cry for 
the death of the hermeneutical subject that authoritatively reduces the purview of 
perspective! readings into univocal meanings (Schrift 1990:1-9; 1995: 24-32). The meeting of 
a score of additional manufacturers and eventual fossilizations is an act that entails 'doing,' 
'acting,' 'becoming.' It is this plethora of activities, and not any a priori essentialist feature, 
that dynamically defines the manufacturer of culture. Concordantly, from the early 
Heidegger, where "the deep truth about [...] existence is that there is no deep truth, so that 
maturity consists in facing up to the groundlessness of our being-in-the-world" (Dreyfus and 
Rabinow 1991 [1986]: 112), the manufacturer of culture endorses the statement while
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qualifying it: there is certainly no deep truth; only action, engagement, in the process of 
which the manufacturer of culture may ground itself. We shall call this engagement the 
subjecting-subjected activity of the manufacturer of culture. We must note the further 
uprooting of the Cartesian cogito implied with the endorsement of such activity. The 
manufacturer of culture doesn't derive meaning out of thinking and arguing for the 
foundation of things -which ultimately requires a beginning that takes the form of God in 
Descartes and science in the Modern Age, but out of engaging culture. That is the reason 
why this engaging activity is also engaged - i t  furnishes the manufacturer of culture with 
stability. Let us note that we move away from the dictum 'cogito ergo sum' into one that 
reads 'engaging immanence engages'.
This nascent transposition is precisely called the 'the subjecting-subjected activity of the 
manufacturer of culture' to emphasize the very unique low- middle- and high-cultural 
configuration and creative capacities that the latter holds contra the dead and deterministic 
configuration of its adversary, viz. fossilizations. This is to say, the cultural matrix needs to 
hold onto an entity or force from which to expect and to which attribute difference in face of 
the rigidity and uniformity to which fossilizations tend. Against many in the post-Kantian 
critique of reason, including Mark Poster and his appellation for a rebellious subject in the 
previous subsection, the decentring of agency isn't articulated by a more subversive type of 
subject. Rather, a subject that oppresses objects is decentred by way of the subjecting- 
subjected activity of which only a manufacturer of culture -n o t a fossiiization— is capable.
The singularities that emanates from the subjecting-subjected activity on the part of the 
manufacturer with respect to fossilizations shouldn't be confounded with isolation. The 
manufacturer of culture is usually one amongst a group of equals. This insight derives from 
the proto-constructivist heritage of Baruch Spinoza, a salient exponent of the immanent 
turn110. In contradistinction to "all his contemporaries from Descartes to Hobbes and Locke 
[who] regarded the isolated individual as the starting point of knowledge [and society]" 
(Montag 1998a: xviii) and socialize it through the juridical mediation of a contract, Spinoza 
affirmed that "[t]he atomic individual is the purest of fictions" (ibid). However singular, self- 
regarding, loving, altruistic, depraved the manufacturer may appear, it is always a product of
110 Cf. Chapter 4, Section 2 above.
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an ongoing encounter with other manufacturers and, in the extant circulation of 
instrumenta movendi, also with fossilizations.
IV
The Simultaneous Exhibition of Low- Middle- And High-Cultural Loci Standi Conforms To A 
Manufacturer Of Culture - Heidegger, whom we follow in this respect, reads the history of 
Western philosophy starting with Socrates, Plato, Aristotle through Hegel up to Nietzsche as 
the history of Western metaphysics.111 He then proposes to undertake a Schritt Züruck (step 
back) to pre-Socratic figures such as Parmenides in order to recollect the being that, 
according to his philosophical analysis, had been obfuscated with the implacable imposition 
of the objective and structural being. It must be noted however that with this pre-Socratic 
retrieval, Heidegger still fails to take to bits the Cartesian dispensation. What is more, it is on 
the basis of an exalted Cartesianism that Heidegger draws his noted ontological difference 
between human existence or Dasein and the imputed "extantness of the stone or the star" 
(Allen 1993: 78). A human being or Dasein, "that entity which 'we ourselves' are, [...] is never 
to be taken ontologically as an instance or a special case of some genus of entities that are 
present-at-hand" (ibid). Heidegger means to say that Dasein should be wholly dissociated 
from the Cartesian res extensa, subscribing thereby to the living-organism/inert-matter 
hyposition problematized above112, which is, needless to say, only a variant of the Cartesian 
cogito. The German thinker anthropocentrically assumes that to those entities traditionally 
associated with the res extensa, "their being is a matter of indifference" (ibid: 78-79). Unlike 
Dasein that enjoys Existenz, animals, atoms, clouds, soil merely enjoy Vorhandenheit 
('presence-at-hand', 'extantness'). Heidegger scrupulously discriminates between the being 
of Dasein and the being of extant things. He argues that res-exte/iso-related entities abide by 
a kind of metaphysics of presence. "To be extant, to be a thing or a natural or purely physical 
entity, is to be somewhere sometime fully or self-identically present" (ibid: 79). Limiting 
thereby to human beings (Dasein) the liberation from a "formal essential [and] natural 
determination" (ibid), which in turn defines the essence of freedom and truth. "The ground 
thought of all my thinking is precisely that being, the disclosing of being, needs man, and 
that conversely man is only when he stands within the disclosing of being" (Heidegger in
111 Cf. Chapter 2, Section 3 above.
m Cf. Chapter, Section 1 above.
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Early Greek Thinking quoted in Allen 1993: 82). Heidegger's philosophical standpoint is 
unfortunately impermeable to Caputi's (2001: 10) pivotal insight which reads that "[a]s the 
ego is annihilated, a different conception of the self is freed to emerge." It is the cultural 
eradication of the egocentric Cartesian-Kantian subject that automatically frees the 
subjecting-subjected activity of the manufacturer of culture.
In sharp contrast to Heidegger's position, in self-organizing or autopoietic systems the 
indissociablility of high-culture or cognitive processes from low-culture or embodiment has 
been regarded as "a radically new concept of mind" (Capra 1988:151). In the context of this 
theoretical body, "all interactions of a living system with its environment are cognitive, or 
mental interactions./ With this new concept of mind, life and cognition become inseparably 
connected. Mind, or more accurately, mental process is seen as being immanent in matter at 
all levels of embodiment" (ibid). Baruch Spinoza, for his part, also advances in his Ethics 
(Ethics, II, Prop. VII) a transposement of his own of the Cartesian divide: "thinking substance 
and extended substance are one and the same substance [...] Thus also a mode of extension 
and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, but expressed in two manners." In 
the cultural matrix we have conveniently called these two manners, respectively, high- and 
low-culture.
A major discrepancy between living systems and the analytics of transposement is that self­
organizing systems explore "the interface between nonliving and living systems" (Capra 
1988: 146), whilst the cultural matrix cancels out such divide with the transposement locus 
standi and its parasitic position instrumenta movendi in an immediate manner and, more 
generally, with the whole ensemble of transposements. Be this as it may, like self-organizing 
systems, the analytics of transposement, via its cultural matrix, regards a mineral as 
endowed with high-culture. The high-culture of a mineral is its willingness to take a given 
shape, be of a given colour and exhibit a concrete texture. To be sure, in the wake of the 
eradication of a superior figure that holds responsibility for the whole of existence, each 
embodied entity is regarded as responsible for its own low- middle- and high-cultural 
composition, save instrumenta movendi and fossilizations that parasitize upon loci standi 
and manufacturers of culture, respectively. Unlike living systems, the analytics also assumes 
that the mineral exudes a middle-culture —its low-cultural exposure or embodiment
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reaches out to third parties. A middle-cultural locus standi such as local politics also enjoys a 
high- and low-culture of its own. This can be generically defined as contextualization and 
embodiment, respectively -a  local politics will appeal to a localized, specific worldview and 
to a given territory. A high-cultural locus standi such as the worldview that informs animist 
communities equally enjoys its middle- and low-culture or specific arrangement of the public 
sphere with a specific politics, and a specific mode of re-embodiment. In animist cultures, 
these can certainly be generically characterised as highly embedded and embodied. A 
mineral, local politics and an animist outlook conform to three distinct manufactures of 
culture when they are simultaneously regarded from the perspective of low- middle- and 
high-culture and are thus conceived as subjecting-subjected activities.
'Manufacturer' is a compound word made up of manus -'hand '— and factura,-ere — 'what 
has been done'— from facio, facere —'to do'. The manufacturer is therefore that 
transposement that co-creates culture by the use and application of its limbs. The 
manufacturer is that transposement within the cultural matrix that tells, announces to the 
remaining conditions of transitivity or transposements about its unique ability to shape and 
be shaped by culture. Little wonder that only the transposement locus standi, the place of 
secure stay of culture, is gifted with the ability to turn into a manufacturer of culture.
V
The Centrality Of The Regimes Of Constrained-Engaged Immanence -  The immanent 
expanse is to a regime of engaged immanence what culture is to cultus.113 Culture stands for 
all possible existential combinations. Similarly, the immanent spatiality is the incarnate 
carrier of all cultural traditions in the form of mythoi. However, culture, and so does the 
plane of immanence, bespeaks lack of realization or engagement. It is the manufacturer of 
culture who, by dint of its activity, perversely but duly deflowers the plane of immanence.
Foucault's circular account of power emanates in many respects from a detached, objectivist 
approach to the immanent spatiality - i t  is unrealized culture. Foucault (1997 [1984]: 292) 
asserts that "in power relations there is necessary the possibility of resistance because if
113 Cf. Chapter 5, Section 3 above.
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there were no possibility of resistance (of violent resistance, flight, deception, strategies 
capable of reversing the situation), there would be no power relations at all." In this 
exposition Foucault appears utterly incapable of immanently -embodiedly, embeddedly, 
situatedly— explaining the interactions established between power relations and resistance. 
Instead, the French thinker has recourse to a transcendent link of possibility — 'the 
possibility of resistance', transcendent construe! which in turn vindicates the existence of 
power relations. There is indeed ample room to claim that Foucault's inability to account for 
these interactions resides in the nominalist immanent expanse against which the French 
thinker, a singular exponent of the post-Kantian critique of reason, sets his histories.114 Barry 
Allen's insights are endlessly illuminative in this respect. In Foucault's work, "the 'objects' of 
knowledge, the 'things' true statements are true to, have no reality apart from the 
agreement of those who talk about them" (Allen 2004: 138). Foucault's outlook on 
immanence is a disengaged one; one with no considerations for the degree of dis­
embodiment, dis-embeddedness and de-contextualization that the statements that circulate 
as true may entail. With no engagement of the open possibilities offered by the plane of 
immanence, manufacturers of culture are deprived of experiencing either constraint or 
engagement, let alone of undertaking any concerted transposements. Foucault's markedly 
detached, nominalist approach to the immanent spatiality accounts for his curtailed ability 
to come up with a coherent theory of resistance.
Such a failure is further responsible for perpetuating the cleavage that sets apart 
foundationalists or realists from social constructivists in the field of green politics (Soper 
2001 [1995]).115 The eventual endorsement of an active plane of immanence -instead of a 
merely nominalist one— on the part of social constructivism may, to be sure, prove as a 
more effective strategy to establish a fruitful dialogue with foundationalist quarters than 
when the theoretical bodies of the former group hold an unrealized plane of immanence. 
Such a proactive strategy on the part of constructivists would aid foundationalist circles in 
seeing what they assume as imperturbable 'natural laws' in a new light. As social 
constructivism would steadily learn to express its political remarks in embodied terms, 
foundationalist quarters would gradually learn to see the political dimension of their alleged
114;Cf. Chapter 4, Section 2 above.
115 Cf. Chapter 3, Section 1, Subsection above.
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objective, value-free statements on the natural law. Progressively both would come to 
understand that low- middle- and high-culture are parallel dimensions of a single cultural 
phenomenon.
At any rate, the affirmation of an active immanent plane, whether constrained by or freed 
from the appearance of fossilizations, is only initially conceivable by dint of the engaging- 
engaged activity on the part of the manufacturer -a  force of difference capable of restoring 
the possibility of active immanence when this is being perturbed with the fossilizing 
operability of instrumenta movendi. With the brief excursus provided hitherto we are now in 
a position to rewrite Foucault's account on the link between power relations and resistance 
without incurring this time into an empty nominalism. Power relations carry with them the 
possibility of resistance -and transposement of the unduly unfair links — when the 
manufacturer of culture's access to immanence is obstructed with the fossilizations that 
ensue from the unchecked circulation of low- middle- and high-cultural instrumenta 
movendi. Without the existence of an active immanent plane -o f  regimes of constrained- 
engaged immanence to a certain degree— relations of power would miss their chance to 
express themselves. There would only be an abstract, uniform monolith, namely the level 
planum of immanence.
The subjecting-subjected activity of the manufacturer of culture, it shall be restated, is one 
strategy to reinscribe the subject/object hyposement in the active immanent plane. In the 
course of this activity "reality is neither subjective nor objective. We are neither spectators 
nor actors. We are -a lbeit not alone—the very same game" (Panikkar 2009: 111). The 
decentring of the subject-object hyposement via the manufacturing-manufactured activity 
of the manufacturer of culture endows the latter with entrepreneurial capacities but 
deprives it of unrestricted free enterprise. The activity of the manufacturer is always 
situating and situated. It moves within a framework of constrained freedom. The 
manufacturer's capacity for initiative is forever constrained -o r, indeed, facilitated in the full 
absence of fossilizations— by the extant low- middle- and high-cultural correlation that 
reigns in a cultus. Muslims orient their prayer in the direction of Mecca. Similarly, 
manufacturers of culture orient their transgressions towards the attainment of regimes of a 
higher degree of engaged immanence than their relations with the obstructing fossilizations
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have hitherto facilitated.
Relevant to our purposes here, it must be added, is the fact that Foucault's conception of 
freedom is equally tainted by his nominalist approach to the immanent expanse. Foucaudian 
freedom may be characterized by way of Nietzsche's in counterpoint. Foucault works in the 
tradition inaugurated by his master, which turns philosophical discourse into the search of 
power relations (Schrift 1995: 34; Foucault 1998 [1970]: 217 et passim). However, Foucault's 
notion of freedom is utterly disengaged and, thus, permissive. Nietzsche's, conversely, is 
much more embodied. Nietzsche subjugates liberty to a healthy or life-enhancing will to 
power. In the Nietzschean philosophical corpus this is the overriding gauging yardstick. 
Under this principle, the entirety of Nietzsche's philosophical toolkit -th e  will to power, 
philology, liberty— gains significance. On occasion, the will to power may be adulterated and 
it may therefore manifest itself at the other extreme of the continuum -namely, as decadent 
or life-destroying will to power.
No doubt that this disparate treatment of freedom between the two philosophers 
determines their respective methodologies. Typically, Foucault's call for the "crossing-over 
[franchissement]" (Foucault 1997: 315) of repressive structures of power may take any 
direction. Contrastingly, Nietzsche's transgressions need to be conducted towards the 
attainment of an affirmative will to power. Alan D. Schrift (190: 221 n.3) puts its incisively: 
"Foucault's archaeological method, like Nietzsche's genealogical method, engages in a 
critical re-reading of history, but from the perspective of the discursive rules and structures 
that were sanctioned at the origin, rather than the Nietzschean perspective of the life- 
affirming or life-negating instincts of those who did the original sanctioning." The cultural 
matrix is in this respect utterly Nietzschean. When the subjugating-subjugated activity of the 
manufacturer of culture is life-enhancing, to couch it in Nietzschean terms, a regime of 
engaged immanence is formed. When this is to the detriment of life, a regime of constrained 
immanence is at work.
3. The Disruptive Fossilizations
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ICharacterization Via Constructivism And Realism -  The notion of fossiiization has many 
affinities with many of the assumptions held in social constructivist circles as long as we take 
instrumenta movendi as the sole basis of their construction. Fossilizations are construed, 
gain their corporality on the trails of low- middle- and high-cultural instrumenta movendi. 
There is no less of a striking overlap between the notion of 'the real' as upheld by scientific 
realism and the characterization of a fossiiization. Sergio Sismondo's (1993: 549 n.6) 
minimalist definition of realism reads: "a realist attitude claims that scientific terms often 
refer to antecedently existent entities in the world." Sismondo (ibid: 516) further adds that 
"constructivism is often fully compatible with realism, and thus that constructivism needs no 
special defence in a field where [...] this is its competitor". Similarly, the analytics of 
transposement claims that there is no incompatibility between realism and fossilizations, for 
realized are the 'existent entities in the world' (ibid: 549 n.6) that have been 'antecedently' 
fossilized. In the cultural spatiality, the fossiiization corresponds to that which has been 
realized and therefore is no longer real -its  reality has turned persistently obsolete: "All 
what repeats itself [is] dull and, in the final analysis, not quite authentic — not definitive 
(precisely because it is amenable to repetition)" (Panikkar 2009: 109; own translation from 
the Catalan translation). It follows that in the cultural spatiality the notion of reality upheld 
by realist thinking (indirectly also endorsed by social constructivism) is disclosed as a dead 
plane; well complex but free of creative potential.
The characterization of fossiiization via realism (and constructivism) vindicates the reading of 
a fossiiization as that part of cultus that speaks for what is no longer real - i t  has dropped its 
original, creative force. Above we claimed that the manufacturer of culture is one of the 
available stratagems to re-figure the subject/object hyposement via the active immanent 
spatiality that is culture itself. The fossiiization is an additional strategy to decentre the same 
hyposement. By naming it 'fossiiization,' the analytics of transposement seeks to connote a 
couple of meanings. One, it intends to underline the disembodying, disembedding and 
decontextualizing nature of their existence. Two, it aims to emphasize the fact that these 
events that tend to ossification are constantly coming into being: they are steadily petrifying 
-fossilizing— as a result of the unchecked proliferation of instrumenta movendi.
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Fossiiization as Disembodying, Disembedding And Decontextualizing Passas -The Source 
Of Complexity -  One may therefore claim that fossilizations conform to past history; that 
which a given cultus leaves behind in the form of tremendous momentum. Fossilizations, to 
be sure, wield immense power over cultus. Yet this is not so much an active force with the 
ability to bring about innovation as an atrophied one in the form of the inertia that follows 
from the complexity proper to fossilizations. This force, which feeds upon an ever-increasing 
number of instrumenta movendi, in turn guarantees the preservation of past -fossilized— 
trends.
Yet the association of 'past' with 'fossiiization' requires due qualification. The notion of 'past 
history' carries distinct connotations at the low- middle- and high-cultural levels. In order to 
gain an insight into their contrasted meanings, let us take a look at the significance and 
etymology of both 'fossiiization' and 'history'. The Oxford English Dictionary states that 'to 
fossilize' is "to turn or change into a fossil." For two of its figurative meanings the OED 
quotes the definitions of the Webster Dictionary of 1864. These read: "to cause to become 
antiquated, rigid or fixed," "to place beyond the influence of change or progress." Against 
the above-mentioned three definitions we may say, in line with our intimations above, that a 
'fossiiization' is that part of a cultus which has coalesced and is therefore placed beyond the 
influence of progress. The fossiiization replicates ad nauseam the unoriginal complexity 
generated by instrumenta movendi -originality is an exclusive trait of loci standi. No wonder 
that a salient feature of a fossiiization is its inertia. Think of a nuclear power station or a 
desktop. The former can generate energy and the latter can assist a human being in its 
thinking and creative processes. However, the low- middle- and high-cultural composition of 
the nuclear power plant and that of the desktop are locked in their own possibilities largely 
determined from the outset, how many actualizations we might introduce to either. 
Fossilizations are out of step with a leading trait of entropy, that of bringing about novelty 
(Prigogine and Stengers 1984)116. Moreover, both the nuclear power plant and the desktop 
invariably generate a fossil, highly visible in its low-cultural dimensions but also operative in 
its middle- and high-cultural dimensions, that does not lend to easy re-circulation within loci-
116 Cf. Chapter 6, Section 1 above.
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standi-\eô cycles. Industrial ecology has coalesced as a field of knowledge and praxis in order 
to render this circulation lighter (cf. Jackson 1996).
Using the etymological definition of 'history' in the OED, it can be further shown how with 
the substitution of 'fossiiization' for 'history' the analytics of transposement gains the 
contextualized edge evoked by cultus.117 'History' derives from the Latin form historia and 
this in turn from the Greek ioTopla: "a learning or knowing by inquiry, an account of one's 
inquiries, narrative, history." History, more importantly, is associated with the disposition 
proper to philosophy and science as epistëmë. "[D]espite the classic antagonism which 
opposes these significations throughout all of classical thought, it could be shown that the 
concept of epistëmë has always called forth that of historia, if history is always the unity of 
becoming, as the tradition of truth or the development of science or knowledge oriented 
toward the appropriation of truth in presence and self-presence, toward knowledge in 
consciousness-of-self" (Derrida 1978f: 291). Namely, history in the context of the 
epistemological trajectory operates as the reconstructed, often linear and progressivist 
narrative of a past truth (cf. Foucault 1972; Nisbet 1980). It is largely an exclusively 
logocentric truth, signalling little about the degree of dis-embodiment, dis-embeddedness 
and de-contextualization enjoyed by either a manufacturer of culture or an entire cultus. It 
must be noted that it is only the very longue durée associated with low-culture that is 
endowed with the authority to order civilisations linearly.118 However, this history is of little 
interest to us, it fails to be cultural history, whilst it is on the other hand true that cultural 
history is in a position to enhance the disposition of the latter.119
Fossilizations, on the other hand, draw a discerning history. They succeed in decentring the 
linear historical sequence and transpose it into degrees of dis-embodiment, dis- 
embeddedness and de-contextualization. Fossilizations are, qua spokesentities of low- 
middle- and high-cultural instrumenta movendi, associated with high degrees of 
disembodiment, disembeddedness and decontextualization. It is the fossilizing circulation of 
instrumenta movendi that passes, leaves an immovable track and opens up the past slot. The 
reader, to be sure, should note that the etymological root of 'past' derives from the
117 Cf. Chapter 3, Section 3 above.
118 Cf. Chapter 5, Section 1 above.
119 Cf. Chapter 6, Section 1 above.
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entwined Latin forms passare 'to pass' and passus 'step'. It is the fossilizing step of 
instrumenta movendi that passes towards the past which remains so in view of its 
unavoidable propensity to generate complex forms deprived of originality and novelty -o u t  
of step with one of the characteristic traits of entropy as stated above. Contrastingly, the 
simultaneous course of low- middle- and high-cultural loci standi, namely, the 
manufacturing-manufactured activity of the manufacturer of culture, brings a cultus into a 
constant state of originality.
In sum, the regimes of constrained-engaged immanence reinscribe history in the cultural 
matrix and transpose it into two directions. First, they reread cultural events according to 
the degree of constrained-engaged immanence they exhibit at the low- middle- and high- 
cultural levels as opposed to a putative linear progress they may have achieved. Regimes of 
engaged immanence speak of an originally rhythmic cycle led by loci standi in their 
simultaneous low- middle- and high-cultural transitivities as captured by the subjecting- 
subjected activity of the manufacturers of culture. Regimes of constrained immanence, by 
way of contrast, are ruled by the fossilizations that follow from the circulation of 
instrumenta movendi at the simultaneous low- middle- and high-cultural positions. They 
adumbrate a passed -past— track that lends to a highly intractable erasure. Second, regimes 
of constrained-engaged immanence are intrinsically revolutionary when they appear at high 
degrees of constrained immanence. They are endowed with the capability to rewrite the 
future endowed with a higher degree of engaged immanence, this being the subject matter 
of Chapter 11.
Ill
From Timespace Into Rhythms And Fossilizations - The manufacturer of culture denotes the 
wide range of possibilities available at any given moment. This is why we may be prone to 
proceed by linking the manufacturer of culture to a prospective present, while restricting 
the fossiiization to the passed -past- tense. Yet such an association is, as already voiced 
above, indeed fairly inaccurate. For one thing, the manufacturer of culture isn't 
characterized by a linear timeline that relentlessly moves from present to future but by a 
rhythm attuned to background cosmic movements such as those that mould day and night
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and the seasons. For another thing, the influence that fossilizations exert upon a cultus is 
not limited to the past. The inertia that follows from the différance-effeet endemic to 
fossilizations has a direct bearing upon the rhythms marked by the manufacturers of 
culture.120 It seems therefore that the analytics of transposement enjoins us to alter our old 
perspective on timespace: a uniform and linear timespace appear to offer no relevant 
insights to cultural events. Rather, the traits that seem to matter are the observance of 
rhythms imbued with originality, and the presence or absence of fossilizations. When a 
cultus remains embodied, embedded and contextualized in low- middle- and high-cultural 
loci standi, the paces common to its manufacturers are scrupulously respected. When a 
cultus is highly dis-embodied, dis-embedded and de-contextualized, fossilizations are as 
abundant as profound and often as irreparable.
There are a good number of similarities between a rhythm and a fossiiization qua a 
transposement and a position, respectively, part and parcel of the cultural matrix and a trace 
qua one in the ensemble of Derrida's undecidables. Very much like a rhythm, "the concept 
of trace is incompatible with the concept of retention, of the becoming-past of what has 
been present. One cannot think the trace [...] on the basis of the present, or of the presence 
of the present" (Derrida 1984b [1968]: 21). Rhythms are characterized by the originality that 
they enable in their courses. Fossilizations, for their part, constrain the engagements that 
open up the possibilities to such novelty. Hence the assertion that "[i]t is not absence 
instead of presence, but a trace [a fossiiization] which replaces a presence [a rhythm] which 
has never been present" (Derrida 1978f: 295), for a rhythm never is; it is only engaged or 
constrained by the circulation of fossilizations. "And yet all meaning is altered by th[e] lack" 
(ibid: 296) introduced by fossilizations.
Just as "it is necessary that a trace be inscribed within the text of metaphysics" (Derrida, 
1984b [1968]: 65) in order to exceed it, so too rhythms and fossilizations must be, in order to 
transpose it, inscribed within the positivity of scientific reason -coded as it is by "the entire 
system of metaphysical grammar" (Derrida 1984a [1968]: 18). Rhythms and fossilizations 
draw a track "that continues to signal not in the direction of another presence, or another 
form of presence, but in the direction of an entirely other" (Derrida 1984b [1968]: 65) plane,
120 Cf. Chapter 7, Section 3 above.
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one which is indefectibly constrained-engaged to a certain extent. Rhythms register the 
regimes of sheer engaged immanence. Fossilizations keep record of the constraints that 
have taken place in the process of engaging immanence. Fossilizations take note of all the 
movements that occur in the simultaneous deployment of low- middle- and high-cultural 
instrumenta movendi, movements which have prevented a number of manufacturers of 
culture from engaging their own immanence. "[A] 11 the determinations of such a trace -a ll 
the names it is given— belong as such to the text of metaphysics that shelters the trace, and 
not to the trace itself. There is no trace /tse//, no proper trace" (Derrida 1984b [1968]: 66). 
Similarly, rhythms and fossilizations conform to transposements and positions, respectively. 
They only gain their meaning in relation -w hether transitive or intransitive— to the pool of 
transposements and positions that circulate within the cultural matrix.
4. Regimes Of Constrained-Engaged immanence And Their Idiosyncrasies
I
After Grand Vs. Decadent Will To Power -  As intimated above in passing, Nietzsche 
distinguishes between grand and decadent styles. Grand style occurs when life is vibrant in 
all its dimensions, a condition only liable to be attained and assessed through the relation of 
components. "For the present I merely dwell on the question of style -W h at is the sign of 
every literary decadence? That life no longer dwells in the whole. The word becomes 
sovereign and leaps out of the sentence, the sentence reaches out and obscures the 
meaning of the page, the page gains life at the expense of the whole —the whole is no 
longer a whole" (Nietzsche 1967b: § 7). In consonance, Nietzsche associates a decadent style 
or, expressed in our own parlance, an instance of constrained immanence, with the process 
of desituation for the production of instrumenta movendi. In such circumstances, "[t]he 
whole [full embodiment, embeddedment and contextualization] no longer lives at all: it is 
composite, calculated, artificial, and artifact" (ibid). Engaged immanence or affirmation in 
Nietzsche "is itself essentially multiple and pluralist" (Deleuze 2001 [1965]: 74); it 
encourages transitivity within the cultural matrix. Constrained immanence or negation in 
Nietzsche "is always one, or heavily monist" (ibid); it constrains transitivity.
In a passage from The Gay Science, Nietzsche explicates the concept of health -which is also
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that of a healthy morality— as the desirable transition from a regime of constrained 
immanence to one of engaged immanence. First the philosopher unravels how the 
objectification of a specific standard of health has overridden the generic rubric 'health:' 
"The popular medical formulation of morality [has established that] virtue is the health of 
the soul" (2005 [2001]: § 120). Nietzsche promptly rebukes such a "concept of normal 
health" (ibid) and goes on to defend a contingent definition by which "your virtue" turns 
into "the health of your soul" (ibid), for "there is no health as such" (ibid). "In so far as health 
or life-enhancement is a situation-specific and variable standard" (Schrift 1990: 192), 
Nietzsche (2005 [2001]: § 120) correlates the characterization of health "for your body" with 
"your goal, your horizon, your powers, your impulses, your mistakes and above all [with] the 
ideals and phantoms of your soul" (ibid). We may conclude that Nietzsche's approach to 
health is a glaring call for low-cultural embodiment, middle-cultural embeddedness and 
high-cultural contextualization. That is to say, the only concepts of health worth retaining 
are those which emanate out of regimes of engaged immanence.
Similarly, style is for Nietzsche (1989b [1967]: § III, 4) the communication of a situated, 
embedded and embodied "state, an inward tension of pathos. [Considering that the 
multiplicity of inward states is exceptionally large" there are "many stylistic possibilities". 
The range of styles and, for that matter, degrees of constrained-engaged immanence is 
virtually infinite. In this context Nietzsche himself never tires of reminding us that "style in 
itse lf  is "a pure folly, mere 'idealism', on a level with the 'beautiful in itself,' the 'good in 
itself,' the 'thing in itself:' [ ] "there is no health-in-itself" (1989 [1967]: § III, 4; 2005 [2001]: § 
120). Nietzsche here is taking issue once again with the Western epistemological trajectory. 
Pure reason by "set[ting] our bodies, [&] environment to one side, and consider things as 
they are" (Allen, 2004: 108) provides no relevant -i.e . either qualitative or quantitative— 
information with regard to the intra-cultural relations.
As it was noted in Chapters 4 and 7, the retrieval of the immanent style entails the regaining 
of a space that takes into account the quality (along with the quantity) of experience. This 
qualitative and quantitative phenomenon, Spinoza retells, is closely related to the direct 
engagement on the part of the manufacturer of the plane of immanence: "[Spinoza] 
displaces the traditional opposition between reason and the emotions or affects with the
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opposition between passive and active affects" (Montag 1998a: xviii). Thus we shall say that 
'active affects' —or engaged immanence— take place when the manufacturer may engage 
directly, free of fossilized interceptions, the extant low- middle- and high-culture. With 
Spinoza we shall assert that such a condition "increases the power of the body to act and 
simultaneously the power of the mind to think" (ibid), demonstrating the communion 
between high- and low-culture emphasized above. Also in the domain of living systems the 
regimes of engaged immanence are associated with a healthy condition. To be sure, when 
the manufacturer of culture conducts a direct low- middle- and high-cultural engagement of 
the cultus it belongs, "the internal environment" of an organism is said to "remain[...] 
essentially constant, even when the external environment fluctuates considerably" (Capra 
1996: 24). Contrastingly, passive affects occur when the manufacturer of culture is 
exclusively allowed to build hierarchical relations with the fossilizations it is forced to relate 
to, thereby "dim inishing] our power to think and act" (Montag 1998b: xviii)
MATERIAL REDACTED AT REQUEST OF UNIVERSITY
Against itself, this is a befitting picture to account for the regimes tending to engaged 
immanence. 'Arbeit macht frei' ('work liberates') reads the banner on the gate. Work 
liberates only and when the gate is left open and manufacturers of culture get a chance to
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begin to conduct self-defined engagements of immanence. There is no liberation (or 
immediate engagement of immanence) within the precincts of the forced labour camp. This 
remark is extensive to the political economy of liberal democracies, not least their saturating 
tendency to commodify labourpower. Employment per se does not liberate - i f  it may pay 
the bills. Emancipating are those jobs by which manufacturers succeed in engaging directly 
immanence, free of fossilized interferences.
On the issue of labour, to be sure, resides one of the paramount differences between liberal 
and Marxist political economies. In consonance with the vision of the good life cherished by 
ancient Greece, Adam Smith sustained that the natural state of a human being is leisure 
(Dupre 1983). Labour under whichever conditions coerces the human being. Marx instead 
proclaimed that labour was the source of self-realization. What had to be abolished were its 
alienating conditions.121 In the cultural matrix, the activity not exclusively of a human being 
but of manufacturers of culture at large is similarly considered to be the source of self- 
realization. Yet in clear contradistinction to Marx but in keeping with ecosystem people's 
own practice (Toledo 1999), the application of instrumenta movendi is no path to self- 
realization; the engagement of loci standi is.
Consistently, the analytics of transposement ties up the notion of intrinsic value with the 
activities of the manufacturers. When this intrinsic value is not apparent in the activities of 
the manufacturers we can be sure that the manufacturer belongs to a cultus pervaded with 
inequities in the form of fossilizations. We shall revisit the notions of intrinsic value and 
inequity when we go through the intra-cultural relations in Chapter 9.
The role that Nietzsche's will to power plays within his textual plane of immanence, and that 
of the manufacturer within the cultural immanent spatiality -which is but an impurely 
engaged plane— lends to an illustrative parallelism. Both the will to power and the 
subjecting-subjected activity of the manufacturer are forces of prominent change. 
Nietzsche's "affirmation of a multiplicity of perspectives [...] that animate his philosophy of 
will to power as active force within the infinite play of becoming" (Schrift 1995: 30) operate 
as a lethal annihilator of the ossified metaphors that make up the history of philosophy and
121 Cf. Chapter 4, Section 1 above.
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science as epistëmë. Similarly, the manufacturer of culture bespeaks a sustained chance to 
dissolve the fossilizations that follow from the circulation of instrumenta movendi and, as a 
result, endow a cultus with higher degrees of embodiment, embeddedness and 
contextualization. The activity of the manufacturer of culture is, therefore, a reminder that 
in the final analysis we are in a self-chosen relation to fossilizations. In other words, radical 
change is an ongoing possibility.
II
Singular Im-Personalizations - Regimes of engaged immanence lead to the im- 
personalization of the activity of the manufacturer, in a manner that "the singular life 
immanent to a man [...] no longer has a name, though he can be mistaken for no other" 
(Deleuze 2001 [1995]: 29). To be more precise, in order to effectively confront liberalism we 
"need a new conception of society in which what we have in common is our singularities and 
not our individualities -w here what's common is 'impersonal' and what is 'impersonal' is 
common" (Rajchman 2001 [1995]: 14). Regimes of engaged immanence yield singularities; 
those of a high degree of constrained immanence annul them towards uniformity. The 
nascent singularities partially secure the dissolution of agency -a  remnant as it is of the 
Cartesian dispensation. "[T]o think is not to be certain nor yet to calculate probabilities. It is 
to say yes to what is singular yet impersonal in living; and for that one must believe in the 
world and not in the fictions of God or the self that Hume thought derived from it" (ibid: 18). 
Regimes of engaged immanence are genetic, perennially "engaged in a process of 
actualization" (Deleuze 2001 [1995]: 31) . In so far as regimes that exhibit a high degree of 
engaged immanence dissolve the manufactures into the immensity of culture -criss-crossed 
as it becomes by transposements— we may assert with Deleuze (1997 [1968]: 180) that 
"[ijmmanence is the very vertigo of philosophy". From whichever angle we approach the 
engagement of immanence a vast labyrinthine terrain opens up to us.
The impersonal but unrepeatable low- middle- and high-cultural encounters amongst 
manufacturers and eventual fossilizations correspond to the moment of truth, freedom, 
justice, good. Or rather, of the actual truth, freedom, justice, good. For this very instant 
transposes the Western metaphysical load of the former concepts or positions into concrete 
transposements, namely into conditions of transitivity of the cultural matrix, which are thus
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liable to be affected by the remaining cultural conditions. The impersonal activity of the 
manufacturer of culture, to be sure, generates not only a specific low- middle- and high- 
cultural configuration but it also delivers a certain (degree of) truth, a certain (degree of) 
liberation, a certain (degree of) justice, a certain (degree of) good, which is susceptible of 
variation in the dynamic meeting of manufacturers amongst themselves and with eventual 
fossilizations.
The characterization of truth as emanating out of an encounter amongst manufacturers of 
culture and extant fossilizations distances itself prominently from both Western 
metaphysical and realist positions. "The pluralistic world in which we live cannot be 
interpreted by an ideology that wants to unify it at all costs in the name of a sole truth" 
(Vattimo 2002: 5). It is the regimes of constrained-engaged immanence that precisely 
capture the extent to which a cultus is pluralistic. When regimes of engaged immanence are 
detected we can assume that the cultus at issue abides by pluralism, whilst when regimes of 
constrained immanence emerge it may be readily derived that plural realities are denied. In 
these encounters there are no essences, no beings, no existences and no identities: only 
conditions of transposement. The emphasis falls above all upon the engagement, which is, 
dynamic and over again singular.
As mentioned in Chapter 4, most authors have treated the plane of immanence as yet 
another monist essentialism -as an absolute and static plane; an idealization. Yet just as 
Nietzsche who "in opposing decadent to grand style makes clear that there is no 'style in 
itself" (Schrift 1995: 177), we also cease to pretend to have reached an Archimedean point 
once we liberate the regimes of constrained-engaged immanence; regimes which exhibit 
plural registers within the constrained-engaged immanent continuum as they are 
determined by each manufacturer in relation to the presence or absence of fossilizations. 
This is tantamount to saying that each manufacturer of culture writes its own story. 
Consistently, there are as many stories or regimes as there are manufacturers despite 
general trends that may pervade them. In this respect, the analytics of transposement is 
attentive to a cultural source of empowerment. Each manufacturer is gifted with the ability 
to patiently weave its own account and engage in as many transposements as necessary in 
order to enhance its degree of engaged immanence.
-209-
Ill
Untimely Insurrections Ensue From Regimes Of Engaged Immanence - In retrieving the 
activity of the manufacturer as a force for potential difference with respect to fossilizations, 
the work of the French philosopher George Bataille ought to be mentioned.
Bataille was widely influenced by the work of Freud. Freud's scientific proof of the active 
force exerted by the unconscious was a major setback for Hegelian synthesis, which 
assumed the attainment of full consciousness, full knowledge, full rationality (cf. Derrida 
1978e). In a Freudian vein. Bataille sustained that moments of sovereignty in the individual 
are ineffaceable. Sovereign operations occur the moment when the unconscious takes 
irremediable hold of the subject. In dispelling a purely functionalist view of the individual 
and largely destabilizing Maslow's (1977 [1970]: 50) hierarchical stratification of needs. 
Bataille claimed that the desire for the sacred and unordinary is as strong as the satiation of 
hunger. Yet the advent of rationalist systems such as capitalism, or the scientific method, 
neglected the space for the sacred, creating thereby a distortion between an illusory system 
-which given the force of sovereignty is deprived from the start of smooth operability, and 
the system at hand as it finally operates by way of its plethora of fossilizations. In this 
context, the workers of any factory, whom capitalism entraps in a circle of eating for 
production and production for eating, manifest a moment of sheer sovereignty when they 
engage in such practices as the drinking of some pints of beer. Bataille (quoted in Derrida 
1978e: 256), to be more concrete, furnishes us with the following instances of sovereign 
operations: "drunkenness, erotic effusion, sacrificial effusion, poetic effusion, heroic 
behaviour, anger, absurdity".
What must be noted however for the sake of argument is that Bataille maintained that 
moments of sovereignty —of the perturbing expression of the unconscious— had an utter 
political character: these are all instances of insurrection. "Bataille's text and style are 
fundamentally political throughout. For the 'revolutionary' Bataille, the general economy is 
the economy -'science'— of political action, of the acts of 'sovereignty'" (Plotnitsky 1993b: 
76). It is true that Bataille's work is still phrased in anthropomorphic terms. Yet this truism 
doesn't stop us from submitting his work to a cultural turn—all manufacturers,
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anthropomorphic and non-anthropomorphic alike, are indeed endowed with high-culture— 
and retain the message of his philosophy: there is an innate force of subversion in each 
manufacturer of culture when intrinsic traits of its constitution are menaced and 
jeopardised. In the same way as Bataille's retrieval of the moments of sovereignty constitute 
a political act, so too the analytics of transposement holds on to a manufacturer and its 
characteristic property, viz. engagement of immanence. It is only the moment when the 
plane where mythoi or cultural traditions reside is irreversibly deflowered, that part of the 
traditional meaning attributed to 'transcendence' is enacted.122 Not as an attempt to revive 
the inveterate functions of a subject "which is either transcendental in relation to the field of 
events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history" (Foucault 1980: 
117). Rather, the manufacturer of culture only promises tenacious activity serving no one's 
purposes except those of its own originality. Regimes of engaged immanence instantiate the 
remit of the philosophy of the future, which "is no more historical than it is eternal: it must 
be untimely, always untimely" (Deleuze, 2001 [1965]: 72). The originality that emanates 
from the regimes of engaged immanence suits no instrumental political agendas, they are 
acts of appropriate insurrection to mechanicist impositions of any persuasion. The activity of 
the manufacturer of culture only knows the insubordinate repetition of the unpredictable 
engagement. Furthermore, in the activity of the manufacturer of culture there is inbuilt 
action for potential change. The manufacture is prone to stand up and resist when its 
intrinsic property-engagement of immanence— is menaced.123
Thus the manufacturer of culture in the analytics of transposement differs from agency in 
social-constructivism chiefly in the fact that the activities of the manufacturer are far from 
an exclusive "convergence of relations of will to power" (Schrift 1995: 55). The activity of the 
manufacturer is simultaneously the site where hope for cultural transposement resides. For 
instance, as a result of revisited interactions, a group of manufacturers may decide to 
organize their settlements around the commons. Likewise, also as a result of cultural 
interactions, pebbles move from upstream to downstream, just as concentrations of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere may increase, trapping thereby a greater amount of 
solar radiation. The manufacturer is, no doubt, the watchdog of cultus when regimes of
m ,Cf. Chapter 4, Section 2 above.
123 Cf. Chapter 11 below.
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engaged immanence are menaced by the proliferated mushrooming of fossilizations. The 
activity of the manufacturer is also the locus of resistance against fossilizations. Fossilizations 
may take virtually any low- middle- and high-cultural form. The low- middle- and high- 
cultural correlation established in the manufacturing of culture is endowed with the 
potential to be a source of resistance and transposement to the impositions that follow from 
the slipping in of instrumenta movendi.
The manufacturer, it emerges, is far from a passive entity moulded by extant fossilizations. 
The manufacturer is the only entity in culture endowed with an active role vis-à-vis 
processes of fossilization. The force of this resistance depends upon the degree of 
constrained-engaged immanence that the manufacturer of culture gains out of the 
encounter with the cu/ttvs it belongs to and eventual fossilizations. The more fossilizations 
deny to the manufacturer its characteristic property -i.e . engaged immanence, the more 
prone the latter is to overturn the extant cultural configuration. In this respect, the 
subjecting-subjected activity undertaken by the manufacturer of culture is like Nietzsche's 
eternal return, "it is the repetition that selects, the repetition that saves. The prodigious 
secret of a repetition that is liberating and selecting" (Deleuze 2001 [1965]: 91).
IV
Absolute Reality Occurs In Regimes Of Engaged Immanence -  Again in Will to Power 
Nietzsche (1967c: § 481) states that "the 'subject' is not something given, it is something 
added and invented and projected behind what there is" -namely, deed or subjecting- 
subjected activity. In a similar vein, the analytics of transposement asserts that the 
subjective-objective hyposement is immaterial - i t  conveys no significant information with 
respect to the regimes of constrained-engaged immanence. When the anthropocentric 
subject and ecological object are expunged, a task initiated in Chapter 3, the dialectical focus 
moves away from this dichotomous interaction and installs itself in the encounter of the 
manufacturers of culture with the cultus they belong to and the eventual existence of 
fossilizations. Like in quantum physics, in the cultural matrix "a priori" or absolute 
statements are metamorphosed into "relative truth[s]" (Heisenberg 1999 [1958]: 91). 
Truths, that is to say, are the result of statements that emerge out of relations. Patently, the 
search for univocity and universality (as Kant intended in The Critique of Pure Reason)
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belongs to the realm of philosophy and science as epistëmë.
It is probably because of the specious quest to associate absolute truth with that which is 
overarching and supra-local -an d  thus which never is— that Buddhism inverts the terms and 
asserts that absolute reality is relative and contextualized. This overturning is consonant 
with the claims that readily spring out of the cultural matrix. Mâhâyana philosophy, as 
expressed by a figure called Nàgàrjuna, states that absolute truth, far from being a body of 
established doctrines "is the totality of experience now this minute, the direct experience of 
sight, sound, taste, smell, touch and conceptual thought" (Du Pré 1984: 151). That which is 
absolutely truthful is, in other words, the manufacturer of culture's low- middle- and high- 
cultural recurrent engagements of the culti they pertain to, yet only when these are ruled by 
loci standi as they permit direct experience in the form of regimes of high degree of engaged 
immanence. It is in this respect that we can claim that engaged immanence or "[j]oy 
emerges as the sole motive for philosophizing" (Deleuze, 2001 [1965]: 84), it turns into its 
exclusive normative horizon. Contrastingly, relative truth for Buddhists refers to those 
statements expressed in any symbolic system, including words, numbers, discourse and text. 
In light of the body of teachings proper to Mâhâyana philosophy, it is conspicuous that 
Nietzsche, Foucault and Derrida, in their equation of the plane of immanence with text, 
discourse and the word, respectively, paid attention to a second-rate kind of truth, namely, 
to mere "conceptualizations of experience" (Du Pré, 1984:152). We revisit this point at the 
opening of Chapter 10.
Analogously, the intra-cultural relations assert that the subjecting-subjected activity of the 
manufacturer of culture -i.e . the moment of the manufacturer-civ/tus encounter— is 'the 
real' one: it exhibits the concrete degree in the regime of constrained-engaged immanence. 
There is scant value in a fossilized cultural configuration which only manifests in the form of 
inertia. The point under ongoing construction is the juncture where all possible modulations 
(a certain degree of 'pleasure,' a certain degree of 'pain', a certain degree of 'equity', a 
certain degree of 'disadvantage', a certain degree of 'poverty', a certain degree of 'self- 
realization') in a regime of constrained-engaged immanence are concretized. Hence the 
prime import of this moment. "The basis of reality is its unrepeatability, that is to say, the 
univocal event, findings, discoveries, joys. The rest are thoughts or reminiscences" (Panikkar
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2009: 109; own translation from the Catalan translation). Similarly, Ernst Mach (quoted in 
Feyerabend 1987:125) declared that "'The World is given to us only once' [...] which means 
that statements implying ahistorical regularities are idealizations, or 'instruments,' 
[instrumenta movendi] not descriptions of reality". In the same vein, with Rudolf Steiner, we 
shall say "that the hypothesizing of some reason why a judgment is true, beyond the fact 
that we recognize it as true, is a nonsense" (quoted in Wilburn 2004: 40). Namely, the act of 
thinking and believing lacks a foundation of its own. Meaning can only be the result of a 
process of recurrently regenerating engagements of immanence or culture. This meaning 
must be sustained by the extant network of loci standi. Instrumenta movendi and the 
fossilizations that they trace constrain in a prominent manner the plane of immanence and, 
in so doing, they also adulterate meaning. In Taylor's (1987: 476) paraphrase of Heidegger, 
"the condition of our forming disengaged representations [mediated via instrumenta 
movendi] of reality is that we be already engaged in coping with our world, dealing with the 
things in it, at grips with them. Disengaged description is one special possibility, realizable 
only intermittently, of a being (which Heidegger calls Dasein) who is always 'in' the world in 
another way, as an agent engaged in realizing a certain form of life."124
With respect to Nietzsche's genealogy, Schrift (1990:189) admonishes that "[w]e will not be 
able to determine in principle or before the fact whether or not a perspective can be made 
to fit. Rather, its fitness will have to be decided in practice." In an analogous vein, the 
analytics of transposement contends that a passive plane of immanence is a contradiction in 
termini. Immanence is always relational (between two manufacturers, or between a 
manufacturer and a fossilization). The actual regime that this relation facilitates or impedes 
to the manufacturer can only be assessed in practice; it is never static and therefore must be 
constantly monitored. A passive plane of immanence, moreover, fails to "escape[...j the 
instituting question of philosophy: what is..." (Derrida 1997:19); it remains entrapped in the 
ontological quest. Likewise, should immanence find itself in the position of absolute 
immanence, it would reinstate into the age-old epistemological query of "what is?" instead 
of the contextualized ones which analyse the activities of the manufacturers of culture. "We 
cannot attain health or life-enhancement, absolutely. In fact, the idea of 'absolute health' or 
'absolute enhancement of life' [...] may be incoherent" (Schrift 1990: 193) once instrumenta
124 The overcoming of the regimes of constrained immanence is the topic of Chapter 11.
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movendi operate within the cultural matrix.
"What is it that forces us in general to the supposition that there is an essential opposition 
of 'true' and 'false'? Is it not enough to suppose degrees of seemingness, valeurs, as the 
painters say" (Nietzsche 2003: §. 341). Similarly, the degree of constrained-engaged 
immanence may "be increased or decreased, straightened or weakened, but there is no 
binary opposition involved: there is only" (Schrift, 1990: 193) a qualitative transposement 
that covers all the registers in-between -low-culturally the latter takes the form of dis­
embodiment, middle-culturally that of dis-embeddedness, and high-culturally that of de- 
contextualization. Unlike what occurs in the good vs. evil hyposement, between engaged 
and constrained immanence "there is no frontier but an economic distribution. It is within 
this general rule that the differences are mapped out" (Derrida 1997: 155). The 
manufacturer doesn't attain an absolute position but a concrete, situated degree within this 
immanent continuum. It is in this concretion where Mâhâyana philosophy spots the source 
of absolute knowledge.
Arnold J. Toynbee's definition of the plane of reality offers another apposite pretext to 
distinguish between a static immanent expanse and a constrained-engaged immanent one 
in relation to the nature of truth. Toynbee's view is of relevance to us in that it is in line with 
that of higher religions. Toynbee reasons that the "phenomena" in which we partake "do 
not explain themselves." These phenomena are "only a fragment of the universe of which 
the rest remains obscure to us". What is more, "the key to the explanation of the whole lies 
hidden in the part [of the universe] which we do not perceive or understand" (Toynbee 
1956: 274, 275). Toynbee further recounts that the cosmos holds a presence greater than 
nature and the human being. "This presence is not contained either in some of the 
phenomena or in the sum total of them [but is] behind the phenomena", which the British 
historian calls "Absolute (spiritual) Reality" (ibid: 275). In the plane of constrained-engaged 
immanence, contrastingly, the vast majority of cultural phenomena might remain perpetual 
mysteries -"knowledge is the access to the unknown and to the unknowable", Bataille 
appositely proclaims (Plotnitsky 1996: viii); a replica of which we find in the field of 
psychology when P. L. Travers (quoted in Curry 2004h: 126) similarly states that "'the 
unconscious' loses nothing and gains much by being called, simply, 'the Unknown'". Yet 
reality doesn't lie behind the activities of the manufacturers; rather, it is captured in the
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activities themselves. This is the great insight advanced by Buddhism. The body of its 
teachings associates the singular instance of constrained-engaged immanence with absolute 
reality, however particular and plural, which leads us to distinguish between classical from 
non-classical theory (Plotnitsky: 1993a, 1993b, 1994). Like in Toynbee, classical theory 
follows Hegelian postulates, according to which absolute as synonymous with universal 
knowledge is possible. Non-classical theory takes a Nietzschean turn: it "affirms[s] 
multiplicity and rejoices in diversity" (Schrift 1990: 82) -this is the force of absolute truth in 
all its particularity.
The activities of the manufacturer of culture, when not constrained by extant fossilizations, 
are acts of sheer engagement of its intrinsic low- middle- and high-culture. Thus where 
Toynbee (1956: 90) asserts "[i]f the Self submits to suffering for the sake of service, it can 
transcend itself by devoting itself, at the cost of suffering, to acts of Love and Pity, and in 
these acts it will be attaining [...] the self-fulfilment which an innately social being can never 
attain through self-centredness," the analytics of transposement clarifies: The association of 
self-fulfilment with transcendence is contradictory. When the manufacturer engages its 
intrinsic immanence —that is, it attains (self-)fulfilment— it has full access to low- middle- 
and high-culture. It is engaged through and through, not transcended. Transcendence 
derives from the preposition trans, 'over and beyond' and the verb scandëre, 'to exit'. It 
implies to exit from the regime of constrained-engaged immanence in order to attain self- 
fulfilment. It is yet not transcendence but engagement that allows for realization. It is on the 
course of self-realization that the manufacturer 'serves' the interests of the entire cultus. It 
may therefore be further contended that the transposement 'constrained-engaged 
immanence' is reverently religious in the etymological meaning of 'religion': from the Latin 
religare, to bind strongly', to assemble'. To facilitate regimes of engaged immanence is to 
enable a direct and therefore strong binding of low- middle- and high-cultural loci standi 
free of fossilized interferences.
As it was noted in Chapter 4, one of the sequels of the transposement 'constrained-engaged 
immanence' is that the significance of 'transcendence' comes to be refigured by the cultural 
matrix. The rubric 'engaged immanence' renders the classical meaning of transcendence as 
fulfilment or attainment of godly attributes redundant, thereby refiguring the signifier at
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issue. Transcendence now comes to literally signify 'the act of climbing over and beyond' 
immanent significance or relevance. In the cultural matrix, transcendence equates with 
trivial speculation in relation to the regimes of constrained-engaged immanence; referring 
to that thinking or piece of research that fails to illuminate the nature and concerns of the 
regimes in hand. However, given that there are no elements transcendent to the plane of 
immanence, this trivial speculation is refigured in the cultural matrix as (high- middle- and 
low-cultural) instrumenta movendi.
Finally, it is noteworthy to emphasize the imagery that the word "engaged" carries with it. It 
dissolves any residues of passivity traditionally attributed to such elements of culture as the 
so-called 'non-human world.' The transposition 'engaged immanence' endorses the 
anthropologist Tim Ingold's proposal to "follow the lead of hunter-gatherers in taking the 
human condition to be that of a being immersed from the start, like other creatures, in an 
active, practical and perceptual engagement with constituents of the dwelt-in world [...] 
Apprehending the world is not a matter of construction but of engagement, not of building 
but of dwelling, not of making a view of the world but of taking up a view in it" (quoted in 
Curry 2003: 347).
V
The Epistemological Representation of Truth Vs. Creative Fictions In Perennial Statu 
Nascendi
Socrates, who almost singlehandedly shaped Western metaphysics, "made of life something 
that must be judged, measured, restricted, and of thought, a measure, a limit, that is 
exercised in the name of higher values: the Divine, the True, the Beautiful, the Good..." 
(Deleuze 2001 [1965]: 70). In so far as in the cultural matrix thought, a dimension of high- 
culture, aligns itself with middle- and low-culture, achieving thereby "the unity of life and 
thought" (ibid: 66) as aimed by Nietzsche, the fetishism unleashed by the higher values is 
corrosively annihilated with the constitution of regimes of constrained-engaged immanence. 
These regimes take on the role of subject!ess generators of meaning. The engagements at 
issue are an index of the fact that there is no such thing as the truth of a constitutive Being, 
or of a scientific paradigm, for that matter -truths are multiple and subjected to the degree 
of directness of the engagement. The regimes of constrained-engaged immanence bring us
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into a post-positivistic terrain. "The world we sense is not there in any positivistic 'objective' 
sense, but is made [...] in the conjunction of creature and environment" (Wheeler 2006:15).
In this respect one must acknowledge that what is building in the cultural regimes is not so 
much the representation of truth as a fiction in ongoing recreation. Fiction, fictiône 
emanates from the Latin verb fingërë, 'to model, to invent', referring to that truth that is 
constantly modelling itself, coming into being as a result of the perennial activity of the 
manufacturer of culture. This fictitious knowledge relates to that human wisdom that 
Bateson registered to have gone astray. "Bateson believed that we have lost the use of our 
wider, deeper, more-than-conscious minds. We have lost some forms of wisdom that the 
other animals still have" (Charlton 2008: 5). Bateson alluded to the regime of engaged 
immanence which, we must note, fall short of being deeper while being direct, immediate 
and therefore 'wider' and indeed 'more-than-conscious'.
A fictitious kind of truth is also the one that Nietzsche advocated. According to the German 
philosopher, "reverence for truth is already the consequence of an illusion— [...jone should 
value more than truth the force that forms, simplifies, shapes, invents" (Nietzsche 1967c: § 
602), namely, the force that models and invents. In the same vein, Nietzsche maintained 
that what the Western metaphysical tradition attributed as erroneous encloses all the 
wisdom that may be relevant to us. "[Ejxamining the process of becoming of the 'false' 
constructs of metaphysics, morality, religion and art, that is, the entire tissue of erring [...] 
alone constitutes the wealth or, more simply put, the essence of reality" (Vattimo 1991 
[1988]: 169; emphasis in the original).125
Truth, 'veritat' in its Catalan equivalent, as an instance of language of Roman ascendancy, is 
in a more unabashed manner entangled with the epistemological disposition. Veritate is that 
truth which is 'in step with reality' and faithfully represents 'the facts'. Yet the reader should 
be reminded that "[l]ogic was intended as facilitation; as a means of expression -n o t as 
truth— Later it acquired the effect of truth" (Nietzsche 1967c: §538). Correspondingly, in the 
logocentric tradition, "true being lies in the objectivity of the objects ascertained by the 
sciences, and codified by the laws of physics" (Vattimo 2002: 14). The regimes of engaged 
immanence, by contrast, exalt the direct veneration of loci standi. This process generates no
125 Fora development at length of this topic, cf. Chapter 11, Section 1, Subsection I below.
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truth in the classical sense but acknowledgement and respect for the original and primal loci 
standi, process which conduces us into a fictitious -creative— realm of sapientia. "The 
ultimte answers to existence are not to be found in intellectual concepts and philosophies, 
however sophisticated, but rather in a level of direct nonconceptual experience [of reality]" 
(Robert Sohl and Audrey Carr in Games Zen Masters Play quoted in Tablet 1996 [1991]: 288). 
Regimes of engaged immanence suspend, bracket out the peremptoriness advanced by the 
stable, eternal and metahistorical ontology proper to Western metaphysics.126
In this context of a fiction in perennial statu nascendi, the cultural matrix is concerned with 
the role that each manufacturer plays in the genetic process: how direct is the engagement 
that the manufacturer attains in its encounter with both the cultus of which it is an intrinsic 
part and eventual fossilizations? Only with an active partaking in the engagement does the 
fictitious knowledge start building. An active partaking implies the forging of links with an 
abundance of loci standi which must remain virtually unperturbed by the residual presence 
of fossilizations that follow from the circulation of instrumenta movendi. "[I]ife happens at 
the boundary between two worlds where energies are transformed" (Sean Kane quoted in 
Curry 2010c: 111). A mediated engagement by the release of fossilizations generates 
veritate or a truthful representation of the reality generated by instrumenta movendi.
In this context, Curry (2010c: 101) must be qualified when he asserts that "agency, active 
intentionality, is not an optional add-on but integral, and it acts in a wild, more-than-human 
way". In the regimes of constrained-engaged immanence, the manufacturer is indeed put in 
touch with pancultural forces. Yet these need discernment. Curry really speaks exclusively 
for those manufacturers of culture who build regimes of engaged immanence. In industrial 
culti active intentionality is without exception intercepted by fossilizations, thereby 
presenting truth instead of fictionally -originally, that is— engaging knowing. "For the play 
of creation, my brothers, a sacred Yes is needed: the spirit now wills its own will, and he [sic] 
who had been lost to the world now conquers his own world" (Nietzsche quoted in Schrift 
1990: 68). This conquest of one's own immanence -closely bound up with the entire mythic 
plane— occurs in regimes of engaged immanence.
In view of the existence of multifarious instrumenta movendi, the condition of full engaged
126 Cf. Chapter 10, Section 3, Subsection VII below.
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immanence is a rarity if not an impossibility. To take an example, industrial climate forcing 
impedes the formation of regimes of engaged immanence -fo r  manufacturers are deprived 
of direct engagement of the locus standi by the name 'carbon-cycling capacity/ Industrial -  
instrumenta-movendi— C02 is now mediating the engagement and, as a result, deferring the 
redistribution of disembodiment. By the same token, within operative culti, regimes of sheer 
constrained immanence are an impossibility, for instrumenta movendi are parasitic upon the 
embodiment, embeddedness and contextualization of loci standi. In other words, the ratio 
dis-embodiment, dis-embeddedness and de-contextualization can never be either 100/0%  
or 0%/100%, it must be at least either 99/1% or l% /99%  .
Nietzsche further characterizers in certain detail regimes of constrained immanence: "Faith 
is always most desired and most urgently needed where will is lacking; for will [engaged 
immanence], as the affect of command, is the decisive mark of sovereignty and strength. 
That is, the less someone knows how to command, the more urgently does he [sic] desire 
someone who commands, who commands severely -a  god, prince, the social order, doctor, 
father confessor, dogma, or party conscience" (Nietzsche (2005 [2001]): § 347). The more 
disengaged the activity of the manufacturer of culture* the more it is ruled by the 
fossilizations that follow from the concerted low- middle- and high-cultural appearance of 
instrumenta movendi.
There is no other apt truth than the absolute fiction that constantly builds in a regime of 
unmediated immanence. Similarly, there is no other freedom but the liberty that gains its 
momentum in the act of immediately engaging immanence. The reasoning of either true 
statements or free states leads to a fossilization that delivers an irreducible différance-effect. 
This was Max Horkheimer's and Theodor Adorno's blindspot in their exaltation of the 
Enlightenment as the doorway to emancipation. No doubt that this apparent step forwards 
delivered by les lumières goes ever accompanied, so Horkheimer and Adorno found out in 
their Dialectic o f Enlightenment, by a step backwards (Schmidt 1996b: 20-25; Horkheimer 
1996). The Enlightenment project conforms to an irreducible to-and-fro dialectic (2002: xvi):
The aporia which faced us in our work thus proved to be the first matter we had to investigate: 
the self-destruction of enlightenment. We have no doubt -and here lies our petitio principii— 
that freedom in society is inseparable from enlightenment thinking. We believe we have
-220-
perceived with equal clarity, however, that the very concept of that thinking, no less than the 
concrete historical forms, the institutions of society with which it is intertwined, already contains 
a germ of the regression which is taking place everywhere today.
To close this section, a cursory historical overview of the treatment of truth within the 
epistemological trajectory. "Heidegger wants to ask What is the essence o f truth? The 
question concerns [...] truth's ontological a priori. This is whatever onto-logicians say has to 
exist to make the occasional truth true. For classical philosophy, it is nature or natural 
phenomena, things with a principle of their own. For critical, modern, epistemological 
philosophy, it is the subjectivity of the subject" (Allen 1993: 88). In the plane of constrained- 
engaged immanence, truth is realized at the point of encounter among manufacturers of 
culture and eventual fossilizations. In this respect, the cultural matrix sees both the classical 
and modern approaches as somehow complementing each other, for both natural 
phenomena and the subjectivity of the subject are seen as mediators of truth instead of 
openers of the space for engagement. Mediated, "the existence and content of truth is 
conditional on some extant entity whose being (identity and existence) is at some point 
given and evident and which makes truths true" (Allen, 1993: 88). Loci standi, the 
transpositions upon which fictitious truth relies, only secure the fictions at hand, they don't 
mediate them. Instrumenta movendi, by contrast, conform to those positions that mediate, 
represent and are capable of verifying a particular kind of truth.
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Chapter 9
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Transposement As In trinsic Value: 
Culti O f Tellus in Opposition To The 
Cultus O f Leviathan
ttttttHHBHttKHHKKBWttttaHHKBWHBKKttttBHHttattW
"It means that principally there are no mysterious incalculable forces that 
come into play, but rather that one can master all things by calculation. 
This means that the world is disenchanted. One need no longer have recourse 
to magical means in order to master or implore the spirits, as did the 
savage, for whom such mysterious power existed. Technical means and 
calculation perform the service. This above is what intellectualisation 
means. " 127
-Max Weber
B H H H H H B B B B B B H H H a a a a a a H
Synopsis - Chapter 9 takes issue with the inter-cultural relations -those which take place 
amongst culti. In view of the restrictions that the ruling ecocidal mode of engagement 
imposes upon our research, the present chapter concentrates upon a theory of intrinsic 
value -only to find out that the latter is inextricable from one of international unequal 
exchange. Two main culti are identified -th e  plural culti of Tellus and the homogenizing 
cultus of Leviathan. Characterized by rationalization, governmentalization and the associated 
proliferation of instrumenta movendi, the coinage cultus of Leviathan aims to conflate that 
of 'modernity', 'capitalism', 'self-regulating market economy' and present the latter three in 
a more holistic light.
The present chapter opens up with a critical reading of world-systems theory as a putative 
basis to draw a theory of value for the cultural matrix. Two chief aporias are detected in this 
theoretical body. In turning into subject-matter of analysis the degree of profitability of
127 Weber, 1964 [1948]: 139.
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production processes, world-system theory hampers, neglects a normative horizon vis-à-vis 
the overcoming of the ecocidal mode of engagement. Similarly, the adoption of countries as 
units of analysis is found to mis-portray the extant transnational enclaves of poverty.
Building on Marxist theory, contradiction is defined as the universalization of high-culture on 
the part of core-fossilizations for the usurpation of peripheral low-cultural loci standi. 
Following the political economic line opened up by Rosa Luxemburg, the contradictions of 
capital are deemed as putting the part of the world that we have come to name the cultus of 
Leviathan into an unrelenting expansive direction. Precisely on the count of the 
contradictions that entail from a cultus rich in instrumenta movendi, the perpetuation of the 
cultus of Leviathan must be suspended. Stability only appears possible within culti of Tellus. 
Respect for intrinsic value -loci standi, facilitates regimes of engaged immanence as was 
expounded at some length in Chapter 8. When regimes of constrained immanence are 
generated one must suspect that unequal exchange is underway -hence the continuity 
between both theoretical horizons. Concomitantly, the economics of the cultus of Leviathan, 
in the bosom of which this science was born, is found to be defined by an instrumenta 
movendi-onenteâ value. It is only some strands of political ecology that resituate value upon 
loci standi. Culti of Tellus, in attaining the highest levels of biodiversity, are assumed as a 
starting basis to articulate a theory of value. Relatedly, the logic of re-production proper to 
the former is taken as paradigmatic. In the emerging theory of value for the cultural matrix, 
it is argued that transposement from unequal exchange into intrinsic value is highly 
restricted in low-culture given the asymmetric arrow of time imposed by the entropy law. 
Middle-culture is liable to modification but not exempt from victims. High-culture is fully 
reversible. The establishment of prices is only conceived as a possibility upon the basis of 
intrinsic value -transposements to higher degrees of engaged immanence are in order in the 
context of unequal exchange. Clusters of fossilizations and manufacturers of culture 
independent of their North-South location are considered more appropriate than monolithic 
countries to address the geopolitical picture of the present day.
1. Historical Marxism And Its Aporias
-223-
I
Initial Overview - In line with the claims advanced by some circles of environmental history, 
world-systems theory may prove as an apt starting basis for the analytical articulation of the 
inter-cultural relations (cf. Hornborg 2001: 36-39), the theme of the present chapter. For 
one thing, world-systems theory is undoubtedly of global dimensions. Furthermore, this 
analytical framework captures the interconnected character that present different areas of 
the globe along with the inequalities that run through them. For all these apposite points, 
world-systems theory is nonetheless plagued with several shortcomings as a basis to further 
articulate an analytics of transposement consonant with the cultural matrix. Three main 
downsides may be readily traced: a materialist metaphysics based upon production 
processes; prominent imperviousness to low- (and, for that matter, middle- and high-) 
cultural concerns; and a rigid assumption of countries as immediate building blocks of the 
world-system.
II
Stuck In Industrial Production - World-systems theory assumes a materialist metaphysics 
based upon production processes. It is for this reason that this theoretical body fails to 
provide an analytical framework where productive processes may be embedded and set into 
perspective. Instead, it turns such processes into ends in themselves. Crudely put, world- 
systems theory comes short of supplying a framework where a number of transposements 
geared at the overcoming of the ecocidal dimensions that plague the current world-system 
may be oriented.
World-systems theory is also known as historical Marxism (Ritzer and Goodman 2003: 290- 
300). It endorses Marxian postulates and has applied them on a world-scale to accord 
accurate details to the vicissitudes undergone by historical materialism. On this basis, a 
number of narratives grounded in labour-power and the uneven distribution of the rate of 
profit across countries has been developed. The notion of an industrial homo faber in 
ongoing construction of its own artifacts and subjectivity is key to the Marxist grand 
narrative. Historical materialism bans the possibility "to ascribe to man any o priori essence 
[save his] historical creation as constant anthropogenesis, deriving from man's ability to 
create objects in which he realizes his subjectivity" (Avineri 1969: 85). Production is the
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fulcrum of historical materialism. Now, if we are to endorse this framework, we immediately 
run into a major aporia to overcome in order to address research questions (3) on novel 
conditions of possibility for a knowledge capable of grappling with our ecocidal 
contemporaneity. Namely, we scandalously lack a context where to set the industrial 
manufacturing of artifacts into perspective.
As we will consider in more detail below, Marx conceives human labour central to his 
philosophical doctrine also because he conceives the former as the source of human life, 
fulfilment and value. Hence, Marx's denouncement of man's alienated condition in the 
industrial and previous modes of production. Human labour qua engagement of one's 
abilities opens up a spatiality pregnant with possibilities for the analytics of transposement. 
Unfortunately, Wallerstein falls short of pursuing this theoretical and analytical line in his 
world-systems theory.
World-systems theory is concerned with social inequity. In common currency, 
correspondingly, circulate categories such as "the basic institutions: markets, firms, multiple 
states, an interstate system, the households, the classes, and the status-groups" (Wallerstein 
2006 [2004]: 24). As ecological insiders have pointed out, "[f]rom an ecological point of view, 
such a manner of understanding change is quite anthropocentric" (Chew 1997: 381).
Ill
The Greening Of World-System Theory - As far as I am aware, two analytical strands have 
attempted to 'ecologize' world-systems theory. One is made up of two different variants 
within environmental history. The other comes from the field of human ecology. On the one 
hand, the sociologist Sing C. Chew has set out to couple the variable 'nature' with the socio­
economic one proper to classical world-systems theory. In the emerging framework, both 
factors intervene in the reproduction of the world-system, "in a dialectical fashion" (Chew 
1997: 386). From this analytical vision, Chew has elaborated a grand narrative "of world 
ecological degradation over five thousand years" aiming to "determin[e] how societies, 
kingdoms, empires and civilizations are reorganized [...] to meet the contingencies of 
ecological scarcity and climate changes" (ibid 2007: xvi).
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There has been another strand of world history, perhaps less conceptual than Chew's, that 
has developed an ecological world-systems theory of the capitalist mode of production (Cf. 
Moore 2002). Finally, modern human ecology has adopted some of the conceptual 
framework of world-systems theory to redefine the theory of unequal exchange (Hornborg 
2001: ch. 3). The possibilities of this proposal seem promising. Part of the feat lies in having 
replaced production with the much broader notion of reproduction. As it was highlighted in 
Chapter 6 and will be emphasized even more in the present chapter, the analytics of 
transposement has benefited enormously from this theoretical manouvre, and the 
corresponding redefinition of unequal exchange upon an ecological basis.
IV
Countries As Units Of Analysis - Wallerstein subjects the division of the world-system to the 
degree of profitability or surplus-value that the production process of each country 
generates. "Core-periphery is a relational concept. What we mean by core-periphery is the 
degree of profitability of the production processes" (Wallerstein 2006 [2004]: 28). Against 
this conceptual backdrop, there are core-like, semiperipheral and peripheral products 
depending upon the position of each country within the global political economic map:
There is therefore a geographical consequence of the core-peripheral relationship. Core-like 
processes tend to group themselves in a few states and to constitute the bulk of the production 
activity in such states. Peripheral processes tend to be scattered among a large number of states 
and to constitute the bulk of the production activity in these states. Thus, for shorthand purposes 
we can talk of core states and peripheral states, so long as we remember that we are really talking 
of a relationship between production processes. Some states have a near even mix of core-like and 
peripheral products. We may call them semiperipheral states, (ibid)
It is therefore apparent that the country unit to which the world-system subjects the ruling 
production-process belies domestic uneven distribution of surplus-values. Contrariwise, the 
analytics of transposement should aspire to register any expression of inequity within the 
world-system.
2. The Cultus Of Leviathan In Contradistinction To Culti Of Tellus
-226-
ICultural Contradictions - Maria Mies (1998: 76) pointedly notes that when intrinsic value is 
violated, "the law of 'progress' turns into a contradictory and not an evolutionary one". In 
such instance, "progress for some means retrogration for the other side; 'evolution' for 
some means 'devolution' for others; 'humanization' for some means 'de-humanization' for 
others; development of the productive forces for some means underdevelopment and 
retrogression for others. The rise of some means the fall of others. Wealth for some means 
poverty for others" (ibid). From this picture it follows that the uprooting of intrinsic value 
debars the intra-cultural relations from forming an evolutionary continuum. This continuum 
is rather saddled with fossilizations which eventually lead to contradictions.
The concept of 'contradiction' as expressed by Mies has a marked Marxist ring. To avoid 
narrow points it is however central to reread Marxist contradictions (cf. Thomas-Pellicer 
2008: 447-451; Thomas-Pellicer and Pepper 2007: 11-14) through the cultural matrix. The 
latter prominently focuses upon the interrelatedness of low- middle- and high-culture, whilst 
the Marxist contradictions narrowly focused upon the impact of one single -however pivotal 
-  middle-cultural attribute, namely, capital. Contradictions of low- middle- and high-cultural 
order alike take place between the exigencies of multiple instrumenta movendi and the 
possibilities of a varied pool of loci standi.128
To analyze the cultural contradictions we must pay heed to intra- and inter-cultural relations 
alike. Cultural contradictions occur when initially fossilizations within any given cultus force 
upon manufacturers of culture regimes of constrained immanence. A contradiction 
therefore materializes with the mediation and deferral of situatedness -embodiment, 
embeddednes, contextualization— of several clusters of manufacturers on the part of low- 
middle- and high-cultural instrumenta movendi. The key difference between mediating and 
deferring core fossilizations and mediated and deferred peripheral manufacturers is that 
initially, the former experience such mediation as practically full embodiment, whilst the 
latter as being stripped of its immediate embodiment, used as it is for mediating that of the 
fossilization. However, in time, as a result of the différance-effect both core fossilizations
128 Cf. Chapter 7, Sections 2 and 3 above for a characterization of instrumenta movendi. Cf. Chapter 7, Section 1 above for a 
characterization of loci standi.
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and peripheral manufacturers inhabit a steadily disembodied cultus. A case in point here is 
the greenhouse effect -p erse  a fossilization, first induced by a minority of fossilizations but 
subsequently borne by us all.
Marx and Engels were vocal in the clarification of the distinction between mediating and 
deferring fossilizations vis-à-vis mediated and deferred manufacturers. Their communist 
thought asserted that the propertied class's domination over the proletariat entailed general 
societal alienation. Marx and Engels (1975 [1844]: 43) wrote in the Holy Family that "the 
property classes and the class of the proletariat represent the same human self-alienation". 
It is just that the oppressor "feels comfortable and confirmed in this self-alienation, knowing 
that this alienation is its own power [whereas the oppressed] feels annihilated in 
estrangement [and] sees in its own powerlessness and the reality of an inhuman existence" 
(ibid).
Subsequently what were fossilizations in only a cultus are prone to turn into the ruling elites 
of the former, which will tend towards growth. That is, a cultus ruled by fossilizations tends 
to annex neighbouring culti, as instrumenta movendi -capital, technology, patriarchy— 
constantly needs new ground where to operate. With respect to capital and technology, this 
was Rosa Luxemburg's completion or rather correction of Karl Marx's political economic 
body (Luxemburg 1951 [1971]; Salleh 2010: 195). Marx could never "see Luxemburg's [...] 
crucial deduction that capitalism could never constitute its own self-contained market. He, 
like his contemporaries, was thus able to put his faith in the global, emancipatory potential 
of the industrial machine" (Hornborg 2001: 61). In keeping, Marx developed his economic 
model for simple reproduction, the one proper to production with a constant stock of 
capital. Luxemburg (1971 [1951]), by contrast, offered a dynamic model of a developing 
economy based upon expanded reproduction, the one that ensues from production with 
capital accumulating. Maria Mies (1998: 225) rephrases Luxemburg's political economic 
contribution -she buttresses it— by asserting that "capitalism cannot function unless it is 
able to create and expand the market for its ever-growing amount of material and non­
material commodities." Altvater conveys it in yet other words. He asserts that surplus 
production goes with a spatial dimension attached to it. "[T]he expansionist pressure 
inherent in the economic logic or surplus production has a territorial dimension (as
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production is necessarily always spatial). Surplus production is thus identical to the 
economic conquest -exploration, development, penetration and exploitation— of space, 
i.e., the production of space" (quoted in Brennan 1977:184).
Customarily, the universalized high-culture that core-fossilizations impose upon the 
globalized cultus enables the former to use up low-cultural peripheral loci standi. A case in 
point is the international climate change regime. In a research piece co-authored with 
Miriam Pepper (Thomas-Pellicer and Pepper 2007: 25), we concluded that "the ICCR is far 
from a regime designed for the abatement of carbon emissions. It conspicuously emerges as 
a chrematistic -o r  exchange-value-oriented—contract geared at the liberalization of soil in 
peripheral areas, and the protectionism of the centres of expertise set up in core-areas." 
High- and middle-cultural imbalances are directly detrimental to the global low-cultural 
balance. Scholar of vernacular communities Radcliffe-Brown (quoted in Goldsmith 1998: 
258) has pointedly noted that "without the co-ordination required to prevent 'persistent 
conflicts,' life processes could not conceivably achieve their common goal of maintaining a 
critical order of the Gaian hierarchy".
II
The Cultus Of Leviathan And Its Modus Operand!- I propose to christen this growing 
situated structure that brings itself to bear upon the instrumenta movendi and is ruled by 
fosslizations 'cultus o f Leviathan'. Leviathan is named after Thomas Hobbes's seminal work 
on political philosophy, where the terms for liberal social contract theory are partially set 
out, setting thereby the precedent for much of Western political philosophy. Hobbes's 
legacy, asserts Latour (1993: 29), "offer[s] us the resources we have been using up to now: 
[...] social force and power [namely] the subject of law". The father of Leviathan "is the man 
who really invented the state, [&] was prepared to do away with every kind of freedom  
(including specifically freedom of thought) in order to achieve peace. In his view any 
government was better than no government at all" (Creveld 1999: 242). The pictorial 
representation of Leviathan captures in a fairly faithful manner the traits proper to this 
instrumenta-movendi-onented cultus, namely, rationalization, governmentalization and the 
associated proliferation of industrial instrumenta movendi (cf. Foucault 1996; Weber 1964
[1948]). The discontinuity between middle-culture, represented by the ruling Leviathan 
emerging from behind the landscape, and low-culture is well apparent in the graphic
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representation of Hobbes's Leviathan. Toynbee's (1977 [1972]: 43) comment in this respect 
is apposite: "The famous frontispiece of Hobbes's Leviathan, displaying society as a gigantic 
human figure composed of a multitude of life-sized human figures, is an anthropomorphic 
misrepresentation of reality." It presupposes regimes of constrained immanence. Hobbesian 
agency is deprived of a state of satiation and fulfilm ent -such as the one proper to the 
regime of engaged immanence. Agency in the Hobbesian schemata is a decontextulaized 
figure assumed to be enmeshed in an infinite mesh of needs and desires. Hobbesian agency 
is incapable of actively partaking in a meaningful cultus. Instead, the polity must be run by a 
great artificial, objective man or monster -Leviathan— that adjudicates in absolute terms.
MATERIAL REDACTED AT REQUEST OF UNIVERSITY
As the attentive reader may have already gathered, the cultus of Leviathan is a proposition 
to regard 'modernity' (in social scientific parlance), 'capitalism' (in Marxist terms), or 'the 
self-regulating market' (in Polanyian terminology) in a new, more holistic —cultural— light. 
Foucault (1996: 392) also faces difficulty when it comes to demarcating "the empirically 
determinable epoch" with which his critical project takes issue. Foucault (ibid) speaks of "a 
period w ithout a fixed date, with multiple entries because one can define it just as well by
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the formation of capitalism, the constitution of the bourgeois world, the establishment of 
the state system, the foundation of modern science with all its correlative techniques." And 
yet Foucault singles out one element as characteristic of the cultus of Leviathan. In The 
Order o f Things, the French thinker retells that the domain of knowledge that in Classicism 
was devoted to an analysis of wealth, in modernity is dislocated towards production. The 
threshold between classicism and modernity is marked, amongst other shifts, "when the 
analysis of wealth had disappeared, [and] all economic processes were regrouped around 
the central fact of production and all that rendered it possible" (Foucault 1980 [1970]: 304). 
Or as retold by Foucault's colleague philosopher Gilles Deleuze (1998: 128) with regard to 
the treatment of labour in the historical formation of the 19th-century: "There is no longer 
simply a force of productive work; instead there are conditions of production on the basis of 
which work itself falls back on capital (Ricardo) before the reverse takes place, in which 
capital falls back on the work extorted (Marx)." One of the defining traits of the cultus of 
Leviathan, to be sure, is its predilection for production processes.
Conservative, liberal and Marxist thought alike -th ree  manifestations within the cultus of 
Leviathan— have been guided by the self-same "organizing myth" (Wallerstein 2001: 53), 
namely, "development" (ibid: 51-79; cf. also Vattimo 1991 [1988]: 168
). Attention to "development" is tantamount to the lending of primacy to "production." 
Hence the vindication that Leviathan, modernity and capitalism are three different 
interpretations of one same phenomenon.
From the Nietzschean (Nietzsche, Heidegger, Bataille, Derrida) perspective, the cultus of 
Leviathan is an epiphenomenon of a larger one. It represents the culmination of philosophy 
as epistëmë, when the latter explodes into the modern sciences (Heidegger 2000f [1978]). 
For post-Kantian thinking "[mjodernity loses its singular status, it constitutes only a last 
epoch in the far-reaching history of a rationalization initiated by the dissolution of the 
archaic life and the collapse of myth" (Habermas 1987c: 87).
Ill
Has The Cultus Of Leviathan A Future? -  The high-cultural composition of the cultus of 
Leviathan is univocal. It is the "success of Plato's Socrates in exalting episteme (sic), or
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theoretical knowledge resulting from the application of pure reason to abstract universals, 
as the paradigm of knowledge and intelligence" (Curry 2003: 354). The Leviathanian low- 
cultural composition is equally conspicuous: "the tradition of episteme (sic) is, in practice, an 
enormous deception (especially self-deception) and, in its modern instantiation an 
enormously damaging one" (Curry ibid). The numberless ecocides that the world witnesses 
today are a systemic low-cultural footprint or expression of the consummation of Western 
metaphysics in the form of the cultus of Leviathan. "The end of philosophy proves to be the 
triumph of the manipulable arrangement of a scientific ecological world and of the social 
order proper to this world. The end of philosophy means the beginning of the world 
civilization that is based upon Western European thinking" (Heidegger 2000f [1993]: 435).
Heidegger (ibid: 437) considers "the possibility that the world civilization that is just now 
beginning might one day overcome its technological-scientific world character as the sole 
criterion of man's world sojourn." As we will see in Chapter 11, such overcoming or closure is 
subject to "the readiness of man for a determination" (ibid). What is relevant to note at this 
juncture is the prospect that Heidegger presages to a cultus willing to be steered 
instrumenta-movendi. In this respect, Heidegger (ibid) predicts that if "world-civilization 
stabilizes for a long time, [sjuch stabilization [...] will not rest in something enduring, but 
establish itself in a sequence of changes, each presenting the latest novelty."
When we merge Heidegger's prognosis with Arnold J. Toynbee's insights for a polity of the 
future, we should preliminary conclude that a cultus dominated by instrumenta movendi 
falls short of conforming to a basis for a universal state. Toynbee (1977 [1972]: 317) derives 
from his study of world-civilizations that the "future universal state [...] would not be 
foredoomed to be impermanent. There would be no barbarians and no alien civilizations to 
impinge upon it from the outside; and the internal decay that has been the main cause of 
the disintegration of previous universal states would be inhibited by the permanence, and 
the permanent direness, of the need to prevent genocide, to limit population, and to 
conserve resources". This permanence is exclusively possible when the global cultus resolves 
itself into a number of culti grounded upon loci standi. Toynbee (ibid: 318) further discredits 
the possible basis of a cultus ruled by instrumenta movendi in view of its Western and 
totalizing character. "A future universal state [...] will not necessarily be the creation of one
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civilization alone [...] Westerners should not automatically assume, as they are prone to do, 
that the values and goals of their own civilization will be permanently dominant." Such a 
cultus is foredoomed to the constant impermanence that follows from the repeated 
innovation of the instrumenta movendi, and the inequities, imbalances that these entail as 
the work of Hornborg (2001: ch. 3) evinces.
Toynbee reminds us that "[t]he participants in the societies of this kind have called 
themselves 'civilized' till our own time, when our horrifying and humiliating experience of 
the atrocities that we have committed has taught us that civilization has never yet been an 
accomplished fact, but has merely been an endeavour or aspiration that, hitherto, has 
always fallen far short of its ambitious target." This is another way to saying that the 
perpetuation of culti -'civilizations'— rich in instrumenta movendi should be far from a 
settled fact.
IV
Characterization Of Culti Of Tellus - A regime of engaged immanence is generated out of the 
direct engagement of immanence on the part of manufacturers in their creation of low- 
middle- and high-culture. Such a regime therefore generates situated knowledges, and a 
polity embedded in the 'spontaneous' contours offered by the conditions of reproduction, 
conditions which largely insure that a ctv/ft/s remains embodied \n  loci standi. In so far as an 
array of regimes of engaged immanence facilitate, 'pay cult to' the recreation of extant 
forms of loci standi, we may claim that these regimes conform to a 'cultus of Tellus'. Given 
that such a cultural disposition does not create relations of hierarchical dependency 
between culti, but facilitates their juxtaposition and co-existence, we may expect the co­
habitation of culti of Tellus —as opposed to the absorbing and hierarchizing character of the 
cultus of Leviathan.
Additional aspects of these culti may be featured by describing Aristotle's concept of 
'economy'. In the main, an economic system runs utterly embodied in loci standi. As a result, 
the needs of the manufacturers of culture are limited. The notion of scarcity is furthermore 
alien to this type of culti. In an Aristotelian vein, Polanyi (1971 [1957]: 81) emphasizes the 
latent link between the relentless proliferation of needs and the emergence of the notion of
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scarcity: " if scarcity springs 'from the demand side/ as we would say, Aristotle attributes it 
to a misconceived notion of the good life as a desire for a greater abundance of physical 
goods and enjoyments."
MATERIAL REDACTED AT REQUEST OF UNIVERSITY
Frida Kahlo's 'The Love Embrace of the Universe, the Earth (Mexico), Me, and Senor Xolotl'
(1949) captures with certain precision the disposition of culti of Tellus. The direct, 
unmediated partaking of manufacturers of culture (the sun, the moon, the skies, the 
cactuses and other plants, Frida, Diego, the little mouse) in the co-creation of high- middle- 
and low-culture is self-evident. The way in which the various manufacturers of culture are 
entangled with each other mirrors the co-evolutionary - in  the sense of creative— progress 
proper to this type of culti. There is no abrupt discontinuity among manufacturers since the 
evolution or development of creativity of some is not occurring at the expense of that of 
others.
There is a passage in Max Weber's 'Science as a Vocation' (1964 [1948]: 139) that 
distinguishes the instrumenta-movendi reliance proper to the cultus of Leviathan and the
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loci-standi one common in culti of Tellus in a very illustrative manner. "Unless he is a 
physicist, one who rides on the streetcar has no idea how the car happened to get into 
motion [...] he knows nothing about what it takes to produce such a car so that it can move. 
The savage knows incomparably more about his tools. The savage knows what he does in 
order to get his daily food and which institutions serve him in this pursuit". This passage 
indeed suggests that the low-cultural tools developed and utilized within culti of Tellus 
largely remain under the control, surveillance, and scope of possibilities of the loci standi; it 
is for that matter that we can assert that the tools of the 'savage' remain loci standi. By 
contrast, low-culturally-as much as middle- and high-culturally— the cultus of Leviathan is 
reliant on a set of tools that exert an unrestricted différance-effect over loci standi. Weber 
(ibid) incisively concludes that "[t]he increasing intellectualization and rationalization do not, 
therefore, indicate an increased and general knowledge of the conditions under which one 
lives/'; intellectualization and rationalization, two instrumenta movendi, obstruct the 
formation of regimes of engaged immanence.
Weber (ibid: 140) goes on to elucidate how manufacturers of culture in culti of Tellus 
proceed in an engaged manner with one's loci standi, whereas indeed fossilizations in the 
cultus of Leviathan operate irreducibly constrained by instrumenta movendi. "Abraham, or 
some peasant of the past, died 'old and satiated with life' because he stood in the organic 
cycle of life [embodied] [...] Whereas civilized man, placed in the midst of the continuous 
enrichment of culture by ideas, knowledge, and problems, may become 'tired of life' but not 
'satiated with life.'" The appearance of regimes of constrained immanence also affect the 
approach to death. Weber, here following Leo Tolstoi's footsteps, posits that "because death 
is meaningless, civilized life as such is meaningless" prominently chastising the cu/tus of 
Leviathan.
V
From Anthropogenic And Natural Into Leviathanian And Tellusian - In Chapter 3 the human 
vs. natural worlds were dissolved under the banner of culture. As an offshoot, the standard 
characterization of phenomena such as 'human-induced' or 'anthropogenic' vs. 'natural' is in 
need of revision. This is the place to reformulate these categories. Human existence on
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Tellus is around 80,000 and 100,000 years old129. This human life has relentlessly developed 
artifacts. The impacts of these instrumenta movendi upon loci standi has been different in 
the context of various culti. Indigenous peoples's tools, as we have noted above, have 
always remained loci standi. Hence Toledo's (1999) assertion that what he refers to as 
ecosystem peoples are pivotal for the low-cultural balance of the planet. In any case, part of 
the remit of environmental history consists in clarifying the impact that instrumenta 
movendi exerts in each culti (Radkau 1993).
In this section the analytics of transposement will limit itself to specify the connotations that 
the qualificative 'anthropogenic' and 'natural' take in the current virtually worldwide cultus 
of Leviathan. The first thing to note is that the contemporary cultus of Leviathan is utterly 
determined by the industrial revolution. In this context, 'anthropogenic' is far from a generic 
allusion to all 'women, children and men in all continents and social classes.' 'Anthropogenic' 
today means 'men, women and children managing and enjoying industrial instrumenta 
movendi.’ The signifying bloc 'anthropogenic climate forcing' therefore is not the forcing 
caused generically by any human activity. Rather, it refers strictly to forcing caused by culti 
ruled by industrial instrumenta movendi.
'Natural effects,' on the other hand, are, in the wake of the transposement of culture/ 
nature, those effects emanating from culti that privilege loci standi over industrial forms of 
instrumenta movendi. Thus the "ways of life, businesses, economy, social activities, physical 
structures and technologies [that] do not interfere with Nature's [i.e., loci standi] inherent 
ability to sustain life [themselves]" (East 2008) are also considered culti dominated by loci 
standi. This definition of 'natural' should reinforce the idea advanced by the transposement 
'culture' as the repository of the philosophy of the future for a post-ecocidal age that the 
present work proposes.130 . Namely, the segregation between 'the natural' and 'the human' 
are two positions proper to philosophy and science as epistëmë.131 Both the so-called 
'natural' and the so-called 'human' are endowed with dis-embodied, dis-embedded, and de- 
contextualized transposements. As such, they are innate siblings. This observation only
129 Toynbee (1996 [1992]: 21) claims to be 'one million years old' but in a personal communication Patrick Curry has corrected the 
estimate, considering Toynbee's position as outdated.
130Cf. Chapter 3, Section 3 above.
131 Cf. Chapter 4, Section 2 above.
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vindicates the truism that the true partners and adversaries of the human, and the natural -  
namely, of loci standi— are the instrumenta movendi.
Against this backdrop, the analytics of transposement shall replace the generic 
'anthropogenic' with 'Leviathanian' -i.e ., coming from the cultus of Leviathan.132 
Accordingly, it shall supplant 'natural' by 'Tellusian' or 'Gaian' —i.e., springing from culti of 
Tellus or Gaia.
3. Toward A Theory of Value In The Analytics Of Transposement
l
The Intrinsic Value-Unequal Exchange Continuum - This chapter focuses upon the inter- 
cultural relations. These are the synchronous relations, or low- middle- and high-cultural 
interactions that occur among the manufacturers of culture and fossilizations in a given 
cultus at a given moment. As it was announced in the previous chapter, it is the intra-cultural 
relations that set the tone for the inter-cultural ones. When the activities of manufacturers 
of culture lead to regimes of engaged immanence, the intra-cultural relations are established 
upon the basis of intrinsic value -viz. low-cultural embeddedness, middle-cultural 
embodiment and high-cultural situatedness. Contrariwise, when the interactions of the 
manufacturers of culture among themselves and eventual fossilizations lead to regimes of 
constrained immanence, the intra-cultural relations must be suspected to be running upon 
the basis of unequal exchange. The inequality in exchange consists in importing (usually by 
naturalized means of usurpation or middle-cultural instrumenta movendi such as capital and 
patents) intrinsic value into core-areas and exporting exchange value to the peripheries.
The globally interconnected dimensions of both the market -a  middle-cultural instrumenta 
movendi— and low-cultural loci standi as cycles renders a theory of value inextricable from a 
theory of unequal exchange. Just to illustrate my statement with an example. The real or 
intrinsic value in the form of mangrove swamps in "50 largely tropical and sub-tropical
m Another way to refer to 'modernity' and 'industrial capitalism' at the one and the same time by the analytics of transposition. Cf. Part 1, 
Chapter 8, Section 1 below.
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countries" (Shanahan 2003: 45) is consumed on the plates of Leviathanian fossilizations in 
the form of shrimps. In the US, "an average of 1.9 kg of shrimp is consumed per person per 
year" (ibid). Mangroves conform to key manufacturers of culture in many culti. The 
reproduction of this species of trees "for generations ha[s] supplied [local manufacturers 
with] food, medicines, fuel and building materials" (ibid: 42). However, international 
financial institutions such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank interfered 
with the real or intrinsic value —that which leads to regimes of engaged immanence— of 
these communities in order to promote the mass farming of shrimps, as a means to both 
alleviate their financial poverty and speed up their development of instrumenta movendi.
In "the economic movement of différence, we must conceive of a play in which whoever 
loses wins, and in which one loses and wins on every turn" (Derrida 1984a [1968]: 20). This 
aspect is crucial for a situated -embodied, embedded, contextualized—definition of equity. 
Those who consume loci standi for the operability of instrumenta movendi diminish the 
overall availability of the former. It is this outright act of usurpation that positions these 
fossilizations in a high rank of authority and domination (cf. Hornborg 2001). General 
economy also implies that "[t]here is [...] no difference without trace" (Derrida 1984a 
[1968]: 20). Differences trace the course of history. "Différance enacts an irreducible [...] loss 
in all representation by ineluctably -always already— subtracting from the fullness of any 
presence, original unity, centrality, or plenitude" (Plotnitsky 1994: 41).
Now that we have illustrated the tight interconnectedness between the dislocation of real or 
intrinsic value and the allocation of a Leviathanian kind of value, and the rise of unequal 
exchange, we can proceed with the following observation. The cultural continuum in the 
inter-cultural relations is established between intrinsic value and unequal exchange. This 
section seeks to supply a thorough conceptual basis for the transition captured in this 
continuum, which gives form to a theory of value. The building blocks are gained from 
theories of value developed in the field of political economy and from the strivings of 
political ecology to root value in the loci standi.
II
Value In The Cultus O f Leviathan Resides In Instrumenta Movendi - Axiology is the
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discourse and study of the nature of value. Value furthermore is closely related to ethics -  
the former supplies the basis for the latter. Theories of value informing a given cultus, 
therefore, unravel a great deal with regard to the nature of the cultus at issue. Leading 
theories of value in the cultus of Leviathan have been those coming from the domain of 
political economy, unravelling thereby the raison d'être of economics. Economics is the 
science that regulates richesse ('wealth7) (Schumpeter 1997 [1954]: 302). It is the discipline 
that naturalizes the fact that a given cultus be dominated by instrumenta movendi. It is no 
mere coincidence that an esoteric sect of French thinkers coined the word économistes to 
allude to their activities precisely in the mid-18th century. "Their claim was to have 
discovered the economy" (Polanyi 1971 [1957]: 71).
"La richesse en elle-méme n'est autre chose que la nourriture, les commodities et les 
agréments de la vie" writes the encyclopaedist Cantillon in his influential Essai (Schumpeter 
1997 [1954]: 218). Adam Smith endorses Cantillon's characterization of wealth, and opens a 
chapter in The Wealth o f Nations (1994 [1784]: Book I, Ch. V) by stating that "every man [sic] 
is rich or poor according to the degree in which he can afford to enjoy the necessaries, 
conveniences and amusements of human life." It should be noted that such apprehension of 
the good life is prominently at odds with the components of a regime of engaged 
immanence. The latter command a de-materializied embodiment -materialization precludes 
embodiment, direct involvement with public affairs and active partaking in the creation of 
meaning.
Instead, classical liberal economy brings to bear value upon productive labour. "Labour [...] is 
the real measure of the exchangeable value of all commodities" writes Adam Smith in The 
Wealth o f Nations (1994 [1776]: Book I, Ch. V), setting the tone for both classical and Marxist 
theories of labour. It is however true that by way of this theory of value liberal political 
economy univocally sanctions the cultus of Leviathan, whilst Marxist political economy 
endeavours to explain the exploitation inherent therein. An accurate exegesis of both liberal 
and Marxist theories of value, on the other hand, attests to the fact that value resides in 
both cases in productive processes.
As intimated in the former section, the analytics of transposement reads anthropogenic - a
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fortiori industrial— production as disembodied loci standi for the generation of various 
forms of instrumenta movendi qua tools of mobility which sooner or later shall exhibit their 
complementary facet as instruments of agitation of loci standi. The named classical theories 
of value seek at the one and the same time to regulate that which they stimulate -viz. the 
production and exchange of instrumenta movendi. Hence Hornborg's (2001: 60) resolute 
statement: "The debate about whether to define 'capitalism' in terms of merchant or 
industrial capital can thus be solved only by recognizing that circulation and production are 
mutually interdependent". Classical and Marxist theories of value, to be sure, are geared at 
informing prices.
Ill
The Rebukes From Political Ecology: Value Lies In Loci Standi - As it has been recurrently 
pointed out, ecological thinking has taken issue with that economic theory which is 
predicated upon production. In a Kuhnian vein (1996 [1962]), the leading ecological 
economist Herman Daly (1973b: 152) announces that "the growth paradigm has been more 
than exhausted by the normal science puzzle-solving research done within its confines. 
Political economy must enter a period of revolutionary science to establish a new paradigm 
to guide a new period of normal science."
Alf Hornborg readily provides an answer to Daly's call. Hornborg claims that the dichotomy 
political economy vs. political ecology must be transcended, in a manner that low-cultural 
loci standi become the fulcrum for the emerging fusion: "ecology [needs to be] recognized 
as part and parcel of any attempt to understand political economy" (Hornborg 2001: 36). 
Hornborg's message is that any analytical framework which fails to be anchored in the 
embodied dimension of cultus is outmoded in face of the ecological moment of critique. 
Teresa Brennan (1997: 179), for her part, pointedly asserts that a theory of value must be 
predicated upon the "living nature [instead of the] commodified dead." Brennan adds a 
qualitative element to her transfiguration of political economy into political ecology. The 
American thinker comes to assert that the key difference lies in a qualitative state -aliveness 
vs. death.133
133 Let us recall that the analytics of transposition transposes this divide into a continuum of engaged/constrained immanence, where loti 
standi stand for aliveness. Cf. Part 1, Chapter 6, Section 1.
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Also Herman Daly posits with conviction that a theory of value must be grounded in living 
nature. "The steady-state economy is necessary. It must be the norm" (1973b: 154). Hence 
Daly's proposal for the institutionalization of depletion quotas. It is conspicuous that the 
steady-state economy brings value to bear upon loci standi: "Let quotas be set on new 
depletion of each of the basic resources [loci standi], both renewable and nonrenewable, 
during a given time" (Daly 1973b: 160). From the practical perspective of management, it 
also appears that a theory of value predicated upon loci standi is more favourable than one 
predicated upon instrumenta movendi. Daly (ibid: 165) again:
Entropy is at its minimum at the input (depletion) end of the throughput pipeline, and at its 
maximum at the output (pollution) end. Therefore it is physically easier to monitor and control 
depletion than pollution: there are fewer mines, wells, and ports than there are smokestacks, 
garbage dumps, and drainpipes -n o t to mention such diffuse emissions sources as run-off 
insecticides and fertilizers from fields into rivers and lakes, and onto exhausts
In an indirect manner, Georgescu-Roegen also offers a theory of value of his own. This 
ecological economist relates such a theory to a specific locus standi -namely, low entropy. 
On the basis of his commendable study of the entropie dimensions of the economic process, 
Georgescu-Roegen (1996 [1971]: 80) asserts that "man's economic struggle centres on 
environmental low entropy". Yet what is even more relevant to capture, for a reconstruction 
of Georgescu-Roegen's theory of value, is the interplay at work between the two sources of 
low entropy: the flow of solar radiation and the mineral deposits that reside in the crust of 
the earth. Following the extant asymmetries between these two sources, Georgescu-Roegen 
(ibid: 86) refines his imputed theory of value by asserting that "the increased pressure on 
the stock of mineral resources created by the modern fever of industrial development, 
together with the mounting problem of making pollution less noxious (which places 
additional demands on the same stock), will necessarily concentrate man's attention on 
ways to make greater use of solar radiation".
In absolute terms, this is equal to saying that all the elements that can be produced, 
sustained and recycled in a complex system by the flux of solar radiation are endowed with 
value. Georgescu-Roegen's passage is also implying that the stock of minerals is a source of
-241-
value, of free energy -o r  embodiment in cultural terms. Given the abundant deployment of 
instrumenta movendi in Western societies, "[mjan's biological existence is made to depend 
in the future more and more upon the scarcer of the two sources of low entropy" (ibid: 83). 
And as a cluster of anthropomorphic fossilizations motivated by short-term profit has 
decided to harness this latter source at a very high pace, the stock of minerals has turned 
into instrumenta movendi. Namely, both into tools of mobility (coal, oil, gas) and 
instruments of agitation of loci standi in the form of pollution, global warming and climate 
forcing.134
Over the last few decades, ecological economists have repeatedly embarked upon the 
inveterate quest to derive an objective, stable theory of value (cf. Hornborg 2001: 39-43). 
This latter-day endeavour, however, is proving as problematic as the one undertaken by 
earlier-day classical and Marxist political economists. In ecological economics one is to find 
the promulgation of a principle of complementarity all its own. Modern physics appeared 
unable to locate a rational basis by which to code, uniformize, discipline all its findings 
(Georgescu-Roegen 1974 [1971]: 34). Analogously, ecological economists avow defeatism 
when it comes to locating either economic (or middle-cultural) or ecological (or low-cultural) 
rational criteria to inform a theory of value by which to set right price tags. This situation 
leads this quarter of economists to the proclamation of incommensurability of values 
(Martinez-Alier et al 1998: 278-279).
As Martinez-Alier (1994 [1990]: 5 et passim) avers in the history of this trans-discipline, 
attesting to the 'fiction of commensurability' is another way of conferring with Marx's 
indictment of capitalist society and its commodity-structure. The fetishism of commodities 
occurs when goods and services are assumed as commensurable and therefore liable to gain 
exchange value (Marx 1983 [1867/1887/1954]: 76-87; Lukacs 1971: 83-222). It is no surprise, 
therefore, that it is in the socialist tradition where one encounters a repudiation of a 
unifying economic rationality aimed at chrematistics or exchange-value. Instead, socialists 
have propounded accountability in kind. Otto Neurath's proposal for a Naturalrechnung in 
the debates of the 1920s and 1930s on economic calculus in a socialist economy is a case in 
point (Martinez-Alier 1994 [1990]: 6, 212-218; Martinez-Alier et al. 1998: 278).
134 Challenging Georgescu-Roegen's reconstructed theory of value, Teresa Brennan (1997: 182) states that 'real value' lies in "the 
reproduction time" of nature.
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In this context, the politicization of ecological debts (Martinez-Alier 2002; Martinez-Alier 
and Oliveras 2003), that in climate-forcing settings take the form of climate debts, must 
be understood as the restoration of intrinsic value. In a conjoint analysis with Miriam  
Pepper (2007: Part IV), we concluded that the successful politicization of these debts 
consists not so much in the consecration of capital as exchange value in the form of 
monetary compensation for the uprooting of loci stondi, as in the restoration of intrinsic 
value grounded in loci standi. In this respect, ecological debts exhibit a theory of value 
suitable for a post-ecocidal age. Recently Ariel Salleh (2009) has further extrapolated the 
ecological debt to the embodied debt, marking in a more conspicuous manner the need 
to consolidate a theory of value brought to bear upon loci standi.
IV
Extant Culti Of Tellus As Paradigmatic - The current theory of unequal exchange that 
emanates from world-systems theory hinges upon "the degree of profitability of production 
processes" (Wallerstein 2006 [2004]: 28). It is further concerned with the study of the 
uneven distribution of profit. Primacy lent to productivity, to the manufacturing of 
instrumenta movendi, in no way guarantees respect for loci standi. We must therefore 
annotate our reservations as to the adequacy of production processes for either the 
reformulation of the theory of unequal exchange or the formulation of a theory of equal 
exchange -a  theory of value, that is. The cultural matrix energetically commands an 
alternative framework.
We may endeavour towards the creation of an equal exchange framework predicated upon 
the highest degree of situatedness (embodiment, embeddedness and contextualization) by 
looking at culti ruled by loci standi -a  framework which obviously leads to localization 
(Norberg-Hodge 2000) and bioregionalism (Bookchin 1993). Such culti may be assumed as 
normative in so far as they conform to the utmost expression of value -they  deliver regimes 
of engaged immanence. To this end, the work of the ethnoecologist Victor M. Toledo offers 
some key hints. Toledo (1999) contends that there is a "remarkable overlap between 
indigenous territories and the world's remaining areas of high biodiversity". The Mexican
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ethnoecologist daims that the sort of exploitation that indigenous peoples conduct of the 
biome or ecosystem which they inhabit/oc/V/tates the greatest level of biodiversity -o f  low- 
cultural loci standi—possible. This sort of exploitation consists of a pattern of subsistence of
non-specialized production based on the principle of diversity of resources and practices. This 
mode of subsistence results in the maximum utilization of all the available landscapes of the 
surrounding environments, the recycling of materials, energy and wastes, the diversification of the 
products obtained from ecosystems and, especially, the integration of different practices: 
agriculture, gathering, forest extraction, agroforestry, fishing, hunting, small-scale cattle-raising, 
and handicrafts, (ibid: 8)
The domain of ecology states that when an ecosystem reaches the maximum level of 
maturity it moves into a steady state. At this stage, the ecosystem enjoys the greatest level 
of biodiversity possible (Brown 2002: 33-39) without human interference.135 I have added 
and emphasized 'without human interference' in so far as it is on this critical point where 
Toledo's findings gain the greatest relevance. Brown's position is common currency in 
Cartesian narratives such as Toynbee's (1976: 41). "In so far as Man has achieved the 
domestication of some species of plants and animals, he has, it is true, substituted human 
selection for natural selection, and, in imposing his choice for his own specific purposes, he 
has impoverished the biosphere in order to enrich mankind." For his part, Toledo retells that 
the low-intensity, multi-use strategy adopted by vernacular culti generates a level of 
interference with the ecosystem that is neither high nor low; it is intermediate. Defying 
received wisdom, an intermediate level of anthropogenic disturbance of low-cultural loci 
standi spawns a higher level of biodiversity -o r  a greater variety of loci standi, than when 
the ecosystem reaches a steady state fully left to its on devices and thus free of human 
interference. No wonder that some authors have named the anthropomorphic inhabitants 
of these culti "ecosystem people" (Toledo 1999: 4).
There are an additional couple of points to highlight with regard to these ecosystem people 
who set the tone for a plausible theory of value for our purposes here. First, vernacular 
community members' bond with the environment is so profoundly o la Tellus that
135
It is noteworthy, Patrick Curry's qualification in a personal communication. Despite Brown's relative contemporaneous reference 
(2002), Curry asserts that 'current scientific ecology is critical of the concept of steady or climax states, and indeed stability construed as 
stasis.'
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biodiversity turns into their gauging yardstick of wellbeing: "their quality of life is therefore 
intimately linked to the maintenance of certain levels of local biodiversity" (Gadgil quoted in 
Toledo 1999: 4). Or to convey it in cultural parlance, abundant low- -and  for that matter 
middle- and high— cultural loci standi available at the local level are part of the ingredients 
for the formation of regimes of engaged immanence. Second, vernacular communities "tend 
to maintain (and even increase) biodiversity" (Toledo 1999: 8). It is evident that biodiversity 
-n o t large-scale plantations of monocultures— stabilizes the climate. That is to say, we may 
posit those ancestral communities which organize their lives outside the logics of the self­
regulating market as pivotal representatives of culti of Tellus.
Hornborg (2001: 239) further points to the transgressive role that peripheral manufacturers 
of culture may play in the demolition of the cultus of Leviathan: "anthropological 
observations in the periphery of the world-system could help shed light on the ta ken-for- 
granted [...] constructions of the centre". The anthropological notes that come from the 
peripheries state that the 'natural' function of any community is their reproduction, a 
process which affords the continuity-not free of novelty (Prigogine and Stengers 1984)— of 
extant forms of manufacturers. In keeping, Aqqaluk Lynge, a spokesperson of the Inuit 
community, describes the Inuit's desire to "live as we have always done -in  harmony with a 
fragile, vulnerable and sensitive environment" (Milmo 30/05/2007).
Thus should we wish not only to refine the theory of unequal exchange but transpose it into 
one of value by grounding it in the reproduction of embodiment -and attendant middle- and 
high-cultural implications, historical eco-Marxism must undertake at least one key 
theoretical manoeuvre. Namely, it must rise above the logic of production and posit that of 
reproduction as an operative analytical basis. Analyses along the lines of production do 
assist us in spotting the contradictions inherent in unequal exchange logic. The first and 
second contradictions of capitalism emerge as paradigmatic in this respect (Thomas-Pellicer 
and Pepper: 7-9). However, in view that the conditions of production relate to low-cultural 
instrumenta movendi, and thus disregard in full the embodiment of cultus in its loci standi, 
the resolution of the contradiction that arises out of inequalities in the distribution of these 
conditions is no guarantee of overcoming ecocidal tendencies. Equal distribution of
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instrumenta movendi comes short of warranting that a cultus stops generating regimes of 
constrained immanence to start delivering regimes of engaged immanence.
Now, in our quest to redefine equity on the basis of leverage exerted over processes of 
decision-making (middle-culture), and attendant accesses to both processes of nomization 
(high-culture) and various forms of re-production (low-culture), we understand that the logic 
reigning over indigenous territories is one of reproduction. The correlative transpositions of 
the cultural matrix point to the fact that whatever occurs at any of the low- middle- and 
high-cultural dimensions has a reciprocal manifestation in the two remaining spheres.136 
Reproduction is a trait of low-culture. It is respect for the conditions of reproduction that 
secure embodiment. To be sure, there is only one way to attain low-cultural value and this 
consists in the preservation of the highest number of instances of immediate embodiment, 
thereby substantially reducing the number of its mediators, i.e., of instrumenta movendi. 
Little wonder that Teresa Brennan (2000) associates production with death.
We must, without fail, endeavour to see what the corresponding intrinsic values at the 
middle- and high-cultural levels are. Embodiment has its middle-cultural correspondence in 
embeddedness and its high-cultural one in contextualization. Embeddedness is only attained 
by enabling the direct cultivation of middle-culture on the part of all manufacturers of a 
given cultus. In a similar manner, contextualization occurs when manufacturers directly 
partake in the creation of meaning and knowledge. Let us note once again that classical -  
liberal and Marxist alike— theories of value, contrastingly, remain a middle-cultural 
abstraction grounded in exchange value. Herman Daly (rephrased by Prato 1992: 503) puts it 
in a nutshell: "traditional market prices and internalization of externalities only reflect 
relative scarcities, not absolute scarcities. In other words, biophysical limits on the scale of 
the economic subsystem are not internalized by market prices."
The normative move away from instrumenta movendi or production in favour of loci standi 
is not exclusively based upon the intrinsic value that the analytics of transposement assigns 
to the latter. The modified normative basis with respect to the primacy lent to production on 
the part of world-systems theory responds to historical events. The relevance of loci standi is
136 Cf. Chapter 6, Section 3 above.
thus not merely prescriptive. I will elaborate. UN environmental negotiations and treaties 
may be broadly characterized as the process by which the centrality of the conditions of 
reproduction for human survival is acknowledged. Indeed, the Earth's carbon-cycling 
capacity conforms to one such condition. This process, however, is failing to regard the 
conditions at issue in their own terms: endowed with paces and exigencies of their own. In 
the UN framework, low-cultural loci stand! are instrumental^ conceived as an objective part 
of the anthropocentric productive process and thus managed as 'fictitious commodities' 
(Polanyi 2001 [1944]: ch 6) -hence the vindication that sustainable development is 
continuous with productivity.137 The analytics of transposement, in particular in its 
'transposemental' capacity, commands a cultus to abide by the exigencies of the conditions 
of re-production qua low-cultural loci standi.
V
Value, Contradiction And Transposement In Low- Middle- And High-Culture -  Above 
reference was made to the fact that the cultural matrix enjoys a general economic 
architectonics138. It is precisely différance along with the instrumenta movendi that instigate 
such effect that which vindicates such peculiar firmament. "[W]e will designate as différance 
the movement according to which [...] any code, any system of referral in general, is 
constituted 'historically' as a weave of differences" (Derrida 1984a [1968]: 12) free of 
Hegelian or otherwise synthesis. Each operation executed by instrumenta movendi differs 
from and defers loci standi, creating thereby an irreducible pool of distinctive fossilizations. 
Progressively, low-cultural instrumenta movendi, qua instruments of agitation, exhibit their 
own symptoms of wear and turn into a disruptive amount of matter.
The theory of value and actual possibilities of transposement in face of contradiction within 
the analytics of transposement are made manifest in the correlative and dynamic 
transpositions -namely, in low- middle- and high-culture and in dis-embodiment, dis- 
embeddedness and de-contextualization. At the low-cultural level, to be sure, we truly find 
a map of differences not amenable to Hegelian synthesis. Janus-faced, low-cultural
137 Cf. Chapter 1, Section 2, Subsection I, underthe heading '5 / An Umproblematized Reversal Of Productivity In The Context Of Industrial 
Capitalism'.
138 Cf. Chapter 3, Section 3 above.
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instrumenta movendi, "connote[...] the joint dynamics of production-dislocation -an  energy- 
like and an entropy-like process" (Plotnitsky 1994: 41). Let us recall that in the Hegelian 
"Aufhebung: every concept [and, for that matter, operation] is to be negated and lifted up to 
a higher sphere in which it is thereby conserved. In this way, there is nothing from which the 
Aufhebung cannot profit" (Bass 1984 [1982]: 20). Once we embody the Hegelian concept 
and thus endow it with a low-culture all its own, Hegelian synthesis finds itself 
"constrained] [into] taking account its consumption of" (ibid) culture, assuming thereby its 
general economic character. Against this backdrop, "différance in no way implies that the 
deferred [and differed] can always be found again" (ibid). The operability of instrumenta 
movendi disrupts the stability of loci standi. The latter have been deferred-differed as the 
former leave behind their isolated position by usurping the transposement -embodiment, 
embeddedness, contextualization— of the latter. However, it is only loci standi the entities 
endowed with the ability to preserve shape and pace. The gaining of the full status of 
transposement on the part of instrumenta movendi traces fossilizations.
Low-culture is, to be sure, in the very long-term, subject to an irreversible arrow of time. The 
Second Law of Thermodynamics submits the events occurring in low-culture to an 
idiosyncrasy that renders them intrinsically distinct from middle- and high-culture alike: 
"Entropy is a selection principle breaking the time symmetry" (Prigogine and Stengers 1984: 
297).139 Processes at the low-cultural level are virtually irreversible, except when the costs of 
this reversal remain within the possibilities afforded by low entropy. Only in this latter 
scenario would hold a dialectics of the Hegelian type. Otherwise the general economic 
matrix's dictum applies: "excesses o f energy [...] without the slightest aim, consequently 
without any meaning" (Bataille, The Inner Experience, quoted in Plotnitsky 1993a: 20) occur 
all the time. Western metaphysics "is not something which we can 'put aside like an opinion. 
Nor can it be left behind us like a doctrine in which we no longer believe'; rather, it is 
something which stays in us as do the traces of an illness or a kind of pain to which we are 
resigned" (Vattimo 1991 [1988]: 172-3 partially quoting Heidegger). Moreover, the very 
long-term eventually effaces the whole of low-culture, rendering the dialectics a highly 
conspicuous implausible process.
Middle- and high-cultural relations are reversible conditions. The middle-cultural continuum
139 Cf. Chapter 6, Section 1 above.
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is dis-embeddedness. This continuum is liable to modifications but not exempt from victims. 
Dialectics of the Hegelian type to explain change hold here. The high-cultural continuum is 
de-contextualization. This qualitative continuum is fully reversible. Dialectics of the Hegelian 
type to account for change also hold in this cultural dimension.
While preserving the self-defined homogeneity of a cultus, the divergent low- middle- and 
high-cultural continua suspend "a history whose function is to compose the finally reduced 
diversity into a totality fully closed upon itself" (Foucault 1998 [1971]: 379) (ibid). Hence the 
need to turn historical narratives into a complementarity of attributes of a relatively 
coherent immanent spatiality or cultus, instead of perpetuating a concept (say, the Rise of 
the State) across time and space.140 There are constant spatial and/or temporal schisms 
among culti. These are only "transformations that serve as new foundations, the rebuilding 
of foundations" (Foucault 1972: ch 5; cf. also 3-17,166-177).
VI
M atter Is Bereft Of Value - A regime of constrained immanence occurs when a number of 
fossilizations force upon a group of manufacturers of culture hierarchical relations in the 
creation of low- middle- and high-culture. On both Heidegger's and Derrida's judgement, the 
concept of hierarchy belongs to the legacy of the history and philosophy and science as 
epistëmë. "Like Heidegger before him, Derrida realizes that in overturning a metaphysical 
hierarchy, one must avoid reappropriating the hierarchical structure. It is the hierarchical 
oppositional structure itself that is metaphysical, and to remain within the binary logic of 
metaphysical thinking reestablishes and confirms the closed field of these oppositions" 
(Schrift 1995: 16). Regimes of constrained immanence, moreover, turn a cultus into a 
materialist plane given the fact that its low-culture is disembodied from its loci standi, 
constantly generating more high-entropy, waste or matter than ecocycles are able to export 
into outer space. Teresa Brennan aptly designates low-cultural loci standi' as 'biodegradable 
life / and 'matter' as 'nothing.' Brennan forcefully asserts that modernity's "victorious 
economy, capitalism, is turning biodegradable life [loci standi] into a form in which it can 
generate nothing [matter]" (Brennan 2000: 2).
A heterogeneous body of evidence testifies to the fact that the low- middle- and high-
140 Cf. Chapter 8, Section 3.
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cultural activities of a manufacturer of culture "may actually be impaired by high levels of 
materialism" (Jackson 2006d: 373). Qua an expert in consumer culture, Tim Jackson goes on 
to say that "far from being necessary to our survival, materialism threatens our 
environment, engenders inequality and does not even make us happy" (ibid). Jackson 
unleashes the age-old, but not for that matter less necessary, litany against materialism. 
From his statements we can support the following three premises. First, when waste or 
matter is generated at a speed higher than loci standi in the form of ecocycles which are 
able to release the former into outer space, the materialized cultus threatens the stability of 
loci standi. Second, the overgeneration of matter betokens a cultus that accords priority to 
instrumenta movendi over loci standi. The lending primacy to the tools of mobility and 
instruments of agitation is an outright violation of intrinsic value. Such a cultus needs to 
constantly absorb external cu lti-\t  needs the low-cultural loci standi of the latter to proceed 
with its own productive processes, usually breaking itself up into a core, a semi-periphery, 
and a periphery. It follows that inequality turns into a defining tenet of this cultus. Third, it is 
not in vain that intrinsic value is associated with loci standi -these places of stand are a 
source of wisdom and fulfilment. Contrastingly, when the latter values are sought to be 
realized by way of instrumenta movendi, regimes of constrained immanence or unhappiness 
fo llow .
VII
The Establishment Of Prices - Liberal and Marxist theories of value strive to elucidate how 
profit is raised. These theories are intrinsically linked to the establishment of prices. The 
prices at issue regulate the exchange of wealth in the form of instrumenta movendi -bo th  
goods and services. The analytics of transposement proposes a theory of value that no 
longer aims to elucidate how profit is made. Its function is rather prescriptive. It is designed 
to expose where the value of a cultus should lie. When this newly defined value is dislocated 
-and thus unequal exchange starts operating— the enterprise of value-analysis is redirected 
towards the examination of the low- middle- and high-cultural dimensions of the dislocation 
under way. The queries for the required investigation are the ensuing ones: by way of which 
private and collective institutions, which fossilizations encode which high-cultural 
instrumenta movendi to provoke and justify which rate of dis-embodiment? This is equal to 
saying that the analytics of transposement articulates a theory of intrinsic value with one of
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power at the one and the same time.
Which is then the position of the analytics of transposement with respect to prices? The 
answer is quite straight-forward: in the cultural matrix intrinsic value is not liable to 
commodification. In cultural parlance, commodification is the process by which a cultus 
starts being ruled by instrumenta movendi, thereby creating the low- middle- and high- 
cultural artillery that naturalizes the uprooting of neighbouring culti from their intrinsic 
values or loci standi (Cf. Hornorg 2001: Ch. 3). Commodification results in the consumption 
of intrinsic value and the imposition of exchange value. The operation of such a cultus 
requires transposement so that intrinsic value can be again enjoyed. Only when intrinsic 
value is regained may prices be set. Intrinsic value, no doubt, entails low-cultural 
embodiment, middle-cultural embeddedness, and high-cultural situatedness. From this 
picture of fairness prices follow as logical conclusions. In the reasoning of Aristotle as 
rephrased by Karl Polanyi (1971 [1957]: 80):
The rate at which the shared services (or, eventually, the goods) are exchanged follows from the 
requirement of philia, i.e., that the good-will among the members persist. For without it, the 
community itself would cease. The just price, then, derives from the demands of philia as 
expressed in the reciprocity which is the essence of all human community.
Georgescu-Roegen's work -conveyed in cultural speech— emphasizes the disembodying 
nature of production. In keeping, ecological economists proclaim the incommensurability of 
values (Martinez-Alier et al 1998: 278-279). Such promulgation carries the consequence of 
indeed rendering commodification incompatible with value. Similarly, Aristotle states that 
the rate at which dis-embodiment will proceed will "follow from the requirements of the 
philia,, or "standing of the participants in the community" (ibid). That is, according to 
Aristotle, it is a concerted middle- and high-culture which informs a given cultus and 
determines the status of low-culture.
Aristotle's substantive elaboration on the economy echoed two pressing policy subjects of 
his contemporaneity -viz. trade and price. They are also contemporary issues of ours. 
Aristotle univocally tied these two notions in with oikos or household -largely setting out the 
modus operand! proper to culti of Tellus. For the ancient Greek philosopher "either the
-251-
economy was about the material, substantive, things that sustained human beings, or else 
there was no empirically given rational link between matters such as trade and prices on the 
one hand, and the postulate of a self-sufficient community, on the other" (Polanyi 1971 
[1957]: 82). Economics for Aristotle is a subject only practicable in a milieu akin to that of a 
cultus of Tellus. The Aristotelian designation for the kind of exchange prevalent in the cultus 
of Leviathan is chrematistics. Chrematistics ('crema', possession or wealth) "refers mainly to 
the pecuniary aspects of business activity." (Schumpeter 1997 [1954]: 53; cf. also Thomas- 
Pellicer and Pepper 2007: 7). Hence the vindication of first needing to break down the cultus 
of Leviathan into culti of Gaia in order to proceed with the issue of price-setting. In sum, the 
institution that links market to trade, viz. the supply-demand-price mechanism, is of no use 
as a theory of cultural value.
In line with the embedded and embodied setting reclaimed by Herman Daly, Alf Hornborg 
and Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, amongst others, we may endorse the prescriptive horizon 
set forth by Aristotle. Only then are we in a position to settle the issue of exchange and 
attendant theory of prices. Aristotle states that "trade is 'natural' when it serves the survival 
of the community by maintaining its self-sufficiency" (Polanyi 1971 [1957]: 79). The ancient 
Greek philosopher thus posits that exchange remains embedded in loci standi, which secures 
that all manufacturers of a given cultus enjoy access to these loci standi. Hence Polanyi's 
(ibid: 70) association of this paradigm with embeddedness. The kind of trade that is put to 
work to secure the enjoyment of low-cultural loci standi by all manufacturers requires an 
embedded middle-culture. Namely, one where there is a relatively direct partaking of all 
manufacturers in the direction of the cultus at isue. Polanyi (ibid) notes that such direct 
participations usually occur through the establishment of various middle-cultural institutions 
among which kinship, marriage, age-groups, secret societies, totemic associations, public 
solemnities, ceremonial practices, custom, ritual and religious association are included.
The type of trade that occurs in culti of Tellus, Aristotle goes on to reason, requires set prices 
that reflect equivalences in kind. In step with this insight, the analytics of transposement 
metamorphoses the concept of value from a quantitative approach into a qualitative one. 
This qualitative outlook precludes the extrapolation of value to price. Without getting into 
the history of Naturalrechnung (or accountability in kind) (Martinez-Alier 1994 [1990]: 6,
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212-218; Martinez-Alier et al. 1998: 278), it may be concluded that the analytics of 
transposement is only in a position to supply a theory of prices and trade in the frame of 
culti of Gaia. The cultus of Leviathan provides no reasonable, logical way to establish price 
tags. Rather, as Hornborg (2001: Ch. 3) successfully features, prices in Leviathan are 
legitimizing devices of unequal exchange. This is because the Value' of this cultus lies in the 
instrumenta movendi.
VIII
From Countries To Clusters Of Fossilizations And Manufacturers - Alf Hornborg (2001: 36) 
renders us cognizant of some of the critique levelled against world-systems and dependency 
theory. Both analytical frameworks have been based on the impossibility of delivering part 
of their remit, namely "visualizing 'metropolis-satellite' and 'core-periphery' relations, and 
notions of surplus exploitation,' as spatial, material realities". To remedy these pervasive 
aporias, Hornborg proposes to abandon the middle-cultural approach consisting in readily 
relying upon national trade statistics" (ibid) common in world-systems theory. Hornborg 
proposes instead to adopt a low-cultural outlook predicated upon "net flows of energy and 
materials, irrespective of political boundaries" (ibid).
On another note, the international political economist Robert W. Cox (2002a: 84) announces 
that the "globalization of production is producing a three-pronged social hierarchy that is 
world-wide in extent, cutting across state boundaries". The stratification at issue comprises, 
first, an elite segment of anthropomorphic fossilizations (global economic managers) that is 
integrated into the global economy and beneficially reaps the fruits of such transnational 
division of labour. Second, a subdivision in the labour force that serves the global economy 
but only more precariously can rely on it -is  under the constant hazard of readily 
disposability. Finally, we find an excluded slice of anthropomorphic manufacturers who, 
either under the status of permanently unemployed, superfluous worker or not participant 
at all suffers from the setbacks of globalization. The three segments are a product of the 
globalizing cultus that emanates from the post-Fordist flexible organization of labour (Weeks 
2007: 139-157; Harvey 1995 [1990]: 141-172). The OECD labour market expert Raymond 
Torres is vocal in this respect: "The job for your life is dead [...] In order to reap the benefits 
of globalization you have to move. Enterprises have to move into new areas, new niches,
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and people have to move into new enterprises'" (quoted in Seager 20/06/2007). An analytics 
that posits the regime of engaged immanence as normative horizon must take this tripartite 
reality into account. In this respect, Peffer (1998:143) aptly notes that "an adequate theory 
of justice will put at least as much emphasis on /ntronational redistribution as on 
international redistribution".
All countries have been historically pervaded with class divisions. The more stable global 
political economy of preceding centuries may arguably sustain theoretical 
conceptualizations upon the basis of countries, as captured in world-systems and 
dependency theories (Wallerstein 1974, 2004a, 2006 [2004]; Frank andGills 1999 [1993]; 
Hornborg 2001: 37-79). For analytical purposes it should be observed that the closer we 
arrive at the neoliberal stage of the cultus of Leviathan the more senseless the country as a 
unit of analysis becomes. "Whereas first and third worlds could formerly be distinguished 
along national boundaries, increasingly, and in most countries, one finds relatively insulated 
pockets of wealth surrounded by ever widening fields of impoverishment" (Ryan 2002: ix). 
Inequity tends to be disrespectful of national boundaries. Thus whilst till the 1980s the core, 
semi-peripheral and peripheral division may have been amenable on the basis of country- 
monoliths, this analytical strategy increasingly fails as neoliberal strategies reorganize the 
global cultus.
Likewise, the North-South divide does not fully reflect the actual map of inequalities. As it is 
evident in a virtually homogeneous manner in the case of African countries, national elites in 
the South are in control of domestic policies and economic markets. The presence of these 
elites has facilitated the control of African resources by transnational corporations. In the 
name of development, African governments contract services offered by global companies. 
As a result, transnational corporations obtain leases on African land for relatively lengthy 
periods of time, and with it direct control and management over resources. Ashis Nandy 
(2004: 482) describes the role played by Third World elites in these words: "most of the 
[peripheral-manufacturers] in the Third World [are] desperately poor and ruled by despots 
[core-fossilizations] who live off it as systematically as do[...] the First World". Similarly, the 
North is far from a homogeneous monolith of harmonious and well-to-do communities. 
Segregated from the super elites and an extended middle-class, deprived groups are also
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present within technologically-affluent nations.
Let us further note that the suitability of the 'country' as an analytical unit in the literature is 
likewise problematized with regard to earlier stages of the cultus of Leviathan. Elites seizing 
a greater share of the surplus-value have been constant throughout the colonization period, 
as much as they have permeated the post-World War II era of maldevelopment (Shiva 2002 
[1989]) to date. These elites correspond to the clusters of core-fossilizations that have 
arrogated to themselves the right to manage and decide the fate of peripheral 
manufacturers. "[I]n the early post-World War II period [...] First and Third World elites 
[core-fossilizations] accepted the price of massive impoverishment, of selling Third World 
resources to the most convenient bidder. Of degrading their physical and human ecologies, 
of killing and torturing, of condemning their indigenous population to near extinction" 
(Escobar 1997: 91-2).
One of the consequences of the swelling cultus of Leviathan has been the homogenization of 
the periphery. Escobar (1997: 92-3) points out that such process of uniformization "entails 
the erasure of the complexity and diversity of Third World peoples, so that a squatter in 
Mexico City, a Nepalese peasant, and a Tuareg nomad become equivalent to each other as 
poor and underdeveloped". Nandy, on the other hand, emphasizes the transposemental 
force that the homogenized periphery may exert in view of their relative embodied and 
embedded positions: "the defiance of the nation-state has become the sine qua non of 
survival for many in the Third World and Third Worlds within the First and Second (sic) -th e  
indigenous peoples, the minorities, the political dissenters, who do not or cannot use the 
language of global mainstream and are partly or wholly outside the market, economically 
and/or psychologically" (Nandy 2004:486-7)
We may therefore conclude that contemporary world-system theory can no longer be 
established on a country-by-country basis. Different clusters with varying accesses to highl­
and low-culture appear to disrupt the traditional core, semi-peripheral and peripheral 
configuration. The analytics of transposement preserves the tripartite division -core, semi­
periphery, and periphery— but replaces countries with clusters of fossilizations and 
manufacturers alike. We may conclude that any cluster may emerge in any country of the
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North or the South and extend itself across national boundaries. What renders each cluster 
core, semi-periphery or periphery is their respective accesses to high-cultural processes of 
nomization and low-cultural processes of global re-production, not their respective 
geographical positions as world-systems and the germane dependency theory would claim.
IX
Transposement Of Contradictions -  As intimated by Nandy above, the sustained denial of 
engaged immanence to manufacturers creates at the same time the possibility of 
transposement of the cultus at issue so that regimes of greater engaged immanence may be 
attained. It is for this reason that we shall say that the loci of transposement reside in 
peripheral-manufacturers. Representative democracy, to name another conspicuous 
instance of middle-cultural contradiction, creates a political elite vis-à-vis a grand mass of 
proletarian voters. This system may compel that, alongside professional politicians, some 
pockets of manufacturers object to the representative-democracy fossilization by which they 
are excluded from political life and decide to engage in direct politics. It is in this way that we 
may explain the birth and proliferation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
community-based organizations (CBOs) (cf. Foucault 2000 [1984]). Even when a part of these 
organizations remain in the shadow of the representative democratic system and therefore 
become a mere extension of the latter, another group of these organizations is pulling the 
world-polity towards a more directly democratic system in line with bioregionalist postulates 
(cf. Barry 1999: ch. 4).
A contradiction of high-cultural order relates to those meanings and cognitive clusters born 
out of processes of objectification. To take one example, the credence that a manufacturer 
of culture may only take an anthropomorphic shape speaks of a Western worldview being at 
work. In pagan animist culti, as largely registered by the cultural matrix, subjecting-subjected 
activities are equally attributed to goddesses and gods, spirits, animals and plants. Thus the 
pervasive imposition of anthropomorphism in the global polity may well stir the 
reaffirmation of animistic culti, destabilizing thereby the high-cultural uniformization of the 
oppressed culti at issue and eventually diversifying the assumptions with regard to agency 
and its activity.
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XThe Workings Of Unequal Exchange Revisited -  The intra-cultural relations exhibit how 
value in the analytics of transposement is attributed to a qualitative state which ultimately 
also relates to a quantitative disposition, namely, to a high degree of engaged 
immanence.141 High-culturally this manifests as contextualization, middle-culturally as 
embdeddedness and low-culturally as embodiment. As it was observed above, classical 
political economy attributes value to the outcome of the productive process. The analytics of 
transposement, contrastingly, states that the dislocation of intrinsic value ought to be 
penalized. Once a cultus decides to displace intrinsic value, it starts materializing - i t  begins 
to be increasingly ruled by instrumenta movendi instead of loci standi. The production of 
low-cultural instrumenta movendi - a  fortiori the more complex species such as highly 
sophisticated technology— entails a supra-local appropriation of embodiment (Hornborg 
2001: 43, 125). In line with Luxemburg's (1971 [1951]) contribution to international political 
economy announced at the beginning of this chapter, a materialized cultus carries the 
consequence that it needs to increasingly incorporate neighbouring culti for the steady 
sustenance of its materialized low-culture.
In line with world-systems teachings, this incorporation of neighbouring culti leads to a 
hierarchy of fossilizations-manufacturers, where those that accumulate low-cultural loci 
standi turn into the rapacious core of the cultus at issue, and those that have their low- 
cultural loci standi expropriated turn into peripheries. A materialized cultus is therefore no 
longer operating upon the basis of intrinsic value but upon that of unequal exchange: 
middle-cultural instrumenta movendi such as exchange-value (capital, carbon credits), 
private property, self-regulating markets are created by way of which the low-cultural loci 
standi of the peripheries is transferred to the cores. The looting of these low-cultural places 
of secure stay occurs thus with the simultaneous dis-embeddedness and des- 
contextualization of middle- and- high-culture, respectively, of the cultus that is being 
absorbed. It will hence be claimed that core-fossilizations in the cultus of Leviathan import 
intrinsic value from the peripheries where they export unequal exchange (cf also Giddens
141 Cf. Chapter 8, Section 2 above.
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1992 [1990]: 21 et passim).
Teresa Brennan (1997, 2000) has also undertaken a dislocation of the subject-object dualism 
in order to capture the modus operandi of capital. Not surprisingly, Brennan (1997: 179) too 
concludes that a valid theory of value can be established by antagonizing "living nature and 
the commodified dead". It follows, Brennan argues, that the 'real' contradiction in any cultus 
geared at production lies in the disparity in speeds between loci standi and instrumenta 
movendi. "[WJithout the subject/object distinction, the [labour] theory [of value] reveals 
that the essential contradiction in production is between the reproduction of time of natural 
energy and the time or speed of exchange for profit" (Brennan 1997: 177). Brennan's 
theoretical insights further inform us that the contradiction exacerbates with the 
centralization of industrial production processes: "[T]he reproduction time, or real value, will 
be and is discounted the more industrial production is centralised. Discounting the cost of 
reproduction, in fact, is the other side of centralisation, meaning the increased 
concentration of production and industry in urban centres, and the increase in monopoly 
ownership" (Brennan 1997:183).
This is in line with the theoretical conceptualizations advanced by the human ecologist Alf 
Hornborg. Or rather, Hornborg provides the thermodynamical explanation to Brennan's 
insights. Technology, one of the most sophisticated expressions of low-cultural instrumenta 
movendi "entails a supra-local appropriation of negentropy" says Hornborg (2001: 43, cf. 
also 125). Negentropy consists of entropy in an orderly state. Let us recall that the second 
law of thermodynamics is one restricting factor of the dynamic transposement 'dis­
embodiment', where low-entropy is practically synonymous with embodiment. Hornborg's 
statement then means that the low-cultural footprint of technology exceeds the embodied 
possibilities of the site where a piece of technology is located. Those clusters that therefore 
wish to be in possession of technology need to subsume the low-culture of external culti 
under their yoke. This cultural phenomenon largely explains the imbalances in the world 
today -a  part of the world affluent when it comes to low- -and  for that matter, middle- and
high cultural instrumenta movendi entails without exception another part deprived of
low- -and  for that matter, middle- and high—  cultural loci standi. The analytics of high- 
middle- and low-culture without fail enjoins the researcher to see the three cultural
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dimensions correlatively. The seizure of foreign low-cultural loci standi goes hand in hand 
with the disembeddedness of autochthonous middle-cultural arrangements, and the 
objectification of the high-culture of the cultus which is being absorbed.
In the context of unequal exchange, we find as many as three avenues through which power 
makes inroads: a low- middle- and high-cultural. Nietzsche and Foucault capture neatly, the 
high-cultural avenue in relation to the middle one: "Knowledge works as a tool of power. 
Hence it is plain it increases with every increase of power" (Nietzsche 1967c: § 480). Marx 
specifies a modern middle-cultural one: capital accumulation. Finally, human ecologists such 
as Alf Hornborg elucidate the momentum that low-cultural instrumenta movendi gather 
once they are developed. This truism is in line with the duplicitous nature -means of 
mobility and tools of agitation— attributed to instrumenta movendi in Chapter 7.142 
Hornborg further draws attention to the holy alliance forged between low-cultural 
instrumenta movendi and capital, and presents both as leading sources of disembodiment 
and disembeddedness within the prevailing world-system or cultus of Leviathan:
market prices are the specific mechanism by which world system centres extract exergy from, and 
export entropy to, their peripheries. It would be impossible to understand accumulation, 
'development/ or modern technology itself without referring to the way in which exchange values 
relate to thermodynamics [dis-embodiment], that is, the way in which market [middle-cultural] 
institutions organize the net transfer of energy and materials [dis-embodiment] to world systems 
centres.
Hornborg appears vocal in asserting that some middle-cultural clusters are paying for having 
their low-cultural loci standi depleted, a mechanism by which a number of advantaged 
middle-cultural clusters render peripheral counterparts submissive to what emerges as a 
highly unfair international game. We find a replica of Hornborg's link to capital to technology 
in Keynes. For Keynes capital is that middle-cultural mechanism by which the dislocation of 
time-space is possible. "Money does not relate to time (or, more accurately, time-space) as a 
flow, but precisely as a means of bracketing time-space by coupling instantaneity and 
deferral, presence and absence" (Giddens 1992 [1990]: 25).
Despite the pivotal role played by capital in the stratification of clusters within the cultus of
142 Cf. Chapter 7, Section 3 above.
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Leviathan, it should be again clarified that the analytics of transposement is not a critical 
strategy by which class is exclusively defined in accordance to income. This analytics 
scrutinizes intra-cultural clusters with reference to their respective middle-cultural 
arrangements, which in turn ensure their control over and accesses to high- and low-culture 
alike.
When unequal exchange is guiding the inter-cultural international relations, the queries of 
reference deployed for analysis are, in one putative phrasing, the following: in the name of 
which high-cultural configuration, which clusters of fossilizations are benefiting from the 
appropriation of the intrinsic value of which clusters of manufacturers, for the creation and 
enjoyment of what type of low-cultural instrumenta movendi?1*3 Interestingly, culti of Tellus 
shall use the same set of queries for the establishment of a steady-state economy, for the 
latter too ultimately requires value-judgement: "The choice of stock levels and rates of 
maintenance throughput requires value judgement, but the attainment of a steady state at 
some level is a physical necessity (Daly 1973b: 153)".
Somehow the deployment of our theory of value complements the following passage, in 
itself an indictment of a putative theory of value predicated upon technological innovation: 
"Global warming is not a technological problem and no increase in the production of solar 
and wind and eco-gadgets can solve it. The energy crisis and rising C02 levels are crises of 
market economics and the question we must ask is: How do we change society to make it 
sustainable (sic)?" (Fitz 24/04/2007). Fitz is asking how do we victoriously break down the 
swelling cultus of Leviathan into autonomous culti of Gaia?
In any case, to recapitulate, the low- middle- and high-cultural analytics of transposement is 
a theory of intrinsic value from which, unlike in political economic theories of value, a 
multidimensional normative basis is derived. In contradistinction to classical (liberal and 
Marxist alike) political economies that establish price (value) from a single source -namely, 
labour— the analytics of transposement configure three main gauging yardsticks anchored 
in the inherent values proper to culture: low-cultural embodiment, middle-cultural
143 Cf. Hornborg (2001: 62) for a discussion of how to relate and analyse time, space, technology and class: "This is the essence of human 
technology: the use of time and space to save time and/or space for some social category. Technology and capital thus amounts to a way 
of redistributing temporal and spatial resources in global society."
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embeddedness and high-cultural contextualization. When the inbuilt values are found to 
have been violated in a given cultus, the analytics of transposement turns into an inter- 
cultural theory of unequal exchange, or what is equal to saying, to one of power.
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Chapter 10
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Transposement As K ultur: 
The Prescriptive Places Of God
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"Knowledge cannot realistically be limited to historically credible 
statements or inscribed in an economy of discourse. It cannot be inscribed 
in anything less than the global human ecology, which is the ultimate 
context for understanding knowledge"
-Barry Allen144
"Unanimity of opinion may be fitting for a church, for the frightened or 
greedy victims of some (ancient or modern) myth, or for the weak and willing 
followers of some tyrant. Variety of opinion is necessary for objective 
knowledge"
-Paul Feyerabend145
Synopsis - Chapter 10 re-reads philosophical and scientific practice from the normative lens 
adumbrated by the cultural matrix. It starts off with an interpretation of the textualism 
proper to Nietzsche's, Foucault's and Derrida's work, where the plane of immanence is 
continuous with text, discourse and sign, respectively. The semiotic turn is presented as a 
fossilization impervious to the pivotal distinction between loci standi and instrumenta 
movendi. As a result, textuality is said to have to be reinscribed in the cultural matrix so that 
(a) the quality of the relations be again amenable to scrutiny, (b) meaning be regarded as an 
exclusive dimension of culture -its  high, and (c) allow for the constellation of active regimes 
of constrained-engaged immanence to gain centre stage.
The abundant debates upon the ends of philosophy are associated with the characterization
Allen 2004:145.
145 Feyerabend 1975:46.
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of the Übermensch -th e  figure in Nietzsche's philosophy that emerges in the wake of God's 
and Man's death. In inscribing the Übermensch in the cultural matrix, the prescriptive 
regimes of engaged immanence emerge as imbuing the former with meaning. The regimes 
at issue are renamed by way of the German rubric Kultur -'cu lture'— in reply to the 
historical and philosophical German banner Aufklarung.
Building upon an alternative etymology of scientia as 'having the skill to' -and  not as mere 
accumulation of knowledge, scientific practice as Kultur is regarded as a wholesale cultural 
affair that entails to be in the position of low-cultural embodimdent, middle-cultural 
embeddedness and high-cultural contextualization in order to perform a skill. In other 
words, regimes of engaged immanence are reclaimed for the constitution of knowledge. In 
this light, the process of knowledge production is partially put on a par with that of 
divination. In this context, the laboratory is reread as a constellation of instrumenta 
movendi. Newton's instrumenta-movendi-mtenslve theory of colour is subsequently 
contrasted with the embodied, embedded and contextualized one of Goethe's. Emulating 
the latter, cultures of knowledge are proposed away from logocentric cognitive avenues. 
Cultures of knowledge present their multidirectional findings in a complementarity or 
addition of their findings clustered around low-culture, middle-culture and high-culture, 
thereby uprooting the historical linearity common to the epistemological disposition. This 
arrangement of knowledge responds to the immanent acausality characteristic of the 
cultural matrix.
Positional claims to truth are reported to be opposed to transposemental ones. The former 
are those proper to science as epistêmê. They seek to settle the nature of truth for good; 
they are geared at issuing ultimate, static and immovable statements. Transposemental 
claims to science, by contrast, are those proper to science as Kultur. As such, they gain their 
truth relationally. Under the cultural spatiality, epistemological positions fuse with their 
obverses to form dynamic transposements, thereby gaining the low- middle- and high- 
cultural dimensions by which the latter define themselves -viz. dis-embodiment, dis­
embeddedness and de-contextualization. Thus beauty and ugliness, to take but one 
example, turn into a continuum of low- middle- and high-cultural un-beauty. Science as 
Kultur operates upon the mode of engagement -n o t on the mode of being proper to the
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epistemological disposition. Philosophy and science as Kultur decentre ontology and enact a 
methodology that we may call osmogenesis, 'the perpetual, impulsive action or activity of 
engendering; the perennial rebirth of the engagement'.
1. Textualism As Fossilization
I
The Treatment Of The Irreducible Transposements Of Culture -V iz. Loci Standi And 
Instrumenta Movendi— In Nietzsche's, Foucault's And Derrida's W o rk - Nietzsche is 
regarded as both the precursor of the hermeneutical turn in philosophy and the primal 
father of the postmodern condition (Habermas 1987c; Schrift 1990; Vattimo 1991 [1988]: 
164; 1995; Rorty 1980; Leiter 2006b, 2006c). It might be his leadership role that stops 
Nietzsche from running into the pitfalls that his followers in both directions certainly 
commit. Like the hermeneuts, Nietzsche seeks to eradicate classical epistemological 
foundationalism. In face of solipsist positions, hierarchical oppositions, unproblematized 
reversals, a consummate humanism and other key traits of the epistemological 
disposition,146 Nietzsche advocates plurality of interpretations. In the primacy lent to 
interpretation over epistemological correctness, hermeneuts and a fortiori postmodern 
scholars succumb to an unmitigated relativism by which all statements attain equal validity. 
Nietzsche, by contrast, contains interpretative licentiousness by passing statements through 
a sieve. The Nietzschean sieve is in charge of sorting the plurality of interpretations 
according to the proclivity each exhibits in positioning itself at a point of a continuum of will 
to power. This continuum, to be sure, takes the form of a qualitative gradation that goes 
from decadence or life-negation towards health or life-enhancement147. Nietzsche only 
cherishes "[t]hose interpretations which are healthy, i.e., those interpretations which 
enhance the creative and procreative impulse of life" (Schrift 1990:192-193).
What we must note at this stage is that both the 'will to power' and its epithets 'healthy' and 
'decadent' denote two concrete points in the dynamic transposements. They are a reference 
to the possibilities that grow, respectively, out of loci standi -well-being, creation,
146 Cf. Chapter 1, Section 2, Subsection I above.
147 Cf. Chapter 8, Section 4, Subsection 1 above.
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procreation— and instrumenta movendi —control, constraint, waste or matter. Let us note 
that Nietzsche posited a normative preference fo r-in  our own parlance— loci standi. It is his 
fierce defence of loci standi that inoculates Nietzsche's philosophical corpus against both 
Western metaphysics and postmodern relativism, a truism that further substantiates the 
argument advanced in Chapter 5. Namely, Western metaphysics with its apex in modernity 
and the postmodern condition conform to a hyposement. Or, to put it more precisely, the 
postmodern condition operates within metaphysical ground, whilst loci standi aim to be 
penetratingly subversive of this continuity.
Above it was argued that the only constants in Foucault's historical inquiries are situated 
structures constituted by contingent power-knowledge relations.148 We should now clarify 
the link between Foucault's historical narratives and dis-embodiment. Foucault sketchily 
adumbrates the implications of the practice of wirkliche Historié —literally translated 'real 
history/ of which Nietzsche's and Foucault's genealogy are two instances. Such practice is 
opposed to both progressivist historiography and that of Frankfurt-School-like 'critical 
theory' (Dean 1997 [1994]): 4):
We believe [...] that the body obeys the exclusive laws of physiology, and that it escapes the 
influence of history, but this too is false. The body is moulded by a great many distinct regimes; it is 
broken down by the rhythms of work, rest, and holidays; it is poisoned by food or values, through 
eating habits or moral laws; it constructs resistances (Foucault, 1998 [1971]: 380).
Relevant for our purposes here is to note that Foucault emphasizes the irreducible 
interconnectedness of issues of low-culture ("physiology", "body", "food"), with those of 
middle-culture ("work", "rest", "holidays", "eating habits", "resistances") and high-culture 
("values", "moral laws"). Foucault offers "a unique emphasis on the body as the place in 
which the most minute and local social practices are linked up with the large scale 
organization of power" (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983: xxvi).
In line with the position of the analytics of transposement but questioning Braudel's 
assumptions on the environment as the fulcrum of la longue durée,149 Foucault (1998 
[1971]: 380) goes on to contend that wirkliche Historié "is without constants." The French
148 Cf. Chapters, Section 2, Subsection II above.
149 Cf. Chapter 5, Section 1 above.
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philosopher is unravelling highly precious information for the construction of intrinsic 
value150 as well as for the more generic characterization of conditions of possibility of 
knowledge. Foucault is retelling that the body —or power and knowledge, for that matter, 
is too precarious a variable on which to bring to bear an entire philosophical corpus. 
"Nothing in man [sic]—not even his body— is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self­
recognition or for understanding other men" (ibid). Foucault seems to be rather supporting 
an analytics with an abundant amount of conditions of transitivity -w here one variable leads 
to the rest. At this juncture, the storyline begs the question: why did Foucault fail to speak of 
body-power-knowledge?
It is in an introductory passage of The Archaeology of Knowledge where Foucault (1972: 47- 
8) retells his elusive relation to the irreducible transposements -viz. loci standi and 
instrumenta movendi: "What [...] we wish to do is to dispense with 'things/ To 'depresentify' 
them [...]. To substitute for the enigmatic treasure of 'things' anterior to discourse, the 
regular formation of objects that emerge only in discourse [...] What we are concerned with 
here is [t]o define these objects without reference to the ground, the foundation o f things." 
Foucault's "reduction of 'reality to representation'" (Curry 2010b: 6) renders him to 
downrightly dismiss the relevance of preferring embodied forms to disembodied one. In the 
wake of such dismissal the distinction between loci standi vs. instrumenta movendi 
dramatically collapses. Foucault's (1972: 48) only interest in the irreducible transposements 
lies in "relating them to the body of rules that enable them to form as objects of a discourse 
and thus constitute the conditions of their historical appearance". In a nutshell, Foucault 
subjects the irreducible transposements to "the tyranny of the text" (ibid: 47). The salient 
trait of a semiotic system -o r  any system of signs, for that matter— is its impeccable internal 
logic. "Language has become a law unto itself, a law governing itself and its own world" 
(Latour 1993: 63). This perfection that takes on absolute overtones is at the expense of 
navigational and adjudicative faculties -th e  text can willingly go in any direction. Foucault 
strips us of our right to conduct regimes of engaged immanence. In this light, with Richard 
Rorty (1991 [1986]: 47) we can assert that Foucault's apparent anarchist method is made up 
of a set of "purely negative maxims" - i t  does not search progress or meaning in history, it 
does not place unilateral significance on the body, it refrains from anchoring historiography
150 Cf. Chapter 9, Section 3 above.
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in any extra-textual element, is but "self-indulgent radical chic" (ibid): will discursive 
practices and readily walk us out of the ecocidal mode of engagement?
By way of writing, Derrida creates a selective immanent plane. This is a great strategy to 
evade realism. "The medium of writing lends the text a stony autonomy in relation to all 
living contexts" (Habermas 1987f: 166). However, Derrida departs from an intellectualized 
position -in  contradistinction to a political one. The French philosopher's subject matter is 
the history of Western metaphysics, which stops Derrida from politicizing his narrative in 
relation to issues of his time. Derrida's critique is internal to academic discourse. 
Postmodern "theory is a project of scholarly transformation within the academy" (Mignolo 
2007: 449).
In this context, Derrida provides a self-styled defence of the irreducible transposements of 
culture. The French philosopher considers presence vs. absence as one of the privileged 
hyposements of the history of Western metaphysics. To contravene this and other binary 
structures, Derrida sets forth a network of undecidables (or transposements in cultural 
parlance).151 Jointly, these seek to destabilize the hierarchizing oppositions at issue and 
attain a condition that is neither fully embodied, embedded and contextualized (present) 
nor fully disembodied, disembedded and decontextualized (absent). I shall confine my 
exposition to only two such undecidables —viz. différance and supplement.
Like Nietzsche and Foucault, Derrida chooses to scrutinize reality as mediated via logos. "We 
know that [...] exchanges only take place by way of the language and the text, in the 
infrastructural sense that we now give to that word" (Derrida 1997: 164). Unlike in classical 
logocentrism where the link between signifier and signified is conceived to run direct, the 
Derridean discursive sign "bypasses the presence of the thing and the duration of being" 
(ibid: 151). That is, the signifier constantly alters, defers and displaces the presence of the 
signified it refers to. Différance (difference + deferral) is Derrida's neologism to express the 
two modifications that the signifier elicits qua mediator of the signified (Plotnitsky 1994: 37- 
4 4 ).152
The supplement, for its part, is that "[djangerous" undecidable that "adds only to replace"
151 Cf. Chapter 2, Section 3 above.
152 Cf. Chapter?,Section 3 above.
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(Derrida 1997: 149) in a way that, unlike a complement that is always an insider, it remains 
exterior to the positivity that is being annexed. It is in its position of extraneousness that the 
supplement is gifted with the extraordinary ability to change terrain, away from the present- 
absent metaphysical scenery. At bottom, Derrida exposes the undecidability -th e  arbitrary 
choice for presence; i.e., roughly, full embodiment, full embeddedness and full 
contextualization— that can be attributed to philosophy and science as epistêmê from a 
marked Georgescu-Roegenian angle. Like the pioneering ecological economist, Derrida 
seems to say that the gamut of meanings, interpretations and play -another way to refer to 
the cultural matrix— opens up when full presence -o r  low-entropy and, for that matter, low- 
middle- and high-cultural loci standi— is consumed. This is why we must regard the link 
signifier-signified as present and absent at one and the same time -namely, as dis­
embodied, dis-embedded and de-contextualized to a certain extent. Just as Georgescu- 
Roegen politicizes the entropie process153, so too Derrida culturalizes presence — he endows 
presence with historical or cultural significance. Derrida nonetheless eventually suppresses 
the possibility of bringing to bear the purview of meanings, interpretations and play upon 
loci standi. Like Foucault, Derrida denies the possibility of conducting regimes of engaged 
immanence: "What appears most fascinating in the critical search for a new status of 
discourse is the stated abandonment of all reference to a center, to a subject, to a privileged 
reference, to an origin, to an absolute archia" (Derrida 1978f: 286). In the final analysis, the 
absence of any privileged reference speaks of the fossilized status of Derrida's plane of 
immanence, a point to which we return below.154 So perhaps we have to assess Derrida's 
endeavour as the naturalization of the loss of presence -o r  embodiment, embeddedness 
and decontextualization— instead of its culturalization and politization, for that matter.
Above was already exposed the "infrastructural sense" or systemic character that Derrida 
(1997: 160, 164) attaches to writing: "if the texts that interest us mean something, it is the 
engagement and the appurtenance that encompass existence and writing in the same tissue, 
the same text" (ibid: 150). The French thinker goes on to disclose the extant incompatibility 
between language and loci standi. Or, to rephrase the statement, language, qua a spatiality 
of analysis where meaning unfolds is born out of the denial of loci standi: "we have read, in 
the text, that the absolute present, Nature, that which words like 'real mother' name, have
153 Cf. Chapter 6, Section 1 above.
154 Cf. Chapter 10, Section 1, Subsection 3 below.
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always already escaped, have never existed; that what opens meaning and language is 
writing as the disappearance of the natural presence" (ibid: 159).
In a somewhat imprecise movement, I shall render 'natural presence' equivalent with low- 
middle- and high-cultural loci standi. In light of this equation, Derrida seems indeed to assert 
that the birth of language -th e  spatiality of meaning— is the death of full embodiment, 
embeddedness and contextualization, which begs the question: "Must we solemnly 
announce the death of man and dissolve him in the play of language [...]? No, since we are 
no more in Discourse than we are in Nature" (Latour 1993: 137). Whilst the cultural matrix 
proposes to dissolve man in the play of culture -a  move which refigures both discourse and 
Nature into culture and low-cultural (and, for that matter, middle- and high-cultural) loci 
stand, respectively; Derrida uses 'Nature' in the anthropocentric sense proper to the 
Cartesian tradition. The French thinker associates loci stadi with positivism, where only 
univocal -as opposed to plural— meaning is allocated. Derrida, thus, reacts to the 
ascendancy of positivism by annihilating its spatiality of performance -viz. Nature. Quite 
distinctively, the cultural matrix disperses positivism by subjecting it to a qualitative turn -  
what matters is the highest degree of embodiment, embeddedness and contextualization 
possible.155
In recounting the ruptures from logocentrism endeavoured by Nietzsche, Freud and 
Heidegger, Derrida (1978f: 280) lays bare the fact that in dissolving "the transcendental 
signified [...] the domain and the play of signification [extends] indefinitely". All the elements 
for a full-blown immanent turn are in order. Yet Derrida unwittingly also discloses the 
reason why this incipient turn is eventually aborted: "we have no language -n o  syntax and 
no lexicon— which is foreign to th[e] history" (ibid) of philosophy and science as epistêmê. 
Such a statement bespeaks Derrida's (and other Nietzsche scholars) inability to dissociate 
the plane of immanence from logos -o r  text, discourse and language. It further proves the 
fact that Derrida proposes various undecidables without attending to the specific needs of 
his contemporaneity, including the ecocidal mode of engagement, leaving philosophy as a 
relatively autarchic domain. Derrida (1984 [1971]: 329) proclaims that "Reconstruction  
does not consist in passing from one concept to another, but in overturning and displacing a 
conceptual order, as well as the nonconceptual order with which the conceptual order is
155 Cf. Chapter 6, Section 3 above.
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articulated" However, the readily destruction of the space to allocate loci standi and the 
logocentric corruption of the plane of immanence terminate the intended displacement of 
the nonconceptual order in relation to the surpassing of the ecocidal mode of engagement.
II
The Aborted Attem pt To Register Loci Standi: Language And The Immanent Turn -  Despite 
the fact that "Nietzsche comes to serve a talismanic function as a proper name for the very 
possibility of thinking otherwise, a shorthand marker for the other of logocentrism" (Schrift 
1995: 10), his practice, it is my claim, remains logocentric thinking. In the final analysis, 
Nietzsche along with Foucault and Derrida compromise their great chances to think 
otherwise following their obedience to "the metaphysical snares of grammar and the 
oppositional structures inherent in language" (Schrift 1990: 192). In the following it will be 
exposed how the three thinkers partake in the immanent turn that largely characterizes the 
post-Kantian critique of reason.156 Yet their repeated insistence to render the immanent 
style co-extensive with logos condemns the former to a fossilized status.
Far from believing in the pretensions of language to convey a univocal truth and knowledge, 
Nietzsche renders the plane of immanence conterminous with text. In The Genealogy of 
Morals, where "Nietzsche reads the history of morality as a text" (Spivak 1997: xxiii; cf. also 
Schrift 1990:184), the German thinker endeavours to construe "the successive meanings of 
systems of morality" (ibid; emphasis added). Foucault (cf. 2001 [1967]) only assents to 
Nietzsche's exercise, and credits him with the opening of the other thinking of the twentieth 
century. Nietzsche, Foucault (1980 [1970]: 305) remarks, is "the first to connect the 
philosophical task with a radical reflection upon language." This is an allusion to the linguistic 
turn that overwhelmed intellectual and cultural history, the human and social sciences, and 
philosophy over the last century (cf. Baynes et al. 1987: 6 et passim; Latour 1993: sec. 3.5). 
Despite the variety of linguistic theories of meaning categorizing this turn, there is a 
common threat running through them all. Namely, the qualification of "the cultural world, 
the realm of meaningful experience" as a "vast rhetorical production" (Toews 1987: 881).
The equation of the immanent spatiality with language was most prominent in structuralism
156 Cf. Chapter 4, Section 2 above.
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and poststructuralism, two currents of thought with which Foucault (2000 [1980]) and 
Derrida (1978f) are associated to varying degrees. Foucault associates the plane of 
immanence with discourse. Evidence abounds in this respect in all of his works. A passage 
from Foucault's methodological work, The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972: 55), for 
instance, reads:
I shall look for a field of regularity for various positions of subjectivity. Thus conceived, discourse is 
not the majestically unfolding manifestation of a thinking, knowing, speaking subject, but, on the 
contrary, a totality, in which the dispersion of the subject and his discontinuity with himself may be 
determined. It is a space of exteriority in which a network of distinct sites is deployed.
Thus whilst in works such as Discipline and Punish Foucault "discusses all manner of artifacts 
and techniques, including methods of torture, orphanages, military drills, factory whistles, 
and prison architecture [...], his idea of what taking them into account requires subordinates 
them to discourse" (Allen 2004:142). It is only through discourse that reality manifests itself.
Barry Allen (ibid: 261) accuses Foucault's work of "flamboyant formalism" precisely given the 
French thinker's imperviousness to low-culture -  to the continuum dis-embodiment. On the 
other hand, it should be noted that Allen's own apprehension of low-culture is reduced to 
instrumenta-movendi forms, in particular to those which represent "superlative artifactual 
performance" (ibid: 63-77 et passim). By 'superlative artifactual performance/ Allen means 
knowledge that has made an indelible mark only and because it has enabled the production 
of artifacts. Foucault's strident formalism resides in his complacent extrication of high- from 
low-culture. "It is not the accomplishment of knowledge that [Foucault's] archaeology 
unearths from the archive; rather, it is claims to that accomplishment, traces of once- 
prestigious discourse, regardless of operational effectiveness, about which Foucault is 
serenely indifferent" (ibid: 261). Foucault's plane of immanence is disembodied, 
disembedded and decontextualized. It cannot tell instrumenta movendi and fossilizations 
from loci standi and manufacturers of culture.
Allen adopts an evolutionary if not teleological approach to knowledge. This follows from his 
notion of civilization based on the observation that human evolution is inextricable from the 
development of artifacts. Hence, his asseveration that that knowledge that passes as valid in 
each epoch is that which has advanced the development of "technical [...] performative
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effectiveness" (ibid). It goes without saying that the analytics of transposement strongly 
upbraids Allen's construe! of low-culture (and, for that matter, middle- and high-culture) on 
grounds of excessive reductionism. Allen's low-culture exclusively contemplates the 
construction of instrumenta movendi. In further setting in parallel -as three teleological 
processes— evolution, urbanization and the steady development of human artifacts, Allen 
neglects the contingent role that uneven allocations of power play in the proliferation of 
artifacts, the ascendancy of the nation-state, the triumph of the (epistemological) scientific 
method, the various enclosure movements -including both land and air, the militarization of 
the world, and contemporary globalization processes. All these processes, to which, it should 
be duly emphasized, Allen's narrative is blind, privilege instrumenta movendi over loci standi.
We now have gathered sufficient grounds to discard Allen's hypothesis. It is fallacious that a 
high-cultural statement only triumphs on the back of triumphant instrumenta movendi. 
From the vantage-position that we gain in stepping into the cultural matrix, the selection 
criterion for successful claims to knowledge -those that lead to regimes of engaged 
immanence— is rather sacrosanct respect for loci standi. Ethno-ecology takes this principle 
as the basis of its research, geared as it is at analyzing "the value of the belief-knowledge- 
practice complex of indigenous peoples in relation to the conservation o f biodiversity" 
(Toledo 1999; emphasis added). On the other hand, it is no less of a truism that the 
intervention of instrumenta movendi, such as capital, can make circulate as valid 
disembedded, disembodied and decontextualized claims to truth. The high-culture of a 
single manufacturer of culture or of a whole cultus is irrevocably determined by its leaning 
towards loci standi -as in the case of culti of Tellus— or towards instrumenta movendi -as in 
the cultus of Leviathan.
The detection of a pervasive ecocidal mode of engagement drives the philosopher to 
adumbrate a normative horizon. This urge to adjudicate evinces the fact that the 
acknowledgement of the correlative transposements -low - middle- and high-culture— is 
insufficient. To be effectively analytical one has to introduce the irreducible transposements 
—viz. the differantial instrumenta movendi and the securing loci standi. Even though it is the 
multidirectional transitivities established by transposements that deliberately riddle the 
epistemological tradition, the centrality of loci standi should not be underestimated -th ey  
steer this noxious tradition out of its ecocidal tendencies.
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For all their differences, the cultural matrix concurs with Allen's position when he asserts 
that for a high-cultural expression to pass as true it has to leave a low-cultural footprint. 
Little wonder that the disembodied outlook endemic in The Archaeology of Knowledge 
"must lead where Foucault's does: to the position that any prestigious discourse is as well 
and truly knowledge as any other" (Allen 2004: 261). The disembodiment of knowledge from 
low-cultural loci standi leads to a second unintended consequence: the impossibility of 
adjudicating in accordance to prescription. In Foucault's historical work -archaeologies and 
genealogies, "[wjhat is important for statements offered as knowledge is not their adequacy 
to being but their currency, their capacity to pass authoritatively for the truth" (ibid: 262- 
emphasis in the original). Insofar as claims to truth are regarded circulating through a plane, 
as Saussure had already noticed, is somewhat ethereal (read: disembodied) (Palmer, 1990: 
14-17; Allen 1993: ch. 6), they are exempt from borderlines when it comes to their cultural 
possibility. Foucault is unable to present the discursive practices circulating through the 
distinct epistemes as more or less in-adequate. In his set of 'purely negative maxims' the 
invalidation of a normative horizon is a fa it accompli.
Ill
The Semiotic Turn As An Instrumentum Movendi -  Post-Kantian practitioners working in the 
wake of Nietzsche, we repeat, have come to associate the plane of immanence with 
discourse. In their historico-philosophical work, "the metaphysics of presence is shaken with 
the help of the concept of sign" (Derrida 1978f: 281). This means that their historico- 
philosophical work remains trapped in logos -language, discourse, the sign. Or, to put it 
another way, when Nietzsche, Freud and Heidegger undertook an immanent turn and 
intended to distance themselves from the history of Western metaphysics, "[tjhis was the 
moment when language invaded the universal problematic, the moment when, in the 
absence of a centre or origin, everything became discourse" (ibid. 280). It is in this light that 
we must read Derrida's celebrated dictum via Rousseau: "There is nothing outside of the text 
[there is no outside-text]: il n'y a pas de hors-texte" (Derrida 1997: 158). While not being an 
admonition against the referential fallacy, this motto conspicuously attests to the fact that 
the immanent expanse, in Derrida, is textual. Hence also Derrida's (ibid: 44) asseveration 
that "[t]he very idea of institution [...] is unthinkable before the possibility of writing and 
outside its horizon". In an analogous fashion, Foucault (1980 [1970]: 386; cf. also
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Canguilhem 1999 [1994]: 72-3) believes that modernity will be overcome with the steady 
resurgence of discourse in philosophy. "If [...] language is now emerging with greater and 
greater insistence in a unity that we ought to think but cannot as yet do so, is this not the 
sign that the whole of this configuration is now to topple, and that man [modernity] is in the 
process of perishing as the being of language continues to shine ever brighter upon our 
horizon?" The semiotic turn may well operate as a counterpoint to philosophy as epistêmê. 
Its effects as incisive critique and displacement of the ecocidal mode of engagement must be 
nonetheless rigorously suspended. "To confuse the indivisible nature of reality with the 
conceptual pigeonholes of language is the basic ignorance from which Zen seeks to free us" 
(Robert Sohl and Audrey Carr in Games Zen Masters Play quoted in Tablot 1996 [1991]: 287- 
8).
Nietzsche's, Foucault's and Derrida's fidelity to logos turns into their own strategic betrayal. 
These are thinkers who, "as Hacking says, think that ideological purity requires us to speak of 
texts rather than facts" (Rorty 1986 [1991]: 42). While the cultural matrix concurs with these 
three author's attempts to bypass the factualism proper to realism, we still have to note that 
with the reification of text, the registration of qualitative change -w hether towards the pole 
of improvement or to that of deterioration— is irremediably impeded. Let us recall that in 
the cultural matrix, qualitative change is expressed by the dynamic transposements dis­
embodiment, dis-embeddedness andde-contextualization.
Structuralism and post-structuralism are closely linked to the linguistic turn. "Structuralism 
developed out of the merger of Saussurean-Jackobsonian linguistics and the social 
anthropology of Claude Lévi-Strauss" (Palmer 1990:14). In view of Saussure's indirect role in 
the fashioning of this turn (Allen 1993: 98), it will have some merit reviewing some of the 
Swiss linguist's theoretical positions. Of special relevance are the dangers that the use of 
language poses to science, to which Saussure alerted us in his posthumous Course in General 
Linguistics. Saussure emphasized that work linguistically coded is systematically prone to 
weave an ahistorical narrative:
scholars cannot organize their research rigorously without [...] making a distinction between the
system of values per se and the same values as they relate to time. This distinction has to be
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heeded by the linguist above all others for language is a system of pure values which are 
determined by nothing except the momentary arrangement of its terms (Saussure quoted in Palmer 
1990:15).
Rephrased in cultural terms, the Swiss linguist comes down to say that when the sign is 
desituated from its relations, and we shall add, transposements -a  situation which 
automatically occurs when the plane of immanence is equated with an autonomous text— 
its intrinsic value is uprooted: "A value [...] is somehow rooted in things and in their natural 
relations" (Saussure quoted in Palmer, 1990: 15). This is, to be sure, an allusion to low- 
middle- and high-cultural loci standi.
Time in the cultural matrix is refigured as a qualitative state. Manufacturers of culture speak 
of a rhythmic temporality, whilst fossilizations trace an irreducibly linear past. With the 
reification of text, the registration of qualitative change is obstructed. It follows that the 
text, discourse and a linguistic system of signs with which Nietzsche, Foucault and Derrida, 
respectively, equate the plane of immanence, is but a fossilization; that which has already 
taken place; that which has gained texture and thus interferes with the manufacturer's 
engagement of immanence. To be sure, insofar as the linguistic turn is conceived in 
unbroken continuity with the representational construal of knowledge --"the 
representational view is reconstrued in terms of linguistic representations", where 
"knowledge is to be seen as correct representation of an independent reality" (Taylor 1987: 
469, 4 6 6 )-, the equation of the plane of immanence with text systematically reduces these 
philosophies to an instrumentum movendi. Textualism is mediation, a tool of mobility and an 
instrument of agitation that distorts the immediacy of the immanent spatiality. "[T]he 
autonomization of discourse appear[s] as an artifice" (Latour 1993: 64). Or in the very words 
of Nietzsche (1967c: § 715), "[linguistic means of expression are useless for expressing 
'becoming'; it accords with our inevitable need to preserve ourselves to posit a crude world 
of stability." In the final analysis, discourse fails to enjoy the traits of a fully-fledged spatiality 
readily fit to host the entire scope of modulations of tragedy or those of the full scale of 
gray. Textualism, for that matter, fails to register as much loci standi as instrumenta 
movendi. By cutting off "connections to the referent and connections to the context," 
(Latour 1993: 64) the various forms of semiotics "prevent us from following the quasi­
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objects [low-cultural instrumenta movendi] to the end" (ibid). Or, to put it reversely, 
language is not subject to the irreducible transposements of culture, namely, either loci 
standi or instrumenta movendi:
[Value] depends at each moment upon a system of co-existing values. Its link with things gives it, 
perforce, a natural basis, and the judgements that we base on such values are therefore never 
completely arbitrary; their variability is limited. But [...] natural data have no place in linguistics. 
(Saussure quoted in Palmer 1990:15)
We obviously need to transpose the 'natural basis' into a cultural or immanent one, where 
dis-embodiment, dis-embeddedness and de-contextualization cross the plane, and loci sandi 
and instrumenta movendi subject and disrupt it, respectively. From this passage it follows 
that language per se is unable to provide value in such a dynamic context as the one 
facilitated by the cultural matrix. Rather, language sets value in a plane where relations with 
other values are suspended. This indeed corresponds to the description of instrumenta 
movendi, which in the cultural spatiality is a position that, as such, is deprived of transitivity; 
it only gains animation in a conspicuously parasitic position vis-à-vis loci standi.
Saussure's admonitions of the implications of the semiotic turn finds an echo in the 
contemporary work of Bruno Latour (1993: 62): "Whether they are called 'semiotics/ 
'semiology/ or 'linguistic turns/ the object of all these philosophies is to make discourse not 
a transparent intermediary that would put the human subject in contact with the natural 
world, but a mediator independent of nature and society alike." That is to say, Latour's 
Cartesian resonances apart, language as the ubiquitous plane of immanence is insufficient to 
provide values with immanent traits such as contextuality, quality and temporality. 
"Discursive allusions and permutations can carry on to infinity, but political action calls 
thinking people to test their analysis in material [culturally embodied] doing" (Salleh 2010: 
186). Language appears as an absolute position -a  fossilization— deprived of perspectives. 
And yet we know that "any perspective being by definition, situated, cannot exhaust other 
possible or actual perspectives" (Curry 2007: 284). In conclusion, a linguistic system may be 
charged with excessive arbitrariness.
IV
-276-
A Five-Stage Dialectic Of Logos Or The Ré inscription Of Logos In The Cultural Matrix- In
spite of Derrida's conclusive equation of the plane of immanence with a "textual system" 
(Derrida 1997: 160), the father of deconstruction makes a few puzzling allusions to 
extraneous elements to writing. In The Truth o f Painting, Derrida (1987: 19) uninhibitedly 
speaks of an extra-linguistic realm to which deconstruction hopes to reach o u t 
"[Djeconstruction interferes with solid structures, 'material' institutions, and not only with 
discourses or signifying representations". Although Derrida certainly states that "one would 
be wrong to assign [these structures and institutions] as [...] the external housing" (ibid) of 
deconstruction, the French philosopher still seems to imply that deconstruction outgrows 
the realm of discourse. In the previous quotation, 'solid structures' and 'material 
institutions' conform to actual entities, whilst discourse only to their 'signifying 
representations.' Here the point made in Chapter 4 must be repeated. Derrida is one of the 
authors who works in Marx's shadow. In fleeting Hegelian idealism, the father of 
deconstruction grips what appears as the only remaining alternative -viz. (historical) 
materialism. As a result, what in the cultural matrix would be characterized as its irreducible 
transposements -viz. loci standi and instrumenta movendi, Derrida qualifies as 'solid' and 
'material.'
In yet another passage, Derrida confirms again his partial overcoming of logocentrism. In 
deconstruing the semiological difference and re-construing it into writing's différance, the 
French thinker (1984a [1968]: 15; cf. also 1997: 27-100) also proposes "the transformation 
of general semiology into grammatology, this latter executing a critical labor on everything 
within semiology, including the central concept of the sign, that maintained metaphysical 
presuppositions incompatible with the motif of différance." For all its apparent successes, 
we must remember that grammato/ogy, as the rubric attests to the fact, still lends allegiance 
to logos. The sign remains the spatiality where the plane of immanence comes to reside.
Derrida's dual relation to logos is further manifestly captured in the closing of the essay 
"Différance". On the one hand, the French philosopher exposes how the meta-logos 
affiliation of this rubric is the source of its possibility: "différence has no name in our 
language [...] there is no name for it at all, not even the name of essence or of Being, not 
even that of 'différance/ which is not a name, which is not a pure nominal unity, and 
unceasingly dislocates itself in a chain of differing and deferring substitutions" (Derrida,
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1984a [1968]: 26). On the other hand, Derrida states that différance "speaks /  always and 
everywhere /  throughout /  language" (ibid: 27). In 'Structure, Sing and Play in Discourse of 
the Human Sciences/ Derrida (1978f: 281) sets out an even more straight forward reference 
to the condition of slavery to language to which the immanent spatiality is subject. In this 
essay, "the metaphysics of presence is shaken with the help of the concept of sign [W]e 
cannot do without the concept of the sign, for we cannot give up this metaphysical 
complicity [the opposition between the sensible and the intelligible] without also giving up 
the critique we are directing against this complicity." Language brought on a level with the 
plane of immanence, we may conclude, is Derrida's Achilles' heel in his otherwise assertive 
undertaking to break out of "the vigilance of the Hegelian logos" (Derrida 1978e: 252). As it 
was disclosed above, the reason for this shortcoming resides in Derrida's fairly endogamie 
contestation of the epistemological tradition —deconstruction hardly attends to the political 
necessities of its own contemporaneity.
Should we regard deconstruction as the surpassing of the history of philosophy and science 
as epistêmê, Allan Megill seems to have posited an insightful diagnose. In Prophets o f 
Extremity, Megill asserts that Derrida carries out the fourth and last stage of a dialectic 
initiated by Nietzsche and followed up by both Heidegger and Foucault. In the fourth phase, 
Nietzsche's perspective is 'deconstructed/ In asserting that deconstruction grapples with a 
world that lies beyond discourse -a  world of 'solid structures' and 'material' institutions/ 
Derrida is shattering the unidirectional association of meaning with logos. The French 
thinker is at heart hinting that "the world as a construction of language simply cannot come 
to terms with our experience of the world as determined not only by meanings but by 
natural and social needs" (Toews 1987: 895). Latour (1993: 63), for his part, disapprovingly 
qualifies "semiotic turns" as an act of "autonomization of the sphere of meaning [...] by 
bracketing off [...] the question of reference to the natural world and [...] the identity of 
speaking and thinking subjects." The cultural matrix, on the other hand, exacts that we are 
careful with the categories 'natural and social needs,' 'reference to the natural world' and 
'the identity of the speaking and thinking subject.' These are mere Cartesian, realist, 
categories. The cultural matrix is hardly concerned with these cognitive perspectives and the 
information they convey. It finds them extraneous. Yet the cultural matrix still has a vested 
interest in registering certain aspects of the categories at issue. Hence the need to apply the
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analytics of transposement to these categories. We should, in other words, reinscribe the 
categories reclaimed by Toews and Latour in the cultural matrix. In so doing, we realize that 
the former are allusions to the transposements that align themselves with the regimes of 
engaged immanence, namely, embodiment, embeddedness and contextualization, loci 
standi and manufacturer of culture. The plane of immanence as text fails to register them.
To pick up on Derrida's foremost radical Nietzschean position and bring the analysis to a new 
horizon, we may need to add a fifth movement to Megill's four-stage dialectic. This is the 
stage when logos is reinscribed in the cultural matrix and the analysis of the quality of the 
relations is again facilitated. This fifth dialectical stage may be characterized by way of three 
main traits. First, text, discourse and writing appear as incomplete repositories of the plane 
of immanence -they conform themselves to fossilizations. "Knowledge may be a social 
construction without being a discursive one" (Allen 2004:138). Or, even more incisively, the 
production of knowledge entails not so much a representational perspective as a cultural 
one. "It is not what is textual about a text that makes interpretation a trope for knowledge. 
It is the text's blatant artifactualiy, its obviously conventional, human, constructed quality" 
(ibid: 109). Namely, it is the culturally of the text -its  criss-cossing transposements and 
positions— that makes interpretation a trope for knowledge. Second, Derrida is, however 
ambiguously, pointing to the fact that there are variables other than meaning that intervene 
in a realm that exceeds language. The cultural matrix is one such broad realm. Unlike "a 
radical hermeneutics that assumes that nothing exists beyond meanings" (Towes 1987: 882), 
the cultural spatiality exhibits that meaning is only one dimension of culture -its  high.157 
Third, the overt acknowledgement of dis-embodiment takes philosophy and science as 
epistëmë into new directions. In the wake of the all-encompassing linguistic turn, intellectual 
historians have voiced their resistance against this pervasive trend. Part of their discontent 
reads: "structuralist theories of language seem to extend 'an offer of the entire world as a 
domain of meaning, but at the cost of our historical souls'" (Towes 1987: 882). The analytics 
of transposement endorses the first premise but replaces the second by instead positing 'at 
the cost of our situated, analytical and low- middle- and high-culture.' These are traits that 
only emerge when the plane of immanence, far from being considered as merely a 
fossilization, is assumed as a constellation of active regimes of constrained-engaged
157 Cf. Chapter 6, Section 3 above.
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immanence.
2. From The Ends Of Philosophy Into Kultur
I
From The Task Of Thinking To The Task Of Engaging Immanence -  We speak of philosophy 
and science as epistëmë to refer to the tradition largely inaugurated by Socrates. It is the 
Cartesian tradition that, along Socratian lines, sets the tone for science as epistëmë. As it 
was noted in Chapter 1, Martin Heidegger (2000f [1993]) regards such latter-day 
development as the self-consummation of philosophy. Philosophy as epistëmë dissolves with 
the explosion of the sciences in the Modern Age.158 As a result, "[t]he task of thinking" (ibid: 
449) turns into "the surrender of previous thinking to the determination of the matter of 
thinking" (ibid). The determination of the matter of thinking is the subject of this closing 
chapter.
Heidegger's essay The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking' and Foucault's closing of 
Les mots et les choses share a number of similarities. Both texts speak of the end of a mode 
of thinking and being, respectively, while mentioning the birth of a new stage. Both authors 
allude to the philosophy of the future, to use Nietzsche's expression. In so doing, both 
philosophers re-enact the ultimate questions that the nascent 'modes of being and thinking' 
alike are to address: "what shall we do and how shall we live?" (Weber 1948 [1964]: 143), 
queries which Kant rather formulates as: "What can be known [...], what must be done, and 
what may be hoped" (Foucault 1997: 308).
'What can be known' and 'what may be hoped' are largely the same question, whilst 'what 
must be done' largely differs from the two previous ones. 'What can be known' equates with 
Foucault's quest to find the place that comes to occupy that of the king, as a trope for 
knowledge, in a Post-Modern Age. In Les mots et les choses (Foucault 1980 [1970]; cf. also 
Gutting 1991 [1989]: ch. 5) we learn how, in the philosophy of the Renaissence, the place of
158Cf.Chapter 1 ,Section 2 above.
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the king -o f  knowledge— in the sixteenth century in the West is his -its — representation 
and relations of resemblance. In the classical age, around the middle of the seventeenth 
century, representation and relations of resemblance came to be occupied by relations of 
identity. Since the early nineteenth century, knowledge has fallen into an anthropological 
slumber where der Mensch comes to replace the detachedly represented king in the 
Renaissance. In the Modern Age (which largely equates with the formation of the cultus of 
Leviathan), Foucault exposes how the spatiality of the king -o f  cognition, that is - is filled by 
the constitution of Man as announced in Chapter I . 159 "Man functions in this context as a 
technical term, the name for a certain conceptual determination of the human being" 
(Schrift 1990: 79). Knowledge now revolves around a Man that creates an eschatology out of 
his own anthropocentric experience. In so doing, Man proves utterly unable to regard 
Himself as one amongst such central entities for the overcoming of the ecocidal mode of 
engagement as, inter alio, pebbles, rocks, woods, the seas, rivers, the rainbow and the skies. 
Man is in the philosophy of modernity both its subject and its empirical object, in a way that 
it enables an objectified definition of Him. "Hence that double and inevitable contestation: 
that which lies at the root of the perpetual controversy between the sciences of man and 
the sciences proper -th e  first laying an invincible claim to be the foundation of the second, 
which are ceaselessly obliged in turn to seek their own foundation, justification of their 
method, and the purification of their history, in the teeth of 'psychologism,' 'sociologism,' 
and 'historicism' "(Foucault 1970 [1980]: 35-6).
This mode of being -o r  rather, of engagement—160 that consolidated at the beginning of the 
nineteenth-century has been operating systematically through the mid-twentieth century 
(ibid: Part III; Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983: 26-43; Gutting 1991 [1989]: ch. 5), when its 
cogency started faltering, and postmodern voices steadily came to dominate the scene.
Furthermore, as Welburn (ibid) notes, "[t]he contemplating mind forgets that it has not 
always been contemplating, and that its organization was shaped and formed by the forces 
of the environment in which it struggled into existence," that is to say, by the intercourse 
amongst manufacturers of culture (cf. Stengers 2009). The mode of engagement conveys
159 Cf. Chapterl, Section 2, Subsection 1, Heading 1 /  The Analytic OfFinitude, Man andThe Environment above.
16G;Cf. Chapter 3, Section 2 above.
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with precision Nietzsche's conviction that what matters is the perspective -th e  politics. This 
vindicates again an observation repeatedly advanced in this dissertation, namely, philosophy 
and science as epistëmë is but a register within the cultural matrix. It emanates out of 
regimes of high degrees of constrained immanence. "This is perhaps what Nietzsche wanted 
to write and what resists the Heideggerian reading of Nietzsche; [a transposement] in its 
active movement -w h a t  is comprehended in a [transposement] without exhausting it— is 
what not only precedes metaphysics but also extends beyond the thought of being. The 
latter speaks nothing other than metaphysics" (Derrida 1997: 143). There are two main 
messages to be culled from this terse passage. One relates to the plane of immanence, while 
the other qualifies it in relation -o r, rather, want of relation— to being. The cultural matrix is 
not only irreducible to any ontological, epistemological and theological reappropriation. 
Rather, the cultural spatiality is "the very opening of the space in which ontotheology -  
philosophy [and science as epistêmê]- produces its system and its history, it includes 
ontotheology, inscribing it and exceeding it without return" (Derrida 1984 [1968a]: 6). The 
regimes of constrained-engaged immanence are a condition which "escape[...] the[...] 
concepts [orbiting around epistëmë] and certainly precede[...] them -probably as the 
condition of their possibility" (Derrida 1978: 283). The plane of immanence is anterior to 
scientific reason. The former recodes, re-inscribes the latter as an instance of constrained 
immanence, as fossilised knowledge and thus as a high cultural instrumentum movendi. 
Philosophy and science as epistëmë is the fossilization and institutionalization of a regime 
tending to constrained immanence. A regime, that is, that denies — 'constrains'— our ability 
to swim at will, as an instance of labouring and conducting healing and recreational activities 
in our autochthonous site. This is in opposition to a regime of engaged immanence that 
incites us to learn properly how to swim. A regime, that is, that encourages us to engage in a 
swimming of our own, which may in turn lead to a healing process and to the development 
of a feeling of belongingness to the interconnected cultural web.
In this context, Derrida (1997:19) suggests that one can only avoid "the question of essence 
[...] by challenging the very form of the question and beginning to think that the sign is that 
ill-named thing, the only one, that escapes the instituting question of philosophy: 'what 
is...?"'. The passage lends to an extended syllogism, should we rephrase it in cultural terms. 
The 'sign' in Derrida corresponds to the plane of immanence. This plane, the French author
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further informs, is the only one capable of overcoming the epistemological tradition. The 
analytics of transposement, by contrast, proves that the immanent spatiality is in itself still 
too static. The latter must be equated with regimes of engaged immanence to endow it with 
the potential to bravely surpass the ecocidal mode of engagement. Corollary, only the 
regimes of engaged immanence can exceed the demarcations of philosophy and science as 
epistëmë. This truism indeed further implies, we repeat, that the ontological and 
epistemological dimensions proper to the latter traditions turn into a specific degree in the 
regimes of engaged-constrained immanence proper to the cultural plane. The mode of 
engagement, to be sure, absorbs both.
II
Obermensch as Kultur- The closing sentence of Foucault's 1960 thèse complémentaire, 
"Introduction à l'Anthropologie de Kant", reads: "the trajectory of the question 'Was ist der 
MenschT in the field of philosophy culminates in the challenging response: 'der 
Übermensch’ For Foucault, the death of God presupposes the death of Man. The 
disappearance of both, therefore, "marks the threshold beyond which contemporary 
philosophy can begin thinking again [...] It is nothing more, and nothing less, than the 
unfolding of a space in which it is once more possible to think" (Foucault 1970 [1980]: 342).
Deleuze (1988:130) sets out the quandary of the Übermensch in this rhetorical sentence: "if 
the forces within man compose a form only by entering into relation with forms from the 
outside, with what new forms do they now risk entering into a relation, and what new form 
will emerge that is neither God or Man?" In the first place it must be noted that Deleuze's 
passage is a conspicuous allusion to the mode of engagement as the constitutive basis of any 
form. The God-form speaks for the Classical Historical Formation grounded in a world of 
infinite representation. The Man-form is the historical formation proper to the nineteenth- 
century, predicated upon the notions of scarcity and finitude. It is apparent that the 
Superman speaks for the form proper to a postmodern condition, which in the time when 
Foucault wrote The Archaeology of the Human Sciences was conceived less as a solidified 
state than as one in the making. Hence Deleuze's heading for this period being "Towards a 
Formation of the Future" (ibid: 129). These transient times had the remit to resolve "the 
problem which Nietzsche called 'the Superman'" (ibid). The superman is therefore not so
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much a well-defined form, as a signifier in anguish searching for a signified or spatiality 
where to gain meaning.
As noted above, Nietzsche, Foucault and Derrida posit the thesis that text, discourse and the 
sign, respectively, come to occupy the spatiality of the Übermensch.161 "To discover the vast 
play of language contained once more within a single space might be just as decisive a leap 
towards a wholly new form of thought as to draw to a close a mode of knowing constituted 
during the previous century" (Foucault 1980 [1970]: 307). Yet in the previous section it was 
argued that the semiotic turn in philosophy largely attains an immanent turn. However, in 
view of the staticism intrinsic to immanence, language lacks discriminating power and 
therefore fails as an apt candidate to redress the ecocidal mode of engagement.
In the cultural matrix, the Übermensch takes on a completely distinctive note. Nietzsche, as 
it has been repeatedly noted, is the one who opens the post-modern debate on the ends of 
philosophy (cf. Habermas 1980d). At the end of Zarathustra, the German philosopher 
opposes the Übermensch (the superman) to the hôhere Mensch (the superior man). It is the 
Übermensch the one with the courageous resolution to "awaken[...] and leave[...] without 
turning back to what he leaves behind him" (Derrida 1968: 152), namely, to the secure 
anthropomorphism of the Modern Age and, from a cultural perspective, we shall add, to the 
hesitant and shapeless postmodern. The Übermensch decidedly deserts both the modern 
and postmodern regions. By "burning his text" (ibid.), the Übermensch brings the equation 
of the plane of immanence with logos to an abrupt end. In having exited from logos, this 
nascent entity grows, aware of the inconvenient fossilizations that the modern and post­
modern ages he now has come to abhor has generated. As a result, the Übermensch 
awakens to the concern of "eras[ing] the traces of his steps" (ibid). This entity wishes to live 
as an androgynous manufacturer of culture -n o  longer as a fossilization. The Übermensch 
"will dance outside the [epistemological] house" (ibid). It will engage immanence and will 
willingly forget -"d ie aktive Vergesslichkeit" (ibid)— about the multiple forms that epistëmë 
has taken. The Übermensch, therefore, not only contests epistëmë but also the plane of 
immanence. The latter is simplistic and lacks adjudicative powers. Once the Übermensch is 
reinscribed in the cultural matrix, it follows as a logical conclusion that this discerning
161 Cf. Chapter 10, Sectionl above.
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creature will feel much more comfortable in an ongoing regime of engaged immanence than 
in fossilized form. It is in this respect that we can claim that the Aufklarung-onentedi Man- 
form of the nineteenth century dissolves into an embodied, embedded, situated cultural 
condition which we shall call Kultur. Culture, to be sure, speaks of a plane of immanence 
where all registers are possible. Kultur, the German equivalent rubric in contestation to the 
historical German rubric Aufklarung, is a discriminating culture that posits as prescriptive 
regimes of engaged immanence.
Indeed a key difference between immanence or culture and engaged immanence or Kultur is 
that the latter allows for the overcoming of anthropocentrism thereby making room for the 
activity of the manufacturer of culture. "This is the meaning of the fable in the Old 
Testament of Salomon's Choice and of the saying in the New Testament about losing one's 
life and finding it" (Toynbee 1976 [1971]: 328). Namely, in order for a manufacturer to gain 
its own identity it has to let go of agency by dissolving itself in the engagement of 
immanence. Robert Browning (quoted in Toynbee 1976 [1971]: 328) puts it pithily in a 
couple of terse verses:
"'Ah, but a man's reach should exceed his grasp,
Or what's a heaven for?1"
Agency or a manufacturer of culture only realizes itself, finds heaven, in its subjecting- 
subjected activity, namely when this is unmediated and leads to regimes of engaged 
immanence. Kultur may thus be regarded as "an enterprise by which one tries to throw off 
the last anthropological constraints; an enterprise that wishes, in return, to reveal how 
these constraints could come about" (Foucault 1972:15).
The equation of the ends of philosophy with Kultur can be easily justified by way of Rorty's 
own reflection on such ends. In the final pages of a book-long critical exposition of the failed 
pretensions of the epistemological tradition, Rorty (1980: 394) suggests that "twentieth- 
century philosophy comes to seem a stage of awkward transitional backing and filling (as 
sixteenth-century philosophy now seems to us)". Rorty only holds two certainties in this 
resurrection process of philosophy. The American pragmatist first assumes that when 
knowledge is dissociated from the search of essences, "then we are well on the way to
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seeing conversation as the ultimate context within which knowledge is to be understood" 
(ibid: 389; cf. also Allen 1993: 177-182). Rorty goes on to assert that "[t]he conversational 
interest in philosophy [...] has varied and will continue to vary in unpredictable ways 
depending upon contingencies" (ibid: 392) Now, Rorty's first edition of Philosophy and the 
Mirror of Nature dates back to 1979. Mainstream awareness of the ecocidal mode of 
engagement was far from the case in that date. It follows that by then this mode of 
engagement could hardly be conceived as a contingency. The underlying assumption of the 
present work is that a salient trait of this early twenty-first century is its ecocidal character. 
This feature deviates somewhat from the conversional tone "on the other side of the 
transition" (ibid) of the ends of philosophy. We need to be aware of the direction into which 
the conversation goes. We must ensure that this conversation takes issue with the 
prescriptive horizon advanced by Kultur: high-cultural contextualization, middle-cultural 
embeddedness, and low-cultural embodiment. Only observance of this normative threshold 
will expedite the practice of 'love to wisdom' or that knowledge which is able to lead the 
global polity to peace and equity in the first place.
Just as in the Modern Age the legitimate use of reason leads to Aufklarung (Foucault 1997: 
308), in this period we are attempting to define that which is neither modern nor 
postmodern. The prescriptive configuration of the cultural matrix leads to Kultur. Kultur is 
for sure an entity which in terms of diversity and size stands over and above Man. Yet most 
importantly, the Übermensch qua Kultur is that form which indeed decentres the place of 
Man. Kultur is no longer a static form but a condition attained by way of qualitative -and  
ultimately also quantitative— relations.
In Les mots et les choses, Foucault fails to adopt a normative approach to knowledge. 
Foucault rather understands knowledge as a historical phenomenon, connected with the 
"'experience of order' -th a t is, the fundamental way in which [an epoch] sees things 
connected to one another" (Gutting 1991[1989]: 139). As it has been exhibited in the 
previous section, knowledge in the French philosopher's work is a represented phenomenon 
chiefly by linguistic means.162 Foucault's conception of knowledge is well immanent, but it 
fails to capture the perspective of apt knowledge, which, in the cultural matrix, takes place
162 Cf. Chapter 10, Section 1 above.
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in the regimes of engaged immanence or Kultur. Foucault's archaeology of the human 
sciences -/.es mots et les choses— is grounded in four fundamental prepositions (ibid). If we 
contrast Foucault's prepositions with those set forth by the cultural matrix we shall capture 
the transition from the place of the king as immanence, as proposed by Foucault, to the 
place of the king as engaged immanence or Kultur.
The first proposition is historicism. "What knowledge means has varied from one historical 
period to another" (ibid). Foucault detects four main periods in recent Western culture 
which were named in passing above: the Renaissance, a period that roughly comprises the 
sixteenth century; the Classical Age, running from the middle of the seventeenth century 
through to the end of the eighteenth century; the Modern Age spanning from the beginning 
of the nineteenth century through to the middle of the twentieth; and a Post-Modern Age 
that was only starting to become aware of itself when Foucault first published Les mots et 
les choses in 1966. As it was exhibited in Chapter 3, the cultural matrix enjoys a planetary -  
Tellusian— scope and sees the cognitive processes of nomization (or high-cultural 
processes) inextricable from the entire immanent -cultural, that is— spatiality. We shall 
therefore endorse the first preposition of Foucault's scientific reason with a minor remark. 
Knowledge is both time- and p/oce-related - i t  varies from cultus to cultus.
In the second place, Gutting informs us that, in Les mots et les choses, Foucault assumes that 
things are seen as relational. "A given epoch's conception of knowledge is ultimately 
grounded in its 'experience of order' —that is, the fundamental way in which it sees things 
connected to one another" (ibid: 139). Les mots et les choses is presented as "an inquiry 
whose aim is to rediscover [...] within what space of order knowledge was constituted [...] 
ideas could appear, sciences be established, experience be reflected in philosophies, 
rationalities be formed, only, perhaps, to dissolve and vanish soon afterwards" (Foucault 
1980 [1970]: xxi, xxii). Thus, whilst in the Renaissance resemblance interrelates things, in the 
Modern Age it is an anthropocentric gaze that puts elements in contact. In the cultural 
matrix, it is the manufacturers of culture's engagement of immanence that creates culture 
and thus also high-culture or meaning. A number of transposements partake in this 
engagement-loci standi, instrumenta movendi, low- middle- and high-culture, embodiment, 
embeddedness, contextualization, the subjecting-subjected activity of the manufacturer of
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culture.163 The cultural matrix thus supersedes Foucault's static order of things by the 
dynamic degree of constrained-engaged immanence that a manufacturer of culture or a 
group thereof at large attain in the processes of nomization -th e  engaged end marking the 
attainment of apt knowledge.
The third and fourth presuppositions underwriting Foucault's archaeology of the human 
sciences reveal the French thinker's association of the plane of immanence with discourse. 
Knowledge, in Les mots et les choses, "will depend on the period's construe! of the nature of 
the signs used to formulate truths [and in particular] on an epoch's conception of language" 
(Gutting 1991 [1989]: 140). In the foregoing section, it was exhibited how Nietzsche's, 
Foucault's and Derrida's practice to tacitly equate the immanent space with text, discourse 
and sign, respectively, lends to the charge of nominalism -these authors leave us with a 
disembodied, and for that matter, disembedded and decontextualized plane of immanence. 
In congruence, the analytics of transposement at work within the cultural matrix converts 
these two last assumptions into the following propositions. Knowledge will depend on the 
period's construe! of the plane of immanence: is the latter seen as chiefly high-cultural, 
middle-cultural and/or low-cultural?
In short, for Foucault, knowledge depends on each epoch's "conceptions of order, signs and 
language" (ibid: 140). This set of outlooks and the bearing they exert upon cognitive 
processes is what Foucault comes to call 'episteme/ "[A]rchaeology, address[es] itself to the 
general space of knowledge, to its configurations, and to the mode of being of the things 
that appear in it" (Foucault 1980 [1970]: xxiii). From the perspective of the cultural matrix, 
by contrast, we shall say that (1) knowledge (high-culture) is av/ti/s-sensitive, (2) it depends 
both upon a number of transposements, (3) central among which the regimes of engaged- 
constrained immanence, (4) and into what each cultus turns the plane of immanence. These 
will be our four guiding propositions to reassess the task of thinking in our contemporaneity. 
It is true that in the cultural matrix, it is the transposement ’high-culture* the one in charge 
of registering meaning-creation. However, what creates meaning is the act of high- middle- 
and low-culturally engaging immanence. It follows that the actual, lively process of engaging 
immanence, along with the transposements associated with this process, is what overcomes
163 Transposements could be infinite but the cultural matrix is a political device through and through and thus limits itself to the 
registration of those transposements relevant for the overcoming of the ecocidal mode of engagement.
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logocentrism, philosophy and science as epistëmë.
In line with our propositions in Chapter 2, in this section we have seen how we have passed 
from conditions of possibility of knowledge -as set forth by Foucault, to conditions of 
transitivity of culture. Namely, the conception of the order of things as definitory of 
Foucualt's cognitive field is supplanted by a series of transposements and, for that matter, 
transitivities, of culture. Kultur, and the interconnected, cultural sense that engagement of 
immanence entails is the plausible new place of the absent and represented king in the 
Renaissance subsequently occupied by Man in the Modern Age.
3. Science As Epistëmë Vs. Science As Kultur
I
An Alternative Etymological Meaning Of Scientia - Hitherto the notions of philosophy and 
science have been treated, critically, from the historical perspective. Philosophy as epistëmë, 
it was argued by heavily building upon Heidegger (2000 [1993]) and other authors (Rorty 
1980; Curry 2004), hatches out into science as epistëmë with the figure of Descartes. "[T]he 
will to technical control of objectified processes [i]s the underlying impulse governing the 
train of thought from Descartes" (Habermas 1987c: 102). It is incumbent upon Kultur to 
break out of this historical heritage, to endeavour not to fall captive to these pools of 
regressive historical connotations. Paying heed to etymology may prove a successful 
strategy to circumvent the latter.
Starting off with a clean slate may indeed stop us from falling pray to the tradition we are 
decrying. The latter is in my view Rorty's pragmatist pitfall. In his consummate defence of 
pragmatism, Rorty incurs that pattern of thought which is so characteristic of the normal, 
epistemological, rationalist philosophers whom he fervently indicts. Rorty (1980: 366) 
endeavours to "generalize [the] contrast between" positivists and relativists (or 
pragmatists). As a result, the American pragmatist grows captive to a clear-cut dichotomy, 
which largely explains his inability to exceed dualistic demarcations in his philosophical 
project. Rorty (ibid: 366-368) argues that positivists are "essentially constructivist, [...]
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cooperative and progressive", whilst relativists (and pragmatists) are "essentially reactive" 
(ibid: 366). The American philosopher overlooks the possibility of being reactive while 
constructively building on the reaction instead of turning the reaction into an end in itself. 
Instead, Rorty bows his philosophical credentials to the signifieds that the philosophy and 
science as epistêmê he openly despises has traditionally attributed to signifiers. In sheer 
opposition, the analytics of transposement tentatively attempts to transpose the 
epistemological tradition by keeping signifiers and releasing them from their signifieds. In so 
proceeding, rubrics are rebuilt on the basis of their etymological provenance. This procedure 
has been successfully followed in a number of occasions. We next shall explore whether it 
can be further applied for the banner 'science'.
The Latin verbal form scio, scire, scivi, scitus’ from which the noun scientia derives has two 
broad main meanings. One is to 'know/ 'to understand' —or 'knowledge,' 'science' in their 
noun forms. The other is 'to have the skill to,' 'to be able to' —or 'skill,' 'ability' in their noun 
forms. Philosophy and science as epistëmë only capture the first meaning of scientia 
following the restrictions imposed by epistëmë -th a t truth derived from abstract universals. 
Max Weber (1948 [1964]: 139) provides a highly suitable characterization of philosophy and 
science after this fashion. According to Weber, the latter generates a "knowledge or belief 
that if one but wished one could learn it at any time. Hence it means that [...] one can, in 
principle, master all things by calculation." We are thus faced with an utterly desituating 
knowledge, one which emanates out of regimes of constrained immanence and which thus 
heavily relies upon instrumenta movendi. "[T]he intellectual constructions of science 
constitute an unreal realm of artificial abstractions, which with their bony hands seek to 
grasp the biood-and-the-sap of true life without ever catching up with it" (ibid: 141).
Science in the cultural matrix, by contrast, rather emphasizes the second meaning of 
scientia, namely, 'to be able to,' 'to have the skill to.' Let us note how this second meaning 
entails a major cultural shift. Scientia is no longer the 'intellectual construction' that Weber 
appositely deplores. Rather, it turns into a wholesale cultural affair. It entails to be in the 
position of low-cultural embodiment, middle-cultural embeddedness and high-cultural 
contextualization in order to perform a skill. "Knowledge rests not on mere appearance, 
formal visual properties, but is derived from touch, or the even-more-diffuse kinaesthetic
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modality that responds to pulse" (Salleh 1997:140).
The cultural matrix posits that the production of knowledge always emanates out of a 
certain degree of dis-embodiment, dis-embeddedness and de-contextualization. Philosophy 
and science as epistêmê emerge in regimes of constrained immanence and, for that matter, 
out of high degrees of disembodiment, disembeddedness and decontextualization. "Part of 
the price for the latter position is the sacrifice of original wonder" (Curry 2004e: 88). Original 
wonder is another name for the act of immediately engaging immanence. It is in such a 
process that science as Kultur is created. "Inspiration plays no less a role in science than it 
does in the realm of art" (Weber 1948 [1964]: 136). Via Goethe (Steiner 2000; Barnes 2000; 
Welburn 2004) and the Romantic spirit at large, science as Kultur reclaims regimes of 
engaged immanence for the constitution of knowledge. It is in this specific low- middle- and 
high-cultural arrangement, which is embodied, embedded and contextualized at a time, that 
a manufacturer of culture (the scientist) creates apt knowledge. "Goethe's relationship with 
nature was anything but technocratic. The deeper his insights into the workings of nature 
[low-cultural loci standi] became, the deeper grew his awe for her wisdom. This is evidenced 
by the wonder he felt while observing the simplest natural phenomena" (Barnes 2000: 276). 
Science as Kultur, to be sure, breaks out of the tacit assumption that science, which "for 
most of human history, ha[s] simply meant the knowledge resulting from disciplined 
inquiry," (Curry, 2004e: 88) must follow in the footsteps of epistêmê.
As noted in the previous section, Weber (1964 [1948]: 143), who in this respect follows 
Tolstoi, implies that the production of knowledge must answer the following ultimate 
questions: "What shall we do and how shall we live?"164 This dissertation endorses Weber's 
premise that high-culture must be relevant to the entirety of culture; it must address the 
questions regarding the good life. On this reading, science as Kultur overlaps with some 
aspects of divination, at least on the Curryian gloss of the latter. To be sure, to live up to 
Tolstoi's challenge, the situated production of knowledge should proceed as divination, 
"assume the mantle of the Fates" (Curry 2004a) and grow aware of the present and future 
that its assumptions co-create. Hence the role of Kultur as validator of knowledge, which
164 Cf. Chapter 10, Section 2, Subsection 1 above.
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contrasts dramatically with the role of epistêmê as cognitive validator. In the latter context, 
"knowledge that fails to fit the format of a logical proposition falls from view" (Allen 2004: 
14). Kultur, by contrast, treats cultural findings as that which "is not fixed at birth, but as 
ongoing, constantly being recreated and negotiated, and never complete" (Curry 2004a). 
This is a science that "opens doors and retains freedom," (ibid) where freedom is direct -as  
opposed to constrained— engagement of immanence, and where novelty and 
unrepeatability characterizes these engagements. "When the memory of a past act 
intercepts my contentment or my experience, it contaminates my contentment and it 
transforms my experience" (Panikkar 2009: 109; own translation from the Catalan 
translation; cf. also Prigogine and Stengers 1984). The need for certainty, secure knowledge, 
to be sure, constrains immanence: "Metaphysics is still needed by some, but so is the 
impetuous demand fo r certainty that today discharges itself in scientific-positivistic form 
among great masses -th e  demand that one wants by all means something to be firm [...] the 
demand for foothold, support [...] does not create sundry religions, forms of metaphysics, 
and convictions but does [...] preserve them" (Nietzsche 2005 [2001]: § 347).
Regimes of engaged immanence are genetic, constantly becoming. The required knowledge 
is found not in the static objectification of a process but in the ongoing and direct 
engagement of the vast plane of immanence. Nietzsche defines these regimes as "power of 
self-determination, a freedom  of the will, in which the spirit takes leave of all faith and every 
wish for certainty, practised as it is in maintaining itself on light ropes and possibilities and 
dancing even beside abysses" (Nietzsche (2005 [2001]): § 347). Science as Kultur is thus not 
an intellectualization of events, a mere cognitive process. Rather, it is a wholesale low- 
middle- and high-cultural idiosyncratic disposition. We should thus speak of the exercise of 
Kultur instead of the production of knowledge, as a multifaceted act -n o t as a 
unidimensional fact. In the regimes of engaged immanence "one affirms the necessity of 
chance" (Deleuze 2001 [1965]: 86), of the open engagement, of the transposement by which 
the manufacturer of culture is perennially exposed to all range of possibilities instead of 
remaining locked in the "return of the same" (ibid: 87) -including the univocity of truth. 
Kultur sidesteps any form of fossilization -th e  ossified concepts of the Divine, the True, the 
Good, the Beautiful. The manufacturer is a "player" (ibid) who is but interested in "the throw  
of the dice" (ibid), the engagement characterized as it is by its singularity. The practice of
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Kultur, far from leading to static predictions, assists us in our process of observation, in 
regimes of engaged immanence -in  a state of original wonder, the dynamic operability of 
loci standi and those of the manufacturers of culture so that the latter may be described (cf. 
Steiner 2000). It is this engagement that expands "both knowledge and the unknown" and 
invites the manufacturer to enter "the threshold of the unknowable, which may be the only 
sense [...] of progress of knowledge in general" (Plotnitsky 1996: viii).
Analogously, the exercise of Kultur "involves[...]not prediction but advice" (Curry 2004). 
Science as epistêmê, in emanating out of regimes of constrained immanence where 
fossilizations and instrumenta movendi rule, require no less artificiality in the outcome of its 
endeavour. Epistemological science, to be sure, requires the "b e lie f (ibid; cf. also Weber 
1964 [1948]: 139) in prediction; the possibility of operating on prediction, indeed, as a 
methodological article of faith. It is but this unquestioned credulity, this consecrated 
gullibility which underwrites the universalism of epistemic cognition. "Technical means and 
calculations" (Weber 1964 [1948]: 139) come to replace ongoing unmediated engagements 
of immanence. Yet as opposed to the tendencies in the latter, epistemic cognition fails to 
increase "the knowledge of the conditions of life under which we exist" (ibid) as they fail to 
be grounded in ioci standi; science as Kultur certainly is.
Just as Kultur is tied up with divination, so it is with metis. Metis is that mode of knowing, 
that Socrates, Plato and Aristotle overlooked to the advantage of both epistêmê and 
phronesis.165 While epistêmê corresponds to propositional knowledge, phronesis is the 
practical intelligence that follows from the application of a trade or skill. It was Aristotle who 
considered that p/irones/s-like knowledge should complement epistemic one (Curry 2004f: 
104-06). Metic truth, far from being "unitary, universal and abstract," is "multiple, 
perspective!, and particular" (ibid: 105). Just as it occurs in the regimes of engaged 
immanence, metic knowing is the result of an active engagement between knower and 
known -which does not correspond to the Cartesian subject/object. Rather, in metis just as 
in Kultur, truth relinquishes both the universalism and unencumbered detachment proper to 
epistêmê and the utilitarianism inbuilt in phronesis, while it also deflects the absolute
165 Cf. Chapter 8, Section 1, Subsection )V above.
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relativism of hermeneutical critique (cf. Schrift 1990). Metic regimes of engaged immanence 
deliver a situated truth which only holds for the parties partaking in its encounter. Likewise 
the characterization of truth reclaimed by Max Weber: "only that which wants to be valid for 
all those who wont the truth" (quoted in Curry 2004f: 105; emphasis in the original).
Kultur offers a vantage position for not the rethinking but the reshaping of truth -th e  
mental, high-cultural process shall not suffice— towards singular fictions in ongoing statu 
nascendi. This painstakingly process distances us -in  that the new departure integrally 
neglects them — from at least all the seminal terms in the epistemological tradition that we 
have busied ourselves in transposing in the course of this dissertation -sustainable 
development/productivity, subject/object, realism/constructivism, subject/object, 
humanity/environment, culture/nature, idealism/materialism, modern/postmodern, 
whole/part, the principle of causality, living organisms/inert matter, theism/atheism, 
anthropocentrism/ecocentrism, activity/passivity, hyposemental logic. Rather, regimes of 
constrained-engaged immanence place the import of the emerging fictional truth upon an 
act which does not position ourselves upon the footing of higher consciousness -pace  
Hegel— but that varies in its quality, and which is therefore contextually dependant upon 
the elements that facilitate -o r  constrain- it. The more direct the engagement of immanence 
the more "participatory [...], reflexively performative (rather than descriptive or 
propositional), pragmatic [...], pluralist [...] and perspectival" (Curry 2010b: 7), intelligent and 
more connected to the "'metanatural'" (ibid: 8) or cultural in our own parlance. This 
enumeration, which Kultur, in being proactively embodied delivers them all, conforms to 
Curry's exigencies for a post-rational, post-Cartesian and post-secular negotiation of truth, 
which is automatically transformed into an unrepeatable fiction as discussed in Chapter 8 
above.166
"[WJhereas Heidegger reads the history of philosophy from the point of view of the 
Seinsfrage, the question of Being, Nietzsche confronts the same tradition with the 
Wertsfrage, the question of value (Schrift 1990: 61). In our rereading of philosophy and 
science in the light of Kultur we can assert that today both phllosophla and scientia must 
face no longer the Seinsfrage, as in the metaphysical Heidegger, or the Wertsfrage, as in the
166.Cf. Chapter 8, Section 4, Subsection V above.
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axical Nietzsche, (cf. 1989a [1967]: I, 17 note) but the Kultursfrage or the question of the 
regimes of constrained-engaged immanence. In philosophia as Kultur one conducts direct 
engagements of immanence to come up with those categories of knowledge that are to 
assist us in dealing with the problematics that pervade our contemporaneity. In scientia as 
Kultur one analyzes the regimes of constrained-engaged that take place in a manufacturer or 
(part of) a cultus to determine the correlation of cultural queries: Through which collective -  
both public and private— arrangements and institutions, which manufacturers of culture, 
which high-cultural loci standi and instrumenta movendi are put to use to attain which low- 
cultural interface loci-standi-instrumenta movendi, or rate of dis-embodiment?
II
Re And Its Loci Standi, The Laboratory As A Collection Of Instrumenta Movendi - The
différance-â\mens\on inherent in instrumenta movendi unravels facets of the scientific 
epistemological method that might otherwise remain unduly obscure. Latour (1993: 28), 
who -perhaps unwittingly— endorses some of the positions of science as epistëmë, 
presents the experiments that take place in the laboratory as "facts [that] indeed represent 
nature as it is," however "artificial, costly and hard to reproduce." By contrast, the cultural 
matrix promulgates that the laboratory, far from reproducing low— and, for that matter, 
middle- and high-cultural— loci standi, is a fossilization that alters and defers loci standi. As 
a result, experiments and findings within this confinement are differed and deferred loci 
standi, namely, they are instrumenta movendi.
This is a key distinction - i t  lends to further elaboration. There is in this respect an instructive 
story surrounding Newtonian vs. Goethean scientific approaches to the nature of colour. 
This story will further illustrate perhaps the most foundational negligence committed at the 
beginning of the epistemological tradition. In the myth of the cavern in the seventh book of 
Plato's Republic, "the sun [...] turns into the truth of science, which alone seizes not upon 
illusions and shadows but upon the true being" (Weber 1964 [1948]: 140). For some odd 
reason, the footnotes that make up philosophy and science as epistëmë - in  the 
characterization of the Platonic tradition by Alfred North Whitehead— have one-sidedly 
interpreted 'the truth of science7 as the 'true being,7 while overlooking the source of this 
purported being, namely, the Sun. The epistemological tradition, that is to say, disregards
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the star that illuminates the Via Lactea as a manufacturer of culture. The cultural matrix, by 
contrast, retrieves it as a pivotal strategy to undo 'illusions and shadows'. The cultural Sun is 
far removed from the materialist lens that identifies this element with an inert chemical 
entity made up of helium and hydrogen. Whilst this might be part of its low-cultural 
composition, the cultural Sun is fully animated, mythic. Qua a manufacturer of culture it 
additionally enjoys middle- and high-cultural attributes of its own akin to the ones attributed 
to it by the ancient Egyptian, Greece and Rome civilisations. We could call this cultural Sun 
'Ra' or 'Re' -th e  spelling is indistinctive— after the one revered by the Egyptian civilisation. 
To further categorize Re as a manufacturer of culture, we shall take Rudolf Steiner's account 
of Newton's and Goethe's theory of colour.
Steiner was an Austrian multivalent intellectual of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries who founded a wholesale school called Anthroposophy. Yet for our present 
purposes what is of interest to us is Steiner's facet as a noted Goethe scholar who further 
built on the letter's theory of colour. Goethe had gathered a great deal of ancestral 
knowledge on the nature of colour. Similarly, the Austrian thinker conceived colour as a 
situated entity, that is, as a locus standi, to which, accordingly, one only has access in 
regimes of engaged immanence. Both Goethe and Steiner regarded red and blue to be the 
two true prime colours. Both reasoned that red was irreducible for it is the colour that one 
sees on the horizon with the sunrise and the sunset. Like Goethe, Steiner concluded that red 
is sunlight seen through darkness. "In the red of the sunrise -and the same thing applies 
with the sunset— we are seeing the light through darkness" (Steiner 2005 [1923]: 127). 
Likewise, both went on to argue, one must consider blue as a basic colour; it is what one 
sees when looking out into the clear air through the atmosphere. "Cosmic space is dark [...] 
we ought to see black really. But you see it blue instead of black because the atmosphere is 
illuminated by the sun" (ibid: 128). To be sure, blue is cosmic darkness seen through an 
illuminated atmosphere.
In sharp contrast, Newton had mediated the description of colour by way of a number of 
instrumenta movendi. He had used black paper to cover up the window of a room, had made 
a hole in the paper and had put a three-cornered prism in the slit of light. Behind the prism 
Newton had put up a screen, where a rainbow -red , orange, yellow, green, blue, indigo,
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violet— appeared. His sophisticated experiment led the English natural scientist to conclude 
that all colours emanate out of white. "The white light comes in here and the prism gives 
me the seven colours of the rainbow. Therefore the seven colours of the rainbow are in the 
white light, and all I have to do is coax them out'" (Newton quoted in Steiner 2005 [1923]: 
129). Using Goethe's theory of colour, Steiner corrected Newton's conclusive position by 
emphasizing that the prism {qua an instrumentum movendi) manipulates the slit of light that 
goes through the window. It is however important to note that even this instrumentum 
movendi is a situated object -which certainly desituates— in relation to light. "[Wjhen I look 
into [the prism], I see light on one side being turned red by darkness, and the colour red 
appears, and on the other side darkness being turned blue by light, and the colour blue 
appears. In between, there are just gradations" (ibid: 130). Yet the lesson to be drawn here 
is that Steiner was in a position to re-read Newton's mediated science in so far as he 
regarded colour as a dynamic and relational affair that took place between manufacturers of 
culture-the Sun, outer space, the atmosphere. To be appreciated it only required the 
involvement in a regime of engaged immanence. In allusion to the advent of science as 
epistêmê, Steiner utters the following: "You know, people always looked at things in this 
natural [loci standi-related] way, until they became 'clever/ [...] round the fourteenth, 
fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. And when they grew clever they gradually 
stopped relying on nature [loci standi] and began thinking out all kinds of artificial 
[instrumenta-movendi-mtens'we] sciences" (ibid: 128). The scientific revolution of the 
seventeenth-century was a very specific event as it selected a very concrete genus of 
science. It meant specifically the dawn of low-cultural instrumenta movendi or materialism 
that required as support -in  line with the indications that emanate out of the correlative 
transposements— middle- and high-cultural instrumenta movendi. That emerging science 
was but the unproblematized reversal of theism or a cosmovision grounded in the privilege 
of high-cultural instrumenta movedi such as God and its plethora of mediators including the 
Church and its hierarchy of liturgical personalities.
Relevant to our purposes here, David Bohm contrasts the disposition of reality generated 
with a camera, to that which one gets with a holograph, a device that generates three- 
dimensional photographic images by the application of laser beams. Whilst the camera 
matches one point on the object to one point on the photographic image thereby bearing
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out the materialist mechanism operative in the Modern Age, the holograph writes the 
whole. "The holograph hence suggests a new kind of knowledge and a new understanding of 
the universe in which information about the whole is enfolded in each part" (Bohm 1988: 
65-66). Similarly, when loci standi are taken as the starting basis to make sense of reality a 
cognitive outlook highly distinct from that generated with instrumenta movendi emerges. 
Loci standi provide us with knowledge embodied, embedded and contextualized in the 
entire pluriverse -W illiam  James's alternative coinage for the universe— whilst the data that 
emerge from instrumenta movendi follow from a cultural construct exclusively embedded in 
the Planet which, subsequently, can no longer be considered as Tellus - i t  has been 
desacralized. This construct, to be more precise, has often been reproduced and controlled 
in the laboratory. In "the empirical style [...] [w]e know the nature of the facts because we 
have developed them in circumstances that are under our complete control. Our weakness 
becomes a strength, provided that we limit knowledge to the instrumentalized nature of the 
facts" (Latour 1993: 18). In other words, the empiricism that takes place in the laboratory is 
articulated by way of instrumenta movendi -i.e . tools of mobility and instruments of 
agitation of loci standi.
Ill
The Cultures Of Kultur -  Goethe's and Steiner's organic outlook on colour proves, 
furthermore, the interconnectedness across various domains of culture. On some 
observations of colours' influence upon physiology, Steiner derives a number of 
applications. He realizes that, red, as it is most apparent in a bull's exposure to this colour, 
destroys blood in the eye and stimulates the transport of oxygen from the body to this area 
for regeneration. The presence of blue, by contrast, far from destroying the eye-nerve, 
allows the body to send a feeling of well-being into the eye. "So we can say that blue gives 
people a feeling of inner comfort [...] A person feels rich in his inner life, while with red he 
feels as though something were invading him (sic)" (Steiner 2005 [1923]: 130).
Steiner subsequently extrapolates this physiological observation of the gamut of reds -which  
includes orange and yellow— and the gamut of blues -which includes green and violet— to 
the manufacturing of pigments. The Austrian intellectual realizes that to make proper red for 
painting one has to gather substances that stimulate a living organism to develop oxygen
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within them. Steiner associates such substances with carbon. It is the oxygen-content of 
plants that produces darker colours like blue. This knowledge, in turn, requires a good grasp 
of plants, yet plants regarded not as fossilizations but as manufacturers of culture, with a 
low- middle- and high-culture of their own. We shall consistently refrain from calling this 
science 'plantology', the solipsist discourse on plants. Instead we shall speak of the 'culture 
of plants'.
Out of this culture Steiner observes that when the blossom is yellow, like in a sunflower, the 
process of pigmentation occurs in the blossom itself. Contrariwise, Steiner remarks, when 
the blossom is blue the process of pigmentation takes place in the root: it is subsequently 
transported up to the blossom. In order to produce yellow pigment one needs the 
sunflower; whereas to produce blue pigment one needs the root. Yet important to the 
highlighting of the pitfalls of science as epistëmë it is the realization that science mediated 
via instrumenta movendi, as in the case of Newton, misses out the interconnectedness of 
cultures. "If I went Newton's way I could not [...] arrive at a way of making paints out of 
plants [...], for he simply says, 'It is all in the sunlight and I just have to get it ou t/ The only 
thing this could possibly apply to is my wallet" (ibid: 135). Steiner's reference to the wallet is 
on a level with the solipsist position of science as epistëmë. The wallet is the thing-in-itself 
that "[i]n the morning must contain all my day's spendings" (ibid). It is the container of a 
prominent instrumentum movendi, namely, capital. Capital pays for and therefore 
legitimates a plethora of additional instrumenta movendi.
Newtonian science shall get the pigmentation out of highly complex production processes, 
which are often associated with progress (cf. Nisbet 1980). This is the science, technology 
and developmental complex foundational to the Modern Age. While it subsumes and relies 
upon global low- middle- and high-cultural loci standi, it accords to itself an exclusively 
Eurocentric halo (Bhambra 2009 [2007]). Yet science as epistëmë conforms to an ensemble 
of instrumenta movendi that need one another to operate. This is why the proving of the 
statements of science as epistëmë relies on a never-ending number of instrumenta movendi. 
What is more, given its decontextualizing, disembedding and disembodying character, no 
statements can be made in firm - i t  is only loci standi that provide firm grip. In consonance, 
Steiner additionally notes how Newton's theory of colour falls short of issuing conclusive
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statements. "To this very day we still cannot properly explain why the sky is blue, although 
we can imagine one thing and another'" (Newton quoted in Steiner 2005 [1923]: 138).
Panikkar (2009: 57; own translation from the Catalan translation) firmly sustains that "moral, 
when turned into logos, stops being ethos/' namely, it is no longer relevant to ethics. This 
insightful declaration holds just as vividly for the entire cultures of knowledge. Once we 
subjugate any of them to logos, cognitive cultures relinquish their status only to 
metamorphose into a logocentric science. On the other hand, our reading of the history of 
philosophy and science as epistêmê points to the fact that logocentric cognition —as 
development of the sciences— responds to a markedly anthropomorphic and manipulative 
endeavour-it is knowledge for repressive power (cf. Nietzsche 1967a, 1967c; Foucault 1980; 
Heidegger 2000f [1993]). This is the strongest reason why the cultures of knowledge at issue 
have to open up an entirely new cognitive avenue.
In a few paragraphs above, allusion was made to the wallet as a metaphorical container of a 
constellation of instrumenta movendi. This observation conduces us to another critical point 
regarding the wishful illusion to render co-existent loci standi with instrumenta movendi. 
Both loci standi and instrumenta movendi require more of their kind for their survival and 
reproduction. An ecosystem is the origin and by-product of biodiversity, that is to say, of 
myriad forms of loci standi. Likewise, "[ajrtifacts presuppose each other, produce each 
other, work with and upon each other, in a web of interdependence now practically 
coextensive with the global human economy" (Allen 2004: 64). We may tentatively conclude 
that the survival of the web of instrumenta movendi, which presupposes a growing variety 
and interdependence of the same kind, entails the demise of loci standi. This observation is 
supported by the différance-effect that the former group exerts upon the latter. It follows 
that the modern belief in "destroying the living systems of Earth, our present means of 
survival, in expectation of a magical future to be brought to us by technology and science" 
(Charlton 2008: 5) proves illogical to a fault. The disappearance of loci standi "in the 
preference of the imitation to the original [...] of consumer objects that necessitate the 
degradation of the elemental world" (Caputi 2001: 2) eventually also entails the extinction 
of instrumenta movendi. This is the conundrum of the Age of Dis-Embodiments, another 
name for the ecocidal mode of engagement. There is hardly a possibility for a compromise.
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Either the human species concurs to exert a sustained effort towards a high-degree of re­
embodiment or civilization faces exponential dismemberment asphyxiated by materialism. 
In the Age of Dis-Embodiments, "[w]e must always protect the strong from the weak" 
(Nietzsche quoted in Deleuze, 2001 [1965]: 77), the loci standi from the instrumenta 
movendi. For the possibility that instrumenta movendi take a life of their own is considerably 
high. The historian Arnold J. Toynbee (1992 [1966]: 29) puts it in these words:
Though technology is manmade, it is now challenging Man's ability to retain the power of planning,
directing, and controlling his own future [...]. This inanimate apparatus that Man has invented to
serve human purposes is now threatening to make a declaration of its independence of its inventor.
It is threatening to carry Man [and by extension all manufacturers of culture] whither he would not.
In this context it is worth mentioning Bruno Latour's own approach to instrumenta movendi. 
Latour convincingly makes the point that We Have Never Been Modern. We have been 
operating with bodies of knowledge that have repeatedly failed to acknowledge a 
constellation of artificial elements that has been developing not least over the last few  
centuries. Latour fervently advocates the cognitive codification of such alien elements. "It 
has been necessary to modify the fabric of our collectives from top to bottom in order to 
absorb the citizen of the eighteenth century and the worker of the nineteenth. We shall 
have to transform ourselves just as thoroughly in order to make room, today, for the 
nonhumans created by science and technology" (ibid: 136). The French thinker maintains 
that when the cognitive tools that we put to work render the existence of hybrids invisible, 
these inadequate tools must be made responsible for the uncontrolled proliferation of the 
latter. Should we "reorient and regulate the proliferation of monsters by representing their 
existence officially [,] we would [...] profoundly alter the course of the quasi-objects" (ibid: 
12, 145). Yet Latour falls short of persuasively convincing the reader that hybrids can be 
subjected to moderation and control.
It is my contention that the reason for this pitfall must be ultimately attributed to the French 
author's disembodied, disembedded and decontextualized theoretical approach. Latour 
opens up the door to hybrids so that philosophical and scientific bodies grow impregnated 
with them. Yet not for a moment does Latour regard the hybrid creatures as potential 
extravagances that may jeopardise the equilibrium of a cultus. "How could the anthropos be
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threatened by machines? It has made them, it has put itself into them, it has divided up its 
own members among their members, it has built its own body with them. How could it be 
threatened by objects? They have all been quasi-objects circulating within the collective they 
traced" (ibid: 137).
What is more, Latour accords the authoritative role of "mediatior" between the Cartesian 
positions 'nature' and 'culture' to the hybrid. Yet the cultural matrix informs us that there is 
no such thing as an intersection between loci standi and instrumenta movendi. The elements 
that operate in the cultural spatiality either respect and enhance embodied cycles or they 
exert a deleterious différance-effect over them. When we proceed to reinscribe hybrids in 
the cultural matrix, they emerge as desituating instrumenta movendi. An attempt at 
regulating instrumenta movendi is largely a contradiction in termini. As we have seen in a 
couple of passages above, an embodied outlook such as the one that provides the cultural 
matrix immediately signals that an instrumentum movendi doesn't stand on its own. Rather, 
it feeds on an ensemble of the same kind; it operates within a growing plurality. Far from 
conforming to isolated cases, instrumenta movendi mark a trend within a cultus. In this light 
we must re-instate the observation that Latour's approach to hybrids follows, at bottom, 
from a nominal, intellectualized, desituated -low-culturally disembodied, middle-culturally 
disembedded and high-culturally decontextualized— position which can be tentatively 
regarded as continuous with the history of philosophy and science as epistêmê.
Once we acknowledge the irreducible complicity of instrumenta movendi, we easily come to 
understand that the prospects for ecoefficiency are doubly limited. For one thing, lower 
energetic consumption for the running of an appliance leads to a larger total number of the 
same appliances being used. This is the quintessence of the Jevons Paradox (cf. Martinez- 
Alier 1994 [1990]; Foster 2002: 94-95). Patrick Curry points to the second restriction. Curry 
(2010c: 110) categorically pronounces that "there is only the liminal (we do not, cannot, live 
in any absolute place or state, but between them) and the motile (we do not, cannot, live in 
absolute stasis, but only in more or less dynamic motion)". The overcoming of the ecocidal 
mode of engagement is subject to the realization of both these irreducible liminality and 
motility by way of the multiple anchorages offered by loci standi. A locus standi is 
"[something that promises itself as it escapes, gives itself as it moves away, and strictly
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speaking cannot even be called presence" (Derrida 1997: 154). Full embodiment is per se 
motile and liminal. The varying degrees of dis-embodiment that follow from the circulation 
of instrumenta movendi, by contrast, are differantial -they  exert a différance-effect.
Kultur induces a type of research and education grounded in neither realism nor 
constructivism. Rather, under Kultur both research and education are based upon regimes of 
engaged immanence. Researcher, educator and learner alike turn into insiders of the 
investigated or studied affairs. Thus, the realm of knowledge ceases to be a prefabricated 
intellectual programme to turn into a dynamic stage where approaches and findings are 
perpetually considered provisional. Knowledge and education stop being an unchallengeable 
set of fossilized results and turn into an invitation for creative investigation, where creativity 
is rooted in the regimes of engaged immanence. "A willingness to be transformed is an 
essential characteristic of the participatory scientist" (Harman quoted in Talbot 1996 [1991]: 
298). When either the investigator or the educator has produced an array of instrumenta 
movendi by the time they approach their research or educational target, the possibility of 
exerting différance-effects is very high. The findings and education that follow from the 
application of instrumenta movendi are irrelevant or, what is equal to saying, they turn into 
fossilizations. Similarly, the critique that a manufacturer from a cultus may level against 
another temporal or spatial cultus remains unimportant as long as the former is operating 
within a regime of constrained immanence; as long as the critique is grounded in the 
application of instrumenta movendi the former conforms to an additional instrumentum 
movendi.
IV
Immanent Causality Or Acausality -  Explicitly or tacitly so, those who dare take up the 
placard of the post-Kantian critique of reason, "[fjrom Hegel through Nietzsche or Max 
Weber to Horkheimer or Habermas" (Foucault 1997: 303), root their intellectual musings in 
the plane of immanence. This was the message conveyed in Chapter 4. All these authors 
have been faced with the devastating realization that freedom is a phenomenon of being-in- 
the-world, to convey it in the phrasing of another member of this tradition (Heidegger 1962: 
Division I, Ch. 2). Such discovery is for sure moving, in so far as if freedom, and therefore
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culture, fit foursquarely with immanence, that is, with engagements within this world, the 
investigating scholar is led to as many as two capital denials. On the one hand, their backs 
have to be turned against the flights of transcendence proper not to the "'premodern' or 
'postmodern' era but to the "attitudes of 'countermodernity"' (Foucault 1997: 309-310), 
namely, the attitudes proper to those who fail to derive their thinking out of their 
contemporaneity. Equally the researcher has to resist the atomistic, patchy outlooks that 
follow from the disciplinization of knowledge, prone as they are to incur their attendant 
fallacies. To each discipline their corresponding fallacy. To economics the economistic 
fallacy, "the attribution to the economy of a privileged analytic and historical status relative 
to all other spheres of human behaviour" (Block and Somers 1989 [1984]: 48), as Karl Polanyi 
eagerly reproached to Marxism. Similarly, to ecology we can easily accord the naturalistic 
fallacy as Cartesian nature gains an unduly heightened centrality over the remaining cultural 
variables. In line with Plotnitsky's position (1993; 1994), who closely follows Bataille, these 
are the fallacies incurred when knowledge is atomized as a result of the metaphysics proper 
to classical, restricted economies or of the epistemological trajectory. The latter assume, 
"causality, coordination, wholeness, coherence, logic" (Plotnitsky 1993: 13) presence, full 
know-ability or completeness of knowledge, homogeneity, commensurability or Hegelian 
synthesis (cf. also Plotnitsky 1994:134).
Those who bypass the attitudes of 'counter-modernity' face the demanding riddle of 
properly reporting a causality associated with the active plane of immanence. This is no trifle 
task. The principle of causality had been "considered an incontestable fundamental of all 
interpretations of natural phenomena" in classical physics (Bohr 2000 [1958]: 31; own 
translation from the Portuguese translation). It is a principle that remains ingrained in the 
basic architectonics of the humanities, social and natural sciences alike.167 Immanent 
causality, instead, is that structure that attempts to grapple with the conundrum so 
disobediently raised with the attitude of counter-modernity, "realizing for the first time that 
[its] thinking arises out of and is an attempt to respond to [its] historical situation" (Dreyfus 
and Rabinow 1991 [1986]: 11). The analytical implications of conceiving of the tenets of a 
situated structure as only answerable to its contingency are, no doubt, far-reaching. Situated 
structuralism implacably entails to decidedly move away from a paradigm of causality
167 Cf. Chapter 6, Section 3, Subsection I above.
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towards one of acausality -otherwise called immanent causality (cf. Montag 1999: xvi). 
Acausality refers to both the difficulty - i f  not impracticability— to express the vast richness 
of cultus -différend  (Lyotoard 1992: 22)— through one single domain of knowledge or 
restricted economy, to convey it in Georges Bataille's terms:
To restore to the concept of mental illness [and for that matter, ecocide] its historical and social 
dimension is to remove its object from the mechanistic chain to which its insertion submits in a 
causal system, and on the contrary is to seek to think of its concept in relation to its 
presuppositions and conditions, that is, its 'preconditions' (Macherey 1998b: 79).
By immanent cause it is meant "a cause which is realized, integrated and distinguished in its 
effect. Or rather the immanent cause is realized, integrated and distinguished by its effect" 
(Deleuze 1988: 37). As underscored above in Chapter 6, Nietzsche is an additional thinker 
that takes issue with the problematic question of representation in modern science, which 
"isolate(s) a few pieces" of the actual "continuum", which is the plane of immanence itself. 
On the basis of this bastardization, attempts to fit "every chemical process [...] into a picture 
[...] of cause and effect" (Nietzsche 2005 [2001]: §. 112,113) are readily undertaken.168
V
Immanent Causality Entails An Anti-Epistemology Of Complementarity - In order to 
examine the intra-cultural relations, all the possible information with regard to the low- 
middle- and high-cultural configuration should be curiously amassed. To this end, we have to 
hark back to some positions advanced in Chapter 5. There it was stated that a cultus 
conforms to a homogeneously contextualized texture that lends cult to a number of trends. 
When this situated uniformity mutates, either in time or space, we can be certain to be 
faced with an emerging cultus.
Echoing Foucault's (1972) archaeological method, what is being proposed here is a 
discontinuous history of cognitive situated structures expressed by way of their respective 
low- middle- and high-cultural dimensions. Yet unlike both those histories concerned with 
the variables that promise continuity (ibid: 3-4 et passim) and those in which Foucault was
168 Cf. Chapter 6, Section 3, Subsection I above.
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interested -w here he endeavoured to account for discontinuity, the situated 
complementary matrix relinquishes any concern perse for either continuity or discontinuity. 
Rather, the focal point of the situated complementary matrix is the activity of the 
manufacturer of culture -th e  extent to which the cultus where it is immersed allows for 
Kultur. In this respect, the situated complementary matrix reinscribes the histories of 
continuity vs. those of discontinuity, eluding thereby both an ahistorical conceptualism and 
an aconceptual historicism -against which Hegel prominently alerted us (Hegel 1977: 493; 
Plotnitsky 1996: xii). Instead, we gain a historicized conceptualism or high-culture, which is 
also endowed with a corresponding political or middle-cultural and an embodied or low- 
cultural dimensions.
Each dimension of this situated structure -low - middle- and high-cultural— is expressed by 
way of a grid of complementarity. Plotnitsky (1993a, 1993b, 1994) calls it a non-classical 
anti-epistemology of complementarity, which according to him, can cleanse deconstruction 
of Western metaphysical residues (Plotnitsky 1994: 5):
[A]nti-epistemology [...] refers, broadly to the general possibility of a dislocation, or as we say now, 
deconstruction of classical metaphysical theories -epistemologies, ontologies, phénoménologies 
[...] The theoretical base of this dislocation in Bohr's work is the general economic character of 
complementarity as a theoretical matrix. This character is, once again, codetermined by the 
irreducible loss -and thus indeterminacy— in the process of representation and by the equally 
heterogeneous multiplicity of all representations that such a matrix generates and employs (ibid:
10).
In spite of and because of the impossibility to convey the full meaning of the active plane of 
immanence -there  are irreducible cognitive losses, immanent causality may only be 
presented through its effects, that is by way of adding (free of Hegelian or otherwise 
synthesis) the highest knowledge produced in each culture:
As Bohr's case would suggest, a break from philosophy can perhaps only be achieved by way of 
economies complementarizing continuities and discontinuous -o r  causality and indeterminacy or 
change and necessity— at various levels rather than unproblematized moves to absolute rupture, 
absolute difference, or exteriority, absolute chance, and so forth (ibid: 232).
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The pioneer ecological economist Georgescu-Roegen (1974 [1971]: 35) seconds the concept 
of complementarity as a valid cognitive framework. "[T]he Principle of Complementarity -as  
I argued some years ago— seems to be applicable also in economics: in most cases, no single 
theory suffices to explain an event". That is to say, whilst the low- middle- and high-cultural 
matrix works as a framework to categorize the various cultural interpenetrations, the 
composition of each of the three slots is gained by way of juxtaposition of cognitive cultures. 
The low- middle- and high-cultural slots of the fossilizations are presented not by way of a 
single idealization but by ideally complementing infinite expressions. However, in practice -  
situatedly— only a concrete number of expressions emerges.
Given that the manufacturer of culture produces "excesses of energy [...] without the 
slightest aim, consequently without any meaning'' (Bataille, The Inner Experience, quoted in 
Plotnitsky 1993a: 20), and the complementary structure is made up of interactions amongst 
manufacturers of culture -th e ir activities, the structure in hand resists full know-ability. The 
acknowledgement of this incompleteness in the hermeneutical process, Foucault (1998 
[1964]: 274) informs us, is encountered in "Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud in the form of the 
refusal of beginning. Refusal of the 'Robinsonade/ said Marx; a distinction, so important in 
Nietzsche, between the beginning and the origin; and the always-incomplete character of 
the regressive and analytic process in Freud." Plotnitsky, on the other hand, alerts us to the 
fact that incompleteness of knowledge is the one proper to the non-classical general 
economic grid, that is, when the immanent spatiality is freed from idealizations exerted by 
an absolutism of either high- middle- or low-cultural calibre. In view that general economy 
exposes knowledge to all cultural domains, whilst restricted economies protect knowledge 
from the ravages coming from other restricted economies, the incompleteness of knowledge 
under general economic conditions is the most complete form of knowledge.
As noticed by Bataille and reproduced by Plotnitsky, a trait of general economy, as an 
instance of philosophy of the future, is the one predicated upon 'knowledge [as] the access 
to the unknown' (Bataille in Inner Experience quoted in Plotnitsky 1996: viii):
Philosophy of the future ... would not be possible without creating new spaces of the unknown
and ultimately the unknowable (along with an increase in knowledge) and without offering a
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possibility to continue this joint process into the future. 'Knowledge is the access to the 
unknown/ and finally the unknowable -Bataille says. He offers this great insight (in part) against 
Hegel and his concept of absolute knowledge in his own momentous confrontation with Hegel.
[...] Hyppolite's encounter with Hegel is itself an extraordinary example of expanding both 
knowledge and the unknown, and entering the threshold of the unknowable, which may be the 
only sense of progress in our understanding of Hegel, or of progress of knowledge in general, still 
available to us.
Foucault (1964 [1998]: 274) too captures the duality of this process in "modern 
hermeneutics" that "above all [characterizes] Nietzsche and Freud [...] and to a lesser extent 
Marx" (ibid.). Namely,
the farther one goes in interpretation, the closer one comes to at the same time to an absolutely 
dangerous region where interpretation not only will find its point of return but where it will 
disappear as interpretation, perhaps involving the disappearance of the interpreter himself. The 
existence that always approached the absolute point of interpretation would be at the same time 
that of a point of rupture.
VI
Positional Vs. Transposemental Claims To Truth -  As extensively expounded in Chapter 4, 
the philosophical outlook that goes by the name of materialism -an  outlook which is by and 
large enlisted by science as epistëmë- is an unproblematized reversal of idealism -a  current 
which largely tallies with philosophy as epistëmë. Both idealism and materialism are 
positional Weltanschauungen. They attempt to gain an ultimately static, immovable truth, 
"the lie of unity, the lie of thinghood, of substance, of permanence" (Nietzsche in the 
Twilight of the idols quoted in Schrift 1990). To be more precise, the currency of philosophy 
and science as epistëmë is the position. Position stands for logos —in the Greek form —and 
ratio —in the Latin one— or discourse. 'Epistemology/ for instance, is the position of or 
discourse on prepositional knowledge, as synonymous with the solipsism of propositional 
knowledge. Logos, to be sure, entails an isolated and detached position from the object 
under scrutiny. Hence Panikkar's (2009: 116; own translation from the Catalan translation) 
pithy remark, "if we don't believe in a myth, it is no longer a myth for us. If it is only a myth 
for others, then we can take part in mythology", the discourse or solipsist position on myth.
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The currency of science as Kultur, instead, is the transposèrent. The latter stands for 
transitivity, interconnectedness or culture. It distances us from the quest for a univocal 
truth. "Reality is not only what is said and thought or what may be -a  part of it is not 
transparent to thought" (ibid). The operability of these invisible dimensions indeed suggests 
that what is at stake may not be so much the settling of truth as our relational position in 
the firmament. Logocentrism flagrantly neglects the transitivities amongst transposements, 
if it acknowledges relations at all.169 Science as Kultur, by contrast, captures these 
transitivities; its basis is relational. High-culture, to take an example, is cultural 
interdependence (or transposement) seen from the perspective of a-nomization. Middle- 
culture is cultural interdependence (or transposement) seen from the perspective of 
decision-making. Low-culture is cultural interdependence (or transposement) seen from the 
perspective of re-production.
Positions commit "the illusion of universals (when concepts are confused with the plane 
itself)" (Juniper and Jose 2005: 7), be the latter of idealist or materialist persuasion. Positions 
in idealism, or philosophy as epistëmë, code their truths by way of concepts (Weber 1964 
[1948]: 141).170 Materialism or science as epistëmë searches this conceptual univocal truth 
within the material thing-in-itself (Ding-an-sich). "That is the simplest kind of explanation. 
You explain something by saying that it is already within the thing you get it from [...] The 
very clever people imagine a bag that has everything in it," bemoans Rudolf Steiner (2005 
[1923]: 129). Here again we are endowed with a vantage position to diminish the value of 
both the material -as for instance defended by Stengers (2008)— and embodied materialism 
as proposed by Marxist ecofeminism (Salleh 1997; Mellor 1997; Mies 1998). The reader 
should be reminded that the former outlook was erected with an eye towards becoming a 
sound antidote against Matter and the latter against idealism.171 Yet either of the 
alternatives remains a position. Whilst idealism searches within outer-world ideas, 
materialism seeks within matter. Both are idealizations -namely, simplified and 
decontextualizing scientific descriptions (Plotnitsky 1994: 7-8). Idealism and materialism 
need each other -a re  partners and adversaries— to complement their solipsism. They
169 Cf. Chapter 3, Section 2, Subsection IV above.
170 Cf. Chapter 7, Section 3, Subsection I, underthe heading '3 / Positions As Instruments O f Agitation O f Transpositions'.
171 Cf. Chapter 4, Section 2, Subsection II above.
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conform to a complicit hyposement. Such account explains circular theories of life, of 
materialist persuasion, such as "z[h]e is already in his mother's egg, and develops out of 
that'" (Steiner 2005 [1923]: 130). The reader should note the implied critique of Western 
medicine that is utterly based upon this kind of materialist causation and has gone at great 
lengths in the direction of developing biotechnologies. Or their theist equivalent, z[s]he is 
born when the holy spirit enters her body' (ibid).
Under the cultural matrix, by contrast, life zzneed[s] the help of the whole cosmic space to 
develop the mother's egg" (ibid). What the cultural matrix aims to capture precisely is some 
aspects of this interconnected cosmic space. This spatiality, which is an instantiation of a 
Nietzschean philosophy of the future, selects in particular conditions of transitivity or 
transposements central to the overcoming of the ecocidal mode of engagement.172 Just as 
the mother's egg alone fails to account for the whole reproductive cycles, so too a locus 
standi perse is insufficient for the production of knowledge. A/ocus stoncf/, like high- middle- 
or low-culture, is a category merely immanent. Thus when Newton uttered zzz[t]he sun [a 
manufacturer of culture] contains all the colours, we just have to get them out'" (ibid: 130), 
he proved no less reductionist than when in the experiment with the prism he asserted that 
the entire rainbow emanates out of white. The formation of colours is relational, it occurs in 
the specific disposition, engagement of a number of manufacturers of culture -Re, cosmic 
space, the atmosphere, Tellus, etc.— and eventual interferences from fossilizations.
Kultur is the only transposement that generates apt cultural findings. It exacts direct 
engagements of immanence. The latter require the intervention of the subjecting-subjected 
activity of a number of manufacturers of culture, an activity which operates via low- middle- 
and high-cultural loci standi. The low-cultural dimension is the embodied one: form, shape, 
colour, mass, weight, height, width, etc are scrutinized at this level. Middle-cultural aspects 
are those related to the public sphere: the extent to which the elements under study are dis- 
embedding of social, political and economic affairs is the subject-matter of this dimension. 
High-cultural investigations centre around the level of cognitive situatedness that the 
elements under scrutiny exhibit. To take an example, if you aim to study the cultus of the
172 It is, to be sure, the cultural matrix of and for the Age of Re-Embodiments Cf. Chapter 11.
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Achuar, you have to pose the following queries, as announced a number of times above: 
Which collective -both  public and private— arrangements and institutions, which 
manufacturers of culture, which high-cultural loci standi and instrumenta movendi are put to 
use to attain which low-cultural interface loci-standi-instrumenta movendi, or which rate of 
dis-embodiment? It is central to stick to the high- middle- and low-cultural relation of 
queries. When this relationism is neglected we "are literally quartered among ontological 
regions that define each other mutually but no longer resemble our practices" (Latour 1993: 
123).
Kultur refigures concepts and the thing-in-itself into instrumenta-movendi, protuberances 
parasitic upon loci standi that exert a différance-effect over the latter. Instrumenta movendi, 
to be sure, are operative residues of philosophy and science as epistëmë reinscribed in the 
cultural matrix. Moreover, the acknowledgement of the position instrumentum movendi -  
addresses the "insoluble question with which the modern philosophy of science will wrestle 
over the course of three centuries" (Latour 1993: 28). Latour problematizes the question at 
stake in the following words: When scientists report on the facts taking place in the 
laboratory, "[w]ho is speaking, then, nature or human beings?" (ibid) The cultural matrix 
exhibits how neither of the two is carrying out this act. Both 'nature' and 'human beings' are 
-irrelevant— positions to start with -they belong to the history of philosophy and science as 
epistëmë. What is speaking in the laboratory are instrumenta movendi. Newton and his 
theory of colour provide robust evidence in this direction. The laboratory generates a kind of 
atomistic science that employs an abundance of mediating tools or instrumenta movendi -  
'positions'— to investigate other instrumenta movendi -'positions'. The case is conspicuous 
in the research commonly undertaken to scrutinize cosmic manufacturers of culture. In this 
respect, astronomy is the instrumentum-movendi equivalent of the culture of the stars -o r  
'astrology'. The former is immensely instrumenta-movendi intensive - i t  is markedly 
instrumental. The latter, by contrast, like Goethe's and Steiner's theory of colours, is mainly 
grounded in ancestral and situated knowledges aided, in the Modern Age, by a moderate 
number of instrumenta movendi.
Transposements gain their truths relationally. Transposements are either correlative by 
themselves (e.g. high- middle- and low-culture), continua (dis-embodiment, dis-
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embeddedness, de-contextualization, constrained-engaged immanence) or they go across 
other transposements (from loci standi to the manufacturer of culture to regimes of 
engaged immanence and vice-versa). Positions, for their part, need their obverse to 
complete their identity. Hence the abundance of hyposements: intelligible/sensible 
idealism/materialism, right/wrong, man/woman, etc. (cf. Schrift 1995: 15-219). With the 
presence of hyposements "we are almost inexorably led to manical modes of salvation or 
perdition" (Stengers 2008: 2), whilst the issue of intelligible/sensible, idealism/materialism, 
right/wrong, man/woman is "an open problem, not an opposition" (ibid). When re-inscribed 
in the cultural matrix, hyposements manifest themselves as a degree upon the continua dis­
embodiment, dis-embeddedness and de-situatedness. Positions conform to a mode of 
being. Being stands for eternal presence; a monolith. Transposements, by contrast, conform 
to a mode of engagement;173 they mark incessant encounters of manufacturers with other 
manufacturers and with eventual fossilizations; of high- middle- and low-culture; of 
instrumenta movendi with loci standi, etc.
Kultur is an all-encompassing immanent spatiality constantly reflecting upon itself. It 
presupposes and thus requires most of the transposements of the cultural matrix for the 
production of knowledge. Kultur turns philosophia into the task of adopting a genus of 
knowledge that shall encourage the formation of regimes of engaged immanence within a 
cultus to generate relevant categories of knowledge vis-à-vis one's contemporaneity. Kultur 
further turns scientia into the practice of knowledge predicated upon loci standi. It follows 
that under Kultur there is no general, universal science but idiosyncratic science and culture. 
This means that what matters are no longer static claims to truth but the ongoing high- 
middle- and low-cultural impressions that emanate out of recurrent unmediated 
engagements of immanence on the part of manufacturers of culture. To be sure, the 
production of knowledge is no longer an issue of the isolated mind but a fully-fledged 
cultural affair. 'Cultures of knowledge' no longer mean, as in science as epistëmë, static and 
accumulating bodies of data. Rather, they entail a mode of interpenetration conducive to a 
high degree of engaged immanence and, for that matter, embodiment, embeddedness and 
contextualization. Only in this context may we speak of science as disciplined knowledge. 
Indeed, Kultur breaks out of the tacit assumption that scientia, which etymologically means
173 Cf. Chapter 3, Section 2, Subsection IV above.
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understanding and ability, must be after the fashion of epistêmê. Kultur reclaims science as 
engagements of immanence. These engagements may lead to various cultures, such as the 
'culture of colours,' the 'culture of plants,' 'the culture of health,' the 'culture of stars.' To 
ensure that we possess cognitive cultures fit for a post-ecocidal age, the truly relevant 
questions turn into the following: are we (individually, or as a collective) sovereign over our 
low- middle- and high- culture -namely, sovereign over our loci standi— so that we can 
constantly sense, divine the potentially shifting ground on 'what are we to do, how are we to 
live?' Finding out the degree of this sovereignty is, to be sure, determining the extent to 
which the culture of a given domain of knowledge as produced by a given manufacturer or 
cultus is a sound one and thus leads to Kultur.
VII
Transposements Of Positions And Their Implications— As noted in passing in the previous 
section, the analytics of transposement reinscribes the positions, idealizations and concepts 
proper to philosophy and science as epistëmë -e .g . 'beauty/ 'democracy/ 'the good life / 
'justice' 'freedom1— in the cultural matrix. Under the cultural spatiality, epistemological 
positions fuse with their obverses to form dynamic transposements, thereby gaining the 
low- middle- and high- cultural qualitative dimensions by which the latter define themselves 
-namely, dis-embodiment, dis-embeddedness and de-contextualization. Thus beauty and 
ugliness turn into a continuum of 'low- middle- and high-cultural un-beauty1; representative 
democracy and direct democracy merge to form the continuum of 'low- middle- and high- 
cultural un-democracy'; the good life and mediocrity blend together and constitute the 
continuum of 'low- middle- and high-culture of the engaged-constrained life'; likewise, 
justice and injustice unite to form the continuum of 'low- middle- and high-cultural in­
justice;1 finally, 'repression and freedom join to form the continuum of 'low- middle- and 
high-cultural un-freedom"; "[tjhe enjoyment of the thing itself is [by this process] 
undermined" (Derrida 1997:154).
The cultural matrix deflects the positions 'true' vs. 'false' given their positional solipsism. It 
transposes both into a cultural continuum, the normative, apt -'tru th fu l'— extreme of which 
is Kultur. Loci standi line up on this side, whilst at the opposite extreme one finds 
instrumenta movendi. Truth, that is to say, is a property of Kultur. This is equal to saying that
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truth is engaged immanence, which in turn decentres the quest for a univocal truth. It 
renders apt knowledge liminal -scattered throughout multiple locations— and motile -in  
dynamic motion. Hence the assertion in Chapter 8 above that truth is a perennially nascent 
fiction, a reality incessantly in the making.174 Again, the cultural matrix points to the fact that 
liminality and motility are exclusive predicates of the regimes of engaged immanence, where 
it is loci standi that inform our low- middle- and high-culture. If we reverse the statement we 
find that cultural findings are true -ap t- to the extent that they emanate out of regimes of 
engaged immanence. A regime of constrained immanence leads to artifactual-intensive 
perceptions and findings. These outcomes may be amenable to a truthful representation, in 
line with the etymological meaning of veritate -that truth which is 'in step with reality' and 
faithfully purveys 'the facts'; but they fail to be unrepeatable acts -th e  trait proper to 
Kultur.175 A valid cultural finding is one which stems from high- middle- and low-cultural loci 
standi. A much less reliable one is one where the manufacturer of culture or a cultus finds 
their engagement of immanence inhibited, where therefore the findings heavily build upon 
instrumenta movendi. The distinction at issue replicates the famous ethical dictum of Aldo 
Leopold (quoted in Charlton 2008: 206): "A thing is right when it tends to preserve the 
integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise".
Liminality and motility are another name for freedom. Kultur somehow reframes truth into 
freedom. Or, to rephrase it in other words, relevant findings in Kultur "have nothing to do 
with any supposed self-identity, unity, endurance static presence, purse form, or any of the 
other predicates philosophy habitually associates with being" (Allen 1993: 101). It must be 
noted however that "[f]reedom is not merely what common sense is content to let pass 
under this name: the caprice, turning up occasionally in our choosing, of inclining in this or 
that direction. Freedom is not merely absent of constraint with respect to what we can or 
cannot do" (Heidegger 2000b [1993]: 126). Manufacturers of culture are free to the extent 
that they move within the spatiality demarcated by loci standi.
These observations further point to the fact that the more direct the engagement of 
immanence that a manufacturer-and for that matter, a cultus— enjoys, the higher degree
174 Cf. Chapter 8, Section 4, Subsection V above.
175 Cf. Chapter 8, Section 4, Subsection V above.
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of beauty, democracy, the engaged life, justice and freedom the findings shall enjoy. That is 
to say, if a manufacturer or a cultus enjoys a high degree of engaged immanence, the 
perception of the 'beautiful' will tend to be related to low- middle- and high-cultural loci 
standi. Contrariwise, if a manufacturer or a cultus enjoys a high degree of constrained 
immanence, the perception of the 'beautiful' -however it might be defined within that 
cultus— will tend to be associated with low- middle- and high-cultural instrumenta movendi.
The transposement un-beautiful and so on and so forth is created to re-organize Aristotelian 
hyposemental logic and restore the excluded middle ground. The high-cultural implications 
on the way to fashion and deliver scientific findings in the footsteps of Kultur in order to 
regain the median are tremendous. They are as scandalous as is the association of scientific 
claims with metaphor. "In practice, no statement can be made whose meaning, in order to 
be (to use William James's usefully blunt term) cashed in, does not require metaphor" (Curry 
2010:109). Metaphor is the cultural form that captures the dynamism proper to the ongoing 
engagements of immanence that in turn determine the also mutable degree of, say, un­
beauty. "To present men [manufacturers of culture at large] 'as acting' and all things as 'in 
ac t  -such could well be the ontological [cultural] function of metaphorical discourse" 
(Ricoeur quoted in Curry 2010c: 95; emphasis in the original). Additionally, it is metaphor 
that conveys the relational or tensive ambiguity common to the middle ground. "Being-as 
means being and not being" (ibid: 96). So in statements such as 'this town is very 
beautiful'176 the asseveration gains its meaning perspectively, in relation to an unbroken 
continuum of un-beauty populated by additional creatures -a  butterfly, a river, a lark, a 
willow, the skies—pervaded with certain degrees of beauty.
The resonances of this metaphorical conveying of scientific claims with fuzzy logic are 
considerable (Kosko 1994, 1999). Yet more important to highlight or perhaps correct or, 
even better, embody is the observation that the scientific statements of the cognitive 
cultures herein proposed are metaphorical and therefore subject to the two tensions 
advanced above. Namely, dynamism and ambiguity. Or in Ricoeur's terse terms, "[t]hanks to 
the very instability of meaning, a semantic aim can find the path of its utterance [...] this 
interplay never comes to rest in an absolute knowledge that would subsume the tensions"
176 Which is our common way to convey that 'This town contains a high degree of b e a u t/.
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(quoted in Curry 2010c: 98-99). This is another way of saying that, when we situate and 
embody Ricour's declarative statement, it is the ensemble of loci standi that permits the 
formation of meaning at all. But it is also this vast richness that renders this meaning 
incomplete, and, for that matter, irreducibly instable and ambiguous.
These series of irreducibilites further bring us to the issue of theoretical speculation versus 
bytes of information. Meaningful experience and, for that matter, scientific statements after 
the fashion of Kultur -statements that lead to "wisdom, scientia, gnosis, jhdna" (Panikkar 
2009: 108)— are unrepeatable and invariably open to self-interpretation. If truth worth its 
name, namely, fictions in perennial statu nascendi, is constantly renewed -as opposed to 
repeatedly verified, it follows that scientific statements can only be grounded upon 
insightful speculation, namely, speculation that emanates out of regimes of engaged 
immanence; insights that spring from close observation and contact with loci standi. To this 
end, "one must partake in the symbolic realm because this constitutes the horizon that 
renders" (Panikkar 2009:101; own translation from the Catalan translation) the engagement 
understandable. By contrast, that 'knowledge' that, like the one produced in the laboratory, 
stems from regimes of immanence constrained by the circulation and often unavoidable 
overpopulation of instrumenta movendi must be regarded as veritate -a  truth 
representational of the instrum en ta-m o ven d/- re I a te d facts but obstructive of loci standi. The 
scientific acceptance of theoretical speculation and its poor brother information further 
reconfigure the divide theoria versus praxis. Praxis conforms, ideally, to the low- middle- and 
high-cultural direct engagements of immanence, albeit constrained engagements of 
immanence must also be considered as praxis, or rather ill-practice. The high-cultural 
dimension of this (ill-)prox/s is either theoretical speculation or information, subject to the 
quality or directness of the engagement.
"Something is missing that would make the circle perfect" (ibid) (Derrida 1978e: 297) and 
the rubrics beauty, democracy, the good life, justice and freedom possible. This is an allusion 
to the general economic character of the cultural matrix. Except when operating within the 
cultus of Tellus, where Kultur prevails and thus values are absolutely embodied, embedded
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and contextualized,177 the nascent transposements of un-beauty, un-democracy, the 
constrained-engaged life, in-justice, un-freedom mark always only a degree within the 
continuum. These degrees obviously denote difference instead of synthesis. Yet they are 
infallibly relative to the irreducible transposements —loci standi and instrumenta movendi. 
Namely, the more loci-standi-orlented a cultus, the more beautiful, democratic, engaged-a- 
life oriented, just and free it is. The positive pole of the continuum, that is to say, is 
associated with loci sandi, whilst the negative one with instrumenta movendi. To reverse the 
statement, beauty, democracy, the engaged life, justice and freedom are properties of direct 
engagements of immanence. These are manifested in loci standi and in the unmediated 
activity of the manufacturers of culture. It is the degree of constrained-engaged immanence 
attained by a manufacturer or a cultus on the whole that determines specific forms of un­
truth, un-freedom, un-good, etc. This approach to cultural findings —to science— is in line 
with Buddhist teachings. Buddhism has observed that any material goods -low-cultural 
instrumenta movendi along with their middle- and high-cultural counterparts— that plie up 
on top of basic food, shelter, clothing and education are a source of personal discontent and 
social conflict. In sum, Buddhism fully captures the fact that the proliferation of instrumenta 
movendi interferes with the act of engaging immanence.
All kinds of manufacturers -anthropomorphic and otherwise— are in a position to define 
the rubrics, inter alia, un-beauty, un-democracy, the engaged-constrained life, in-justice, and 
un-freedom in their encounters with other manufacturers and often also with fossilizations. 
The manufacturer of culture 'tree', for instance, defines 'un-necessity' in relation to the low- 
cultural loci standi it requires to get in touch with, to proceed with their engagements of 
immanence, where the necessity end is marked by the needed loci-standi and the 
unnecessity one by superfluous additions. A tree further characterizes the transposement 
'un-necessity' in relation to, among other elements, a middle-cultural locus standi which 
could read 'respect for the commons,' and a number of high-cultural ones with a well- 
categorized notion of un-beauty, un-layout, un-expression, etc., -th e  prescriptive side 
demarcated by the very same traits that the tree exhibits. The manufacturer climate, for its 
part, defines 'stability' as a locus standi, namely, as an irreducible transposement perturbed 
and constrained by the appearance of instrumenta movendi, which in turn converts the
177 Were it not for the very-long term Cf Chapter 6, Section 1, Subsection I above;
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rubric into a continuum of 'in-stability'. Thus a characterization of climatic 'in-stability' 
entails the endorsement of interconnectedness. The climate shall be more or less unstable 
to the extent that manufacturers of culture are (re)situated in culture. In the cultus of 
Leviathan, the manufacturers most closely related to collective -both  public and p riv a te - 
anthropomorphic institutions tend to determine what passes as truth in a cultus. The 
anthropomorphic manufacturers that populate scientific institutions have presented the 
climate according to the levels of GHGs they have found in the atmosphere. This is one very 
specific way to represent the climate. One should ask whether this characterization 
emanates out of regimes of engaged immanence or out of constrained ones. Given that the 
levels of GHGs entail measurement and thus the deployment of instrumenta movendi, one 
has to conclude that this anthropomorphic characterization of the climate emanates out of 
regimes of constrained immanence. It is part-and-parcel of the project of science as 
epistêmê. It is built upon instrumenta movendi and it therefore creates an insrtumenta- 
movendi culture.
VIII
From Mode Of Being To Mode Of Immediate Engagement -  The main concern of Western 
metaphysics resides in the logocentric disclosure of being: "(Onto-)logy'", or the solipsist 
discourse on being, "is its main category" (Panikkar 2009: 111; own translation from the 
Catalan translation). Yet as the cultural matrix signals, being is a construct of logocentric 
thinking, just as madness may be regarded as the construct of the realm of psychiatry when 
this medical body is face to face with certain human behaviours that exceed the merely 
rational (cf. Foucault 2001 [1967]). At any rate, the logocentric construct in hand, this 
eagerness to define the real by way of being as accessed by logos is irrelevant to Kultur-the  
logocentric being adds no information to the regimes of engaged immanence. Rather, it 
reinscribes them as instrumenta movendi. In Chapter 3, it was already disclosed that it is the 
mode of engagement that, at least partially, reconfigures the Cartesian dispensation and the 
attendant mode of being.178 Here we shall render prescriptive the theoretical positions 
advanced in that previous chapter and speak of mode of immediate engagement. Kultur is 
only a reality when regimes of unmediated, direct immanence take place.
178 Cf. Chapter 3, Section 2, Subsection IV above.
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Realism is after the palpable. Kultur, for its part, reclaims the palpable without falling into 
realist positions. This manoeuvre is perfectively possible by regarding the plane of 
immanence as an active and dynamic spatiality —thus as a plane of constrained-engaged 
immanence, which overtakes and dissolves the philosophies of the mind, the primacy 
accorded to consciousness and the penchant for the real. Under this active view of 
immanence, what indeed matters is the degree of constrained-engaged immanence that all 
sorts of manufacturers (pebbles, trees, rivers, the rainbow, the skies, animals, some 
segments of human beings)179 gain out of their encounter with the cultus they belong to. 
This degree in itself has, proportionally, the cognitive, ethical, political and medicinal 
properties that realism seeks in the palpable, and discourse and constructivism at large in its 
historical and cultural analyses. In science as Kultur, not only is there "no acceptance of an 
ontological [cultural] apartheid of lived world (the domain of Geisteswissenschaften) and 
scientifically real world (that of Noturwissenschoften)" (Curry 2010c: 91); what is more, this 
scientific praxis irremediably dislocates the instrumentum-movendi-oriented search for 
ontological predicates. "The doctrine of being, of things, of all sorts of fixed unities is a 
hundred times easier than the doctrine of becoming, of development" (Nietzsche 1967c: 
§538). Science as Kultur no longer focuses upon being but, like in Nietzsche, on an ever 
emerging "qualitative typology" (Deleuze 2001 [1965]: 76) of constrained-engaged 
immanence that univocally extols becoming. "Bateson's claim places relating at the center 
[...] What we thought of as boundaries and limits become zones of interchange, active 
interfaces" (Charlton 2008:140). To be sure, it is not about describing things as they are, but 
about registering the quality at which the 'active interfaces' occur, about finding out the 
conditions under which the ensemble of cultural transposements operate. For "aesthetic 
[and otherwise] engagement offers us a remedy for our sealed-off, self-seeking 
purposiveness, it [does] so by reconnecting, integrating” (ibid: 141; emphasis in the original).
The mode of being is the anthropocentric perspective adopted in order to manipulate 
reality. Nietzsche (Nietzsche 1967c: § 715) is vocal in this respect: "There are no durable 
ultimate units, no atoms, no monads: here, too, 'beings' are only introduced by us (from 
perspective grounds of practicality and utility)." Yet the fact is that the nature of life does 
not lend to manipulation. The biologist Stuart Kauffman (quoted in Wheeler 2006: 29)
179 Cf. Others are fossilizations.
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attests to this fact:
Despite [...] the brilliance manifest in the past three decades of molecular biology, the core of life itself 
remains shrouded from view. We know chunks of molecular machinery, metabolic pathways, means of 
membrane biosynthesis -we know many of the parts and many of the processes. But what makes a cell 
alive is still not clear to us. The centre remains a mystery.
Life is made up of a number of loci standi which must be acknowledged as such and revered 
for what they are. The manipulation of these processes is highly instrumenta-movendi 
intensive. To the extent that we wish to investigate loci standi and harness their potential is 
subject to a cultural decision. In such context we are bound to unfold our analytical toolkit: 
through which collective -both public and private— arrangements and institutions, which 
manufacturers of culture, which high-cultural loci standi and instrumenta movendi are put to 
use to attain which low-cultural interface loci-standi-instrumenta movendi, or rate of dis­
embodiment?
The cultural matrix is post-ontological. It is not concerned with the nature of being or beings 
but with the immediate engagement of immanence. Namely, with the respect for the 
ultimately irreducible elements of culture -loci standi, and the politicisation of their 
annihilation. The politics of such outlook lead to the réinscription of the Darwinian theory of 
evolution. In the cultural matrix, the gauging yardstick of evolutionary theory is not higher 
degrees of consciousness as for instance in Hegel and Bucke (undated reprint [1905]), but 
high degrees of engaged immanence. This hierarchizing criterion takes to bits the article of 
faith deeply ingrained in mainstream evolutionary theory, according to which the apex of 
evolution resides in the latter-day anthropomorphic forms. Evolution in this canonical sense 
is but one of the multiple paths that secure diversity in the pluriverse - i t  is far from  
synonymous with progress. We must "move beyond the 'conscious T which looms as a 
boulder in [our] path of becoming" (Caputi 2001: 10) or engaging immanence in an 
undisturbed manner.180
In this context, let us note that the mode of immediate engagement cuts across and thus 
transposes the modern/postmodern dichotomy incarnated in the universal/contextual
180 Cf. Chapter 7, Section 1 above.
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hyposement. In the mode that rules the cultural matrix, what matters is the quality of the 
engagement of immanence. When this is direct, unrestricted, the intercourse at hand for 
sure occurs in a specific contextualizing setting. Yet it also leads to an interconnected 
experience by virtue of the loci standi that render the encounter possible. It is the latter 
rather than either universalism or contextualism what transposes modern Man into Kultur.
When "both the concrete -particular, situated, and embedded— and magic, meaning 
enchanted" (Curry 2004a) are reclaimed, this should not be regarded to follow as a result of 
a mere reversal of that which is universal. "Nietzsche commits the opposite mistake in 
idealizing transitoriness, which is no less fallacious than deifying permanence" (Yovel 1989: 
173). Rather, the particular and situated, while being the preconditions and potential by­
products of the mode of engagement, are far from their final ends. This mode aims at 
"producing] new connections with what we know, or a change in the mode of connection" 
(Stengers 2008). It is Kultur or direct and precise engagements of immanence which both 
exact and render a situation concrete, particular, situated, embedded and also magic. Yet 
this particularity and concreteness should not be exclusively associated with a single -  
isolated— topography. Rather, manufacturers are interconnected. When they engage one 
another, they partake of this very same interpenetrated network.
Without direct, unmediated engagements of immanence there is no Kultur, and without 
Kultur no valid meaning. When "there is no precision and nothing personal ([when] even 
location 'doesn't matter') -so no mystery. And with no mystery, I might add, no truth" (Curry 
2004a). It is the engagement of immanence and their loci standi that provide both the 
precision and mysterious interconnectedness that lead to Kultur and thus to meaningful 
processes of nomization. "The kernel of truth in [Kantian] idealism is that the identity, unity, 
presence, or being of beings is not simply given, as it was with Greek ontology, but 
mediated, conditioned by the conditions of perception or thought" (Allen 1993: 83). In the 
mode of engagement, the conditions of transitivity of immanence aren't mediation. Rather, 
they are 'engagement/ 'intercourse/ where immediacy turns into the prescriptive horizon. 
This is, to be precise, the leading feature of Kultur.
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IX
From Ontology To Osmogenesis -  Above we have already noted that Heidegger's Schritt 
zurück imprisons us in Cartesianism. His recollection of Being is an exaltation of Dasein or of 
the human experience in exclusivity.181 Here we shall take issue with a second limitation in 
Heidegger's post-metaphysical philosophy, namely, his adherence to the ontological project. 
Heidegger interestingly 'destroys' the objective structure advanced by Western metaphysics 
by way of the Ereignis -th e  event or occurrence of Being. Like the regimes of constrained- 
engaged immanence, Being as event fails to enjoy the structural stability that philosophy 
and science as epistêmê attributes to it. Undoubtably, Heidegger impulses a major 
immanent turn. The eternal and meta-historical structure of the metaphysical Being is 
supplanted by the contingencies and eventualities of its occurrence. "Being gives itself, again 
and again, in its occurrence" (Vattimo 2002: 21). Nevertheless, Heidegger's immanent turn 
remains incomplete - i t  fails to significantly rival ontology. In Heidegger's philosophy there is 
an identification of the immanent with Being. "[Tjhe event of Being lies in the double sense 
of the genitive: the horizon is the opening belonging to Being, but it is also that to which 
Being itself belongs" (ibid). Heidegger's immanent expanse is punctuated by moments of 
transcendence. A truly immanent indwelling in the world, far from exalting Being, dissolves 
and diffuses it into multiple activities or engagements. The activity or event does not belong 
to Being. Being-which when reinscribed in our philosophical scenario as a manufacturer of 
culture has a much broader sense than Heidegger's human-centred Dasein— is but one 
facilitator of the activity or event, not its final terminus. This truly immanent indwelling, to 
be sure, corrosively liquefies Being into the activity or occurrence, which, in the case of the 
cultural matrix appears in the shape of regimes of certain degrees of constrained-engaged 
immanence subject to the interfering presence of instrumenta movendi and their 
fossilizations. The completion of the immanent turn wholly corrodes ontology, the solipsist 
position of or discourse on the nature of being. It rather signals the import of the 
osmogenesis of the event or activity or the perpetual rebirth of the engagement. To 
complete the immanent turn, to be sure, we need "to introduce movement into thought 
rather than trying to find universals of information or communication" (Rajcham 2001: 20), 
we need to abandon the Seinsfrage or question of being -ontology- to embrace 
osmogenesis; from the mode of being to the mode of engagement. Deleuze calls this way
181 Cf. Chapter 8, Section 2, Subsection IV above.
-322-
out of nihilism, of the mode of being into the mode of engagement an "empirical 
conversion" (Rajcham 2001: 18); in the cultural matrix the conversion at issue takes on 
osmogenetical overtones.
Osmogenesis is a compound word made up by the noun coa^oÇ 'impulse/ and genesis, 
derived from the verb yevvaco 'to engender' and the suffix -aiÇ, 'action', 'formation', 
'operation,' 'generalization.' Osmogenesis signifies the perpetual, impulsive, action or 
activity of engendering; the perennial rebirth of the engagement. With an analogous 
description Nietzsche characterizes the 'will to power.' "Meaning consists of a relation of 
forces in which some act and others react in a complex and hierarchized whole. [...] This 
distinction is not only quantitative but also qualitative and typological, for it is in the nature 
of forces to be in relation to other forces and it is in this relation that they acquire their 
essence or quality" (Deleuze 2001 [1965]: 73). It is in (the act of) the transposement that 
elements gain their traits and, if you will, un-truth -dynamic and fictional by definition. Such 
process renders any ontological project utterly redundant on the count of both staticism and 
irrelevant objectivity. The only valid objectivity it seems is the one generated in the 
osmogenetic process, a procedure which one may assume to be prone to high variability. 
"The will to power, says Nietzsche, consists not in coveting or even in taking but in creating 
and giving" (ibid.). The manufacturer of culture gives itself off wholly into the engagement; 
it is this incessant act which keeps culture engaged and forms Kultur, thereby successfully 
preserving ioci standi.
Philosophy and science as epistëmë is being— presence-, that is— oriented, whilst Kultur is 
engagement-oriented. Thus while the former speaks of a mode of being or ontology, the 
latter of a mode of engaging or ontogenesis. Accordingly, the cultural matrix speaks of a 
plane that "far from reflecting the way things are, actually determines" them (Welburn 
2004: 246). "We can't understand the thing 'in itself', isolated from its context -any 'in itself' 
is an abstraction. Anything is always in alio, in dialogue with all elements constitutive of its 
context" (Panikkar 2009; own translation from the Catalan translation). Philosophy as 
epistëmë is contemplative, static whilst Kultur is active, dynamic, osmogenetic, in an ongoing 
state of engagement. Unlike Heidegger's anthropocentrism where "man is the 'place', the 
structural possibility that Being can reveal itself as such, and express its sense through 'man'
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(Kerslake 2002: 12), the polyvalence of Kultur manifests itself in the liberation, transitivity, 
and for that matter engagement, of immanence. It is in the perennial osmogenesis, the 
recurrent "throw of the dice" (Deleuze 2001 [1965]: 87) where transposements play 
themselves out.
It is worth comparing osmogenesis to phenomenology. Like science as Kultur, 
phenomenology aims to recentre science in the intersubjective lived experience or 
Lebenswelt unaided by technological artefacts or low-cultural instrumenta movendi. This is 
why, like the scientist that pursues Kultur, the phenomenologist believes that logos is a 
second-rate reality:
To return to things themselves is to return to that world which precedes knowledge, of which 
knowledge always speaks, and in relation to which every scientific schematization is an abstract 
and derivative sign-language, as is geography in relation to the countryside in which we have 
learnt beforehand what a forest, a prairie or a river is (Merleau-Ponty quoted in Abram 1996: 36).
However, for the father of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, such experience retains neo- 
Kantian overtones; it is a mental, intellectual endeavour. Contrastingly, "Merleau-Ponty 
begins [...] by identifying the subject -th e  experiencing 'se lf— with the bodily organism" 
(Abram 1996: 45). Merleau-Ponty paramountly relocates claims to truth in a pivotal locus 
standi, namely, the body. However, Cartesian subjectivist reminiscences are still evident. 
Osmogenesis, while retaining the phenomenological dimension, radically cuts across 
Cartesianism and Kantianism alike. It fully decentres the experiencing self -w hether  
identified with the mind or the body— and relocates it in the loci standi. Namely, it is not so 
much relevant the sensorial origin of claims to truth as the fact that science occurs in a 
regime of engaged immanence, that it is grounded in loci standi. The experiencing self is 
dissolved in Kultur, in the meeting -interface— of two or more loci standi; a meeting that 
goes beyond the phenomenological "ceaseless dance between the carnal subject and its 
world" (ibid: 54) - i t  erases both.
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Transposement As Hyperbolic  
Immanence: 
The Age O f Re-Embodiments
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“I  suggest t h a t  i f  we are to surv ive  in a meaningful way in the face  
o f  t h i s  d i s i n t e g r a t i o n  o f  the o v e r a l l  world order,  a t r u l y  c r e a t i v e  
movement to a new k in d  o f  wholeness is  nedeed, a movement t h a t  must 
u l t i m a t e l y  g iv e  r i s e  to a new o rder ;  in  the consciousness o f  both 
the i n d i v i d u a l  and s o c ie t y .  This order  w i l l  have to be as d i f f e r e n t  
from the modern order as was the modern from the medieval  o rd er ,  we 
cannot go back to a premodern order .  A postmodern world must come 
in to  being be fore  the modern world  destroys i t s e l f  so thoroughly  
t h a t  l i t t l e  can be done f o r  a long t ime to come."
-David Bohm182
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Synopsis - This chapter focuses upon the last transposement proposed in the present study, 
namely, hyperbolic immanence. In line with Nietzschean admonitions regarding the 
dissolution of metaphysics, it is claimed that to decentre the epistemological trajectory one 
shouldn't adopt a strategy based upon moving forward and the overcoming of the old -this  
conforms to the tactic characteristic of modernity. Rather, the closure of metaphysics entails 
the audacious occupation of the ground that this trajectory has sealed off on the count of 
untruthfulness. Nietzsche calls such strategy the errancy of metaphysics. The errants proper 
to the cultural matrix are, no doubt, the transposements. The force that activates them is 
called hyperbolic immanence.
In line with the etymological meaning of hyperbola, the characterization of immanence as 
hyperbolic means that the former goes beyond situated immanence in two directions or
182 Bohm 1988:59.
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moments. In the first moment, it registers the excesses that follow from the circulation of 
instrumenta movendi. In the second one, it endeavours to surpass the detected excesses. 
This second moment of hyperbolic immanence is geared at the restoration of loci standi so 
that manufacturers of culture may attain regimes of engaged immanence. To this end, the 
components of fossilizations must be re-assembled. This re-configuration entails the 
enactment of all the transposements hosted in the cultural matrix. The present chapter 
provides a review of this constellation.
The chapter closes by stating that every time that regimes of constrained immanence are 
detected and the need for their transposement is acknowledged, we may claim that we are 
enacting the Age of Re-Embodiments. This Age is made up of piecemeal and concerted 
efforts to leave the ecocidal mode of engagement behind.
1. Hyperbolic Immanence And The Dissolution Of Western Metaphysics
i
Errancy As The Dissolution Of Western Metaphysics - In Chapter 8 mention was made to 
the decentering of truth as veritate in favour of a truth in perennial statu nascendi, a truth 
that constantly erects itself in the repeated, direct engagements of immanence and is thus 
rather called fiction -from  the Latin form fingërë, 'to model', 'to invent'. Allusion has also 
been repeatedly made in various passages to the fact that Nietzsche -  and Heidegger who 
idiosyncratically follows the former as a master— posits that the search for logos and truth 
as foundation or Grund is the trademark of Western metaphysics (Plotnitsky 1993a: 152-3; 
Vattimo 1991 [1988]). The trajectory at issue has indeed privileged the quest for truth as 
immaculate representation of the facts (Rorty 1980).183 Nietzsche and Heidegger further 
pronounce that modernity is an indefatigable race marked by novelty and constant change. 
"Modernity is defined as the era of overcoming and of the new which rapidly grows old and 
is immediately replaced by something still newer, in an unstoppable movement that
183 Cf. Chapter 8, Section 4, Subsection V above.
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discourages creativity even as it demands creativity and defines the latter as the sole 
possible form of life" (Vattimo 1991 [1988]: 166).
In a framework characterized by its own proneness to unrelenting catching up with oneself, 
the strategy of 'overcoming' to exit from Western metaphysics drops its critical purchase. 
Nietzsche "cannot imagine a way out of modernity as the effect of critical overcoming" 
(ibid). The decentering of this trajectory doesn't consist in further moving forward in straight 
line. Rather, the destabilization of the epistemological monolith exacts the undertaking of 
multidirectional incursions into the ground and tract that the former has banned; the areas 
that epistemologists have qualified as untruthful need to be revisited and reconsidered. It is 
this territory that contains, in a bottled up manner, the bounty of life suppressed as it has 
been by the diktats of philosophy and science as epistêmê. Our headlong invasion of this 
subdued region, by way of plural transposements, conduces us to grow in immediate touch 
with those elements that are to assist us in our own resurrection, in directly engaging 
immanence again. Nietzsche calls this concerted counteroffensive the errancy of Western 
metaphysics, strategy which is in diametrical opposition to the undertaking of a direct 
affront with the foundational Being or God. At the end of the metaphysical trajectory, "[i]n 
Nietzsche's terms, thought does not return to the origin in order to appropriate it; all that it 
does is travel along the multiple paths of errancy, which is the only kind of wealth [...] that is 
ever given to us" (ibid: 174). Western metaphysics is dissolved to the extent that the 
material that has been silenced and repressed in the steady ascendancy of the former is 
released.
In the cultural matrix, this treading on forbidden swathe corresponds to the unfolding of the 
manifold transposements that shall gradually riddle Western metaphysics. Transposements 
are cross-streets of Kultur that traverse in multiple directions the objectifying 
epistemological monolith. In the cultural matrix the force that allows for these destabilizing 
penetrations is called hyperbolic immanence.
II
Initial Characterization Of Hyperbolic Immanence - In the course of this dissertation two 
approaches to or types of immanence have been examined. In Chapter 3 we went through
the plane of immanence as enacted by the post-Kantian critique of reason. Of this we said 
that it effectively consolidates an innerwordly turn but leaves the immanent turning-point 
largely incomplete. In Chapter 8 it was argued that the plane of immanence, when truly 
liberated to itself, appears as a situated and active spatiality that realizes itself in certain 
degrees of constrained-engaged immanence, simultaneously signalling certain degrees of 
dis-embodiment, dis-embeddednes and de-contextualization. In such disposition 
immanence enjoys historical and analytical value. The information that we obtain from the 
regimes of constrained-engaged immanence is material to both the intra- and inter-cultural 
relations.184 In the present chapter we set forth hyperbolic immanence, by way of which the 
dynamics of transformation in the cultural matrix is articulated.
Ellipses conform to that geometric form that engenders stable heliocentric circles. Planets 
draw ellipses around the Sun. Comets, instead, burn themselves off. The uneven forms they 
draw around the Sun account for part of this phenomenon. Comets describe such 
pronouncedly stretched out ellipses around the Sun that the latter rather resemble 
parabolas and hyperbolas. A hyperbola is a smooth curve that gets steeper or flatter at a 
constant rate. In observing the fate of comets, we may say that hyperbolas cause suffering 
to the body that follows their route. Regimes of constrained immanence are hyperbolic in 
this respect. Instrumenta movendi and fossilizations characterize regimes of constrained 
immanence. Fossilizations obstruct the subjecting-subjected activities of the manufacturers 
of culture. Instrumenta movendi are differantial in relation to loci standi. Instrumenta 
movendi gain their enactment by mediating -disembodying, disembedding, 
decontextualizing— loci standi. In the course of such mediation, embodiment, 
embeddedness and contextualization are deferred ad infinitum. It is in this light that we can 
assert that regimes of constrained immanence are the distorted, exaggerated, hyperbolic, 
disfigured -indeed constrained— version of the regimes of engaged immanence. Yet it is this 
context of surfeits that contains the seed of its own transposement.
The vocable 'hyperbolic' derives from the Hellenic infinitive form ûnepôâÀAeLv, 'to exceed'. 
Hyperbolic immanence exceeds situated immanence -th e  regimes of constrained-engaged 
immanence— in two reciprocal directions. First, it goes beyond
184 Cf. Chapter 8 and9 above.
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its excesses and extravagances. It polices the denials of engaged immanence that follow 
from an overabundance of low- middle- and high-cultural instrumenta movendi put to 
circulation, and their resulting fossilizations. Second, it endeavours a transposement towards 
a higher degree of engaged immanence so that the immoderations that follow from the 
unrestrained proliferation of instrumenta movendi may be surpassed. There are thus two 
moments to hyperbolic immanence. The first one registers hyperbolas or regimes with an 
exaggerated degree of constrained immanence. The second one addresses the hyperbolas at 
issue by exceeding them with the restoration of loci standi.
2. The Second Moment Of Hyperbolic Immanence
l
The Restoration Of Loci Standi - Rephrasing Heidegger, Vattimo (1991 [1988]: 171) mentions 
that in our "living completely the experience of the necessity of error" to decentre Western 
metaphysics we come face to face with "Being itself" (idem: 175). While we may sidestep 
the meaning of Being in Heidegger's work -its  addressing may well take up the space of 
another dissertation, it is important that we clarify the significance of Being for the cultural 
matrix. As it was announced in Chapter 7 and subsequently in Chapter 10, osmogenesis 
orients the theoretical and analytical perspective in a direction utterly distinct to the one 
privileged by ontology, the solipsist discourse on being. This is equal to saying that in the 
wake of a slain God -th e  objective and foundational Being of the Western metaphysical 
trajectory—/oc/ standi are freed from the pressing repression that the former used to wield 
upon them. The paced termination of Western metaphysics entails the progressive 
restoration of loci standi. The eradication of a centralizing figure liberates a repressed 
plurality.
High-culturally, the exercise of hyperbolic immanence in its second moment consists, in line 
with Nietzsche's and Heidegger's announcement above, in committing error vis-à-vis 
Western metaphysical standards. It is about occupying the space of non-truth in accordance 
with an epistemological characterization of the latter. Meaning has to be localized so that 
self-styled fictions may ensue. The overarching banner of sustainable development that 
stands for industrial production should be relinquished with certain urgency. Instead,
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cosmovisions inspired by loci stondi should flourish to their utter fulfilment. This condition 
implies to learn a great deal from indigenous communities. The West and Westernized world 
have already uprooted a great amount of loci-stondi-re\ate6 traditions. As the ethno- 
ecologist Victor Toledo (1999) aptly claims, indigenous -ecosystems— people hold the 
memory of the human species. It is their existence what makes history cyclical and thus 
continuous -as opposed to linear and thus discontinuous. A pervasive trait of indigenous 
people is that they feed upon local Weltanschauungen. Their deeds, indeed, close ecocycles.
Middle-culturally, the re-establishment of loci standi entails the re-embeddedness of the 
polity in eco-constituencies. The implications of such statement for centralized states are, it 
goes without saying, enormous. If we fall short of advocating their full disappearance, we 
still must opt for the considerable dwindling of the volume and import of states; this is to 
say, the production of nuclear energy and weapons of mass-destruction, and the 
development of pharaonic infrastructure should come to a halt. By contrast, counties ought 
to turn into virtually sovereign entities. As county-states, they ought to be part of a global 
confederation that regulates the global polity under the principle of honesty.
Finally, the low-cultural retrieval of loci standi signifies the re-embodiment of Western and 
Westernized tread on Mother Tellus in ecocyles and biorhythms alike. The liberation of loci 
standi is the simultaneous encircling of instrumenta movendi. There are no halfway 
solutions as, and this is an irreducible truth, both loci standi and instrumenta movendi 
operate in networks. A fern can't survive on its own. Rather, it requires a complex ecosystem 
-o r  a series of them as an ecosystem can't survive on its own. Similarly, a car puts a high 
demand upon ores and petroleum. Its mass commercialization entails a well-developed 
traffic infrastructure, constantly improving and expanding. It simultaneously exacts the mass 
production of cars, among other reasons, to give a sense of normalization to this anomalous 
and short-lived -in  view of its intensive ecological footprint— means of transport.
We are face-to-face with the battle between the autochthonous loci standi and the 
barbarian instrumenta movendi. And it's completely up to us to win this battle or to let it be 
lost. The stakes are high and the road is arduous for basically three reasons. One, the vested 
interests of the politico-industrial cliques ratified by centres of meaning production such as
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further educational institutions and think tanks. Two, the untold riches of loci-standi that 
have been hitherto eradicated. Three, the inertias and sense of normalcy that the 
proliferation of instrumenta movendi has unleashed.
Where are the bastions of hope to let loci standi flourish back in? I can think of three 
enclosures of loci standi. In order of effectiveness, first, out of the box solutions, such as 
altruistically setting up organic farms as new hubs for socialization. In New England it is fairly 
common practice for many collages to run their own organic farms. Second, the 
altermondialiste movement or movement of movements that is developing around the 
World Social Forum. Third, resistance from within such as the 'Prosperity without Growth' 
movement that has developed around the work by Tim Jackson. However, these three 
pointers seem to me paramountly insufficient vis-à-vis the stakes. It seems that we shall 
have to close the tragicomedy of the Age of Dis-Embodiments as tragicomedies in Ancient 
Greece would. Namely, by means of a Deus-ex-machina. Quite literally, we need a set of 
miracles to reverse trends and let loci standi flow back in. Perhaps when the glaciers start 
their mass melting and weather conditions worsen dramatically those who live padded with 
instrumenta movendi shall learn to turn our backs to all these variegated devices where we 
have come to depend, and shall start appreciating the true beauty and functionality inherent 
in loci standi. It's only that at that point the climate system may have been irreversibly 
altered.
The second moment of hyperbolic immanence shatters linearity in time. "Being the meeting 
point of the Past and the Future, [the hyperbolic Present] is by its very nature a turning point 
-a  period of revolution, for better or for worst" (Bhave 2002 [1951]: 1). In so far as it aims to 
surpass extreme regimes of constrained immanence, hyperbolic immanence is an intentional 
act. It entails a revised engagement with respect to the course of 'history' in the instant it is 
occurring. Hyperbolic immanence "would describe the course of history not as a linear 
progression or as decadence, but as a course of events in which emancipation is reached 
only by means of a radical transformation and distortion of its very contents" (Vattimo 1991 
[1981]: 179). The referred distortion is achieved by way of the enactment of the 
transposements that make up the cultural matrix on the part of the manufacturer of culture.
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In Chapter 2, where the neologism in its primal form -'transposition'— was announced, it 
was said that the designation 'transposement' stood for both the entire exercise and the 
specific conditions of in-transitivity as developed chapter by chapter.185 As partially glossed 
in Chapter 10, the exercise of hyperbolic immanence, qua the intentional setting of the 
course of history in the direction of a post-ecocidal panorama, consists in transposing 
positions.186 It is about placing a transposement where there used to be a position or a 
hyposement.187
The exceeding of Western metaphysics "is an overcoming neither in the usual sense nor in 
the sense of a dialectical Aufhebung" (Vattimo 1991 [1988]: 171) The act of transposing, the 
second moment of the hyperbolic dimension isn't a synthesis of a thesis and its 
contradiction as in Hegel. Nor does it consist in stepping back to retrieve the overlooked 
original Being as in Heidegger. "For Hegel, the conversation with the earlier history of 
philosophy has the character of Aufhebung, that is, of the mediating concept in the sense of 
an absolute foundation. For us [Heidegger], the character of the conversation with the 
history of thinking is no longer Aufhebung but Schritt zurück, the step back" (Heidegger in 
Identity and Difference quoted in Allen 1993: 83). Osmogenesis, by contrast, establishes a 
conversation with philosophy and science as epistêmê by way of situated and hyperbolic 
immanence. This theoretical perspective aims to detect the degree of constrained-engaged 
immanence enjoyed by manufacturers of culture and culti at large. When the case arises, it 
advocates higher degrees of engaged immanence to secure Kultur. In relation to the 
epistemological disposition, osmogenesis provokes the mass conversion of solipsist positions 
into transposements. It imposes the death of things-in-themselves while granting their 
rebirth under the transposemental condition. "Death is not the simple outside of life. Death 
also inaugurates life" (Derrida 1997: 143). Transposements secure resurrection to positions 
in cultural ground.
Derrida provides for our purposes here an operative procedure to go about the second 
moment of hyperbolic immanence -th e  moment of the transposement. The French 
philosopher (Derrida 1987: 10) claims that undertaking a destruction of, in our own
185 Cf. Chapter 2, Section 3, Subsection IV above.
186 Cf. Chapter 10, Section 3, Subsection VII above.
187 Cf. Chapter 3, Section 1, Subsection I above.
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parlance, a fossilized configuration is not about "the demolition but the de-sedimentation, 
the de-construction" of different episodes of interaction among instrumenta movendi which 
steadily coalesce, sediment in the form of fossilizations. The act of transposement, in other 
words, consists not so much in knocking down the erected structure -th e  fossilization— as in 
mainly reassembling the elements that make them up. The objective of such reconfiguration 
is the opening of the possibility for manufacturers of culture to attain ever higher degrees of 
embodiment, embeddedness and contextualization.
II
Synoptic Overview Of The Transposements To Be Enacted -  As a simultaneous synoptic 
chart, let us next see the role that each transposement plays in the enactment of hyperbolic 
immanence in its second moment:
The contextualization of the exercise of philosophy renders all its statements politically 
relevant. The validity of its claims to truth is further regarded as provisional. The practice of 
philosophy turns into an endeavour that erects itself with an expiry date attached to it. Truth 
drops its pretensions of immortality.
The deployment of the logic of in-transitivity is meant to displace both hyposemental logic 
and the logic of supplementarity. Its application discredits the value of the disjunctive 
mindset 'either, say, idealism or materialism' proper to Western metaphysics on the count 
that this structure has privileged an andromorphism disrespectful of the whole of existence. 
The logic of in-transitivity equally rivals Derrida's of supplementarity -b o th  presence and 
absence'. The perspective obtained by the addition of opposed poles succeeds in addressing 
issues internal to philosophy. It fails however to re-orient culture in a post-ecocidal 
direction. The configuration that follows from the deployment of the logic of in-transitivity, 
by contrast, is designed to discern between ecocidal and non-ecocidal elements.
The endorsement of relations distances the exercise of philosophy and science from the 
attempt to both characterize things-in-themselves -as in realism— and identify the socio­
political load of scientific assertions -as in constructivism. The overt acknowledgement of 
the operative multidirectional relations in scientific practice, timidly shatters the Cartesian
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subject/object rift.
The circulation of the cultural matrix further displaces the Cartesian cogito -culture is 
utterly dissociated from Cartesian connotations. What is more, culture turns into the matrix 
-from  matrice, 'womb'— of all possible transposements; it is the foremost reconfigurative 
operator. Culture qua a grid grounds a wholesale metaphysics. It makes it possible that 
hyperbolic immanence be not only an exclusive low-cultural affair but a simultaneous 
middle- and high-cultural one.
The transposement embodiment endeavours to leave behind the idealist/materialist 
hyposement. In embodying philosophical and scientific statements, the uncritical 
materialism endorsed by post-Kantian authors in the wake of Marx's triumphant claim over 
idealism becomes redundant. The truly immanent dimension emerges to be embodiment. 
(Embodiment, a low-cultural category is subsequently supplemented with a middle-cultural 
counterpart, viz. embeddedness, and a high-cultural one, contextualization. That is to say, 
embodiment, embeddedness and contextualization alike appear as three paramount 
immanent traits.) From this vantage position, the Marxian materialism that emulates 
industrial homofaberis  seen as an unproblematized reversal of idealism.
The plane of immanence, in asymmetric opposition to the transcendent spatiality, aims to 
effectively restore the space of innerworldedness. In so doing, dualism, binary thinking is 
further displaced -  the immanent expanse conceives all elements inherent to its plane as 
forming a plurality. The enactment of the plane of immanence is however considered 
insufficient. There are another two sequences in the progressive process of unfettering the 
immanent spatiality from its epistemological shackles. Once binary logic has been displaced 
by asserting the all-inclusiveness of all possible extant elements, a subsequent movement 
consists in situating the plane at issue. In so operating, the all-indwelling elements emerge 
as constrained-engaged to a certain degree. In view of the constantly shifting nature of such 
disposition, this second sequence -which leads to a transposement— is referred to by the 
name of regimes of constrained-engaged immanence. When the regimes at issue 
materialize in high degrees of constrained immanence, the third sequence of the plane of 
immanence comes into view. This, named hyperbolic immanence, splits into two moments.
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In the first one, the excesses committed by the circulation of instrumenta movendi are 
registered. In the second one, the immoderations at issue are endeavoured to be subdued 
by deploying the ensemble of transposements that populate the cultural matrix. Sufficient 
has been said of this third sequence in the course of the present chapter.
Once the immanent expanse is identified as manifesting itself on the basis of situated 
structures, two positions that conform to the building blocks of a hyposement are intended 
to be evaded. Situated structuralism aims to uproot, on the one hand, the universalizing 
spirit proper to the Modern Age -in  itself a culmination of the epistemological disposition. 
On the other, it endeavours to displace the unmitigated contextualism defended by a good 
number of postmodern authors. Situated structuralism, which in the cultural matrix takes 
the form of culti, further intends to transpose the whole/part hyposement identified as 
foundational to the epistemological outlook. Culti neither occupy the whole cosmic expanse 
nor conform to a subdivision of a larger entity. Culti are rather relative wholes.
An additionally asphyxiating fossilization which the second moment of hyperbolic 
immanence is to take issue with is that of the splintered fields of knowledge -th e  atomized 
disciplines. The dissection of the realm of cognition leads to cognitive fallacies. Each field of 
knowledge distorts the truth of the relative whole or cultus by overemphasizing certain 
factors of the latter. Economics, to take one example, has placed such a disproportionate 
importance to material elements or instrumenta movendi that it has consolidated and 
circulated as valid, a theory of value grounded upon the latter.188 Ecology, to take another 
example, is inconsistently buttressing the Cartesian notion that nature is an expanse made 
up of components liable to quantification, manipulation and subject to scientific laws. To 
evade such distortions, the manufacturer of culture is encouraged to put into circulation the 
low- middle- and high-cultural correlative transposements of culture. Low-culture deals 
with re-productive processes, middle-culture addresses issues related to the collective 
sphere and high-culture attends to those affairs connected to the production of meaning. 
Unlike disciplines that are set forth independently, the three dimensions of culture are 
always seen in parallel in a manner that the contents of low-culture in no way eclipse those 
of middle and high-culture and vice-versa -rather, one is a reminder of the extant relevance
188 Cf. Chapter 9, Section 3, Subsection II above.
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of the other remaining two dimensions. These correlative transpositions make possible the 
analysis to some detail of situated structures or culti without losing sight of either the sundry 
features that characterize them or the general tone of the whole structure.
The agenda of equity is a main issue in the second moment of hyperbolic immanence. "The 
environmental justice movement is an indication that we are beginning to appreciate the 
extent to which environmental problems are also problems of social distribution" (Hornborg 
2001: 49; emphasis in the original). In the ecocidal mode of engagement, a redistributive 
middle-culture is more likely to restore the balance that some segments of the human 
species have lost with their own loci standi than is the advocacy of further development of 
instrumenta movendi (Martinez-Alier 2000b [1997b]; Rist 2002). The accent here invariably 
falls upon the qualification 'some segments of the human species': "the message that we are 
'all in the same boat (or spaceship)' is not true; there are at least two boats, and one of them  
is pulling the other towards catastrophe" (Hornborg 2001: 35). The restoration of loci standi 
for the collective striking of regimes of engaged immanence is but a middle-cultural -socio­
political- affair. De Lucia (2008) is further vocal in this respect:
A great deal of the consequences of "extreme" weather events (droughts, floods etc.) and slower 
consequences of global warming (desertification), are indeed linked to the local social and 
ecological changes which have taken places over the centuries, through man-made 
reconfigurations of landscapes and industrial activities: deforestation, soil exploitation, 
underground water reservoirs depletion, river banking, damming, draining, leveling, mining etc.
These activities and their consequences -  which to a large extent are the result of colonization 
and post-colonial development policies - are being obscured by the discourse of mitigation and 
adaptation, as if by mitigating climate change the impacts of these other activities would 
disappear.
Cause/effect corresponds to yet another hyposement to be decentred. To exceed this 
layout, manufacturers of culture should unfold the dynamic transposements. These signal 
degrees in three correlative continua. Low-culturally, it is a point in a space characterized by 
dis embodiment that is registered; what matters middle-culturally is the extent to which 
collective institutions are dis-embedded from eco-constituencies; high-culturally the 
relevance falls upon the scale of de-contextualization vis-à-vis bioregional outlooks. Heeding
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these magnitudes assists in the displacement of the principle of causality ingrained in 
philosophy and science under the aegis of epistêmê.
There are three hyposements that compellingly oppress the plurality of elements that 
provide secure stay to culture. Exceeding Western metaphysics entails the recognition of 
these loci standi and the destabilization of the repressive binary dispositions at issue. The 
liberation of loci standi presupposes the decentering of the living-organism/inert-matter 
divide. It further signifies the uprooting of an objectifying figure -G od— as well as its place 
to stop science or any other monist essentialism from readily occupying the vacant position. 
The release of loci standi additionally involves the disqualification of the vying monisms 
anthropocentrism/ecocentrism -they obscure the cultural polycentrism incarnated by loci 
standi.
Regimes of constrained-engaged immanence reinscribe the course of history in the cultural 
matrix and transpose it. They reread cultural events according to the degree of constrained- 
engaged immanence they exhibit at the low- middle- and high-cultural levels as opposed to 
their imputed ascendant linearity. Regimes of engaged immanence build upon loci standi 
characterized, inter alia, by originally rhythmic cycles. The subjecting-subjected activity of 
the manufacturers of culture leads automatically to engage loci standi at the simultaneous 
low- middle- and high-cultural levels. This activity dissolves the centrality played by both the 
theo- and anthropo-morphic subjects in the epistemological trajectory. The activity of the 
manufacturer of culture further challenges the epistemological notion of truth. In engaging 
immanence by way of loci standi, truth turns into a fiction under a constant state of 
construction. Regimes of constrained immanence are, by way of contrast, ruled by the 
fossilizations that follow from the prolonged circulation of instrumenta movendi at the 
simultaneous low- middle- and high-cultural dimensions. Fossilizations adumbrate a passed 
-past— track that lends to a highly intractable erasure.
The operation of large collections of regimes of constrained immanence and the 
fossilizations that follow thereof over the centuries have lead to the cultus of Leviathan -a  
designation that intends to be more comprehensive than that of 'modernity', 'capitalism' 
and 'self-regulating market economy'. The survival of the cultus of Leviathan hinges upon its
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constant expansion and annexation of the independent culti of Tellus. The exercise of the 
second moment of hyperbolic immanence entails the reversal of such trend and the resolve 
of the cultus of Leviathan into a constellation of Tellusian ones. To this end, a political 
ecology that acknowledges the intrinsic value of loci standi needs to be developed and 
implemented in key contemporary issues such as a post-Kyoto treaty for climate justice.
The prescriptive regimes of engaged immanence direct philosophical and scientific practice 
towards Kultur. Philosophical and scientific statements under the aegis of Kultur entail a 
wholesale low- middle- and high-cultural disposition rooted in loci standi. The practitioner 
must grow into a fully embodied, embedded and contextualized position in order to perform 
the skill of producing knowledge -in  line with one of the etymological meanings of scientia. 
With a view to dissolving logocentrism, scientific statements under Kultur are organized in 
interactive cultures of knowledge -e.g., the culture of plants, the culture of the stars. In 
order to evade the solipsism and fallacies that follow from the compartmentalization of 
knowledge and duly preserve cultural correlations, findings under Kultur are arranged in 
cognitive complementarities that take the form of low-, middle-cultural and high-cultural 
clusters. Kultur impedes that knowledge be derived from the mode of being. It bans the 
issuing of static claims to truth concerned with thing-in-themselves. Rather cognition under 
Kultur springs from the immediate mode of engagement of immanence. The claims that 
derive from the ongoing low- middle- and high-cultural impressions attained by the 
manufacturers of culture are scientific. This is equal to saying that with the advent of Kultur, 
the production of knowledge is no longer an issue of the isolated mind but a fully-fledged 
cultural affair. The 'cultures of knowledge' that Kultur promotes no longer signify, as in 
science as epistêmê, static and accumulating bodies of data. Rather, they entail a mode of 
interpenetration with the subject-matter under scrutiny rooted in a high degree of engaged 
immanence.
The eradication of regimes of constrained immanence ultimately entails the abandonment 
of ontology -th e  solipsist discourse on being—and the approval of the osmogenetic outlook. 
Osmogenesis exalts the centrality of relations in the analysis. One of the remits of this 
cognitive approach is the discernment of whether scientific statements have been 
established on the basis of loci standi or on that of instrumenta movendi.
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3. The Age Of Re-Embodiments
The present analysis has endeavoured to expose the fact that our contemporaneity involves 
a fundamental reordering of the elements that conform to reality as well as the manner they 
are conveyed. This reshuffling attends to the crisis of the mode of engagement characteristic 
of the Modern Age, traversed as it is with multiple epistemological motifs -a  truism that 
became evident in our patient analysis of the promise of sustainable development.189 This 
crisis is all the more prominent in view of the growing ecocidal mode of engagement into 
which the Modern Age is deriving.
We live in a time when the proliferation of all sorts of instrumenta movendi has come to 
question the ratio loci standi-instrumenta movendi. This is an age that conduces to myriad 
dis-embodiments - i t  may be submissively called the Age of Dis-Embodiments. Yet the 
politics we have adopted following our willingness to regain the sites where some of us are 
used to undertaking labour-related, healing and recreational activities exacts the fashioning 
of an age where loci standi should appear as normative. To facilitate the transition from dis­
embodiments into re-embodiments we must, without fail, re-orient the Age of Dis- 
Embodiments. In Chapter 5, the tone taken by postmodernity was referred back to 
metaphysics. It follows that Post-Modern Age is no apposite banner to allude to this ultra­
modern times we are to build to suffocate the ecocidal mode of engagement. What is in 
order is the activation of hyperbolic immanence. In its first moment this alert immanence 
registers hyperbolas or regimes of constrained immanence; in its second it activatees 
transposements geared at re-contextualization, re-embeddedness and re-embodiment. To 
furnish the multiple disembodiments with a prescriptive edge, the rubric Age of Re- 
Embodiments appears as a plausible candidate. The suffix 're-' indicates 'going back usually 
in a reformed manner'. The denomination 're-embodiments' speaks in the form of a 
metonymy for wholesale transposements -th e  correlative transposements are a reminder 
that low-culture is without fail endowed with middle- and high-cultural counterparts. 
Processes of re-embodiment are accompanied by re-embeddedness and re-
189 Cf. Chapter 1, Section 1 above.
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contextualization. Re is furthermore one of the possible spellings for the Egyptian Sun God. 
The Sun, as we saw in the previous Chapter, is a central manufacturer of culture.190 In this 
respect, the Age of Re-Embodiments stands for yet an additional metonymy. It denotes both 
manufactures at large and their building blocks, the loci standi. While "[i]n its depiction of 
artisanal technë [...] classical philosophy indulged the illusion that civilization runs on its 
own, practically like nature" (Allen 2004: 115), the Age of Re-Embodiments is particularly 
wary of the ratio technê or instrumenta movendi-loci standi.
The Age of Re-Embodiments is the process of resolving the antinomies proper to the 
ecocidal mode of engagement. When Latour (1993:14) poses the question, "Who is to write 
the full constitution [one which takes into account all aspects of the Modern Age]?" The 
answer is not so much "anthropology [as it allegedly] has been pretty good at tackling 
everything at once" (ibid) as Kultur. With low- middle- and high-cultural dimensions, Kultur is 
the Aufklarung of the Age of Re-Embodiments: it is a low- middle- and high-cultural coming 
of age at one and the same time. Kultur registers the modern imbroglios with the help of 
hyperbolic immanence.
Despite the restrictions imposed by low-culture,191 the Age of Re-Embodiments is hardly 
subject to a timeline. To be sure, it is not the case that with this Age "we are entering a new 
era" (Latour 1993: 47). The Age of Re-Embodiments doesn't come after the Modern Age, or 
the Postmodern for that matter, forming an unbroken continuum. The Age of Re- 
Embodiments can set the two latter into perspective, as traces within its bosom exhibiting a 
certain degree of constrained-engaged immanence. By contrast, the Modern Age -o r  the 
Postmodern for that matter— is unable to register the multiple manifestations of the 
multiple ecocides that it encourages and justifies. Hence, by way of Latour (1993: 130), we 
may somehow pronounce that the Age of Re-Embodiments is "the nonmodern world that 
we are entering [...] without ever having really left it".
The Age of Re-Embodiments is alive every time that the need to run culti on an embodied, 
embedded and contextualized basis is explicitly acknowledged. One is in a position to
Cf. Chapter 10, Section 3, Subsection II above.
191 Cf. Chapter 6, Section 1, Subsection I above.
-340-
recognize the advent of the Age at issue from the moment when this began to be necessary, 
namely, when instrumenta movendi appeared and started invading culti around the world. 
This is the moment of the Neolithic Revolution and metallurgy (Cf. Toynbee, 1976: 44). This 
Age, moreover, is not so much a historical period as a situation by which intellectual -high- 
cultural— analysis and high- middle- and low-cultural transposements take place at a time. 
To be more precise, the Age of Re-Embodiments is a series of hyperbolic situated structures 
where the excesses that follow from the circulation of low- middle- and high-cultural 
instrumenta movendi are willingly denounced in the form of transposements to higher 
degrees of engaged immanence.
a a a a
n u n
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Epilogue
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Answer To The Q uesti
Was 1st Aufklarung Kultu
annanxxan
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“The as y e t  unnamable which i s  p r o c l a i m i n g  i t s e l f  and which can do 
so, as i s  n ecessary  whenever a b i r t h  i s  in  the o f f i n g ,  o n l y  under  
the s p e c ies  o r  n o n sp ec ie s , in  the f o r m le s s ,  mute, i n f a n t ,  and
t e r r i f y i n g  form o f  m o n s t r o s i t y . "
-Jacques  D e r r i d a 193
H n H H n n n H H H H H H H H H H H H H n H  H H H H B H H H H H H K H H H H H H H B n H
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Synopsis -This doctoral thesis was initiated by claiming that the immanent mobilization 
endeavoured by the Enlightenment project is largely left unfinished. The path opened up by 
les Lumières to be emulated and further pursued is the attempt to de-link from dogmatisms 
and doctrinaire thinking alike. However, the full release of the immanent turn, as the 
chapters that make up the present work intended to exhibit, conforms to a phenomenon 
that bypasses the pretensions of reason as the fulcrum of the turn at issue. Taking the 
immanent spatiality to its logical conclusions entails a wholesale low- middle- and high- 
cultural shake-up.
This epilogue transposes the first four paragraphs of the foundational text of the 
Enlightenment project. It is Immanuel Kant's terse reply to the German periodical, 
Berlinische Monatsschrift, to the question 'Was ist Aufklarung?' published in 1784. In this 
exercise Kant's transcendental idealism is reinscribed in the cultural matrix so that we gain a 
literary characterization of the full immanent turn as proposed in the chapters above.
19‘ A fictitious name. That is, no author(ity) but an anonymous voice o f the Age o f Re-Embodiments.
193 Derrida 1978e: 293.
194 The te x t is a m oderately free rendering o f my own form  the original German. I compared my results w ith  specifically th ree  English
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A. Have Courage To Liberate Yourself From Your Own Attitudinal Immaturity
..................  |i
Aufklarung Kultur is the conscious hyperbolic departure an individual 
manufacturer of culture undertakes with an eye towards releasing themselves 
[from  their self-incurred attitudinal imm aturity
|  Attitudinal imm aturity  +s, m
turn, the inability to  employ one's reason
free of fo reign guidance g g g g g g g g  
fossilizations Self-incurred, on the other hand, refers to tWs j § i , e $ e  very 
a ttitudinal immaturity regimes o f constrained immanence, when the cause of
the latter is not rooted in a deficiency in the innate competence of reason
and courage to employ one's reason *-n,;3penf@0 0 NI
immanence free of foreign guidance. Sapere aude\ Wave courage to employ 
your own reason! |  gg^l This is exactly the maxim of
the
B. Laziness And Cowardice Call For 
In
To Set
Laziness and cowardice are the two reasons which elucidate why there is such 
great a portion of individuals 0 0 0 § j j§ r e -  ulture in th e w orld Tellus who 
prefer to linger in a lifelong constrained condition of a ttitud inal imm aturity, 
even long after Natu re the immanent spatiality has set them free from foreign 
guidance [naturaliter maiorennes). The aforementioned reasons further gloss 
why it appears extraordinarily easy for these fore ign m inds
to set themselves forth as guardians. How comfortable it is to be
translations published online at h ttp ://www-personal.ksu.edu/~lvm an/enR lish233/Kant-
W IE.htm ,h ttp ://w w w .fo rdham .edu/ha lsa ll/m od /kant-w ha tis .h tm l. and h ttp ://e th ics.acusd.edu/Books/Kant/Enlightenm ent/what-is- 
enlightenm entKant.h tm .
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immature in ottitudo mm! Whenever I am in
possession of a book which has reason -in lieu of my own reason offers a high- 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ^ 0 0 ] ,  a pastor who has conscience in
lieu of my own conscience_______________________
middle-culture, a doctor who prescribes a diet for mo 
own engage d low culture, and so on and so forth, in such cases I need not 
bother myself. There is no need for me to think to conduct a low- middle- and 
1 ^ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 ^ 0 0 ,  if I can only pay -a  foreign m ind |  
fossilization to swiftly take over the irksome task for me. It comes therefore as 
no surprise that the great majority of individuals (manufacturers of iu l:u re  
(amid whom the entirety of the fair sex) considers the step toward a ttitud inal 
maturity the attainment of regimes o f engaged immanence perilous on top of 
burdensome. Such a disposition the guardians 0 0 0 0 ^ ^ 0 0 0 0 1 ^ 0 0 1 0  
Leviathan rush to set up -they  who so willingly have undertaken the 
superintendence of individuals the tu it i o f Tellus, Once the guardians core- 
fossilizations first render the flocks dumb and then carefully ascertain that 
these tamed creatures shall not dare leap one step out of the cage where they 
have been sealed, they subsequently proceed to present the domesticated 
creatures with the peril which shall loom over them, were they to endeavour to 
w alk-alone establish re g r nroanence. Redundant as it is to
mention that this peril is scarcely so great, for, by stumbling a few occasions the 
creatures would finally learn to tread on their own foot establish regimes of 
engaged immanence; it is nevertheless certain that threatening the creatures 
once would suffice to inhibit them and in consequence put o ff any prospective 
attempt of their own.
C. Striving Yourself Out Of A ttitudinal Immaturity Regimes o f Constrained 
Entails Great Hardships
It appears therefore onerous for an isolated individual 
constrained immanence which has almost naturally encroached upon t hem
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The individual manufacturer of culture has grown 
enormously fond of this state, not to mention the poignant reality that for the 
moment he |  is deprived from employing his own-reason ^oncuitm g its i  wn
opportunity to aim at it. Statutes and formulas, these mechanical artefacts 
which replace the fe asoned use -o r
rather m isuse H B B tB B H B H B B W -  of his natural gifts H H H H I ,  are the 
shackles fossilisations responsible for the perpetuation of an attitudinal 
immaturity immet erçe in the indiv idual N N N M N I
| On the other hand, the fact that those who were to shake o ff the
shackles -would merely be able to to tte r a li t t le over the narrowest ditch remove
is no less o f a sorrowful veracity for the 
individual manufacturer o f culture] is not accustomed to such degree of free 
movement degree nmanence. It is thus obvious that barely a few
successfully strive themselves out of the state of attitudinal immaturity 
0 0 0 0 1 0 ^ ^ 0 1 1 ^  through the—exefdse—of their own—minds 0
middle- and high-- e, and acquire a steady
gait in the aftermath.
D. Contrastingly, a Gradual Experience of Aufklarung  N M 0  is Likely to Occur 
among a Group of Individuals Within a Cvltub
Conversely, it is fairly likely that a group of individuals enlightens itself  ja cluster 
0 0 0 0 ^ ^ ^ 0 ^ 0 0 0 0 y n g d # e  o r i ' C 0 ^ 0 l 0 | ^ ^ | .  Such a process 
unfolds almost naturally im m inently when an individual is endowed with
freedom a
of fossilizations. For the w orld Tellus shall always accommodate autonomous 
th inkers manufacturers conducting uncompromising engagements of
even amongst the guardians 
appointed to rule the masses. The masses once they have rid themselves of the 
yoke of at t itud inal immaturity c o n s t r a i n e d  i m m a n e n c e ,  shall spread beyond 
their confines the spirit to dare make a§ reasoned |e p ga § | assessment of one's
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mer its and calling 1 ^ ^ ^ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 ^ ^ 0 0  which one possesses to 
thmk by themselves oyrn v f ram c ^ 0 0 .  Now, the
bizarre thing here is realizing that the group of individuals peripheral 
manufacturers whom the guard ians c o re - fo s s 0 0 0 0  had subjugated to yokes 
in the past, may force the guardians c j'e -fu ^ iliz d t.o n j themselves at a later 
stage, incapable as they are of anv Aufklarung M B .  under yokes -on ly  if a few 
guardians çore-fossilizations compel the group 0riphera l manufacturers to act 
in such a manner. It is so detrimental to sow prejudices spread im>lrumeniQ 
^ ^ 0 1 ^ ^ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ^ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  for,
sooner or later, their instigators (or, in their absence, descendants of theirs) 
perceive revenge in some fashion or other. The rationale now exposed 
demonstrates that group of individuals 0 0 0 0 ^ ^ 0 0 0 ^ ^ ^ 0 0 0 0 ^ 0 0  
may only gradually attain Aufklarung 000 . A revolution may unfold the seed 
to foster the fall of a despotism which one person a core-fossilization exerts 
upon a group cultus as well as to halt avaricious and tyrannical constraining 
oppression; a revolution holds nonetheless no potential in itself whatsoever to 
sow the seeds of an authentic reform in the manner of th inking conducting
Novel prejudices instrumenta movendi
. ____________
and carbon trade then
emerge, which, in the likeness and image of obsolete ones, serve as the new
leash to bmd constrain afresh the masses, previously d ispossessed of the ir
competence—te—think—by th emselves
nu ra j nu fdj ra j ny
Relation Of Transposements
[Was \st Aufklarung?] [Was ist g # ? ]
Im m anuel Kant Florence Maurice-Amondi
47S4
A
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[selbstverschuldeten U nm ündigke it] 
your own attitudinal im m aturity
A ufk la rung Kultur
GGnsdous hyperbolic
[des Mensches] 
an individual a manufacturer of culture
[selbst-]
themselves ■
[  seiner selbstverschuldeten  
U nm ündigke it] 
their self-incurred attitudinal im m aturity the reg- , t s wl inn-'rainrn immanence
[U nm ünd igke it] 
attitudinal im m aturity regimes of constrained immanence
[ is t]
is hj'-ow îro->.
[sich seines Verstandes bedienen] te  
em ploy one's reason to conduct direct engagements of immanence
[Leitung eines anderen] 
foreign guidance
Interferences from fossilisations
[des Verstandes] 
reason
[sich seiner bedienen] 
te-em ploy one's reason
to  conduct immediate engagements of 
immanence
[Sapere aude\]
Have courage to em ploy your own  
reason!
[Aufklarung]
Enlightenm ent
the Age of Re-hv.bodiments
B
the Foreign-Guardians BMSBH*
[Menschen]
individuals
the world 05
[unm ündig] 
of attitudinal im m aturity constrained
[die N atur]
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Nature the im m in e n t spatiülity
[anderen] 
these foreign minds ti pool of * * jS3 17 at ons
[unm ündig] 
im m ature in attitude in a regime oi  constrained im m anence
[fü r m ich Verstand hat] 
has reason in lieu of my own reason
[fü r m ich Gewissen hat] 
has conscience in lieu of my own  
conscience
[fü r mich die D iat] 
a diet for me
[denken]
■tcHthink
[andere] 
a-foreign mind W 3Ê B È M
[der Menschen] 
individuals
—
[M ü n d ig ke it] 
attitudinal m aturity W & m B ?  ‘5 ,0 3 0 0 0
[jene Vormünder] 
th e  guardians m m m m a s m m a Ê m m
[über sie] 
individuals
[sie] 
the guardians cere fossilizations
[allein zu gehen] 
to walk alone
[gehen] 
to tread on their own fee t
C
[U nm ünd igke it] 
attitudinal im m aturity regimes of constrained immanence
[jeden Menschen] 
an isolated individual
[sich] themselves a
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[beinahe zur N atur] 
almost naturally —
them 1
[Er]
the individual the ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ I
[(Er)]
he 1
[sich seines eigenen Verstandes 
bedienen] 
is deprived from  employing his own 
reason
[ihn] h e
[mechanischen Werkzeuge] 
mechanieal artefacts [nstrume n tc  m ovendi
[vernünftigen Gebrauch] 
reasoned use of — m ,
[M ifib rauchs] 
misuse of constrain engagements
[seiner N aturgaben]
its loc i s tand i
[Fu/Sschellen]
shackles ■ U H
[U nm ünd igke it] 
attitudinal im m aturity ....... .......................................................
in the individual in the manufacturer of culture
[abwürfe, würde dennoch auch über den 
schmalesten Graben einen nur 
unsicheren Spring tun]
ditch
[Er]
the individual
[zu dergleichen freie Bewegung] such 
degree of free m ovem ent
[durch eigene Bearbeitung ihres Geistes] 
through the exercise of their own minds
through jan engagement of
D
Aufklarung Kultur
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among a Group of Individuals within a Cultus
[ein Publikum sich selbst aufklare]
<• cluster vf -ndnufdcturers of culture engage 
directly immanent e
[beinahe unausbleiblich] 
alm ost naturally imminently
[man la jl t  ihm  nur Freiheit] 
an individual is endow ed w ith-freedom
[da] 
6the world ■
[Selbstdenkende] 
autonom ous thinkers
manufacturers conducting uncompromising
engagements of immanence all their own
[U nm ünd igke it] 
attitudinal im m aturity
[vernünftigen]
reasoned ongjf’cd
[des eigenen Werts und des Berufs] 
merits and calling ...............................................
[selbst denken] 
think by themselves
own engagement of immanence
[das Publikum] 
the group-of-individuals
[von ihnen] the guardians
[Vorurte ile  pflanzen] 
to sow prejudices W tK tK t t t t Ê Ê Ê
[die selbst a lle r Aufk la rung unfahig sind] 
incapable as they are of any Aufklarung incapable as they are of a n y J J J flj
[ein Publikum] 
a group of individuals
[zur A ufklarung gelangen] 
attain Aufklarung
[von persônlichem Despotism] 
a despotism which-one-person exerts 
upon a group
a despotism which exerts 
upon a M m #
[herrschsüchtig]
tyrannical
constraining
[Denkungsart] 
m anner of thinking
manner of c o n d u c t * i g e r r  e its of
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[Vorurteile]
prejudices
[zum Leitbande...dienen] 
the new leash to  ëm ë const» am
[des gedankenlosen grojlen Houfens] 
dispossessed of their com petence to  
think by themselves
constrained from their immediate engagements
of im m anence
B B B
H H H H H
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Glossary
Ç
Constrained-Engaged Immanent Continuum:
Authors in the post-Kantian critique of reason that have dealt with the issue of immanence 
(chiefly amongst whom Gilles Deleuze, a number of scholars that revolved around the 
structuralist Marxist Louis Althusser, and, to a lesser degree, Antonio Negri) have treated the 
latter as a static, immovable plane. Contrastingly, it is professed that the plane of 
immanence, when fully delinked from Western metaphysical residues, manifests itself upon 
a continuum variously hampered or facilitated by instrumenta movendi (fossilizations) and 
loci standi (manufactures of culture), respectively. These specific contexts lead to regimes of 
constrained-engaged immanence to some degree.
Cultural Matrix:
A commonly assumed hyposition-hyposement -binary pair— in the Western metaphysical 
tradition is that of nature/culture. The present thesis contrastingly sustains that this only 
conforms to an apparent hyposition-hyposement -binary pair. Culture is the active space 
that synthesizes -and therefore transmutes, transposes— the quintessence of both realism 
-th a t view which assumes the existence of an objective reality which enjoys a life of its own 
even available in the absence of subjective relations with it— and constructivism -th a t  
position which largely denies the extant reality only to emphasize the politically tainted 
interpretations of the latter. In signifying the active undertaking of attention, cultivation, 
respect and worship, culture is both an extant reality and it is subjectively worked upon. It is 
therefore presented as conforming to the self-same transposition-transposement of the 
nature/culture hyposition-hyposement. As a result, it is assumed as the apt receptacle for 
the numberless relations which the rubric "environment7 has been identified to be saturated 
with.
More technically, culture comes to be named cultural matrix, grid or structure. Let us note 
the etymological root of matrix. It emanates from the homonymous Latin noun matrice, 
"reproductive female", "womb", which itself derives from the noun mater, "mother". The 
cultural matrix corresponds, that is, to the womb of Tellus, our Mother Earth. It is a leading 
transposition-transposement in that it shelters the remaining transpositions-transposements 
to be put on a par with the central role that "writing" plays in Derrida's philosophical body. 
When circulated in its bosom, culture automatically metamorphoses old hypositions- 
hyposements while, in turn, engendering new transpositions-transposements. This matrix, 
qua a transposemental operator, mediates transitivities. It attests to the logic of in- 
transitivity defended in the present thesis as opposed to both binary logic and the logic of
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supplementarity.
Cultus (sing)/Culti (pl):
Cultus is a Latin word which means 'cult'. Whilst culture or the cultural matrix allows for the 
whole gamut of possibilities, cultus is that which is actually paid cult to, worshipped, 
cultivated. A cultus conforms to the actual number of worshipped elements. In line with the 
building blocks of the present doctoral thesis, those elements are mainly characterized as 
loci stondi versus instrumenta movendi. It is in this respect that in the present day we must 
distinguish between culti of Tellus and the cultus of Leviathan.
Culti of Tellus
Culti of Tellus conform to those culti across the globe that cultivate loci standi -fo r  they 
worship Tellus, Mother Earth. As such, they are independent bastions -such as those made 
up by aboriginal peoples—that don't interfere with the issues of their neighbouring areas. 
Contrastingly, culti of Tellus are interfered by the cultus of Leviathan.
Cultus of Leviathan:
The cultus of Leviathan largely conforms to the Western and Westernizing part of the globe. 
In cultivating instrumenta movendi. this cultus requires constant expansion. As a result, it is 
constantly annexing, absorbing neighbouring territories or culti of Tellus.
D
Disposition:
Disposition or layout corresponds to the actual arrangement of elements. The present thesis 
pays heed to the way that the constituents of reality combine together. The endorsed 
metaphor of religare, true to its etymological meaning as 'to bind strongly,' 'to put together', 
'to assemble' disperses disembodied and disembedded approaches such as Hegel's spirit of 
the times, Michel Foucaut's fascination with the ethos, milieu of the Enlightenment, 
Foucault's own exaltation of discourse as well as Patrick Curry's steady focus on a non­
modern sensibility. The literal meta-physics of religion endorsed by the present thesis pays 
attention to the layout of the elements of reality, a layout which is always embodied, 
embedded and contextualized. The uncompromising politics of religare take issue with the 
various ways in which this contextualized layout-disposition- is arranged.
F
Fossilization:
These are instrumenta movendi regarded as low- middle- and high-cultural entities at one 
and the same time. As opposed to manufacturers of culture, fossilizations constrain 
immanence. They form regimes of mediated, engaged immanence . It is for that matter that 
we say that fossilizations mark a pasus -'step', breaking thereby the cycles of the oikos and 
creating a passed track or past; a linear continuum as opposed to a cyclical one. 
Fossilizations abound in the cultus of Leviathan. Our Common Future, or Brundtland Report 
is a fossilization. High-culturally. it homogenizes plural worldviews under the placard of 
secular materialism. Middle-culturallv. it sanctions the state as the standard political unit. 
Low-culturallv. it promises but rationalized industrial production. The International Climate
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Change Regime (ICCR), which includes the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, the World Bank's 
Prototype Carbon Fund, and various emissions trading schemes conforms to another 
fossilization. To be sure, the ICCR is far from a regime designed for the abatement of carbon 
emissions. Rather, middle-culturallv it conspicuously emerges as an economic contract 
geared at the low-cultural liberalization of soil in peripheral areas and the high-cultural 
protectionism of the 'centres of expertise' steered by the cultus of Leviathan.
H
High-culture:
High-culture is that part of culture that deals with our cognitively contextualised condition. 
Sound processes of knowledge-production are autochthonously arranged. In keeping, we say 
that high-culture is contextualized to the extent that worldviews emanate from a cultus of 
Tellus. Contrastingly, a high-culture is decontextualized when the philosophies that inform it 
are foreign to the ecoregion where a cultus belongs. The Kyoto Protocol is a 
decontextualized contract to all culti of Tellus. It enforces foreign concepts such as the 
centralized state, the environment as a mere resourceful backdrop, ecology as ecocratic 
management and basic needs based upon industrial production.
Hyperbolic Immanence:
Hyperbolic immanence corresponds to that immanence that exceeds situated immanence -  
the regimes of constrained-engaged immanence— in two reciprocal directions. First, it goes 
beyond excesses and extravagances. It polices the denials of engaged immanence that 
follow from an overabundance of low- middle- and high-cultural instrumenta movendi put to 
circulation, and their resulting fossilizations. Second, it endeavours a transposition- 
transposement towards a higher degree of engaged immanence so that the immoderations 
that follow from the unrestrained proliferation of instrumenta movendi may be surpassed. 
There are thus two moments to hyperbolic immanence. The first one registers hyperbolas or 
regimes with an exaggerated degree of constrained immanence. The second one addresses 
the hyperbolas at issue by exceeding them with the restoration of loci standi. The World 
Social Forum, the movement of movements, is, for instance, fairly good at the first moment 
of hyperbolic immanence, at registering the shortcomings of the world today on many 
fronts. However, it appears weaker at the second moment, at the consolidation of change. 
Similarly, the Durban Group is very powerful at the analytical level and at the declaration of 
intentions. However, it is weaker when it comes to actual change.
Hypo-position-Hypo-posed:
In the hyposition-hyposement -binary logic— a hypo-position corresponds to the 
downgraded element. The position -subject, productivity— complements itself by way of 
the hypo-position -object, sustainable development.
As to the form it must be said the following. Cartesianism attributes to the res cogitans -  
subject— the ability to actively issue ontological predicates while limiting the res extensa -  
object— to the passive position of stoically receiving these ontological narratives. Yet what 
transposes is both transposing -active- and transposed -passive. The suffix '-tion' is added 
to verbs to denote activity; it refers to an instance of the verbal process. The suffix '-m ent'.
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by contrast, denotes both activity (transposing, hyposing) and passivity (transposed, 
hyposed): it refers to both an instance and result of the verbal process at issue. To 
thoroughly corrode the Cartesian chasm, we need to appositely rename 'transposition' 
'transposement' and 'hyposing' 'hyposement'. However, to mark the subjected, passive 
voice to which the dichotomous pole of the hyposition-hyposement is put use, we must turn 
the hypo-position into 'hypo-posed', an exercise duly undertaken as of chapter 8.
Hyposition-Hyposement:
Hyposition is another name for binary pair, a highly common phenomenon in the 
epistemological tradition. It engulfs both the initial position -subject, productivity— and its 
hierarchizing pole or hypo-position-hypo-posed -object, sustainable development. 
Cartesianism attributes to the res cogitans -subject— the ability to actively issue ontological 
predicates while limiting the res extensa -object— the passive position of stoically receiving 
these ontological narratives. Yet what transposes is both transposing -active- and 
transposed -passive. The suffix '-tion' is added to verbs to denote activity; it refers to an 
instance of the verbal process. The suffix '-m ent', by contrast, denotes both activity 
(hyposing) and passivity (hyposed); it refers to both an instance and result of the verbal 
process at issue. To thoroughly corrode the Cartesian chasm, we need to appositely rename 
'hyposition' 'hyposement, just as we rename 'transposition' 'transposement'. an exercise 
duly undertaken as of chapter 8.
i
Immanence:
Etymologically the word is made up of the Latin prefix in, 'in', 'inside' and a noun derivation 
of the verb manere, 'to remain'. As a result, the rubric 'immanence' has been routinely 
pitted against that of transcendence to refer to the Weltanschauung that sustains that all 
philosophical (or/and religious) elements are innerwordly. In the context of my thesis I 
however sustain that immanence, far from conforming to the hypo-position-hypo-posed-or 
downgraded element— of transcendence, is its transpositon-transposement or third figure. 
The latter incorporates the former as in my philosophical proposal there are no external 
elements. Once the case is made in favour of an innerwordly worldview, the cultural matrix 
(chapter 4) is rendered the repository of immanence -being therefore exchangeable with 
the latter.
Instrumentum Movendi (sing) /Instrumenta Movendi (pl):
Instrumenta movendi are loci standi destabilizing counterparts. They must be historically 
registered as of the Neolithic Revolution and a fortiori with the advent of metallurgy. These 
are double-edged devices. On the one hand, this Latin signifying banner is translated as 'tool 
of addition mobility' to the one afforded by loci standi. On the other, it is read as 'instrument 
of agitation' also in relation to loci standi. A genetic modified seed, an instance of low- 
cultural instrumentum movendi, provides an additional possibility to that of its counter-part 
loci standi, the organic seed; the former appears indeed as a tool of additional mobility -  
possibilities— vis-à-vis the latter. Yet the genetically-modified seed is simultaneously 
destabilizing of the former. When we modify and use such an altered seed we are deferring, 
delaying, postponing the possibilities of the organic one; the former emerges as an 
instrument of agitation of the latter.
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This altering and deferring effect on the part of instrumenta movendi over loci standi is 
called différence, following Derrida's neologism. Différence exhibits how instrumenta 
movendi gain their embodiment, embeddedness and contextualization by disembodying, 
disembedding and decontextualizing loci standi. To put it reversely, instrumenta movendi 
alter loci stondi in a creative manner but they simultaneously deform the latter in a 
destructive way.
Some further examples of low-cultural instrumenta movendi are automobiles such as cars 
and trucks. Middle-cultural instances are centralized -in  contrast with federal and a fortiori 
bioregional— forms of governance such as state governments, central banks, the European 
Union, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization. High-cultural forms of 
instrumenta movendi are ideologies with ecumenical intentions such as liberalism, Marxism, 
Islam and Christianity; all concepts, idealizations definitory of philosophy and science as 
epistêmê such as subjective idealism, hypositions, namely, coercive hierarchies appear as 
another form of high-cultural instrumentum movendi.
K
Kultur:
Kultur is the ideal state of culture, namely, it is culture in a regime of engaged immanence. It 
occurs when indeed manufacturers of culture engage their intrinsic immanence or low- 
middle- and high-cultural loci standi.
Belatedly, philosophy and science as Kultur is pitted against philosophy and science as 
epistêmê to refer to the fact that in the former case claims to truth are made when in 
contact with loci standi while in the latter case in contact with instrumenta movendi. An 
instance of philosophy and science as Kultur is when Goethe claims that blue and red are 
two basic colours -an  assertion grounded upon cosmic phenomena. When Newton had 
earlier asserted that all colours emanate out of a disembodied white colour, we say that this 
is an instance of science as epistêmê.
L
Locus standi (sing) /Loci standi (pl):
A literal translation from this Latin form is 'place(s) of secure repose, stay' of culture or the 
cultural matrix. Loci standi manifest themselves at the low- middle- and high-cultural levels. 
Some examples of low-cultural loci standi are the genome; local species; non-GM seeds; 
macronutrients such as nitrogen, phosphorous and water; ecosystems; the hydraulic cycle; 
the Earth's carbon-cycling capacity; low entropy. Instances of middle-cultural loci standi are 
customary law, and local and bioregional politics. Animist worldviews are a form of high- 
cultural loci standi. So is any philosophy or worldview that does away with provincialism 
while preserving that which is autochthonous.
Loci standi partially decentre the following hypositions-hyposements or binary pairs: living- 
organism/inert-matter, theism/atheism, anthropocentrism/ecocentrism. This means that all 
those positions and corresponding hypo-positions-hvoo-ooseds are cognitively irrelevant. 
The perspective advanced by the present doctoral thesis is that of the places of secure stay. 
Loci standi, as it is the case of instrumenta movendi. are found in networks; they conform to 
a plurality.
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Logic of In-Transitivity:
Philosophy and science as epistêmê is duly claimed to run upon binary logic-leading thereby 
to a proliferation of hypositions-hyposements. Such a logic operates upon the basis of 
solipsists positions or concepts -subject, productivity. Such isolation is complemented by its 
opposite compound -object, sustainable development. In this light, 'object' and 'sustainable 
development' emerge as the unproblematized reversals of subject and productivity. This is 
to say that the former -th e  initial position— is the new ground upon which the latter -hypo- 
posement-hypo-posed- comes to reside and gains a new life of its own. Jacques Derrida 
claims that binary logic needs to be supplanted by the logic of supplementarity. Derrida 
sustains that the initial position and subsequently complementing hypo-posement-hypo- 
posed needs to be added instead of resolved. In his view, it is both 'subject' and 'object', 
both 'productivity' and 'sustainability' that operate on a par.
A theoretical corpus always favours a perspective. The present thesis shifts away Derrida's 
import placed upon supplementarity. Rather, it is claimed that the logic of transitivity needs 
privileging. Namely, philosophical elements must be regarded either as facilitating 
transpositions-transposements or as ecocidal and therefore as hampering them. It is 
categorized as intransitive that which is disrespectful of the oikos ('self-sufficient household') 
and its surroundings. It is, by contrast characterized as transitive those practices and 
arrangements that exhibit a respectful communion with the constellation of elements 
surrounding the oikos. Agri-fuels, to take an example, appear as intransitive -they set into 
place vast monocultures.
Yet it is not enough to enact a logic that assesses practices as transitive or intransitive 
according to their relation with the household and its surroundings; what emerges as 
intransitive exacts due transmutation -cf. hyperbolic immanence.
Low-Culture:
Low-culture is that cognitive part of culture that deals with the aspects that surround our 
enworlded, embodied condition. It basically deals with the issues of reproduction, reminding 
us that productive processes are subsumed to the latter. We say that low-culture is 
embodied when bio- and ecological rhythms are respected. A low-culture is disembodied 
when those rhythms are uprooted by productive ones. The bicycle is a disembodied low- 
culture - i t  uses a great deal of metal.
Low- Middle- and High-Culture:
The division low- middle- and high-culture corresponds to a cognitive attempt to reunify the 
disciplines. Each part of culture or the cultural matrix looks at an aspect of knowledge 
without overlooking the rest. That is why we mention the three cultural parts at a time.
M
Manufacturer of Culture:
These are loci standi regarded as low- middle- & high-cultural entities at one and the same 
time. As opposed to fossilizations. manufacturers of culture engage immanence directly. 
They form regimes of unmediated, engaged immanence .
Middle-Culture:
Middle-culture is that cognitive part of culture that deals with our politically embedded
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condition. It is assumed that the public polity is embedded in ecoregions or culti of Tellus. 
We say that middle-culture is embedded when political statements emanate from those 
ecoregions or culti of Tellus. A middle-culture is disembeddeded to the extent that those 
statements are foreign to the ecoregion where a cultus belongs. The Clean Development 
Mechanism, one of the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, is a disembedded piece of 
policy. The cultus of Leviathan is using land from less or non-industrialized areas to allegedly 
offset its emissions of C02- equivalent. This was a decision taken by ecocratic elites. It 
doesn't reflect the will of the culti of Tellus. of the manufacturers of culture inhabiting the 
non-industrialized corners of the world.
N
Nomization:
Processes of nomization are related to high-culture. They refer to the process of creating 
meaning. It is a currency commonly found in the sociology of knowledge.
o
Osmogenesis:
Philosophy and science as Kultur decentre ontology and enact a methodology that we may 
call osmogenesis, 'the perpetual, impulsive action or activity of engendering; the perennial 
rebirth of the engagement'.
p
Plane of Immanence:
In a loose sense this banner is synonymous with the vocable 'immanence'. In a more specific 
manner, largely as it is referred in the frame of my doctoral thesis, it speaks of the French 
thinker's Gilles Deleuze's treatment of the concept. Building upon the 17th-century 
philosopher Baruch Spinoza, Deleuze may be the contemporaneous thinker who has most 
extensively dealt with the issue of immanence, only to tangentially add Antonio Negri and a 
group of philosophers that orbited around Louis Althusser. In philosophical circles it is said 
that the concept at issue has been Deleuze's philosophical quarry -his source of inspiration. 
Yet it is equally argued that the French late philosopher failed to properly deal with the 
issue; he rather exhibited a tendency to circumvent it in his writings. The present doctoral 
thesis sides with this pointed rebuke. It is claimed that the signifying bloc 'plane of 
immanence' is a metaphysical farce. Once the plane at issue is fully released -namely, 
delinked from its undue association with materialism as modern and postmodern 
philosophers in the wake of Marx's victory over Hegel's idealism have uncritically assumed 
(chapter 4), this plane bursts into specific degrees within the constrained-engaged 
immanent continuum.
Position:
We shall call a 'position' that practice which qualifies as 'intransitive' in that it breaks down 
the transitivities -th e  cycles— of the oikos. Max Weber was in the habit of calling them  
'concepts'.
As to the form it must be said the following. Cartesianism attributes to the res cogitons -
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subject— the ability to actively issue ontological predicates while limiting the res extensa -  
object— the passive position of stoically receiving these ontological narratives. Yet what 
transposes is both transposing -active- and transposed -passive. The suffix '-tion' is added 
to verbs to denote activity; it refers to an instance of the verbal process. The suffix '-m ent', 
by contrast, denotes both activity (transposing, hyposing) and passivity (transposed, 
hyposed); it refers to both an instance and result of the verbal process at issue. To 
thoroughly corrode the Cartesian chasm, we need to appositely rename "transposition7 
"transposement7 and 'hyposition7 'hyposement7.
Contrastingly, a position -e.g., productivity— is endowed with the ability to subject. 
However, as it forms a hyposition-hyposement with its hypo-position-hypo-posed -  
sustainable development— it fails to be simultaneously autonomously subjected. Rather, a 
position is subjected to the hypo-position-hypo-posed or downgraded pole with which it is 
upon dependant relation for the completion of its significance. It is for that reason that the 
ending 7-tion7 of position can be respected - i t  duly captures its active voice.
R
Regimes of Constrained-Engaged Immanence:
It is claimed that a plane of immanence is a metaphysical fallacy. Once immanence is fully 
liberated from Marxian materialist residues (chapter 4), the plane of immanence appears in 
concrete degrees of constrained-engaged immanence. This means that the plane of 
immanence, far from being static, is dynamic. It appears either hampered, confined by 
restrictive innerwordly elements -  instrumenta movendi. fossilizations — or facilitated by 
conducive innerwordly elements -loci standi, manufacturers of culture. Each manufacturer 
of culture strikes a regime of a given degree of constrained-engaged immanence when it 
meets the cultus it belongs to and its eventual fossilizations.
When the manufacturer operates within the cultus of Leviathan, the cultus at issue is 
pervaded with fossilizations. As a result, the regime that is established leads to a high degree 
of constrained immanence; the exact degree depends upon the number of present 
fossilizations. When Isaac Newton elaborated his theory of colour he used a number of 
instrumenta movendi -paper, a prism, a window, the postulates of Western materialism. 
That's why we say that his statements emanated out of a regime of relative constrained 
immanence. Our Common Future emerges out of a higher degree of constrained 
immanence. There are a larger number of instrumenta movendi involved in the decision­
making process of the report at issue -basic needs intimately bound up with industrial 
goods, ecocratism, states, development.
When the manufacturer operates within the cultus of Tellus. the cultus at issue is free from  
fossilizations. Rather, it is built by manufacturers of culture on the basis of loci standi. As a 
result, the regime that is established exhibits a high degree of engaged immanence and it is 
so in absolute terms given the absence of fossilizations. Goethe's theory of colour emanates 
out of a regime of engaged immanence. It is only manufacturers of culture -th e  scientist and 
their sight, the atmosphere, outer space, the Sun— involved in the construction of this 
theory.
s
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Situated immanence:
Situated immanence corresponds to that immanence that exclusively registers regimes of 
constrained-engaged immanence. The reader should contrast this kind of immanence with 
hyperbolic immanence.
I
Transposition-Transposement:
A transposition conforms to the currency of the cultural matrix par excellence. Following the 
meaning of the suffix 'trans-' in 'transposition' as 'across', 'over', we shall call a 
'transposition' that practice which qualifies as transitive in that it facilitates the cycles of the 
oikos. In so far as the suffix 'trans-' of 'transposition' additionally signifies 'beyond,' 
'transposition' not only conforms to the banner for transitivity but also to that of 
transmutation; to that of correcting and converting 'positions' -intransitivities— into 
'transpositions,' transitivities. The latter is linked to hyperbolic immanence. Organic farming 
conforms to a transposition, whilst farming with pesticides is a position. Similarly, mobility 
on foot is a transposition, while going by bicycle and car conforms to two positions.
As to the form it must be said the following. Cartesianism attributes to the res cogitans -  
subject— the ability to actively issue ontological predicates while limiting the res extensa -  
object— the passive position of stoically receiving these ontological narratives. Yet what 
transposes is both transposing -active- and transposed -passive. The suffix '-tion' is added 
to verbs to denote activity; it refers to an instance of the verbal process. The suffix '-m ent', 
by contrast, denotes both activity (transposing, hyposing) and passivity (transposed, 
hyposed): it refers to both an instance and result of the verbal process at issue. To 
thoroughly corrode the Cartesian chasm, we need to appositely rename 'transposition' 
'transposement' just as we redub 'hyposition'. 'hyposement', an exercise duly undertaken as 
of chapters.
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This Annex includes two book chapters published in two different academic collections:
1] Ruth Thomas-Pellicer, (2008) 'A Low- Middle- and High-Cultural Characterization of the Ecocide/ in Saikat Kumar Basu and Sudip Datta 
Banik (ed.), Environmental Concerns and Perspectives, New Delhi: APH Publishing Inc, Vol. II. pp. 400-506;
This paper corresponds to the literature review of my doctoral thesis.
2] Ruth Thomas-Pellicer with a "Postscript" by Tim Jackson (2009), 'Building Cultures of Sustainable Consumption and Climate Justice: 
Towards a Deconstruction of the Global Polity', Mukherjee, B., Ray, R. and Basu, S. K. (ed) Environment: Gathering Crises, Kolkata: Sikha 
Books; pp. 271-343,
a working paper co-authored with Miriam Pepper for the II World Forum on Liberation and 
Theology (1997) to be published in an upcoming academic collection that I am editing with 
Glasshouse Press probably entitled Essays For An Age Of Re-Embodiments:
3] Ruth Thomas-Pellicer and Miriam Pepper (2012), 'A Jubilee for Climate Justice as a Roadmap into the Age of Re-Embodiments', in Ruth 
Thomas-Pellicer (ed.), in Essays For An Age O f Re-Embodiments?, Glasshouse Press (forthcoming),
and the call for contributions of the British Sociological Association Theory Study Group 
Symposium [4] 'Re-Imagining Our Sociological Contemporaneity: What Is the Age Of Re- 
Embodiments?' I coordinated that took place in London on 16th July 2010.
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ABSTRACT
This chapter aims at a discursive characterization of the ecocide 
across the disciplines. Ecocide must be understood as deliberate damage of 
the environment. Building upon the central notion of interdependence 
within environmental studies, the characterization at hand is further divided 
into three major intertwined blocks: low-culture, middle-culture and high- 
culture. In this light, the low-cultural slot captures discourses dealing with 
environmental degradation related to the embodied and material dimensions 
of culture. These include overpopulation, technological inefficiency, but 
also utilitarian technology, industrial production and industrial forms of 
agriculture, the current shift towards biofuel production, development, and 
consumer culture. Middle-cultural discourses, for their part, grapple with 
the ecocidal dimensions related to the polity or arrangement of public 
affairs. These include the commodification of nature, the ascendancy of 
liberal market economy, liberal international trade, the geopolitical 
preponderance of the financially-powerful North, the hierarchization of 
the social body, and patriarchy. Finally, high-cultural discourses focus upon 
issues surrounding philosophy, religion and values, This third section 
therefore takes issue with the Cartesian-Newtonian worldview, the 
unfolding of instrumental reason within the history of Western philosophy, 
the overriding scientific paradigm, predicated as it is upon weak
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uncertainty, the institutionalization o f rational utilitarianism, neoclassical 
and Marxist political economic epistem ologies, anthropocentric morality, 
the obliteration o f our spiritual constituency, the desacralizing legacy o f  
Christianity and Judaism, and the entrenchment o f natural and cultural 
m aterialism  at the expense o f  a theodicy. The chapter c lo se s  by 
destabilizing the notion o f  ‘environmental crisis’ and emphasizing the 
marked cultural interconnectedness o f the eco-debacle.
“Even Einstein, who categorically refused to renege the 
rationalist dogma, had to admit that ‘for the time being,...we  
do not possess any general theoretical basis for physics, 
which can be regarded as its logical foundation.’ And since 
‘for the time being’ seemed to perpetuate itself, N iels Bohr 
proposed a new epistem ological tenet known as the Principle 
o f Complementarity: ‘only the totality o f  the phenomena 
exhausts the possible information about the objects’.”
Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen1
[1.] TOWARDS A DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF THE ECOCIDE
In the profuse introduction to his noted research, The 
Politics o f the Earth: Environmental Discourses, political scientist 
John S. Dryzek (1997: 7-12) alerts us to one technical point. Namely: 
on what materials should one ground one’s analysis. Dryzek poses 
the problematic with regard to his research motivation -viz. the 
politics of the Earth. And so in the list of possibilities he includes 
discourse analysis, institutions (markets, government bureaucracies, 
legal systems), NGOs, policy analysis and case studies. His focus 
of scrutiny is finally directed towards environmental discourses, but 
inasmuch as the other materials in the list are permeated with 
discourses, Dryzek preaches, he dwells amply upon them all.
Dryzek’s problematic is apt to extrapolation to a study of the 
accounts for the causes, roots, nature of the ecocide. On what 
resources ought one to premise one’s arguments? Or to paraphrase 
it: out of what materials should one excavate, dig an anatomy of 
environmental woes? Should the exercise be located within the 
contours of material which overtly falls into the green discourse; or 
should rather one read obliquely and include explanations of 
environmental degradation which have not yet been typified as
1. The Entropy Law and the Economic Process, 1974 [1971]: 34.
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green? The latter question is more appropriate than the reader may 
regard it to be at first sight.
In contrast to Dryzek’s endeavour which is environmental by 
definition, a characterization of the ecocide may include sources 
which have not been catalogued under the domain of knowledge 
arbitrarily -one may say— instituted as ‘environmental studies’. As 
it will be pointed out in due course, two such sources come from the 
work of historian philosopher Arnold J. Toynbee, and economic 
historian and anthropologist Karl Polanyi2. None of them was versed 
in environmental issues, and yet both touched substantially upon 
both. The reason being because partly both authors intended to 
systematize the complexity of reality without simplifying it, and 
partly because the reality they were grappling with was already 
imbued with notorious disturbances in the environment, to which 
the perceptive eye could no longer turn its back. Moreover, the 
thesis of ‘the environmentalism of the poor’ by Joan Martinez-Alier3, 
for the contradiction in its formulation, departs from a subtle 
analysis of practices and discourses in which either the words 
environmentalism or ecologism are wholly absent:
“Chico Mendes was for 10 years a union leader of 
rubber collectors, fighting against deforestation and 
cattle ranches in Acre, in the remote western tip of 
B razil’s Amazonia; he learnt that he was also an 
ecologist only a couple of years before his death” 
(Martinez-Alier 2000 [1997b]: 76).
On an analogous line, Eric Darier (1999) has culled three 
concepts with ecological charge from the vast oeuvre of Michel 
Foucault - ‘governmentality’, ‘biopower’ and ‘space’. Ironically 
enough, the French thinker “ ‘detested nature’, or rather, [...] he 
preferred ‘visiting churches and museums’” (ibid.: 6).
Despite the multidisciplinary sources of the materials from 
which I am deriving the present review, it remains within the
2 Though the work o f Polanyi has been retrospectively acknowledged 
as environmental (cf. B lock 2001 xxvi; Daly & Cobb 1994 [1989]; 
O’Connor 1998: 159).
3 For an exposition o f his thesis in the larger frame o f (so-called  
Third World) political ecology, see the subsection ‘[7.4] A Failure 
in the G eopolitics o f the Financially Powerful North: the Reproach 
of Political E cology’.
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methodological framework of discourse analysis. Discourse analysis 
emerged in the wider frame of the post-positivist interpretative 
tradition. Interpretative social science challenges positivism in 
denying both the search for causality and the finding of general 
laws typical of the natural sciences. Instead, discourse analysis aims 
to elucidate the meaning of certain processes in society and to trace 
the various conceptual connections.
The deeper historical roots of discourse analysis must be 
found in the analysis of ideology, rhetorics, the sociology of 
science, and language philosophy. Much recent social scientific 
work grounded upon discourse analysis owes a great deal to the 
‘linguistic turn’ brought about by the later work of Wittgenstein 
(1958) and J.L. Austin, and to the oeuvre of Michel Foucault (Carver 
2002; Hajer 1997 [1995]: 44, footnote). To be sure, discourse analysis 
derives from a paradigm shift in 20th-century philosophy which 
“moved from taking a view about the world and its properties 
expressed through language, to a focus on language and its 
properties as such, and how the world is made for us from the 
meaning that language expresses” (Carver 2002). In this light, 
discourse is conceived as a “specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, 
and categorizations that are produced, reproduced, and transformed 
in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given 
to physical and social realities” (Hajer 1997 [1995]: 44).
[2.] PROS AND CONS OF POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVES
Above I have clarified that I shall gather discourses which 
characterize the ecocide. It remains now to discern on what basis 
these discourses shall be organized. I propose five options:
[1.] Authoritative: author by author, or school of thought 
by school of thought.
[2.] Hegemonic: from hegemonic discourses to minority- 
supported ones.
[3.] Political: inferring from green politics -viz. by first 
considering  the argum ents put forth  by 
environm entalists and thereafter those of radical 
ecologists.
[4.] Contextual, Situated: setting the predicament in its 
proper context and employing a key notion (e.g. 
interconnectedness) as a backbone.
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[5.] Epistemological: following a specific epistemology or 
set of reasoned criteria.
Each proposal presents its share of assets and liabilities. Let 
us briefly examine them one by one. Should I be faithful to the 
discourse set forth by each author’s exposé, as indicated in point 
[1.], I may end up with a long list dispensed with coherence for the 
issue I aim to address -the  root of the green debacle. A considerable 
number of green thinkers make assiduous recommendations as to 
the way out of the debacle. Their efforts appear less cogent, less 
c ritica lly  reasoned when it com es to detec ting  causes of 
environmental decay. Topping this inadequacy, different authors 
converge in adducing the same causes. One paradigmatic such 
instance is capitalist (and socialist) industrialism. Apart from some 
experts who, perhaps swayed by convictions of ideological order, 
appear reluctant to acknowledge the gravity of the ecocide4, virtually 
the entire spectrum of green thinkers suspects that capitalism and 
industrialism are environmentally, as well as socially, noxious. As we 
will see in the next section, differences arise when it comes to the 
faith (or its lack) in greening the financial dynamics of capitalism. At 
all events, an author-grounded taxonomy appears misleading for our 
purposes here.
Was, as suggested in point [2.] above, the standard to 
organize the host of agents of environmental degradation one of 
placing first the causes advanced in hegemonic discourses and 
reserve a second-class position for the minority voices the outcome 
may also misfire. That is, in so proceeding we are well paying 
homage to the political reality. However, we are probably failing to 
portray a more objective repertoire of ecocidal causes. The 
contributions of authors in the post-structuralist tradition -e.g . 
Thomas Kuhn’s (1962) scientific ‘paradigms’5, Michel Foucault’s 
notion of ‘knowledge/power’, Jacques Derrida’s deconstructionism, 
Jean-François Lyotard’s critique of modern ‘metanarratives’— have 
all aided to disclose that, in effect, the rationalism which sustains 
hegemonic positions serves as a royal vessel with which to smuggle, 
so to speak, concrete ideologies and w orldview s. That is, 
‘disciplinary matrixes’ in Kuhnian terminology, ‘discursive practices’
4 Addressed in section [11.] ‘Crisis, What Crisis?’
5 Latter renamed the ‘disciplinary matrix’ (Cuff et al., 1992 [1990]:
198).
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in Foucauldian, ‘m etanarratives’ in Lyotardian, are ultimately 
bastions of the ensemble of interests which the political institutions 
of the hour stand for.
Having quickly discarded the organization of discourses 
upon their authoritative and hegemonic provenance, point [3.] 
‘Political’ in the list above commands more detailed attention. 
Debates between ecologists and environmentalists invade the green 
camp as much as they load it with a wide range of arguments.
[3.] THE ENVIRONMENTALISM VS. ECOLOGISM FISSURE IS 
NO USEFUL YARDSTICK
Regarded prim ly in its socio-ideological dim ension -  
obviously backed by its respective pools of intellectuals, the modern 
ecological/environmental movement in the North is circa four 
decades old. Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962) is conventionally 
assumed as an opening landmark (Dobson 1998 [1991]; 25; Fox 1995 
[1990]: 4; The Ecologist 1993: 87), yet a surge in political responses 
in the form of environmental legislation, regulations and institutional 
building at the national and international levels should be more 
precisely dated in the early 1970’s (Darier 1999: 1).
Transversal to the modern green movement flows a dividing 
line which keeps apart quarters of environmentalists from their 
ideological foes -radical ecologists. The fact that this fissure6 has 
gained steady acknowledgment of its existence parallel to the build­
up of the movement has eclipsed the ancestral roots of each strand. 
To circumvent this carelessness and attain a more comprehensive 
understanding as to the two-pronged fracture, the following will be 
the line of procedure in this section.
First, the reader will be introduced to the scholarly hallmarks 
of each ideological strand within the confines of the modern green 
movement -starting off from the early 1970s. Secondly, to each 
green variety (ecologism vs. environmentalism) their respective 
diachronic kinship relations will be appended. Finally, the relevance 
of this ideological fracture will be discussed as a putative backbone 
to classify the discourses of environmental decay.
6 Certainly a controversy constantly evoked. Cf. Dobson 1998 
[1991]: 204; Macauley 1996: 8-11; Zimmerman 1996, who instead 
of ‘ecologists’ uses ‘radical environmentalists’ and covers with it 
deep ecologists, social ecologists and ecofem inists; Barry 1999: 2- 
3; Darier 1999: 24.
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Hallmarks in the modern green movement
The birth-date and birth-place of the environmental/ecological 
dichotomy may well be 1972 and Bucharest. That year, Norwegian 
philosopher and funding father of deep ecology Arne Naess gave a 
speech in the course of which a clear-cut line between the shallow 
vs. deep ecology movement was drawn (Dobson 1998 [1991]: 242; 
2001 [2000]: 40; Morris 1993: 40; Dryzek 1997: 156). It is true that the 
main thrust of Naess’s distinction pointed to a disgust for ‘arrogant 
anthropocentrism’, while calling for a turn towards ‘biocentric 
egalitarianism’ or ecocentrism. The distinction was nevertheless no 
less ideologically connoted. By “shallow” ecology Naess implicated 
simultaneously, and disapprovingly so, “a reformist attitude to the 
present ecological crisis, one that still retains a u tilitarian , 
anthropocentric approach to nature, and does not suggest any 
fundamental change to the present economic system” (Morris 1993: 
40). It is no coincidence that John Barry, in his critical review of 
green politics (Barry 1999), pairs together the terms ‘deep’ and 
‘radical’, on the one hand, and ‘shallow’, ‘reformist’, on the other. 
They are largely interchangeable.
American political philosopher, avowed anarchist, and 
founding father of social ecology, Murray Bookchin (1988 [1980])7, 
offers for his part an influential share to the antagonism under 
revision. Bookchin uses the word ‘environmentalism’ (in contempt) 
to distinguish it from his uncompromising social ecology. The former 
he faults with an “instrumentalist” or “technical” approach to the 
environment. So reads his utterance against environmentalism:
“Environmentalism, in fact, is merely environmental 
engineering. [Far from] questioning] the underlying 
notions of the present society...it seeks to facilitate that 
domination [of the human being over nature] by 
developing techniques for diminishing the hazards 
caused by domination” (Bookchin 1988 [1980]: 77).
Arguably, Bookchin’s radical ecologism differs from Naess’s 
in its superior intellectual and political analytical finesse. In Brian
7 For a commented metamorphosis o f  Bookchin’s anarcho-ecologism  
in the late 60s and 70s to his social ecology o f the 80s and 90s see 
Graham Purchase, ‘Socia l E cology , A narchism  and Trades 
Unionism ’ in Murray Bookchin et al. (1993), Deep Ecology & 
Anarchism, London: Freedom Press; pp. 23-35.
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Morris’s own understanding, this seems to be a difference not only 
of degree but primordially of kind:
“Bookchin’s alternative [social ecology] seems to me 
to carry far more intellectual and political substance 
than the ‘deep ecology’ suggested by Naess...nowhere 
in the book does Naess [1989] directly address himself 
to social problems -poverty, inequality, racism, state 
repression, neo-colonialism, exploitation — all of which 
are directly linked to environmental issues [and thus] 
offers little in the way of exploring the underlying 
causes of the present ecological crises, other than to 
offer a general indictment of the present economic 
‘system’”(Morris 1983: 40).
Political philosopher Andrew Dobson, our third figure of 
analysis, has similarly effectively contributed to the ideological and 
scholarly split. In 1990 Dobson publishes his Green Political 
Thought*. We read in the ‘Introduction’ that Dobson’s prime aim is 
that of
“d e sc r ib in g ]  and a s s e s s in g ]  tha t set o f ideas 
regarding the environment which can properly be 
regarded as an ideology -the ideology of ecologism” 
(2001 [2000]: 1).
In his intellectual effort in order to upgrade “the radical green 
challenge” to the category of ideology, Dobson spells out in detail 
the divergences with environmentalism, which are “not only in 
degree but also in kind” {ibid.). In Dobson’s view, ecologism 
squares with radicalism9 and wholesale political and economic 
changes. Environm entalism , in stark contrast, “argues for a 
managerial approach to environmental problems” {ibid.).
If one reviews the publications posterior to the first edition 
of Dobson’s, as it were, declaration of principles one notices that 
the intellectual efforts of this author have yielded strong results. 
Ecologism as a theoretical ideology aware of itself seems by now to 
have crystallised in the firmament of green political theory. In 1999 
political philosopher Brian Baxter presents his colleagues with
8 The book in question as been revised twice. The second edition
was published in 1995, and the third in 2000. See also Dobson, 
1998 [1991]: 4-9.
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another claim on the side of unyielding green thinkers —Ecologism: 
an Introduction (Baxter 1999).
John Barry’s (1999) work -mentioned above— mirrors with 
no less prominence the weight exerted by Dobson’s scholarly 
involvement. Insofar as his publication was posterior to both 
Naess’s and Dobson’s, Barry is endowed with ample perspective to 
rephrase the traits of both camps by mingling the jargon of his 
predecessors. From this vantage point, Barry retells that ecologism 
is associated with the ideas of ‘deep’, ‘radical’. Common ground 
amidst ecologists is, furthermore, an adherence to the idea of limits 
to growth, the endorsement of the eco-anarchist critique -i.e . face- 
to-face democracy, decentralization and appropriate scale, and a 
revisionist attitude towards anthropocentrism supplanted by an 
ecocentric philosophy of life (Barry 1999: 4, 3). Environmentalism is 
by contrast defined as ‘shallow’ and ‘reformist’ {ibid.: 3). That is, an 
approach which falls short to contest the underlying structures 
underpinning the present-day (Western) society. Consistently, the 
champions of this strand uphold the faith that the path towards 
sustainability is merely the greening of current legislations and 
political institutions alike.
Next we turn to Rudolf Bahro, an active member of the German 
green movement and a dissent of the German Greens (political party) 
precisely on the grounds of the polarization at hand. Bahro (1986; 
1994) was the theorist of what he termed ‘green fundamentalism’. 
The ideology he presents consists of two building blocks: an 
“outer” and an “inner”. The former “puts ecology before economy, 
and long-term matters before immediate and short-term ones”. The 
latter calls for a spiritual metamorphosis, a “radical change in the 
Metropolis -the notions of the ‘developed’ world— [which] begins 
with a readiness for self-transformation, even self-surrender, of the 
bourgeois individual” (1994: 4)10.
Amongst the German green backbenches, this call for branch- 
and-root transformation shared ideological niche with a milder, 
reformist posture. In its initial years, die Griine tied ‘realos’ -  
shorthand for advocates of Realpolitik, with Jundis’, a nickname
10 Rudolf Bahro’s position is further reviewed in [10.8] ‘A Failure in
the Cultivation o f the Spiritual Constituency: the Grand Postponed 
Challenge o f Humankind’.
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which speaks for those ‘fundamentalist’ thinkers who pursue “ideals 
and morals”, and forsake “the pragmatic realities and material needs” 
which filled the agenda of the former faction (Bahro 1994: 16).
Next, let us move back to the work of political scientist John 
S. Dryzek (2005). In his analysis of environmental discourses, Dryzek 
has recourse to the split “reformist/radical” as one main axis on 
which to place varieties of greenerism. Dryzek’s understanding of 
‘reform ism ’ squares with the ‘shallow ’, ‘environm ental’ and 
‘Realpolitik’ notions of Naess, Dobson and Bahro, respectively.
[4.A] ANCESTRAL ROOTS
As noted above, the review as regards the environmentalist/ 
ecologist fissure sought to broach the ideological tension endemic 
to the modern green movement. It reflects the reactions to the global 
acknowledgement of the human-induced environmental upheaval. 
Yet, as previously intimated, these contemporary voices carry their 
counterparts, both in theoria as in praxis, to former historical 
traditions, albeit “many in the ecology movement [-i.e. ecologists, 
seem] quite oblivious of the libertarian socialist tradition and so 
[offer] suggestions for a ‘new renaissance’ that are anything but 
new or original” (Morris 1993: 43)". An analogous remark holds true 
for envirom entalists. Their ideology, disposed of the green 
dimension which enjoys in the present day, encounters its replica 
in old ideological traditions.
11 P olitica l sc ien tist John D ryzek (2005: 13) seem  to reason  
otherw ise. In his v iew , “environm ental discourse beg ins in 
industrial society, and so has to be positioned in the context o f the 
long-dominant discourse o f industrial society [, which features] 
many com peting ideologies, such as liberalism , conservatism , 
socialism , Marxism, and fascism . But whatever their differences, 
all these ideologies are committed to industrialism. Indeed, from an 
environmental perspective they can all look like variations on [the] 
theme [of industrialism].” Dryzek strong position is vulnerable to 
credibility when contrasted with other sources which report, for 
example, on the existence o f active Iberian anarchist practices as o f 
the late nineteenth century. These seem to have contested the path 
o f industrialism and appealed to alternative forms o f development 
markedly ecological in character. Cf. Eduard Masjuan, La ecologia  
humana en el anarquismo ibérico. Urabnismo “orgânico” o ecologico, 
neomalthusianismo y naturismo social, Barcelona: Icaria, 2000.
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Joan Martinez-Alier (1994b; 1994c) has made an academic 
effort to outline the roots of the ideological map which dominate the 
contemporary green field. The author dubs them respectively 
‘popular ecologism’ or ‘current eco-socialism’ contra ‘international 
eco-technocratism’. According to his paradigm, ecologism (his 
‘popular ecologism’ or ‘current eco-socialism’) conflates two major 
traditions. One constitutive block is made up of the left politics 
avowed by libertarian socialists: anarchists, anarcho-communists, 
anarcho-unionists and anarcho-feminists. These practices, which the 
author conveniently traces as far back as to the First International 
in the late 1860’s, embrace figures such as Bakunin, Kropotkin, 
Goldman, Thoreau, Tolstoy, Morris, the Russain Narodniki and 
Gandhi, along with a num ber of other popular anonymous 
individuals. The other main block of popular ecologism covers the 
anti-colonialist movement of the nineteenth century onwards, local 
struggles for livelihood (as the Chipko movement in India), and 
naturalist, feminist and pacifist practices.
Environmentalism -o r  his ‘international eco-technocratism’ 
typified in the Brundtland Report (WCED 1987)— is likewise a blend 
o f a double-edged trad ition . One, the L en in ism -S talin ism  
characteristic of the bureaucratic Marxism of the Soviet Union, and 
the real socialism of Eastern Europe during most of the twentieth 
century. Next to it, its counterpart in capitalist countries essentially 
made up of post-war Keynesian capitalism. Two, a continuum made 
up of the social-Darwinism typical of the nineteenth century 
onwards, liberal and “greenish” capitalism.
[4.B] PARTICULARLY RELEVANT TO GREEN POLITICS
With this historical review of the environmental/ecological 
split hovering over green politics, the reader should have gained a 
satisfactory intellectual grasp of their respective meanings. That 
being so, I may proceed to the concluding remark.
The binomial environmentalism/ecologism is pre-eminently 
related to the fashion by which to go about the ecocide. Each 
independently, they conform to ideologies in which to underpin 
green politics. In an imaginary timeline, this distinction would cover 
the present-future segment, but not necessarily hold for the past- 
present segment. However, it is the latter which safeguards the clues 
for a disclosure of the integral nature of the ecocide. The departure
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point of both camps is the acknowledgement o f environmental 
decay. Therefore, the concluding rem ark as to the divide 
environmentalism vs. ecologism is that, powerful as though it is in 
political terms, it loses steam as a standard by which to organize a 
map of social ills with ecological impact.
Returning to potential methods to organized the literature 
review at hand, so far [1.] Authoritative- [2.] Darwinist or First-Past- 
the-Post-Approach-, & [3.] Political-based proposals have been 
exhausted. Let us next probe whether an inquiry into fundamental 
notions in the lexicon of environmentalists and ecologists is met 
with more favourable results. In so doing, we are addressing [4.] 
‘Contextual’ in the points listed out above.
[5.] ABIDING BY THE NOTION OF INTERDEPENDENCE
The notion of ‘interconnectedness’ (Commoner 1990 [1975]: 
141; Dobson 1998 [1991]: 13; Pointing 1991; Shiva 1993a: 23; 
O’Connor 1994: 60; Dryzek 2005: 8, 9; Baxter 1999: 6 and passim, 
53)12 -referred to also as ‘interdependence’, ‘reciprocity’, ‘integrity’, 
‘balance’, ‘holism’, ‘harmonious whole’, ‘wholeness’, ‘gestalts’ and 
‘gestalt thinking’ (the latter in Naess 1989: 57, passim)— occupies a 
privileged position in the multi-layered green edifice.
The reason for the emphasis upon this notion is the fact that 
environmental concerns cover two main dimensions -ecological nets 
and social realities. Each is the result of an exhaustive number of 
minor intra-relationships. Forms of life on Earth, for instance, may 
be grosso modo divided into terrestrial, aquatic, atmospheric etc. 
Yet the human being partakes in the three dimensions. Likewise, 
social systems may be broken down into political, sociological, 
psychological, philosophical matters -each dependent upon one 
anther.
12 The father o f ‘transpersonal ecology’, Warwick Fox - in  my view  a 
second generation voice in the deep ecology movement—  argues 
for the preference o f  use o f  ecophilosophy (i.e . e co lo g ica l 
philosophy) over environm ental ph ilosophy precisely  on the 
premise o f interconnectedness. So summarizes Fox his argument: 
“the term environm ent refers to the external conditions or 
surroundings o f  organism s, w hereas e co lo g y  refers to the 
relationships between organisms and their external conditions or 
surroundings, that is, their environment” (Fox 1995 [1990]: 8; 
emphasis added).
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We may then conclude that environmental concerns cover, 
on the one hand, the relations established, separately, within 
ecosystem s and social system s - i .e . their respective in tra ­
connectedness. On the other hand, they also intend to understand 
the rapports ascertained between the natural and the human realms 
-i.e . their interconnectedness. For our purposes here, the seizure of 
a notion so ingrained in the core of socio-ecological networks may 
be w arran ted . Even m ore so if  we acknow ledge that the 
environm ental debacle is anthropogenic - i .e .  provoked by 
humanity’s tread on the Earth.
[6.] REFLECTING UPON THE NATURE/CULTURE DIVIDE
We must next make a stop with regards to the chasm 
ecosystems/social systems. There is no such thing as pristine nature 
independent from human interference. There are sufficient grounds 
to find a way out of the quandary by referring to both under the 
name of ‘culture’. Etymologically culture derives from the Latin verb 
colere, which means ‘to attend to’, ‘to cultivate’, ‘to respect’. 
Correspondingly, the first definition of ‘culture’ in the Oxford 
English Dictionary reads “the action or practice of cultivating the 
soil; tillage, husbandry; synonymous with ‘cultivation’”. Therefore, 
in alluding to ‘culture’, the history of the human species with its 
sets of rules and beliefs in ongoing interaction with its natural basis 
is implicit. Terry Eagleton (2000: 2) captures the integration of
meaning achieved in the word ‘culture’ neatly:
“The word culture [...] encodes a number of key 
philosophical issues. It is an epistemologically ‘realist’ 
notion, since it implies that there is a nature or raw 
m ateria l beyond ou rse lves; bu t it also has a 
‘constructivist’ dimension, since this raw material must 
be worked up into humanly significant shape. So it is 
less a matter of deconstructing the opposition between 
culture and nature than of recognizing that the term 
‘culture’ is already such a deconstruction”.
[7.] TOWARDS AN ANALYTICS OF HIGH- MIDDLE- AND LOW- 
CULTURE
So far I have exh ib ited  how the notion  of
‘interconnectedness’ may be seized as a guiding stick to grope our
way down to the roots of the ecocide. I have also argued in favour
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of transcending the partition between the human/non-human realms 
by appealing to ‘culture’. I must now problematize the fact that 
cultural in terconnectedness sim ply speaks in favour o f an 
‘egalitarian totality’ with which to approach the nature of the 
ecocide. It seems to me that we are still left with a lacuna to fill as 
how to organize this entirety. Willy-nilly we must resort to point [5.] 
‘Epistemology’ in the list above. That is, work out a set of reasoned 
criteria, however rudimentary, by which to confer inner structure to 
the whole.
Mark Poster (1996 [1989]: 6) states that critical theory “refer(s) 
to a certain style of questioning the foundations of the disciplines in 
the hum anities. Theory in this sense is decidedly in ter or 
transdisciplinary”. As human ecologist Homborg acutely captures, 
the questioning of the foundations of the disciplines “is ever more 
pressing in an age of collapsing distinctions”. Hornborg emphasizes 
the need to acquire “more holistic perspectives [with a view towards] 
understanding] the troubling social and ecological processes of our 
time.” This is the reason why he underscores the need for “analysis 
[to] be balanced with synthesis” (Homborg 2001: 130).
It seems therefore that we are bound to confront the 
epistemological divide which keeps science apart from philosophy. 
This is a separation which not only assails environmental issues 
but the realm of knowledge on the whole. According to the 
sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein, this is the greatest challenge with 
which scholars are presently faced. In Wallerstein (2001: ix)’s own 
words:
“the world of knowledge has been facing a basic 
epistemological challenge, that of overcoming the 
artificial divide of the “two cultures”, and of creating a 
new, reunified epistemology of scientia/philosophia. In 
the decade to come this will turn out to be, I believe, 
the central intellectual issue of the world of knowledge 
and w ill lead not m erely  to new in te lle c tu a l 
constructions, but inevitably to new structures of 
knowledge and a radical revision of the cultures that 
inform the life of the academy.”
Philosopher Mary Midgley is also fairly vocal when it comes 
to pointing to the difficulties that the fragmentation of knowledge 
exerts upon Gaian thinking. Gaia is the name of the Greek Earth
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Goddess, mother of gods and men. After this mighty Goddess the 
scientist James Lovelock named his theory of the living Earth. Gaia 
theory, which despite much initial reluctance has now gained 
scientific status, states that all entities within the Earth are 
responsible for her homeostasis. Lovelock conceives of “the global 
ecosystem  [as] a self-correcting entity  with som ething like 
intelligence” (Dryzek 2005: 17). In the introductory words to James 
Lovelock’s The revenge o f Gaia, Crispin Tickell (2006: XI) describes 
Gaia Theory at some greater length in the following words:
“Who is Gaia? What is she? The What is the thin 
spherical shell o f land and w ater betw een the 
incandescent interior of the Earth and the upper 
atmosphere surrounding it. The Who is the interacting 
tissue of living organisms which over four billion years 
has come to inhabit it. The combination of What and 
Who, and the way in which each continuously affects 
the other, has been well named ‘Gaia’.”
For our storyline, however, it is important to highlight what 
Mary Midgley has stated regarding the epistemological stumbling 
stones for the adoption of Gaian thinking. As Midgley makes clear, 
the atomisation of knowledge is part of the Cartesian/Newtonian 
legacy. In Midgley’s (2001: 18) wn words:
“We are used to hearing of a stark war between the two 
cultures and of a total sepertaion between facts and 
values. In our universities, the Arts and Science tend 
to be well separated. Much of the difficulty about 
grasping the concept of Gaia is not scientific but comes 
from this fragmented general framework of our thought. 
It arises from these artificial barriers, derived centrally 
from Descartes’ original fence between mind and body.”
The taking of issue with this divide also entails to make a 
theoretical proposal as regards a number of ontological and 
epistemological aporias (difficulties) with which the post-Kantian 
critique of reason is beset. No doubt, the scrutinizing of the ecocide 
willy-nilly entails a sketchy outline of a critical theory. To this I 
proceed.
A good part of the post-Kantian critique of reason has 
assumed an acritical materialist ontology in line with Karl Marx’s
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overturning of Hegelian idealism . Ontology is the realm  of 
philosophy which deals with the nature of reality. An ontological 
outlook therefore codes the terms of a given understanding of 
reality. A materialist ontology assumes that only the world of matter 
is real. Thoughts, ideas and other non-physical things are merely 
movements of physical matter or chemical reactions. An idealist 
ontology, in contrast, asserts that the physical world around us is 
not real. Rather, this physical complex mirrors an ideal realm where 
an unchanging and absolute truth lies. There is no reality beyond 
the physical. There is a tendency among the practitioners of the 
post-Kantian critique of reason to regard “materialism as a force of 
resistance in the history of philosophy” (Derrida quoted in 
Plotnitsky 1993b: 252). This acritical m aterialist ontology is 
epitomized when, for instance, the historian and critical theorist 
Mark Poster (1985 [1984]: 151) asserts that in the work of the 
poststructuralist Michel Foucault, “knowledge is a material force in 
history” (emphasis added).
On the other hand, some of the circles who have avowed 
their materialism have dislocated the transcendental tradition to the 
advantage of an immanent worldview. Transcendentalism is usually 
related to Immanuel Kant’s philosophical body and is associated to 
the existence of a priori ideas as necessary mechanisms to come to 
know objects. As I will define below in more detail, an immanent 
ontology assumes that the entirety of reality is present, free of 
moments of transcendence. Somewhat mysteriously, however, those 
quarters who have embraced ‘the world of immanence’ have equated 
the latter with a materialist ontology. That is to say, these thinkers 
have assumed that all what is present is of material nature. For 
instance, a group of French philosophers who orbited around the 
French M arxist philosopher Louis Althusser seized Spinoza’s 
philosophical immanence as a vantage position in their attempt to 
reread Marx. They dangerously - i f  not irresponsibly in my view— 
concluded that the Dutch Jewish philosopher of the seventeenth 
century Baruch Spinoza “was perhaps the most thoroughgoing 
materialist in the history of philosophy” (Montag 1988: xi).
On the whole, one may detect in the post-Kantian critique of 
reason a gigantic confusion between embodied experiences and 
materialism. Customarily, embodied experiences are foursquarely 
equated with a materialist ontology (cf. Plotnitsky 1993b: 249-251;
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Schrift 1995: 20). I would like to argue that such an equation is 
misleading. The clarification of this point is crucial in so far as it 
defines the traits of an immanent ontology in contradistinction with 
a materialist one. Let us in the following provide two definitions of 
immanence in order to proceed with the differences between 
materialism and immanence. Kerslake (2002) defines a philosophy of 
immanence as
“Formally, [...] a philosophy that does not appeal to 
anything outside the terms and relations constructed 
and accounted for by that philosophy. Ontologically, 
we might say that in a philosophy of immanence, 
thought is shown to be fully expressive of being; there 
is no moment of ‘transcendence’ of being to thought” .
Yirmiyahu Yovel (1989: xi), for his part, defines
“(1) immanence [as] the only and overall horizon of 
being; (2) it is equally the only source of value and 
normantiveness and (3) absorbing this recognition into 
one’s life is a prelude -and precondition— for whatever 
liberation (or, emancipation) is in store for humans.”
Against these definitions, I would like to claim that a 
philosophy of immanence invokes not so much ‘materialism’ as 
‘situatedness’, ‘contextualization’. Yet the relevant point to 
emphasize is that by appealing to such a philosophy and deflecting 
the facile equation with materialism we may prove far better 
equipped in order to make a proposal towards the unification of the 
philosophia/scientia divide. This proposed unification, in turn, 
could serve as an anchoring point for the further development of a 
green critical theory.
Therefore upon the basis of a situated immanent ontology, 
which is said to transcend the divide between the Arts and Science, 
I shall make the following tripartite epistemological proposal. I 
p ropose to gather a firs t group of d iscourses re la ted  to 
environmental decay around the embodied dimension of culture. I 
would like to restate that embodiment, against an immanent 
backdrop, is not the same as materialism. Also in this group, what 
may be called the ‘instruments of mobility’ (such as technology, 
infrastructure commodities, waste) of which the embodied entities 
avail themselves are included. I would like to emphasize that the
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embodied dimension of culture covers all forms of ‘life’. From soil, 
stones, water, plants, trees, insects, animals, human beings, planets 
to stars. It must be noted that this understanding of life dislocates 
the anthropocentric conception of life which pervades the Western 
scholarship. Instead, an eco- or even geo- or cosmocentric approach 
is undertaken.
I subsequently propose a second group of environmental 
woes around issues related to the arrangement of the public sphere. 
Many of the authors who embrace the holistic paradigm question 
the division between the economic, the political and the social 
realms. In his epoch-making Stone Age Economics, for instance, the 
cultural anthropologist Marshall Sahlins (2004 [1972]: ix) states that:
“rather than as separate sphere of existence, economic 
activity is perceived as encompassed in cultural order. 
Hence it needs to be understood as in the relative 
terms of a given mode of existence”
Wallerstein too calls for a questioning of the disciplinary 
boundaries ascertained between the economic, the social and the 
political. According to him, this is part of the legacy of the modern 
division of knowledge. Those partitions were created parallel to the 
entrenchment of the nation-state in the West, in accordance to the 
needs of the budding bureaucracies towards the management of
populations. So Wallerstein writes in his reflection upon The Limits
o f Nineteenth-Century Paradigms:
“the m ost enduring (and m isleading) legacy of 
nineteenth-century social science -the  division of 
social analysis into three arenas, three logics, three 
‘levels’ -the  economic, the political, and the socio­
cultural [ - ...]  stands in the middle of the road, in
granite, blocking our intellectual advance” (Wallerstein 
2001:4).
In realising the incisive points advanced in both Sahlins’ and 
Wallerstein’s critiques, I propose to lump the economic, the social 
and the political logics together in just one block. I finally propose 
to create a third group which shall speak for the array of knowledges 
(philosophical, ethical, religious), which in the literature have been 
portrayed as ecocidal.
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In the form of a recapitulation: I first make the point that the 
post-Kantian critique of reason has m isguidedly confounded 
embodied experiences with materialism. I propose to resolve this 
misconception by appealing to a situated immanent ontology. In 
opening this ontological space I undertake an epistemological 
decentring of the dualism created between the Arts vis-à-vis the 
Sciences. The unleashed epistemological dislocation takes an 
a lte rn a tiv e  tr ip a rtite  form . In a firs t group o f th is re ­
conceptualization, I gather discourses regarding the embodied 
dimensions of culture along with their instruments of mobility. In a 
second group I merge the discourses surrounding social, the 
political and the economic on the grounds that the three disciplines 
deal with the public sphere. Finally, the third dimension situated 
upon the immanent ontology is aimed at capturing the discourses 
dealing with the gamut of knowledges that inform culture.
To further highlight the interconnectedness of the three 
spheres of culture, I would like to redub them low-culture, middle- 
culture, and high-culture respectively. I endeavour to posit these 
three distinctive levels -em bodim ent and instruments of mobility, 
the polity, and know ledges- as the three irreducibles of culture. 
When I speak in terms of the three irreducibles of culture, I mean 
to say traits that ought to be found in all cultures. Their contents 
is how ever defined  co n tin g en tly . Thus acco rd ing  to my 
epistemological proposal, what defines, say, Western culture is 
not so much a trait intrinsic to it - a  ‘race’, a language, a type of 
soil -  but those areas of the world which during a particular time- 
span are sharing a particular high- middle- and low-cultural 
correlation. Analogously, we may speak of the peripheries of the 
world by detecting a common high- middle- and low-cultural 
configuration.
Let us further note that by clinging to the notion of culture 
we are dissolving the antagonisms which assail the Western 
philosophical tradition -viz. materialism vs. idealism. A divide which 
would prevent us from seeing all the elements of culture interrelated. 
Again in Eagleton’ s (2002: 4-5) words:
“The idea of culture [...] is both a rebuff to both 
naturalism and idealism, insisting against the former 
that there is that within nature which exceeds and 
undoes it, and against idealism that even the most
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high-minded human agency has its humble roots in our 
biology and natural environment.”
Finally, it is interesting to note how Alf Homborg’s (2001: 46) 
own irreducibles of culture in his economic anthropological analyses 
also cover a tripartite division akin to the high- middle- and low- 
cultural one I propose. So writes Hornborg:
“[I] will need to consider three factors that enter into 
any process of accumulation: (1) the social institutions 
that regulate exchange [or part of middle-culture], (2) the 
symbolic systems [or part of high-culture] that ultimately 
define exchange values and exchange rates, and (3) the 
thermodynamic and other physical circumstances that 
allow us to discern the direction of net flows of energy 
and materials [or part of low-culture]”.
The detachment of materialism from immanence and the 
alternative embracement of a situated immanent ontology certainly 
enables to see knowledges (high-culture) in correlation with the 
organization of the public sphere (middle-culture) and finally with 
embodied forms (low-culture).
In short, I would like to set forth an analytics of high- middle- 
and low-culture as a comprehensive critical theory fit for application 
across human and ecological issues, one which facilitates the 
resolution of such a dichotomy by transcending idealism and 
materialism and appealing to a situated immanent ontology.
[8.] LOW-CULTURAL FAILURES
As announced above, this section shall cover discourses on 
the ecocide related to the embodied and material dimensions of 
culture.
[8.1] A Failure in Demographic Control: ANeo-Malthusian Response
It has been the task of population biologists and bare 
ecologists13 that of linking environmental pollution to the pressure 
which population exerts upon resources and sinks. The expression
13 As opposed to those who also take the local and international 
politica l agenda into account, i .e . p o litica l e co lo g ists . The 
contribution o f the latter quarters to the reconstruction o f the ecocide 
may be found in section [9.4] ‘A Failure in the Geopolitics o f the 
Financially Powerful North: the Reproach o f Political Ecology’.
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of this link has been technically phrased as ‘carrying capacity’ - a  
concept set to identify the threshold of population of any given 
species which an ecosystem can sustain indefinitely (Dryzek 2005: 
27-30; Martinez-Alier 2002: 47-48).
Two names surface as the proponents of this cause: Garrett 
Hardin14 and Paul R. Ehrlich. In 1968 both launched their respective 
theses. Hardin published his article ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ 
in the influential journal Science15, while Ehrlich presented his 
arguments in a book entitled The Population Bomb. Their views 
converged in upholding that environmental degradation originates 
in the discrepancy between the earth’s limited pool of resources and 
the escalating human population, which stresses the environment 
and also spurs such social problems as poverty and hunger. “A 
finite world can support only a finite population; therefore, 
population growth must eventually equal zero [...] The pollution 
problem is a consequence of population [...] There is no technical 
solution to the problem” may be the bulk of Hardin’s message (1996 
[1968]: 129, 134, 127), not substantially different from Ehrlich’s, “a 
tireless Cassandra of demographic disasters” (Feenberg 1996: 257).
According to Barry Commoner (1990 [1975]: 143), this appears 
to have been an influential discourse when the international 
community evinced consensual preoccupation for the state of the 
environment -i.e . in the early 1970’s. It reinforced the credo that 
population control was the only practical way to curb pollution, 
which “caused many forced sterilizations and large-scale female 
infanticide in many countries [such as China]16, and they threaten 
small surviving ethnic groups” (Martinez-Alier 2002: 47).
14 Who, aged 88, recently passed away. Garret Hardin (1915-2003).
15 Reprinted in Herman E. Daly and Kenneth N. Townsend (1996 
[1993]) (eds.), Valuing the Earth: Econom ics, Ecology, Ethics, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts & London, England: The MIT Press; pp. 
127-143. In this same edition one may also encounter Hardin’s brief 
‘Second Thoughts on ‘The Tragedy o f the Commons” (pp. 145-151).
16 The socio-econom ic consequences o f the Chinese one-child policy  
which has certainly caused wholesale female infanticide and more 
recently, follow ing the refinement o f technology, equally large 
numbers o f female-foetuses abortion have been recently reported in 
the mainstream press under such headings as ‘40m  bachelors and 
no wom en...the birth o f a new problem for China’, The Guardian, 
09/03/ 2004; p. 3.
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With such a neo-Malthusian framework in mind, the Club of 
Rome17 modelled predictions at a global scale. Their mathematical 
computations, they considered the food shortages that may occur 
as global population soars, along with the amount of economic 
growth and environmental degradation that follow from a growing 
global population. Their conclusion, printed out in a report called 
The Limits to Growth (1972), “which within four years had sold four 
million copies” (Dryzek 2005: 30), was a collapse in global population 
as the only path towards the restoration of the equilibrium within 
the confines of the planet. In the course of the following two 
decades, the group could gather sufficient data to re-launch an 
updated report published under the self-evident title of Beyond the 
Limits (1992). The text emphasized the absence of change in trends 
during the time elapsed since the publication of their first report. 
Now, with an additional 20 years of ride ‘beyond the limits’, it would 
prove even more strenuous for humanity to strike an optimum 
balance between the total number of inhabitants and the amount of 
available resources. In 2004, Limits to Growth: The 30-year Update 
was launched only to emphasize that there was no time to be lost in 
order to undertake transitions to a sustainable system.
To locate the roots of the concern at hand, not gratuitously 
named ‘neo-Malthusian’, we obviously must refer back to the figure 
of Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834) and the less known one of 
William Forster Lloyd (1794-1852) (Dryzek 2005: 29). Malthus’s ‘law 
of population’, published in his epoch-making An Essay on the 
Principle o f Population (1803), may be spelt out as follows. An 
imbalance of rate appears between the speed at which food is 
supplied and the pace at which population grows. The former 
expands in arithmetical progression, whereas the latter soars 
geometrically. The equilibrium between the two non-concordat forms 
of reproduction can either be struck by way of wars, famines, and 
disease (Bookchin 1994: 30); or prevented by way of ‘moral restraint’ 
from sexual activity, the delaying of parenting until later in life, and 
the prudential restraint on marriage (Jackson 2002: 3).
17 “A se lf-a p p o in te d  org a n iza tio n  o f  in d u str ia lis ts  and 
environmentalists”, in Barry Commoner’s words (1991 [1975]: 
146). Eco-M arxist James O ’Connor (1998: 159), for his part, 
speaks in terms o f ‘Club o f Rome technocratism’, whilst political 
scientist John Dryzek (2005: 30) refers to them as “a group of  
well-heeled and sympathetic academics concerned with what they 
styled the ‘predicament o f mankind’”.
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As many as four critiques arise around the belief that the 
nature of the green ordeal is purely demographic. In raising 
objections to the population growth postulate, each critic suggests 
an alternative cause. Therefore, this section is dispensed with a 
fully-fledged articulation of their respective arguments. These are 
simply briefly named and related to the corresponding heading, so 
that the reader may refer to them at will. On the one hand, Barry 
Commoner challenges neo-Malthusianism and shifts the emphasis 
towards the nocuous effects of production technologies -see [8.2] 
‘A Failure in Technological Efficiency: the Advocates of Ecological 
Modernization’. This objection should not be taken at face value, 
since it generated a debate with, or rather against, Ehrlich’s thesis, 
with far-reaching effects for the subsequent green movement:
“The Commoner-Ehrlich debate quickly moved beyond 
the scientific disagreement to embrace two radically 
different rhetorics and strategies. Their arguments, 
which took place at the very beginning of widespread 
public concern over the environment adumbrated the 
main themes of later controversies over humanism and 
anti-humanism, democracy and dictatorship, and North/ 
South disputes” (Feenberg 1996: 258).
On the other, Martinez-Alier, from the emerging field of 
political ecology, shifts the focus of attention away from population 
pressure upon resources towards production pressures upon them 
for export -see [9.4] ‘A Failure in the Geopolitics of the Financially 
Powerful North: the Reproach of Political Ecology’. Retrospectively, 
Mohandas K. Gandhi centres the critique on modem civilization -  
see [8.8] ‘A Failure in Affluent Western Lifestyles: the Indictment of 
the Industrial Consumer Society’. The crux of the matter is shifted 
away from low-culture towards middle-culture.
We shall next expose the litany of reproaches put across by 
our fourth critic -Murray Bookchin (1994: 32-33). His views may be 
more broadly read as the charges of anarchism on ‘the population 
law’. Bookchin discredits neo-Malthusian arguments on a three-front 
basis. First of all, the author claims that the collapse of human 
beings into “line graphs, bar graphs, and statistical tables” falls 
short of capturing the political and historical elements which 
structure  society  h ierarch ically  - th e  au thentic roo t of the 
conundrum. Like Martinez-Alier, Bookchin shifts the focus of
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emphasis away from low-culture towards middle-culture -see [9.5] 
‘A Failure in Hierarchical Structures: the Social Ecology Perspective’. 
Secondly, in extrapolating the present social reality into prospective 
scenarios, Bookchin argues that Neo-Malthusians fail to propose 
social structures alternative to the status quo. Finally, as the 
population discourse gains momentum, the theorist of social ecology 
believes that we run the peril of legitimating the extension of the 
state’s power over the issue of reproduction -lim iting thereby yet 
another of our liberties.
[8.2] A Failure in Technological Efficiency: the Advocates of Ecological 
Modernization
Soon after the publication of The Limits to Growth, a report 
on the state of the environment of neo-Malthusian pedigree as it 
was reviewed above in the section above, the scientist Barry 
Commoner (1990 [1975]) proved -p artly  numerically, partly 
rhetorically— that there was no direct link between rapid population 
growth and the despoliation of the environment. The authentic 
nature of the conundrum did not lie, in Commoner’s view, in the 
natural ecosphere -as neo-Malthusians had so eagerly striven to 
prove numerically. Rather, environmental decay had to be attributed 
to production technologies. To operate his thesis, Commoner coined 
the concept of ‘modern technosphere’. According to this, the 
hemisphere which hosts technology and generates wealth is the 
northern one, filled as it is with “factories, power plants, automotive 
vehicles, and petrochemical plants” . The southern hemisphere, 
contrastingly, is home to the majority of population, “nearly all 
desperately poor” (Commoner 1990 [1975]: 141). That is, in 
Commoner’s view, the quid of the ecocide is decoupled from a 
quantitative approach of either industrial production or inhabitants. 
Having contrasted  d ifferen t sources of availab le data, his 
concluding remarks run so:
“in the United States the factor more responsible for 
the sharp increases in pollutants since World War II -  
and the factor most capable of reducing pollution -is  
production technology: the new methods used to 
produce vehicular travel, cleansers, crops, beer, and 
many other goods” (ibid.: 151).
Seen from this prism, Barry Commoner may be ascertained as 
a precursor proponent of ecological modernization -an  ensemble of
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environmental guidelines geared at the reduction of pollution, as we 
will next skim over.
The Ecological Modernization Strategy
As a phenomenon, ecological modernization explains the 
successful environmental-policy performance of Germany, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, Norway and Japan since the 1980s. As a 
scheme, it consists of a conflation of three strategies. Namely, high 
energy efficiency of national income, low per capita emissions of 
pollutants, and low per capita generation of household garbage and 
other solid wastes (Dryzek 2005: 162 f.).
According to political scientist John Dryzek, the academics 
who first noticed and documented this practice were the German 
social scientists Joseph Huber and Martin Janicke (ibid.: 167). If we 
on the other hand follow Joan Martinez-Alier’s (2002: 6) description 
of ‘the gospel of eco-efficiency’, a current of environmentalism 
which embraces the practices proposed by eco-modemizers, the 
name of Arthur Mol, “who did research on the Dutch chemical 
industry”, should be appended to the two scholars mentioned by 
Dryzek.
The core conviction of ecological modernization is that the 
externalities into the environment that the capitalist political 
economy has yielded to date may be redressed with no recourse to 
a dismantling of the economic system. The secret lies in setting 
industrial and agricultural production on a technologically efficient 
and clean track. In other words, there is full compatibility between a 
sound environment and an increase in economic growth.
In terms of kinship relations, ecological modernization is 
intimately intertwined with sustainable development. The former, in 
being technically-oriented, offers a how-to-do blueprint to the latter, 
which erects itself essentially as a discourse rather then a plan of action 
(Dryzek 2005: 145, 153). Ancestral links to the practice of ecological 
modernization are also to be found in European scientific forestry 
management, efficient use of energy, agricultural chemistry, and in the 
many 19^ century debates among engineers, and public health experts 
on industrial and urban pollution (Martinez-Alier 2002: 5).
The eco-modernization’s commitment to production may have 
left this quarter of environment-minded corporatism (Dryzek 2005:
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167) with little room for reflection regarding the nature of the ecocide. 
However, from their environmental strategy one may well proceed 
with the following inference. Like in Commoner’s argumentation, for 
the advocates of eco-modernization, the environmental debacle boils 
down to a failure in technological efficiency.
Ecologists, and in particular ecological economists, challenge 
the faith in “the gospel of ecoefficiency” (Martinez-Alier 2002: 5) by 
appealing to the levons’s paradox. William Stanley Jevons (1835- 
1882) was a British neoclassical economist who in a chapter of his 
The Coal Question entitled ‘Of the Economy of Fuel’ argued that 
increased technological efficiency in using a natural resource -in  
his case ‘coal’— resulted in a rise in demand for that resource. The 
reason for this paradox is well illustrated in a passage of that 
chapter:
“If the quantity of coal used in a blast-furnace, for instance, 
be diminished in comparison with the yield, the profits of the trade 
will increase, new capital will be attracted, the price of pig-iron will 
fall, but the demand for it increase; and eventually the greater 
number of furnaces will more than make up for the diminished 
consumption of each” (Jevons quoted in Foster 2002: 94).
O ther exam ples which attest to this paradox are the 
introduction of more energy-efficient automobiles, refrigerators, 
computers and myriad household gadgets. By no means have these 
improvements translated into a fall in the overall use of energy. The 
contrary is the case. The reason being the mass-accessibility and 
consumption of these technologies.
[8.3] A Failure in Utilitarian Technology: Common Ground among 
Ecologists
Having appealed to a lack of technological efficiency as 
cause of environmental degradation, we now refer to a distinct 
sort of technical failure -v iz. gadgets as utilitarian depredators of 
nature. ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ and its malevolent 
effects on the environment is a theme which encounters well- 
a rticu la ted  she lte r in one o f the lead ing  ph ilosophers in 
phenomenology -namely Martin Heidegger. Heidegger (1889-1976) 
has been reiteratively a subject of study for his contribution to 
ecophilosophy and, more particularly so, to the fundamentals of 
deep ecology (Devall & Sessions 1985: 98-100; Fox 1995 [1990]:
426 Environment Education: Global Issues and Policies
238-239 & 276-277; Berthold-Bond 1994: 279-283; Macaulay 1996: 8- 
9; Zimmerman 1996).
The exclusive Heideggerian philosophical insights which are 
yet worth reviewing in the present section are those related to the 
thinker’s critique of modem technology and science (Heidegger 2000 
[1993]; Berthold-Bond 1994: 283-284). As it appears clarified in the 
subsection entitled [10.2] ‘A Failure in Western Philosophy: the 
Unfolding of Instrumental Reason’, the kernel of Heidegger’s critique 
must be evidently located in the diachronic line of philosophy -no t 
in technology per se. “Technology is not equivalent to the essence 
of technology [or, put tautologically,] the essence of technology is 
by no means anything technological”, writes Heidegger (2000 [1993]: 
311) to his readership. We are presented here with the occasion to 
highlight the interconnectedness between high- and low-culture. 
Indeed, in cultural parlance we can ascertain that when Heidegger 
mentions ‘the essence of technology’ he means its high-cultural 
dim ension. ‘Technology’, contrasting ly , is its low -cultural 
manifestation. Consistently, in this section only a description of 
how utilitarian technology harnesses the environment is advanced. 
The exposition of the philosophical background is reserved for later.
Whenever “nature becomes a gigantic gasoline station, an 
energy source for modern technology and industry” (Berthold-Bond 
1994: 284); the role performed by the latter is fragrantly utilitarian. 
For in such instances technology is liable to exhaust the limited 
resources of the Earth and thus be attributed as a cause leading to 
environmental catastrophe.
Such a concluding position as regards technology has been 
with equal impetus adopted by many an ecological thinker. From deep 
ecologists, to ecofeminists, who see capitalism and modern science 
and technology as correlated manifestations of a patriarchal system 
misleadingly enthroned upon nature -not within its limits (Merchant 
1980; Shiva 1993,1997,1999) -see [9.6] ‘A Triple Failure in Patriarchy: 
the Voices of Ecofeminism’. Also forefather of ecological economics, 
Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, attests with his pioneering work on 
economics and thermodynamics to the intensification of the entropie 
process with the dawn of industrial technology -see both [8.4] ‘A 
Failure in Industrial Production: the Intensification of the Entropie 
Process’ and [8.5] ‘A Failure in Modern Forms of Agriculture: 
Industrial, Biotechnological, Nanotechnological’.
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Historian Arnold J. Toynbee (1992 [1966]; 1976), for his part, 
points to the dissonance struck betw een the technological 
capabilities of modem civilization, which have been evolving at an 
exponential pace ever since the descent of humankind, and the 
stagnated global body politic composed of non-cooperative, 
belligerent parochial sovereign states. The latter in the last resort a 
mere reflection of an involuted spiritual constituency -see [10.8] A 
Failure in the Cultivation of the Spiritual Constituency: the Grand 
Postponed Challenge of Humankind. Medieval historian Lynn White 
too contributes from the domain of ecotheology. White, whilst 
ultimately putting down ‘The Historical Roots of Our Ecological 
Crisis’ on Christianity’s destruction of pagan animism, sees modem 
Western science and technology encroached in this very “matrix of 
Christian theology [predicated on the belief] that it is God’s will that 
man exploit nature for his proper ends” (White 2004 [1967]: 199, 
197)” -see [10.9] ‘A Failure in Christianity and Judaism: the 
Desacralization of the Earth’. This relatively extensive list signals 
that the indictment of the pernicious effects of technology on the 
environment is common ground among ecologists.
[8.4] AFailure in Industrial Production: the Intensification of the Entropie 
Process
It is the domain of knowledge which juxtaposes ecology to 
economy, that is, ecological economics, the one which analyses the 
economic process from the physical perspective of thermodynamics 
(Kawamiya 1985; Murota & Tsuchida 1985; Daly 1999 [1986]; Faber, 
Manstetten & Proops 1998 [1996]a, 1998 [1996]b, Jackson 1996: 8- 
17), so that “a rational base in order to calculate the costs of our 
economy” is provided (Martinez-Alier 1994 [1987]: 80).
In this ambit of knowledge, one name for sure stands out -  
the Rumanian sui generis economist Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen. 
Precisely for his pioneering work “in a visionary way” (Faber et al. 
1998a [1996]: 105) on The Entropy Law and the Economic Process, 
which gives name to his most notable opus in this field (1974 [1971]; 
1996 [1971]), Georgescu-Roegen has been retrospectively endowed 
with the status of categorical progenitor of ecological economics - a  
field which was not formally constituted till an international 
encounter of scholars in Barcelona that took place in 1987. The 
interpretation of the economic process through the lens of this 
branch of physics may be conceivably the major contribution from
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ecological economists to the elucidation of the nature of the 
ecocide.
Both the works of G eorgescu-Roegen and subsequent 
scholarly reviews point to a critical clash emerging from the laws; 
re ign ing  through ecosystem s and those govern ing  our 
contemporary economic system. The asymmetry substantiates 
basically in the contrasted moderate pace at which ecosystems 
regenerate18 and the accelerated rhythm of exploitation (of resources 
and sinks alike) at which industrial economic processes are forced 
to operate. This tension is obviously portrayed both as an 
epistemological failure and one de facto. The exposition of the 
former is addressed in the third block in a section called [10.6] ‘A 
Failure in the (Neo)classical and M arxist Political Economic 
Epistemologies: the Obliteration of the Biophysical Constraints of 
the Earth’. It is the account of how, physically speaking, the 
industrial process operates in utter disharmony with respect to the 
dynamics of the ecosystems where the focus in the present section 
is directed.
Basic thermodynamic lexicon
To come to grips with the operative system of the entropy 
law we first must cover a set of fundamental notions regarding the 
field of physics called thermodynamics. These concepts are: systems 
boundaries; and free energy or low entropy vis-à-vis bound energy 
or high entropy. So, first of all, a note on thermodynamic system 
boundaries.
Thermodynamics abstracts three forms of systems -isolated, 
closed and open— subject to the rapport inflow /outflow  of 
energy— m atter which these establish  with the surrounding 
environment. Against this discernment, an isolated system is one 
which exchanges neither energy nor matter with the peripheral area; 
a closed one, on the other hand, is open to the exchange of energy 
with the neighbouring systems but closed to the reception and 
expulsion of matter; finally, a system is deemed thermodynamically 
open when it permits the free circulation of energy and matter with
18 That is, their resilient capacity, “the ability o f a system  to 
maintain itse lf despite a disturbance, without flipping over to a 
new state. It is also defined as the capacity o f a system to return 
to the initial state” (Martinez-Alier 2002: 44).
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the area circumventing it. With this information in hand, it should be 
easy to understand why the economy is conceived to conform to an 
open system - ”it only absorbs matter-energy and throws it out 
continuously” (Georgescu-Roegen 1996 [1971]: 76) from and into 
the environment. By the same token, the thermodynamic system 
boundaries of the Earth are said to be closed with respect to outer 
space -our Planet receives a constant inflow of solar energy and 
returns long-wave radiation into space19.
Another key notion which the reader must grow acquainted 
with is that of the two different qualitative states into which energy 
may be found -namely, free vs. bound. Energy is conceived to be 
free in its orderly initial structure; it turns into bound when it has 
been chaotically dissipated either due to the automatic entropie 
process internal to the material environment or due to human 
purposive activity to e.g. set in motion the economic process 
(Georgescu-Roegen 1974 [1971]: 281-282). Another way to refer to 
free energy or order is low entropy. Derivatively, bound energy or 
chaos translates into high entropy. Both concepts have obviously 
their physical correspondences. So solar energy and natural 
resources and sinks, on the one hand, are the sources of low 
entropy of the Earth and also of the economy; solid waste and toxic 
gas emissions, on the other, are considered the high-entropy output 
of the economy. As Georgescu-Roegen first established, it is
19 It is the alteration o f this thermodynamic cycle which explains the 
steady trend, markedly so since the postwar, towards global warming. 
Roughly speaking, the phenomena at work enchain with one another 
in the following manner. The mounting combustion o f fossil fuels 
increases the concentration o f greenhouse gases (C 02, N 2 0 , CFCs, 
CH2, 0 3  and water vapour) in the atmosphere. Greenhouse gases 
are so called for, by being transparent to solar radiation but opaque 
to long-wave radiation, they trap long-wave infrared radiation -i.e .  
heat—  within the lower levels o f the atmosphere and provoke a 
(natural) Greenhouse Effect. By this process optimum temperatures 
on the surface o f the Earth for large numbers o f life-forms are 
attained. Now, a higher concentration o f greenhouse gases enhances 
the Greenhouse Effect by curtailing the amount o f long-wave  
radiation returning directly into space and causing in turn reradiation 
o f some o f the heat energy back to Earth’s surface, and thus turning 
temperatures gradually unbearable for a number o f life forms among 
which the human (Spash 2002: 25-59).
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relevant to highlight that the Earth has access to two distinct 
sources of low entropy or free energy. One consists of a stock, 
while the other is a flow. The stock refers to “the mineral deposits 
[located] in the bowels of the Earth”. The flow of low entropy, for 
its part, emanates from the “solar radiation intercepted by the earth” 
(Georgescu-Roegen 1996 [1971]: 83).
The application of this physical law (entropy) to the economic 
process is yet of a rather involved character. To start with, in 
equilibrium thermodynamics, the irreversibility of the entropie 
process -which will be immediately defined below— has a limited 
applicability to isolated systems -that is, those which are closed to 
the exchange of both energy and matter with the neighbouring area. 
In contrast, the subsystem s of our experience, as the very 
Georgescu-Roegen has acknowledged, are all either closed or open 
(Faber et al. 1998 [1996b]: 120). Adding to the complexity of the 
matter, we learn from ecological economists that it proves hard to 
draw a clear-cut line between an “isolated systems vs. closed/open 
system in reality” (ibid. 113; footnote 5).
Despite these intricacies, scholars in this field conclude that 
thermodynamics, while far from advancing a theory of economic 
value, does indicate where the biophysical boundaries of the 
economic process lie. Entropy tends to be regarded as a restrictive 
factor (Faber et al. 1998 [1996]: 115-135; Prigogine & Stengers 1984: 
257-290). Herman E. Daly is significantly vocal in this regard when 
responding to a piece of critique set forth by a bunch of entropy 
skeptics:
“Entropy is a physical law, like gravity, and entropie 
constraints (depletion and pollution) are objective facts 
evident in the present, not value judgements, and not 
speculation about future millennia.
How we react to this objective condition, whether by 
emphasizing sustainability or temporary extravagance as the dominant 
goal, is certainly a value judgement” (Daly 1999 [1986]: 98-99).
The entropie nature o f the economic process
Having introduced to the reader the rudim ents of the 
thermodynamic lexicon, the entropie nature of the economic process 
should  be grasped  w ith g rea te r ease. The F irst Law of
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Thermodynamics, or law of conservation of matter-energy, institutes 
that matter-energy can be neither created nor destroyed. The total 
amount of matter-energy available in the universe is constant and 
therefore can only be transferred from one system to another under 
different forms. The First Law translates thus into economic terms:
“matter and energy are not created ex nihilo, but must 
be extracted from the environment, and...outputs must 
return to the environment in various forms which add 
up to equal the quantity of inputs” (Daly 1999 [1986]: 
96-97).
The Second Law of Thermodynamics, for its part, predicts that 
in an isolated system, low entropy turns irrevocably -i.e. even with 
the absence of human purposive activity— into high entropy. The 
First Law bars the shifts underway in the Second from being of a 
quantitative nature. It restricts them to qualitative reallocations of 
matter-energy, inexorably unfolding from order to chaos and never in 
the opposite direction. Hence the attribute it has gained, the Entropy 
Law, of being a pessimistic law. For all its inexorability, the conclusions 
arrived at in more recent research has been conducive to a slight 
decompression of the ‘gloominess’ previously accorded to it:
“The interpretation of the Second Law as imposing an 
absolute constra in t on econom ic grow th, be it 
quantitative or qualitative, has turned out to be too 
pessimistic. The Earth is not an isolated system, but is 
subject to the laws describing the evolution of closed 
and open systems. The energy and the associated low 
entropy that we receive from the sun offer a creative 
potential for the build-up of increasingly complex 
structures” (Faber et al. 1998 [1996]b: 133).
In the context depicted above, it is easy to come to terms 
with the idea that entropy is first and foremost taken as a yardstick 
by which to gauge the qualitative state of energy-matter in a 
subsystem. On these grounds, entropy would respond to the 
question: how much free vs. bound energy-matter is to be found in 
this or that system?
The entropie burdens o f an industrial society
Yet the flow of low entropy optimism, so to speak, of 
contemporary research should be met with an equally good dose of
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(thermodynamic) caution, as the correlation of three variables may 
transform the economic process, which thermodynamically speaking 
behaves as an open system, into “de facto isolated” (ibid.). One of 
these factors refers to the pace of ecosystems, while the remaining 
two relate to the economic process in (advanced) industrial societies.
As to the reality in ecosystems, one must consider the 
expanded time-scales along which natural processes (e.g. the 
formation of exhaustible resources) evolve, and situate in them the 
lifespan of resilience, that is, the time it takes for an ecosystem 
which has been interfered with human purposive activity to regain 
its initial state. An instance of the latter is the accumulation of non- 
degradable pollutants in the atmosphere. The prolonged ecological 
time-scale must be furthermore contrasted with two decisive factors 
in the economic route -namely, its scale and its speed. If the scale is 
too large and the speed out of pace with the resilient capacity of an 
ecosystem, which tends to be the norm in industrial economies, 
“resources and sinks are brought into a fast-moving regime of 
exploitation” (Martinez-Alier 2002: 44), and thus the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics is de facto  applicable. Or, what is equal to say, the 
entropie nature of the economic process is vindicated. In such case 
we may assert as regards the physical implications of the economic 
process that,
“although total input equals total output in quantitative 
terms, there is a big qualitative difference between the 
equal quantities of raw material inputs and ultimate 
waste outputs. Raw material is low entropy matter- 
energy, waste is high-entropy matter-energy” (Daly 
1999 [1986]: 97; emphasis added).
In sum, in entropie terms the economic process must be 
posited as that purposive cultural activity which both anticipates 
and enhances the automatic entropie process of low-culture. That is 
to say, insofar as it degrades low entropy and transforms it into 
high, production anticipates the natural course of the entropie 
process; insofar as it requires additional low entropy to anticipate 
it, production increases the entropie process. For example, to turn 
copper ore into a copper sheet, a matter-energy-intensive process, a 
“sorting or purposive activ ity” in G eorgescu-Roegen’s own 
formulation (1974 [1971]: 282), is put to work. Hence we may say 
that this economic activity entails two entropie effects. One, the
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anticipation of the natural degradation of copper ore. Two, the 
enhancement of the general automatic entropie process in the 
deployment of additional resources to ignite the anticipation at 
issue.
Up to this point I have presented a relatively comprehensive 
view of thermodynamics, with special emphasis cast upon the 
Second Law of Thermodynamics and the entropie nature of the 
economic process. This expanded explanation is key in order to 
understand the nature of industrial processes at the low-cultural 
level. Now we will adjust the definition to the industrial process. In 
entropie terms, industrial production must be regarded as the 
cultural purposive activity hitherto developed by humankind which, 
with the aid of an assortment of technological devices, is endowed 
with the ability to strike the grandest differential between the natural 
entropie process and the human-induced one.
Entropy and intergenerational equity
The an tic ipation  and enhancem ent o f this physical 
phenomenon -entropy— has, on the other hand, its correlation back 
in the economic realm. It partially determines the discount rate. That 
is to say, the pace at which financial interests accelerate the entropie 
process establishes the rate at which low entropy (resources and 
sinks) will be gradually unavailable in the future. The theme of the 
discount rate or, ethically speaking, intergenerational equity, is also a 
topical one in the theoretical body constitutive of ecological 
economics (Costanza et al. 1997: 124-126; Martinez-Alier 2002: 44-46).
In his distinctive manner to append analogies to abstract 
explanations -which rarely fail to make a mockery of the object 
under comparison, Georgescu-Roegen (1996 [1971]: 85) glosses both 
the intra- and intergenerational unequal allocation of resources 
prevalent in the modern world in these words:
“Every time we produce a Cadillac, we irrevocably destroy an 
amount of low entropy that could otherwise be used for producing a 
plow or a spade. In other words, every time we produce a Cadillac, we 
do it at the cost of decreasing the number of human lives in the future”.
Non-renewables, ‘pollution-free’ industry, recycling and entropy
In the same line of thermodynamic reasoning, Georgescu- 
Roegen browses critically through a number of practices common in
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industrial societies. Two such instances are the use of non- 
renewable sources of energy and the belief that there is such thing 
as pollution-free industry. Insofar as sources of energy -such as 
nuclear— fail to capture and transform solar radiation - a  direct 
source of low entropy as expounded above— the natural entropie 
process is intensified and accelerated. In keeping, no matter how 
cleanly industry may proclaim to be operating its manufacturing 
process, it is fallacious to state that its production is pollution-free 
-industry harnesses low-entropic terrestrial stock and turns it into 
useless high-entropy waste.
Through the same critical sieve Georgescu-Roegen passes 
the widespread creed in “salvation through a perpetual recycling of 
waste”, which is customarily deployed by “the various authorities 
on pollution” (1996 [1971]: 82) to challenge the ecological ills 
resulting from industrial production. In the light of the Second Law 
of Thermodynamics, recycling differs from an ordinary industrial 
process only in one detail. Namely, in that the input of the former 
consists of high-entropy m aterials. Apart from this certainly 
substantial difference, the remaining production process follows a 
regular course. Stated in entropie phraseology, converting high 
entropy into low entropy (i.e. recycling) enhances the natural 
entropie process —to accomplish the feat an additional amount of 
free energy is required. Expressed in one liner from the wealth of 
maxims with which Georgescu-Roegen assaults his narrative: “[t]ere 
is no free recycling just as there is no wasteless industry” (1996 
[1971]: 82).”
[8.5] A Failure in Modern Forms of Agriculture: Industrial, 
Biotechnological, Nanotechnological
The Entropie Nature o f the Industrial Agriculture
Within the same paradigm, Georgescu-Roegen directs yet 
another indictment to the shift to industrial agriculture as a 
countermeasure for the population explosion in the twentieth 
century. Entropically speaking, turning traditional agriculture into 
an industrial process -i.e . fully-fledged mechanization of the land 
and substitution of artificial fertilizers for manure— entails a 
relocation of the low entropy source. It turns it away from the 
ongoing solar flux to further harness the limited terrestrial stock. In 
the (ecological) economist’s self-explanatory words:
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“[t]he ox or the water buffalo -w hich derive their 
mechanical power from the solar radiation caught by 
chlorophyll photosynthesis— is replaced by the tractor 
-w hich is produced and operated with the aid of 
terrestrial entropy” (Georgescu-Roegen 1996 [1971]: 84).
In other words, industrial agriculture forsakes the intrinsic 
virtuosity of more traditional practices -tha t of functioning by 
feeding directly on solar radiation or low-entropy. The same logic 
applies to fertilizers, which supplant organic manure and so cut short 
of tapping directly the low entropy solar flux.
Again, disposed of the thermodynamic sophistication of 
Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, Arnold J. Toynbee concurs with the 
former on the ecological-production balance struck by traditional 
agriculture. In Toynbee’s view, the technological capacities acquired 
with the Neolithic Revolution -i.e . the discovery of agriculture and 
cattle-rearing, which sets the basis for traditional agriculture,
“can be seen to have been felicitous devices for 
reconc iling  the developm ent of M an’s [sic] 
technological power with the preservation of the 
welfare of the biosphere” (Toynbee 1976: 41).
As a result of his markedly ecological consciousness, the 
historian goes on to suggest:
“In fact, there is no reason why agriculture and animal 
husbandry, once invented, should not be carried on 
until the biosphere ceases to be habitable” (ibid.: 43).
An assertion, that of Toynbee, reminiscent of the prognostics 
for agricultural practices advanced by Georgescu-Roegen (1974 
[1971]: 21):
“we can rest assured that sometime, perhaps sooner 
than one may think, man [sic] will have to reorient his 
technology in the opposite d irection  - to  obtain 
gasoline from corn, if he will still be around and using 
internal combustion engines. In a different way than in 
the past, man will have to return to the idea that his 
existence is a free gift of the sun.”
These critical comments preached in the sacrosanct, well so 
for ecological economists, realm of thermodynamics are apt to be
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extrapolated to all modern forms of agriculture; from those proposed 
and experimented during the so-called Green Revolution in so-called 
Third World countries to the equally ‘m iracle seeds’ of the 
biotechnological revolution, down to the breakthroughs coming from 
the nanotechnological era which we have ju st entered. The 
contributions of these forms of agricultural practices to the collapse 
of ecosystemic functioning are not confined to the intensification of 
the natural entropie process, though. A number of authors have 
adduced additional perverse effects on the environment.
A pioneering figure in the latter group is that of Rachel 
Carson. Carson’s influential Silent Spring (1962) indicts the modem 
world for its thoughtlessness in the indiscriminate use of synthetic 
chemicals on the land, which “she warned they invited the prospect 
of a dying world, a world in which springtime might no longer bring 
forth new life, only a chilling silence” (Fox 1995: 4; see also Dobson 
1998 [1991]: 25-28).
The Green Revolution
Another woman of international stature, Vandana Shiva, 
contributes at greatest length to the debate around traditional and 
modern agriculture (Shiva 1997; 1999). This physicist, ecofeminist, 
environm ental ac tiv ist and one of the forem ost outspoken 
intellectual voices of the Indian peasantry’s message all along comes 
down to highlight the ecological and social ruptures which modem 
agricultural practices impinge upon ecosystems and the traditional 
social tissue alike. For our purposes here we shall confine the focus 
of attention to the author’s ecological examination of the ‘miracle 
seeds’ introduced with industrial farming.
First an introductory note on the contextual elements around 
which the Green Revolution was wrapped up. The latter is a term 
coined to refer to a series of industrial-agriculture based experiments 
carried out in the post-war period in a host of so-called Third World 
countries. Yet the event has a patent Indian ring. The upshot of 
these practices in the subcontinent during the period running from 
1967 to 1978 is alleged to have been by and large the most 
auspicious. The intent of this novel form of farming was that of 
avoiding the reinstatement of pangs of mass starvation such as the 
Bengal Famine under British-ruled India in 1943. A satisfactory 
application of the formula required the convergence of three
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elements. One, continued expansion of farming area; two, double- 
cropping per year, which forced the creation of a second ‘artificial 
monsoon’ by constructing huge irrigation facilities (read: damns); 
three, seeds with improved genetics.
To articulate the ecological impact of this grand event, Shiva 
prem ises her reasoning on the inex tricab le  condition that 
“sustainable agriculture” entails the recycling of soil nutrients. 
Contrastingly, the Green-Revolution paradigm of agriculture failed 
to close up the ecological nutrient cycle. Instead, it enforced “linear 
flows of purchased inputs of chemical fertilizers from factories and 
marketed outputs of agricultural commodities” (Shiva 1997: 48). In 
broad lines, the Green Revolution contributed three-fold to the 
breakdown of ecosystem functioning. On the one hand, it wrought 
desertification and, along with it, soil diseases and micronutrient 
deficiencies. Furthermore, it added to global warming, as the 
discharge of nitrogen-based fertilizers was an imperative manoeuvre 
for the miraculous method to yield its bounty effects. Nitrogen- 
based compost releases nitrous oxide (N20 ), a greenhouse gas which 
traps long-wave radiation in the lower strata of the atmosphere and 
enhances the Greenhouse Effect20. Finally, the Green Revolution 
ousted inveterate forms of integrated polyculture and forced the 
way to the practice of monoculture. That is, it entailed a shift from 
local biodiversity practices to a biological uniformity “externally 
m anaged and g lobally  co n tro lled ” , w hich but ushered  in 
“homogeneity in forestry, agriculture, fishery and animal husbandry” 
(Shiva 1997: 107, 65).
The Blue Revolution
In an extended meaning, ecological writers allude to the 
advent of a Blue Revolution (Shiva 1997; Martinez-Alier 2002: 80). 
The impingement of Blue Revolutionary practices means for fishery 
what the Green Revolution meant for agriculture, namely, the 
dismantling of traditional forms of livelihoods and the intrusion of 
intensive forms of farm ing. Arguably, the epitom e of Blue 
Revolutionary farming in the present day is the widespread practice 
of shrimp aquaculture, largely a World-Bank-endorsed strategy to 
repay the external debts incurred by many countries in the South on
20 For a rapid description o f the Enhanced Greenhouse Effect, see 
footnote 22.
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the anti-ecological advice of the International Monetary Fund. 
Martinez-Alier (2002: 80) retells that the uprooting of mangroves to 
build up the farming ponds and collect the cherished “pink21 gold” 
are apt to be placed alongside the prime sources of low- and middle- 
cultural dislocation:
“poor people [who] live sustainability in or near the 
mangroves forests [are pushed out, and in so occurring] 
other functions of mangroves are also lost, perhaps 
irreversibly, such as coastal defence against sea level 
rise, breeding grounds for fish, carbon sinks, repositories 
of biodiversity (for example, genetic resources resistant 
to salinity), together with aesthetic values [and varieties 
of] wild shrimp (Martinez-Alier 2002: 80)”.
The Biotechnological Revolution
The more recent biotechnological revolution adds to the 
ecological stress impaired by the Green and Blue Revolutions. 
Biologically speaking, the achievement of this novel manner of 
farming spins around a genetic manipulation of the seed with the 
aid of technological advances, which permits its e.g. hybridization. 
In ecological terms, Shiva recounts that a genetically manipulated 
seed poses a critical fracture to the natural cycle. “The commodified 
seed is ecologically incomplete” (Shiva 1997: 50). To grasp the 
meaning of this loss of ecological integrity, we first ought to review 
the role the seed is reported to play in traditional agriculture.
In agroecological practices the seed performs essentially two 
economic tasks. These functions are the means of production and 
the product. The seed is a means of production at zero cost to the 
peasant in that it reproduces itself every year. It is at the same time 
the product of their economic activity in that it yields harvest
naturally. A genetically modified seed, in stark contrast, is an
ecological misfit, for it ceases to deliver economically in the 
reproduction process just as it fails in the production one. That is, a 
hybrid variety of seed is a biotechnological feat, but an ecological 
failure; it requires the intervention of technology for its replication. 
“Genetic resources are thus, through technology, transformed from 
a renewable into a nonrenewable resource” (Shiva 1997: 50). Now 
rephrased in entropie terms: biotechnological agriculture fails to
21 ‘Pink’ is the colour o f shrimps.
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keep the reproduction of seeds plugged into the low entropy solar 
flux and, contrastingly, succeeds in generating a dependency on the 
low entropy terrestrial stock. The genetically modified seed too is 
ecologically incomplete on its other economic function -v iz . 
delivering the product. It falls short of growing and yielding harvest 
by the means available in ecosystems. The cultivation of these 
artificial seeds requires the constant pouring of chemicals.
The Nanotechnological Revolution
Along these lines, expert in nanotechnology and the 
environment Pat Mooney22 has also considered nanotechnological 
agriculture a source of environmental disruption. Nanotechnology 
differs from biotechnology in that it operates not on the genetic but 
on the minutest level of life-form -i.e. the atom. This nascent variety 
of technology puts Mary Shelly’s fiction into motion: it holds the 
capability to create novel structures of life on the Planet.
All the same, this section intended to illustrate how some 
authors consider energy- & technology-in tensive form s of 
agriculture a threat to the stability of ecosystems. Not only because 
growing seeds with the support of technology and the constant 
irrigation with chemical fertilizers redundantly enhances the entropie 
process. Industrially-assisted agriculture, moreover, shatters the 
ecological cycle which permits the natural recycling of soil nutrients.
[8.6] A Failure in a Shift towards Biofuel Production: Leaving Middle- 
and High-Culture Uncontested
In a quote above, Georgescu-Roegen mentions that “perhaps 
sooner than one may think, man [sic] will have to reorient his 
technology in the opposite direction - to  obtain gasoline from com” 
(Georgescu-Roegen 1996 [1971]: 84). Three decades after Georgescu- 
Roegen’s prophetic words, the time for the production of gasoline 
from corn and other crops and oils at grand scale has arrived. The 
production of biofuels is currently a topical issue. It is considered 
as a key strategy in the addressing of anthropogenic climatic 
forcing.
22 Seminar held in the IV World Social Forum in Mumbai, India, 
January 2004. So far I have been unable to locate online the report 
the author referred to during his intervention.
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There are different types of biofuels. These are classified 
according to the source of their production. Bioethanol, for instance, 
is a crop-based biofuel. Its main sources of production are maize, 
wheat and sugar cane. Biodiesels, contrastingly, derive from 
vegetable oils —soybean or palm. There is yet a third type, 
biobutanol, which is made out of crop by-products such as straw 
and maize stalks (Balch & Carroll 05/06/2007).
Low-culturally, the production of both bioethanols and 
biodiesels entails either the seizure of forestry land or the 
occupation of agricultural land. When forests are felled, the carbon 
in both the trees and the peat they grow on turns into carbon 
dioxide. As British environmental activist and writer George Monbiot 
has reported, the low-cultural impact of this two types of biofuels is 
dramatically high. In his own words:
“A study by the Dutch scientific consultancy Delft 
Hydraulics found that the production of every tonne of 
palm oil causes 33 tonnes of carbon- dioxide emissions. 
This makes oil palm 10 times worse than petroleum” 
(Monbiot 05/03/2007).
As it was noted above, a trait of (human and natural) culture 
is the interpenetration of its m anifestations. This concept is 
apparent here again in so far as it elucidates how the biofuel shift 
away from petroleum falls short of eliminating an ecocidal source 
in the consumption of energy. Rather, the ecocidal dimension is 
maintained but reallocated to novel sources. It however remains 
within the same low-cultural sphere. The analytics of high- middle- 
and low-culture spur us to see how the ecocidal dimensions in the 
consumption of energy must be redistributed within culture. 
Perhaps the question that is due here is the following: according 
to which high-cultural assumptions (e.g. understanding of the 
good life), through which m iddle-cultural arrangements (e.g. 
enforcement of policies which include biofuels as part of the 
energy mix), is low-culture put to which uses (e.g. energy/matter 
intensive production processes such as the production of cars)? 
By addressing these queries, we can see how the shift towards the 
use of biodiesels follows from the lack of contestation of Western 
lifestyles (such as the assumption that each adult must own a car), 
as well as the lack of actual exploration of the low-cultural 
possibilities of the Planet.
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It must be further noted that, though not exclusively, the 
actual space for the growing of bioethanol and biodiesels tends to 
be found in the peripheries of the world: in so-called ‘Third-World’ 
territories. Malaysian, Indonesian and Colombian soils are being 
turned into growers of palm-oils. In the case of Malaysia and 
Indonesia, it appears that the monocultures of palm oil are grown at 
the expense of forested lands (Monbiot 05/03/2007). In Colombia, 
contrastingly, peasants are being evicted off their lands by 
paramilitary groups who find in oil-palm production a lucrative 
source of revenue (Balch & Carroll 05/06/2007). Thus here we can 
see how biofuel production generates an ecocidal practice the 
source of which is middle-cultural; geopolitical. It is an instance of 
the impetus of the global market in increasingly absorbing peripheral 
areas. An example of how local communities are increasingly losing 
control over their lands to serve the needs of international markets.
[8.7] A Double Failure in Development; the Rationale of the Brundtland 
Report
The foremost established environmental discourse which has 
attributed the nature of the ecological debacle to a failure in 
development is by far sustainable development. Let us first browse 
over its brief but influential history.
Sustainable development as a concept came into life in the 
1970s. Emerging as a variant of the by-then operative ‘maximum 
sustainable yield’ from which it draw fundamental inspiration, it put 
down roots in the terrain of renewable resource management (Dryzek 
1997: 145-146; Boff 2002 [1997]: 66). This infant existence 
notwithstanding, as a current-day currency sustainable development 
owes its conception to the World Commission on Environment and 
Development (henceforth WCED).
Under the aegis of the United Nations Organization, the 
WCED was summoned to formulate “[a] global agenda for change” 
(WCED 1987: ix). In this spirit and with Gro Harlem Brundtland23 
leading the challenge, in 1987 the WCED issued its epoch-making 
report on Our Common Future (WCED 1987) -yet more commonly 
referred to as the ‘Brundtland Report’. Therein the meaning and
23 “A doctor who had for a time been Minister o f the Environment 
and was then Prime Minister o f  Norway” (Rist 2002: 178-179).
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guidelines for the attainment of worldwide sustainability and 
development were outline. Some room for manoeuvre on a country- 
by-country basis was nevertheless left24. Henceforth this approach 
has been ascertained as the official currency -though not quite the 
only currency- whereby to trade with any environmental concern. 
Hence; the assertion of green political theorist Douglas Torgerson: 
“ [pjublic discussion concerning the environment has become 
primarily a discourse of sustainability” (quoted in Dryzek 2005: 145).
Yet to comply with the interests of the research inquiry of the 
present literature review, we must strive to locate the causes which 
the Brundtland Commission attributed as agents for environmental 
dilapidation. The following passage may well enclose an opening 
clue to the puzzlement:
“The failures that we need to correct arise both from 
poverty and from the short-sighted way in which we 
have often pursued prosperity. Many parts of the world 
are caught in a vicious downwards spiral: Poor people 
are forced to overuse environmental resources to 
survive from day to day, and their impoverishment of 
their environment further impoverishes them, making 
their survival ever more difficult and uncertain. The 
prosperity attained in some parts of the world is often 
precarious, as it has been secured through farming, 
forestry, and industrial practices that bring profit and 
progress only over the short term” (WCED 1987: 27).
From this fragment we infer two roots to the environmental 
debacle. The first one, i.e., poverty, is ostensibly spelt out. According 
to the Brundtland Report, self-incurred dearth -a  highly connoted 
statement which has not gone unnoticed to the critical eye as it shall 
be reported below— is a source of environmental pollution. The 
second agent of environmental stress signalled in the aforecited piece,
24 One o f  the paragraphs which defines the ratio o f  worldwide- 
communality vs. nation-state-based freedom reads as follows: “thus 
the goals o f economic and social development must be defined in 
terms o f sustainability in all countries -developed or developing, 
market-oriented or centrally planned. Interpretations w ill vary, but 
must share certain general features and must flow  from a consensus 
on the basic concept o f sustainable development and on a broad 
strategic framework for achieving it” (WCED 1987: 43).
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i.e., agricultural and industrial production practices, is, contrastingly, 
enmeshed in a cloud of confusion. The passage at issue confers no 
discerning information as to whether “farming, forestry and industrial 
practices” should be interpreted as a rebuff of industrial capitalism or 
as a call for greening it. A fragment which follows closely the one 
quoted above is crucial in clarifying the dilemma:
“where economic growth has led to improvements in 
living standards [we infer: in the industrialised part of 
the world], it has sometimes been achieved [...] based 
on the use of increasing amounts of raw materials, 
energy, chemicals, and synthetics [...] Thus today’s 
environmental challenges arise both from the lack of 
developm ent [we infer: poverty] and from  the 
unintended consequences of some forms of economic 
growth” (ibid.: 28-29).
That is, the Brundtland Commission not only impeaches 
underdevelopment, understood as it is in the frame of this report as 
primly deficiency in material welfare; at the same time, it condemns 
specific forms of economic progress -those which are exceedingly 
profligate in their use of resources and energy.
In sum, international environmentalism establishes that the 
modern world has contracted two opposed economic patterns which 
threaten the ‘sustainability’ of the Planet: one is its lack of 
developm ent -o r  poverty, and the other could be termed as 
irresponsible forms of economic progress. Indeed, the Brundtland 
Report, as it was issued in 1987, by no means abjures economic 
growth. Rather, it predicates its ‘new agenda for change’ on a novel 
era of development, the alleged originality of which shall henceforth 
reside in technological modernization (which relates this discourse 
to the stratagem set out by eco-modernization)25 in a somewhat 
rhetorical urge for social change:
“The concept of sustainable development does imply 
limits -no t absolute limits but limitations imposed by 
the present state of technology and social organization
25See[8 .2] ‘A Failure in Technological Efficiency: the Advocates o f  
E c o lo g ic a l M o d ern iza tion ’ to understand how su sta inab le  
development and ecological modernization complement one another.
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on environmental resources and by the ability of the 
biosphere to absorb the effects of human activities. But 
technology and social organization can be both 
managed and improved to make way for a new era of 
economic growth” (WCED 1987: 8).
Now, in view of the momentum which Our Common Future 
has been gradually mounting in the course of its fifteen years of 
being, the concept of sustainable developm ent has been the 
receiving end of a bombardment of reproaches. The latter have been 
mainly raided from fundamentalist —in the Bahroian sense— 
segments of adamant ecologists. The charges at issue may be 
grouped in two intermingled sets. The first line of rebuttal faults the 
Brundtland Report on absenteeism as to explanations on the 
provenance of poverty. This group holds that a convincing response 
requires diachronic notions of international political economy and 
ecology -in  this review dealt with under the title [9.4] ‘A Failure in 
the Geopolitics of the Financially Powerful North: the Reproach of 
Political Ecology’. Conveniently, we could dispatch the position of 
political ecologists by saying that: when examining closely the 
dynamics of international trade, one finds that the monetary poverty 
to which the Brundtland Report recurrently refers to has been -and 
still is— generated by “the mechanisms of exclusion operated by 
the economic growth it [‘sustainable developm ent’] seeks to 
promote” (Rist 2002: 182).
Against a broader context, we should nonetheless notice that 
the fact that Our Common Future identifies environmental decay 
with poverty is part of the general rule. Being the result of an 
ecotechnocratic effort, the statements in the Brundtland Report on 
the state of the environment are abundantly congruent with the set 
of discursive practices informing international since the end of the 
Second World War:
“Multilateral institutions [...] have shared a belief that 
‘development’ is a process worth pursuing above all 
e lse , and tha t the T hird  W orld ’s social and 
environmental problems boil down, ultimately, to a ‘lack 
of development’” (Bryant & Bailey 2000 [1997]: 100).
The second set of indictments derives from a review of the 
environmental practices of the monetarily poor. This has been a task 
undertaken in the recent years by a number of scholars, among
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whom Ramachandra Guha, Enrique Leff, Joan Martinez-Alier, Victor 
Toledo, Michael Watts (Martinez-Alier 1994: 329). For all the 
contradictions of this theory26, these authors have claimed that the 
poor are ecologists by default. They would yet normally not 
acknowledge themselves professed greenies by virtue of two 
reasons. One, the label is made in the First World. Two, the type of 
environmentalism pursued by the world’s monetarily poor is that of 
livelihood -as opposed to the quality of life or aesthetic orientation 
for which the monetarily-affluent/biodiversity-poor states normally 
appeal in their quest for greenerism (Martinez-Alier 1994: 6; 2002: 
11; Bryant & Bailey 2000 [1997]: 8). The m onetarily-poor/ 
biodiversity-rich areas, in keeping production off the market, have 
preserved their agricultural traditions to ensure the regularity in the 
ecological cycles, as their survival depends wholly on the as proper 
functioning of nature as possible (Martinez-Alier 1994, 2000 [1997b], 
2002).
26. I w ill try to render the contradictions o f this thesis apparent 
relying on Martinez-Alier exposé(1994; 2000 [1997b]; 2002), which 
is the only one with which I am familiar in some depth. On the one 
hand, Martinez-Alier deplores a language o f negotiation grounded 
in monetary valuation -h e  fin ish es his latest book w ith the 
rhetorical question ‘Who has the power to simplify complexity, 
ruling some languages o f valuation out o f  order?’ (2002: 271). This 
is for sure the language imposed by the materially affluent nations 
of the colonizing European metropolis and offspring. On the other 
hand, M artinez-Alier capitulates to the discourse o f the North. 
Both ‘poor’ and ‘Third World’ (Escobar 1995; Rist 2002: 80-81), 
just as ‘environmentalism’, constitute rhetoric fashioned in the 
bureaus o f  the North. The people in favour o f which the author 
speaks may have been rendered poor due to the clout that the 
language o f negotiation o f the North-financial capital, purchasing 
power- wields in the international geopolitical agenda. Yet these 
peoples are extremely wealthy-steadily less so though —  when it 
comes to biodiversity; hence the interest o f the North in harnessing 
their ‘natural capital’. Even more wealthy they may be in terms o f  
any language other than ‘financial capital’. It is not my task here to 
list out in what many other facets these or any people regard 
themselves wealthy. But le t’s m ove back to the storyline, in my 
view  and in the frame of his own thesis, Martinez-Alier would be 
more consistent when using such alternatives banners as ‘popular 
environmentalism’ or ‘livelihood environmentalism’, also quoted in 
his work (2002: 10).
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[8.8] A Failure in Affluent Western Life-Styles: the Indictment of the 
Industrial Consumer Society
The Indian historian and sociologist Ramachandra Guha (2000 
[1997b]) has endeavoured to re-construe the environmental ethic of 
Mohandas K. ‘Mahatma’ Gandhi. The ecological critique of Gandhi 
was largely rooted in the lavish habits of modern civilization. In the 
writings for social reform of this epoch-making personality, one 
encounters reiterative disapproving remarks on the modern way of 
life. In Gabdhi’s views this consists of an ever-expanding plethora 
of desires based on patterns of industrial developm ent; an 
eagerness “to destroy distance and time” in search of satisfaction. 
One of Gandhi’s foremost renowned dictums flows as follows: “the 
world has enough for everybody’s need, but not enough for 
everybody’s greed’” (Guha 2002 [1997b]: 158). With the benefit of 
hindsight, we may say that greedy accumulation may be attributed 
as Gandhi’s major cause for the advent of the environmental disaster.
Gandhi seems to have set in good measure the tone for the 
Indian environmental movement. Guha, who has given form to the 
Indian environmental history, retells us that despite the multifarious 
ideologies underpinning ecologism in this country -M arxism , 
socialism, liberation theology, traditions of charity and self-help— 
Gandhi appears to “have been the single most important influence 
on the environmental movement in India” (ibid.: 153). Relatedly, 
Sunderlal Bahuguna, an ecological activist of Gandhian persuasion, 
calls for a relinquishment of consumerism and a return to a simpler 
way of life. If we read his morale the other way round, Bahuguna 
too situates the cause of the ecocide, if not exclusively, in the 
steady Westernization of (Indian) life-styles.
As pointed out above, Gandhism enjoins a re-examination of 
neo-Malthusianism as a direct cause for environmental degradation. 
The Gandhian critique of environmental problems revolves around 
greed. That is, the emphasis of the conundrum is shifted away from 
the addition of people and refocused upon the fashion whereby 
people style their lives.
The number of Western voices which raise the issue of 
material affluence is, on the other hand, also notorious. The issue of 
prosperity founded on accumulation is one of the staples of 
ecologism. Take a look, for instance, at one of the titles in Ted 
Trainer’s work -Abandon Affluence! It summarizes in two words one
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of the predicaments of the West, central in the degradation of the 
environment: the gathering of goods by way of the well-established 
practice of consumerism. In keeping, Trainer places the nature of 
the destruction of the global ecosystem on two main axes. Firstly, 
on Western-styled living standards. These presuppose a degree of 
material welfare out of pace with the physical limits of the Planet. 
Secondly, on the forces which operate in the structure of capitalism. 
The survival of capitalism is premised upon an ever-increasing 
output. That is, environmental deterioration prompted by incessant 
consumerist practices and the waste that follows from it is the blood 
which runs through the veins of this financial system. It is an 
ineradicable feature of it. This latter critique connects the failure in 
Western affluent life-styles with the failure in the commodification 
of Nature below.
[9.] MIDDLE-CUL TURAL FAILURES
In this section I shall gather those discourses related to the 
public arrangement of culture. This is tantamount to say that the 
social, the political and the economic spheres, divided as they are 
under the current atomisation of knowledge, will be seen as one 
single dimension. Such a division may for sure serve more 
appositely the purposes of problem-solving theory. However, for a 
critical elucidation of the ecocide, it is more convenient to thrust 
them under one same banner. No doubt they all deal with the public 
dimension of culture.
[9.1] AFailure in the Commodification of Nature: the Ecomandst Critique 
of Capitalism
The critical stances of James O’Connor (1994; 1998a), 
speaking from the altar of ecological Marxism, may be portrayed as 
prominent representations of the rapport between capitalism and 
environmental decay. They reflect O’Connor’s lifetime attempt to 
clarify why Marxism remains alive and well as an operative body 
to interpret humankind’s interactions with nature, “clear of the fake 
scientific claims of Stalinist ‘dialectical materialism’” (ibid: xi). 
Hence also O’Connor’s role as editor-in-chief for many years in 
the journal Capitalism, Nature, Socialism: a Journal o f Socialist 
Ecology, o f which Joan M artinez-A lier’s Ècologîa Politica  
(Political Ecology) proclaims to be a sister journal for the Spanish­
speaking readership.
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O’Connor’s advice for those who wish to understand the 
current “ecological crisis” (and so he turns it into his method) is 
that of identifying the broader middle-cultural conditions which set 
it off in the first place. For this theorist, the course of human affairs 
re la tes to that o f natural h isto ry  in a d ia lec tica l manner. 
Understandably, the Marxist materialist and dialectical methods 
becom e O ’C onnor’s conceptual backbone in his structural 
understanding of the ecocide. Marxist as he is, O’Connor takes on a 
heightened theoretical economic determinism which allows him to 
equate the ‘environmental crisis’ squarely with financial crises 
endemic to capitalism. Seen from the perspective of the analytics of 
high- middle- and low-culture we can say that O’Connor locates the 
disruption of low-culture at the middle-cultural level. Indeed, for 
Marxists, ‘economics’ is always political economy, that is to say, the 
m iddle-cultural m anagem ent of low -culture. After ‘the first 
contradiction of capitalism’, a classical chapter in traditional Marxist 
theory, O’Connor calls the financial crises following from the 
ecological one, the ‘second contradiction of capitalism’. The kernel 
of these crises resolves around:
“the meaning of specifically capitalist scarcity, that is, 
the process whereby capital is its own barrier (or limit?) 
because o f its se lf-d es tru c tiv e  form s of 
proletarianization of human nature, alienation of labor 
power, appropriation of labor, and capitalization of 
external nature and the ‘urban’” (O’Connor 1998b: 159).
As it em erges from  the forgoing quotation, in both 
contradictions the agent of the crisis is capital or, to be more 
accurate, the capitalist, for it is the capitalist who is in possession 
of the means of production. In both cases, too, the result is a 
financial crisis -ye t one is of surplus while the other of scarcity as 
we will immediately see. Also the surmounting of the financial 
critical situation in both scenarios leads to more socialist-prone 
forms of production. The division line between the first and 
second contradiction resides fundamentally in the ‘object’ that 
operates the crisis -the  commodified or capitalized whom or what. 
In the first contradiction, the ‘fetter of capital’ is manoeuvred 
through the worker, in the second through nature. Let us next 
analyse in some more detail how each contradiction is purported 
to unfold.
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T rad itional M arx ist theory estab lishes that the f irs t 
contradiction pivots around the gap opened between the steady 
rise in production capacity and the non-accorded increment in the 
proletariat’s purchasing power. The antinomy arises therefore 
between the forces of production, which potentially can yield an 
infinite amount of goods, and the (social) relations of production 
which hamper the former in the following manner. The propertied 
class, eager to create financial exchange-value, usurps the surplus- 
value or rate of exploitation. Thereby, the propertied class leaves 
the class of the proletariat bereft of the means to purchase that 
which it generated through and by its own sweat, i.e. its own 
production.27 Logically, as time goes by and the proletariat remains 
unable to acquire its own goods, commodities stack up. In this 
inauspicious picture, the elements for a looming chrematistic crisis 
of overproduction are all in place. Along with them, forms of social 
protest, such as the worker’s movement, mushroom and “more 
transparently social, hence potentially socialist” (O’Connor ibid. 
158) productive forces and relations surface.
The second contradiction of capitalism is grounded upon a 
similar grouping of cause-effects. First of all, as pointed out above, 
capital does not impede the proper functioning of capitalism through 
the worker but it does so via nature. According to O’Connor, the 
expansion of capitalism spoils its own production conditions, for it 
pollutes water and air, and reduces biodiversity. The sequel 
backfires to the very capitalist, who must either afford the costs of 
restoring the production conditions, or face dissent movements of 
protest. The latter may or may not impose better production 
practices, in the affirmative case increasing the production costs.
So in this second contradiction, the paradox substantiates 
around, on the one hand, the production relations established 
between the propertied class and the class of the proletariat and the 
productive forces, again potentially unlimited; and, on the other, the 
impaired conditions of production. O’Connor, following Marx, 
employs the concept of ‘conditions of production’ in a broad sense. 
Yet for convenience in our context, let us simply note that central 
among the production conditions is the natural base which supplies
27 Maurice Dobb, “Introduction” in Karl Marx, A Contribution to the
Critique o f Political Economy (Moscow: Progress Publishers 1977
[1859]), pp. 12 et passim.
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the raw materials for manufacture28. Again, the capitalist, impatient 
to generate exchange-value, expands the production forces, 
stressing thereby the production conditions among which the 
environment. The conjuncture brings about a financial crisis which 
assumes, this time, the form of underproduction. In so far as the 
production process lacks an element for its proper functioning, 
capital cannot be realized. This is the reason why in this context, 
O’Connor hypothesis a financial crisis indeed caused by processes 
of underproduction. To restore the production process, “capital 
restructures the conditions of production [by way of,] for example, 
permanent-yield forests, land reclamation, regional land use and/or 
resource planning, population policy, health policy, labor market 
regulation, toxic waste disposal planning, and so on” (ibid.: 161). 
Often the restoration of the conditions of production also follows 
from the pressure exerted by quarters of the green movement in the 
face of ecological disaster.
In summary, the ecom arxist nature of the ecocide is 
tantam ount to financial crises. It is the comm odification or 
capitalization of nature in order to generate profit that which 
destroys the environment.
Fuelled by his financial deterministic analysis, O’Connor 
u n b rid les  a d ia tr ib e  to the stan d ard ized  app roaches to 
environmental degradation which identify ‘“ limits to growth’ in 
terms of ‘“ resource scarcity’, ‘ecological fragility’, ‘harmful 
industrial technology’, ‘destructive cultural values’, ‘tragedy of 
the com m ons’, ‘o v erp o p u la tio n ’, ‘w asteful co nsum ption ’, 
production treadmill’, and so on” (ibid.: 159). The results regarding 
the despoliation of the environment from any of these stances is 
inappropriate in that, from the ecomarxist vantage point, it is 
evident that they all fail to grasp the dynamics of “capitalist 
scarcity”. In effect, O’Connor’s account is a diatribe levelled 
against two of the schools of thought that enjoy the greatest 
currency within green critical thought. Namely, deep ecology and 
the postmodern condition. Against deep ecologists, O’Connor 
decries their fondness of an essentialism based upon the natural
28 To be precise, “production conditions include com modified or
capitalized materiality and sociality, but excluding com modity
produ ction , d istr ib u tio n , and ex ch a n g e  (s tr ic t ly  d e fin ed )
them selves” (O’Connor 1998: 161).
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law. Against the postmodern condition, O’Connor reproaches the 
ascientific relativism that this quarter has disseminated across the 
social sciences. O’Connor aims to restore the scientific edge of 
eco-Marxist theory within the social sciences.
[9.2] A Failure in Liberal Market Economy: the Political 
Institutionalization of Chrematistics
The classical ecological critique of market liberalism may be 
phrased by way of the dichotomy chrematistics-o/fcoreomm. So let’s 
first proceed with a review of the cultural meaning of these terms. 
‘Chrematistics’ and ‘Oeconomicus’ are both Hellenic neologisms to 
be found in A risto tle’s Politica. D efined strictly from their 
etymological significance, ‘Oeconomicus’ ( ‘oikos’, household, and 
‘nomos’, law or rule) is “the practical wisdom of household 
management” (Schumpeter 1997 [1954]: 53). It therefore concerns 
itself “with the management of concrete use values” (Hornborg 2001: 
39). ‘Chrematistics’ ( ‘crema’, possession or wealth), by contrast, 
“refers mainly to the pecuniary aspects of business activity” 
(Schumpeter 1997 [1954]: 53). Karl Polanyi29 appears to have been 
the first in a series of modem economists to retrieve the distinction, 
subsequently endorsed by a number of ecological thinkers among 
whom a strand of ecological economists is to be found.
The two words have been charged with an additional political 
meaning: ‘Oeconomicus’ symbolises the quest for human-scale 
“economics for community” (Daly & Cobb 1994 [1989]: 138). The 
chrem atistic rationale, by contrast, speaks in favour of the 
mainstream market economy paradigm -o r  self-regulating market in 
Polanyian parlance (Polanyi 2001 [1944]).
There appears to be a certain degree of disagreement as to 
whether it was Aristotle himself or his posthumous translators who 
tinged the word chrematistics with today’s meaning30. In any case, 
for expediency here I shall adopt the stance put forth by the school 
of ecological economics (Daly & Cobb 1994; Martinez-Alier, Munda
29 Karl Polanyi, “Aristotle Discovers the Economy,” in Karl Polanyi, 
Conrad M. Arensberg and Harry W. Pearson (eds.). Trade and the 
Market in the Early Empires, (New York: Free Press, 1971 [1957]), 
pp. 64-94.
30 For debate see Polanyi (1971 [1957]: 92-94).
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& O’Neill 1998; Martinez-Alier & Roca-Jusmet 2000). On this 
reasoning, we have in the first instance to come to agree that a 
society underpinned by an oekonomicus mindset is diametrically 
opposed to one run on a chrematistic basis. The statement may be 
premised on Herman Daly’s and John Cobb’s definition of each 
concept:
“Chrematistics is...the branch of the political economy 
relating to the manipulation of property and wealth so 
as to maximize short-term monetary exchange value to 
the owner. Oikonomia, by contrast, is the management 
of the household so as to increase its use value to all 
members of the household over the long run. If we 
expand the scope of household to include the larger 
community of the land, of shared values, resources, 
biomes, institutions, language, and history, then we 
have a good d e fin itio n  o f “econom ics of 
community’l l 994 [1989]: 138).
Now that I have spelt out the meaning of both worldviews as 
how to meet the material conditions of life, I am in a more robust 
position to claim in full the thesis posited at the beginning of this 
subsection. Namely, the present-day m arket economy is not 
economics but chrematistics.
For an in-depth grasp of the bond between the liberal state 
and the environm ental debacle, we should first review  the 
relationship ascertained between the state and economics. Two texts 
do an outstanding job in this regard. One is by the economic 
anthropologist Karl Polanyi: his The Great Transformation: the 
Political and Economic Origins o f our Time (2002 [1944]); the other 
consists of Michel Foucault’s studies in ‘Governmentality’ (2002 
[1978])31. Despite the ostracism it faced when first released in 1944 
due to tacit political censorship, Polanyi’s work is by now a standard 
key text on the political economic substrate of the twentieth century. 
Foucault’s text, on the other hand, has not yet received due 
acclamation -h is  profound and relatively extensive studies in
31 Also published in M ichel Foucault (1978), “Governmentality” in 
The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality edited by Graham 
Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter M iller (1991), The University o f  
Chicago Press; pp. 87-104.
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politics and economics appear to be the most neglected part of his 
research.
All the same, for our interests here, Foucault narrates with a 
striking subtlety, how from the middle of the sixteenth century to 
the end of the eighteenth, in the West texts on the ‘art of 
government’ evince the transition from an 1 oikonomistic’ model of 
the embodied conditions of life to a chrematistic one:
“The art of government...is essentially concerned with 
answering the question of how to introduce economy -  
that is to say, the correct way of managing individuals, 
goods, and wealth within the family (which a good 
father is expected to do in relation to his wife, children, 
and servan ts) [-i.e . p rec ise ly  A ris to te lian  
oeconomicus]— how to introduce this meticulous 
attention of the father toward his family into the 
management of the state” (Foucault 2000 [1978]: 207).
For our purposes here, the most interesting issue to realize is 
for sure how the culmination of chrematistics endures itself 
(virtually) non-stop to the present day:
“The word ‘economy’, which in the sixteenth century 
signified a form of government, comes in the eighteenth 
century to designate a level of reality, a field of 
intervention, through a series of complex processes 
that I regard as absolutely fundamental to our history” 
(ibid.: 208).
Foucault’s historical narratives are concerned with the history 
of ideas (Poster 1997: 134-152). The material of his analysis is always 
textual. In the specific case of the topic which goes by the name of 
governmentality, the texts are treatises upon the art of government. 
In cultural terms, we may therefore say that Foucault’s analyses 
tend to be high-cultural. From an analysis of high-culture, Foucault 
makes inferences as to how in particular middle-culture is arranged. 
Polanyi’s work, contrastingly, is middle-culturally oriented. His 
analyses are concerned with economic and political institutions. 
What is interesting to realise, however, is how the Polanyian 
narrative complements at the m iddle-cultural level what the 
Foucaudian one infers from the high-cultural. Polanyi (2001 [1944]) 
argued that the political institutions and economic agenda of the
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twentieth century converged in pursuing a unique vision -namely, 
market liberalism. The project consisted in disembedding the 
economic system from the social relations under which it had been 
subjugated throughout recorded human history (Polanyi [1971] 
1957). The self-regulating market’s disembeddedness from both low- 
and middle-culture is an intrinsic tenet to it. That is to say, the 
depletion of the environment is an idiosyncrasy internal to the 
operational system of the market economy. With the changeover of 
centuries, the pressing aim became thus that of erecting a wholly 
self-regulating edifice of market economy. So Polanyi writes in The 
Great Transformation:
“The market pattern...being related to a peculiar motive 
of its own, the motive of truck or barter, is capable of 
creating a specific institution, namely, the market. 
Ultimately, that is why the control of the economic 
system by the market is of overwhelming consequence 
to the whole organization of society: it means no less 
than the running of society as an adjunct to the market. 
Instead of economy being embedded in social relations, 
social relations are embedded in the economic system. 
The vital importance of the economic factor to the 
existence of society precludes any other result. For 
once the economic system is organized in separate 
institutions, based on specific motives and conferring 
a special status, society must be shaped in such a 
manner as to allow that system to function according 
to its own laws. This is the meaning of the familiar 
assertion that a market economy can only function in a 
market [i.e. commodified] society” (Polanyi 2001 [1944]: 
60, emphasis added)
Having exhibited how the rapport between the state and the 
economy is established upon the chrematistic path, we can further 
emphasize in what senses state policies bear the brunt of the 
ecological breakdown. Within the years of ecological awareness 
proper -i.e. since the 1970s, Herman Daly (and John Cobb) (Daly & 
Cobb 1994 [1989]) became one of the authors to have articulated the 
ecological sequels of chrematistics. Interestingly enough, Daly owes 
antecedence to the intellectual contribution of Karl Polanyi (2001 
[1944]; 1971 [1957]).
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Polanyi appears to have been the first economist who, having 
rescued the concept of ‘chrematistics’ from Aristotle’s corpus, 
observes that the self-regulating market’s disembeddedness from 
both low- and middle-culture is an intrinsic tenet to it.
Herman Daly (& John Cobb)’s work is relevant in that it 
specifies the environmental character of chrematistics. It informs us 
of the fact that exchange-value -a s  opposed to the use-value 
characteristic of oikonomia— urges the chrematist to merchandize 
with commodities and services; it is therefore geared at unlimited 
accumulation, not at the satisfaction of human needs. That is to say, 
as ecological economists have rendered it a staple of their rationale 
(Martinez-Alier 2002: 73), environmental degradation is not an 
externality of market liberalism; rather, it is built in the way it 
functions. This explains the reason why the time horizon of 
chrematistics is set in the short-term, depleting thereby natural 
resources and saturating carbon sinks and reservoirs at a very fast 
pace. Hence, climate change, ozone depletion and the rapid loss of 
biodiversity.
[93] A Failure in Liberal International Trade: the Ecological Disadvantage 
of Economic Comparative Advantage
One of the proposals of the ecological agenda is that of 
establishing an economy of local scale. Forcefully opposing the 
model laid down by and with the progression of globalization, 
this paradigm has been expressly referred to under the rubric of 
‘localization’. Swedish philosopher, teacher and activist Helena 
N orberg-H odge appears to be one of the in itia l and m ost 
forceful voices in the modern green movement to have called 
for the preservation of localised econom ies. Building upon 
N o rb e rg -H o d g e ’s leg acy , fo rm er head  o f  G re e n p e a c e ’s 
International Economics Unit, Colin Hines, has become one of 
the leading proponents of the novel approach for the provision 
of goods and services. His la test publications include the 
telling titles: The New Protectionism: Protecting the Future 
Against Free Trade (1993), Localization: A Global M anifesto  
(Hines 2000).
A key advantage which localization claims to attain over 
nature-rapacious globalization is the protection of the natural 
environment:
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“For the environment in general, relocalization would 
mean less long-distance transportation and energy use 
and resulting pollution” (Hines 2000: 35)
That is, localization is set to counteract the environmental or 
low-cultural impacts incurred with an economy of global scale. For 
the acute imperfections with which international trade has been 
adopted32, this paradigm, which fuels globalization, owes its 
essential insp iration  to the sem inal theory o f com parative 
advantage, one of the glowing pearls of liberal political economic 
theory.
Let us then next review the notion of comparative advantage 
or, more properly called, Theorem of Comparative Costs. The locus 
classicus of this hypothesis is David Ricardo’s ‘On Foreign Trade’, a 
chapter of his fundamental work On the Principles o f Political 
Economy and Taxation (1951 [1817]). Ricardo’s theorem is a refined 
version of the concept initially ordained by Adam Smith in his path- 
breaking Inquiry into the Wealth o f Nations (1776). The theorem 
establishes that a win-win relationship among nations is ascertained 
when each country specialises her pool of production in those articles 
which she can yield m ost cost-effectively, follow ing local 
advantageous factors such as land, climate, natural resources and 
labour. The subsequent exchange of these nationally-elected products 
with the assorted pool of other nations on a free trade basis is 
purported to bring prosperity to all nations. In agriculture, this 
theorem is a call for the adoption of monocultures, which tend to
32 Hines mentions two basic factors which in his view  overrule the 
Theorem of Comparative Advantage. One is a flaw conveyed in the 
original formulation. Both Adam Smith and David Ricardo failed to 
incorporate “any notion o f power and the bargaining advantage it 
gives” (Hines, 2000: 13). The thinker argues that geopolitical 
correlations o f power impose the actual terms o f  negotiation in the 
exchange o f goods and therefore wreck the self-regulating effects o f 
the ‘invisible hand’ on the international plane. The other is a 
novelty surfaced with the globalized econom y which the classical 
theorists o f political economy fell short o f  predicting. Namely, 
absolute free flow o f capitals which “means that investment is now  
governed by absolute profitab ility  and not by com parative  
advantage [of goods and services] between countries” (ibid.: 12).
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strain the land at the expense of inveterate forms of self-efficient 
agro-ecology or organic agriculture, which ensure a far more caring 
relationship with the land.
Now, from an ecological econom ics’ perspective and 
disregarding Liebig’s law of the minimum for the moment33, should 
we internalize the stress exerted upon the environment by the 
amount of fertilizers required to keep monocultures afloat, along 
with the copious rucksacks in terms of energy and fossil fuels, 
and the foo tp rin ts  w hich fo llow  from  the deploym ent of 
infrastructure, one is liable to reverse the prosperous spirit of 
the much-acclaimed Theorem of Comparative Costs. Instead we 
shall say: Ricardian comparative advantage is comparatively 
disadvantageous.
That is, viewed from the ecological (or low -cultural) 
disadvantage attached to the financial (or m iddle-cultural) 
comparative advantage, just as the manifesto on localization 
ostensibly emphasizes, the origin of environmental degradation is 
rooted in the dynamics of international liberal trade; whether 
operationalized in its pure liberal version or monopolized by the 
whims of power and capital.
[9.4.] A Failure in the Geopolitics of the Financially Powerful North: the 
Reproach of Political Ecology
As it has been intimated on numberless occasions along the 
narrative, the driving forces which political ecology puts forth as 
causes of environmental deterioration are to be found in the 
dynamics of international politics. Also consistently with the 
information conveyed in [8.7] ‘A Double Failure in Development: the 
Rationale of the Brundtland Report’, the intellectual undertaking of 
political ecologists this quarter of scholars appears to challenge the 
received wisdom as to the nature of the ecocide circulating in the 
international polity:
33 Which recommends international exchange on the account that “the 
joint carrying capacity o f the territories would be larger than the 
sum o f  the carrying capacities o f  all autarchic territories” 
(Martinez-Alier, 2002: 47).
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“The prevailing image of the Third World today in 
development literature is that of a part of the world 
trapped in perennial crisis [...] Curiously lacking from 
much of this writing, however, is any sense of the 
political and economic factors that contribute to the 
T hird  W orld ’s env ironm ental problem s [...] In 
contrast, political ecologists attempt to complete the 
story through work oriented around the idea of a 
‘politicised environm ent’” (Bryant & Bailey 2000 
[1997]: 27).
Together with other authors (Boff, 1997 [2002]: 65-67; 
Escobar, 1995; Bryant & Bailey, 2000 [1997]; Rist, 2002) Joan 
Martinez-Alier (1994 [1990]; 2000 [1997b]) has made a significant 
effort to discredit “[t]he main message of the Brundtland Report 
[...]: that poverty34 [not capital, the driver of an industrial consumer 
society] is the main cause of environmental degradation” (2000 
[1997b]: 46). In te restin g ly , the au thor contends tha t the 
ascendancy of sustainable development over other varieties of 
environmentalism has accentuated two specificities in the list of 
priorities drafted by international technocratism. On the one hand, 
the hegemonic environmental polity has deviated “the ecological 
agenda away from the issue of Raubwirtschaff’35 (Martinez-Alier 
(1994 [1990]: xi). On the other, it has shifted the study of “the main
34 As I argued in the paragraphs under [8.7] ‘A Double Failure in 
Development: the Rationale o f the Brundtland Report’, sustainable 
development sets forth two major causes o f environmental decay, 
not only one as Martinez-Alier seems to have concluded: poverty 
as well as profligate development.
35 L iter a lly  ‘p il la g e  e c o n o m y ’ in G erm an. T he id ea  o f  
Raubwirtschaft, now renowned ‘ecological, social, and historical 
debt’ is a central issue in popular ecologism , o f  which, in my 
view, the World Social Forum has becom e a well articulated 
spokesagora. Cf. Shiva (1997).
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human threat to the environment (ibid.)” from wealth towards 
poverty36.
The singular treatment of poverty in the Brundtland Report 
(as, in effect, a manoeuvre to extend the pattern of development 
undergone by the industrial metropolises of the Old and New 
Europe) could append a chapter to Dean M itchell’s (1991) 
connections between the constitution of poverty and the nascence 
of a reinforced mode of liberal governance. In the frame of his 
research, Mitchell contends that the debate on pauper management 
which took place in England from 1795 to 1834 with intellectual 
inputs by such figures as Jeremy Bentham, Joseph Townsend, 
Thomas Malthus and David Ricardo ushered in, at a time, the 
constitution of poverty and a more cogent liberal style of 
governance. The event was substantiated by way of a shift from an 
ethical to an economic conception of public policy -allegedly
36 The singular treatment o f poverty in the Brundtland Report (as, in 
effect, a manoeuvre to extend the pattern of development undergone 
by the industrial metropolises o f  the Old and New Europe) could 
append a chapter to Dean M itchell’s (1991) connections between  
the constitution o f poverty and the nascence o f a reinforced mode 
of liberal governance. In the frame o f his research, Mitchell contends 
that the debate on pauper management which took place in England 
from 1795 to 1834 with intellectual inputs by such figures as 
Jeremy Bentham, Joseph Townsend, Thomas Malthus and David  
Ricardo ushered in, at a time, the constitution o f poverty and a 
m ore co g en t lib era l s ty le  o f  govern a n ce . The ev en t w as 
substantiated by way o f a shift from an ethical to an econom ic 
conception o f public policy-allegedly  epitomised in Adam Smith’s 
Wealth o f Nations. This point o f inflexion in social policy was 
made viable with the substitution o f  the paternalistic old police by 
both [i.] a withdrawal o f the state responsibility for the relief o f  
the p rop erty less by fo ster in g  a patriarchal eth ic  o f  s e l f ­
responsibility grounded on ‘independent labourer’ as wage-labourer 
and m ale breadw inner; and [ ii.]  a cen tra liza tio n  and 
bureaucratization o f the apparatus o f the administration o f  relief. 
Against this background, sustainable development as the strategy 
for the eradication o f poverty -o r , what is equal to say, the 
propagation o f market liberalism—  may be indeed interpreted as 
the culmination on a global scale o f  that liberal mode o f government 
set free in England at the turn o f  the 19th cen tu ry-h en ce  
globalization.
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epitomised in Adam Smith’s Wealth o f  Nations. This point of 
inflexion in social policy was made viable with the substitution of 
the paternalistic old police by both [i.] a withdrawal of the state 
responsibility for the relief of the propertyless by fostering a 
patriarchal ethic of self-responsibility grounded on ‘independent 
labourer’ as wage-labourer and male breadwinner; and [ii.] a 
centralization and bureaucratization of the apparatus of the 
administration of relief. Against this background, sustainable 
development as the strategy for the eradication of poverty -or, what 
is equal to say, the propagation of market liberalism— may be indeed 
interpreted as the culmination on a global scale of that liberal mode 
of government set free in England at the turn of the 19th century.
To achieve his aim, Martinez-Alier has recourse to rural 
research undertaken by geographers37. This camp of knowledge 
distinguishes between two sources of land degradation -viz. one 
resu lting  from  (over)popu la tion  and ano ther en ta ilin g  
(over)production (Martinez-Alier 2000 [1997]). On the basis of this 
distinction, the author introduces a number of examples in the 
‘poor’38 countries of the South, by virtue of which he places himself 
in a favourable position to draw the following conclusion. In many 
occasions the pressure exerted upon the environment is not of a 
demographic order. Rather, it is originated in the foreign demands 
for the exportation of goods or in domestic inequalities. That is, 
poverty and environmental distresses are fabricated both within the 
state, and in the machine of international geopolitics.
The analysis conducted by Martinez-Alier is limited in scope 
as it derives from specific case studies. It appears nonetheless to 
corroborate the larger consensus among political ecologists. In this 
domain, concurrence prevails on two basic points (Bryant & Bailey:
37 Cf. P. Blaikie & H. Brookfield (eds.) (1987), Land Degradation and 
Society, London: Methuen.
38 Not only do I raise objections to this limited concept o f  ‘poverty’ 
which refers exclusively to ‘purchasing power’, but I further claim  
that considering the countries o f the South (and South-East) ‘poor’, 
subtracts c o n s is te n c y  to M a rtin ez-A lier  th e s is  on ‘the  
environmentalism of the poor’. See footnote 28 for an exposition  
of my arguments as to the inconsistencies in the formulation of  
this argument. To overcome both preoccupations I propose to call 
the South ‘financially impoverished and still biodiversity rich’.
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2000 [1997]: 2-5). First, it is broadly agreed that the environmental 
problems wreaking havoc the so-called Third World are not mere 
market failures, as international financial bodies (central among 
which the World Bank) hastily conclude. Rather, they are the visible 
manifestation of broader political and economic forces associated 
with the worldwide spread of capitalism , notably since the 
nineteenth century. Political ecologists highlight, on the other hand, 
that the global capitalist system on its own fails to account for the 
entirity of the environmental ills which pervade the so-called Third 
World. In their view, the intervention of the state promoting 
environmental destructive economic activities is a complementary 
ostensible source of degradation. Above -[9.2] ‘A Failure in Liberal 
Market Economy: the Political Institutionalization of Chrematistics’- 
we have grappled with the latter source of environmental woes -  
those resulting from national political economies/chrematisitcs. 
Henceforth, we explain the dynamics of postwar global capitalism.
A great deal of land degradation which the monetarily-poor/ 
biodiversity-rich regions of the Third World suffer from are the result 
of the exploitations carried out by the monetarily-rich/biodiversity- 
poor states in the First World. Political ecologists and experts in 
development theory (Rist 2002) stress reiteratively how “postwar 
economic development has been a central factor in producing the 
socia l in equ ities  and environm enta l deg radation  tha t are 
characteristic features of the Third World’s politicised environment” 
(Bryant & Bailey 2000 [1997]: 89). Hence their meticulous probings 
into the general trend and specific policies issued by the network of 
multilateral institutions deployed worldwide since the end of World 
War II. These bodies have been promoting social and economic 
development through the provision of technical and financial 
assistance.
The supranational advisory bodies to which political ecology 
refers may be categorized into two main groupings. One set is made 
up of the technical organizations auspicated by the United Nations 
Organization, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 
the Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). The other group of bodies 
consists of the international financial institutions (IFIs) emerging 
from the conference held in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in 1944, 
which bred the In ternational Bank for R econstruction and
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Development, later known as the World Bank, and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). More recently, in 1995, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) has been annexed to the Bretton Woods system 
as an international institution issuing diktats, of a markedly 
neoliberal inspiration, for the (de)regulation of trade between states 
under the rule of the United States of America and the European 
Union. The trade-related instructions drafted in the spirit of the 
WTO, however, retrocede to 1947, when twenty-three signatory 
states produced the International Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). After repeated attempts to upgrade this agreement to the 
status of international body, the trade negotiations of the Uruguay 
Round starting in 1986 finally gave birth to the WTO, with a total 
number of 147 signatory states in 2004. Out of the IFIs, the “World 
Bank has been singled out for extensive study by political 
ecologists due to the sheer size and importance of this institution’s 
role in environment and development issues in the Third World” 
(Bryant & Bailey 2000 [1997]: 87; see also Rowbotham 1998).
In an effort to abridge the basic statements established by 
political ecologists, the following could be ascertained: the findings 
of their research attest to the fact that international multilateralism 
guarantees the vested interests of the transnational corporations 
and the political elites to the neglect of the social and environmental 
realities of those residing in the lower echelons of the pecking order. 
Renowned Indian ecofeminist and environmental theorist Vandana 
Shiva (Shiva 1997; Martinez-Alier 2002: 100 f.), for her part, has 
called this institu tionalised  corporativ ist plunder of nature 
‘biopiracy’, a concept first introduced by Pat Mooney of RAFI 
(Rural Advancement Foundation International), in 1993 but widely 
popularized by the Indian ecofeminist (Martinez-Alier 2002: 132). In 
her understanding, biopiracy is the culmination of a five-century- 
long colonialist crusade which the European metropolis inaugurated 
when Christopher Columbus was set out to sea in search for a new 
route to Asia.
On a similar vein and in line with the accounts advanced by 
other authors (Toynbee 1976: vii-xi, 575-596; Escobar 1995; Rist 
2002), Shiva explains how global capitalism has pushed its way into 
the nation-states bom in the postcolonial era -  which make up the 
bulk of the so-called Third World countries. According to the 
theorist’s analyses, the Trojan Horse for the entrance of capitalism
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into these countries has been the universal allegiance lent to the 
Western concept of science and development in the postwar period. 
National political elites in the emerging countries have ever since 
embraced the quest for development with an eye to catching up 
with the West. In Shiva’s view, the long-standing W estern 
hegemony in geopolitical affairs has facilitated the spread of the 
worldview characteristic of Occident. The high-cultural sway held 
by the Western powers has spared the old colonizers the need to 
prolong the age-old physical annexation. In Shiva (2002 [1989]: l ) ’s 
own words:
“Developm ent’ was to have been a post-colonial 
project, a choice for accepting a model of progress in 
which the entire world remade itself on the model of the 
colonising modern west, without having to undergo the 
subjugation and exploitation that colonialism entailed”.
[9.5] A Failure in Hierarchical Structures: The Social Ecology Perspective
In a passage of the oft-quoted ‘An Open Letter to the 
Ecological Movement’, Murray Bookchin, founding and leading 
voice in social ecology, summarizes his understanding of the nature 
of the green debacle in the following words:
“the domineering sensibility, the hierarchical political 
and economic institu tions, and the m anipulative 
strategies of social change [...] have produced the 
catastrophic split between hum anity and nature” 
(Bookchin 1988 [1980]: 76).
Not surprisingly, to overcome the ecocidal split, Bookchin 
envisions a new ecological society grounded upon:
“mutual aid, decentralized communities, a people’s 
technology, and non-hierarchical, libertarian relations 
that will yield not only a new harmony between 
hum an and hum an, bu t betw een  hum anity  and 
nature” (ibid.: 83).
As Bookchin’s thinking has been quoted in numberless 
passages along this review, suffices now to notice that, for 
anarchism, humanity’s imposing attitude upon nature is a mere 
reflection of the long-standing hierarchical structure which 
determine our social relations. That is to say, the hierarchical
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relations at the middle-cultural level translate into both a split 
between the human and non-human realms, and the assumption that 
the former is superior to the latter. As ecofeminist Mary Mellor (1997: 
150) points out, Bookchin’s inclusive concept of ‘hierarchy’ means 
‘the domination of human by human’ and “replaces the more specific 
Marxist concept of class exploitation, or the feminist concept of 
patriarchy”.
Bookchin’s social ecology, on the other hand, appears to 
have been central to the development of the green movement. It has 
been particular influential in the formation of ecofeminism, a 
discourse to which we next turn our focus of analysis.
[9.6] A Tripe Failure in Patriarchy: the Voices of Ecofeminism
A substantial portion of the ecofeminist enterprise has been 
dedicated to probing academically the patriarchal nature of the 
ecocide (Merchant 1989; Mies 1999; Shiva 2002 [1989], 1993, 1997, 
1999; Mellor 1992, 1997a, 2000; Salleh 1994, 1997). One had rather 
qualified ‘patriarchal’ with ‘capitalist’, as ecofeminism is largely 
based on a deconstruction of “the ontology of capitalist patriarchy” 
(Salleh 1994: 115). The latter, ecofeminists claim, has imbued 
philosophy and received opinion with a series of pseudo-dualisms 
which are accountable for the deprived position into which both 
women and nature have been re legated . Not surprising ly , 
“ecofeminsits are concerned about global sustainability as much as 
gender justice: in fact they see the two as intrinsically interlinked” 
(ibid.: 119).
Roughly, the binomial correspondences that ecofeminists 
claim patriarchy to have construed run as follows. An artificial 
separation between historical action -  epitomized in production- 
and the natural order -expressed in re-production. In which the 
former is connoted as progressive and congruently ‘valorised’, and 
the latter as regressive and consequently ‘under-estimable’. The 
construction of the gendered division of labour, on the other hand, 
echoes in full the fractures. It associates masculine identity with the 
active construction of history “separate from nature, productive, 
and progressive” (ibid.: 117) and thus worthy of remuneration. In 
due complementarity, femininity is typified in the passive re­
productive tasks of the human and natural orders, tasks which not 
only “degrade[...] her along with nature itse lf’ (ibid.), but are also
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assumed to go uncontestedly unpaid. Not surprisingly, ecofeminsts 
appear critical of the type of socialism avowed in trade unionism. In 
their view, this form of political action has been narrowed to a theory 
of the proletariat, while proving utterly dismissive of other equally 
aberrant forms of social exploitation.
Beyond the mere anecdote, the identification of patriarchy 
with ‘the science of economics’ is not confined to the monopoly of 
ecofeminists. A substantial group of male-authors (Capra 1982; 
Hamilton 2002) has been no less perceptive in ascertaining the link. 
The following quote by Clive Hamilton bears scant distinction with 
the tone prevalent in the writings of the women revised in this 
section,
“Strict instrumental rationality and denial of feelings is 
held up as the most laudable quality of economic 
analysis, captured in the idea of ‘rigour’. The stress on 
rigour helps explain why the profession is a largely male 
preserve, for the emotions of modern patriarchy -the  
need to control, competitiveness, the omniscience and 
obsessive rationality— are also those of modern 
economics” (Hamilton 2002: 96).
It must be nonetheless reported that the profound intimacy 
conferred to male-domination and capitalism is a point which stands 
at a crossroads of various ecofeminist voices apparently speaking 
in the unison. In effect, at this point ecofeminsm bifurcates into two 
currents -viz. cultural, also called spiritualist, vis-à-vis socialist. This 
conceptual division instigates tension in the formulation of two 
themes: the structural nature of patriarchy, and the woman-nature 
nexus. On the one hand, ecofeminism of socialist inspiration stresses 
the historical and contextual provenance of the rapport human!ty- 
nature. Consistently, it empowers itself with the common categories 
which help the critical sociologist deconstrue reality. It takes 
account at a time of ‘race’, gender, class, ethnicity, and, on this 
basis, it passes case-by-case judgements as to potential nature- 
iconoclast practices. This is the reason why Marxist ecofeminist 
Mary Mellor states that:
“I see materialist ecofeminism as contributing to a wider 
debate about the material relations into which humans 
en ter when con fron ting  th e ir em bodim ent and 
embeddedness” (Mellor 2000: 113).
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The ecofeminism of culturalist/spiritualist ascendancy, on the 
other hand, analyses the forms of patriarchal structures from a 
m arkedly essen tia lis t angle. A ccordingly , they turn “m ale 
dom ination p e r  se, and even m aleness” (M ellor 1997: 6) 
aprioristically into the culprit of current environmental dissonances, 
paying little attention to the would-be social and historical character 
of the issues involved.
As announced above, the o ther asym m etry  w hich 
ecofeminism qua cogent theoretical entity must cushion is related 
to the distinct understandings of the connection of women and the 
natural world which the two strands exhibit. Here, again, spiritual/ 
cultural ecofem inism  of affin ity  conceives w om en’s higher 
sensitivity towards nature intrinsic to her biological constituency. 
Social constructionist ecofeminism, for its part, while acknowledging 
“that women and men do have existentially different relationships to 
‘nature’ because they have different kinds of body organs” (Salleh 
1994: 116), rebuffs the form er’s uncontested essentialism and 
contends that
“[wjomen are not closer to nature because of some 
elemental physiological or spiritual affinity, but because 
of the social circum stances in which they find 
themselves, that is, their material conditions in relation 
to the materiality of human existence” (Mellor 2000: 114).
Despite this plurality in approaches, ecofeminists of both 
persuasions concur on the claim that all the dimensions of “human 
embodiment” [-] hunger, excretion, maturing and death” (Mellor 
1997: 9) run commonly through the entirety of humanity -children, 
women and men. However, they turn out to be disproportionally 
endured by the lives and bodies of women. Males, who hold the 
posts of power in government, business, unions, the Academe, 
thinktanks, have designed the world to their image and likeness. As 
they have been freed from the mediation of human immanence 
(Mellor 1992; 1997; 2000: 113; Salleh 1994), which moves at the pace 
of the biological and ecological clocks, patriarchal blueprints, 
ecofeminsts emphasize, have crassly failed to respect the necessities 
of either the human body or the ecosystems. Social and economic 
policies, just as theories of knowledge do, “set priorities that are 
comfortable for them [men]” (Salleh 1994: 110), instead of 
responding to the reality of nature and the daily life of children, 
women, and ultimately also men.
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The ecofeminist litany of accusations aimed at patriarchy for 
the deplorable state of the world today finds also its expression in 
economic terms. Men have crafted a supra-world of exchange-value 
- i.e . of superfluous necessities rapacious of both nature and 
feminine human nature, which leaves the majority of use-value 
necessities unattended. To meet the latter, women’s subsistence 
skills have been patriarchally assigned to them. Yet to the homo 
economicus’s rationality these are perceived as mere ‘economic 
externalities’ which, expressed from the ecofeminist worldview, come 
in the form of :
“[ijntangible obligations of women’s open-ended labor 
role: tending children, comforting the aged and sick, 
providing ego repairs and sexual relief for the man in 
their lives, and possibly the labor of childbearing 
consequent to that” (Salleh 1994: 109).
An additional nature-predatory practice which ecofeminists 
attribute to patriarchal domination is the correlated conceptual 
bodies of scientific knowledge and economic development ruling 
the globe today (Merchant 1980; Shiva 2002 [1989]; 1993; 1997; 
Salleh 1994, Mellor 1997b). A conception of science and development 
derived from both the scientific revolution of the seventeenth 
century and the industrial one of the eighteenth. In the nascent 
mechanistic worldview of science, nature was downgraded to the 
status of inert terra nullis, prescribing over its pre-scientific 
conception of lively  terra m ater. The “an im istic , organic 
assumptions about the cosmos” (Shiva 1997: 47) reflected in e.g. the 
Indian women’s treatment of the Earth “as Prakriti, the living force 
that supports life” have been, in turn, collapsed into “a machine and 
a source of raw material” (Shiva 2002 [1989]: xvii)39. Furthermore, 
in d u stria lism  transfo rm ed  econom ics from  the cau tious 
administration of resources to meet sustenance and basic-needs 
satisfaction into a process of commodity production for profit 
maximization40.
39 In this avenue o f critique, ecofem inisim  stands alongside the 
contents in section [10.2] ‘A Failure in Western Philosophy: the 
Unfolding o f Instrumental Reason’.
40 What in section [9.2] ‘A Failure in Liberal Market Economy: the 
P o litica l In stitu tion a liza tion  o f  C h rem atistics’ w as term ed  
oikonomia and chrematistics, respectively.
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This swift revision of ecologically-oriented feminism, which 
diverges from the liberal-oriented in that the former is not content 
with the struggle to which the latter is confined, i.e. “receiving 
nothing more than equality alongside men in the existing system” 
(Salleh 1994: 110), has served to bring to the light the patriarchally- 
impaired damage to the environment, as phrased by ecofeminists.
Recapping, patriarchy has proved to be irrespective of the 
natural world on three fronts. These result from: [L] the nature- 
inattentiveness intrinsic to the category ‘m aleness’ - a  thesis 
contested even among ecofeminists; and [ii.] the nature-devouring 
economic system predicated upon [iii.] a mechanistic utilitarian 
scientific worldview which conceives nature as passive inert matter. 
Hence the vindication of the triple failure in patriarchy in 
perpetrating ecological damage.
[10.] HIGH-CULTURAL FAILURES
This third section deals with discourses of philosophical, 
religious, psychological and moral order that characterize the 
ecocide:
[10.1] A Failure in the Cartesian-Newtonian Mechanistic Worldview: 
Nature as Subservient Machine
At first sight this section may appear, with good reason, 
redundant to the reader. The mechanistic worldview which emerged 
with Newton, on inheritance of the Cartesian legacy, seems to be at 
the root of a good number of causes leading on their own rights to 
ecological disaster.
However, a section must be by necessity dedicated to the 
mechanistic worldview proper to the scientific paradigm reigning in 
the West for the last four centuries. It is in itself a major cause of 
environmental degradation. As the history behind it has been 
commentated upon in various passages of the present review, I will 
refrain from dwelling upon it at length. Instead, I will dispatch it by 
way of a telling quotation. This is from Carolyn Merchant’s noted 
The Death o f Nature (1980: xvii). It reads as follows:
“In investigating the roots of our current environmental 
dilemma and its connections to science, technology, 
and the economy, we must re-examine the formation of 
the worldview and a science that, by reconceptualizing
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reality as a machine rather than a living organism, 
sanctioned the domination of both nature and women. 
[Therefore] the contributions of such founding ‘fathers’ 
of modern science as Francis Bacon, William Harvey, 
René Descartes, Thomas Hobbes, and Isaac Newton 
must be reevaluated” (Merchant 1980: xvii).
[10.2] A Failure in Western Philosophy: the Unfolding of Instrumental 
Reason
The phenomenological philosopher Martin Heidegger has 
already been introduced to the reader in the section entitled ‘[8.3] A 
Failure in U tilitarian  Technology: Common Ground among 
Ecologists’. Under the present heading the aim is that of conducting 
a slightly more in-depth review of the th inker’s distinctive 
interpretation of the Western philosophical tradition to understand 
how this contributes to the elucidation of the ecocide.
Heidegger’s reading of the Western tradition is certainly singular. 
It is so in so far as the German thinker sees the whole of this 
philosophical practice, “right down to Kant and Hegel” (Berthold-Bond 
1994: 289) conforming to a one-block continuum on which “being” is 
reduced to analytical, quantifying, calculating reason. Let us note that 
in Heidegger’s philosophical body, being is a key ontological concept. 
For expediency here it may be defined as “always ‘in’ the world [...], as 
an agent engaged in realizing a certain form of life” (Taylor 1987: 460). 
At any rate, for Heidegger, Western philosophy is the unfolding of 
instrumental reason, the miserable history of the forgetfulness of being 
which culminates in the technological nihilism of modernity, so 
extraordinarily voracious of nature.
The author’s inquiry into technology -or, rather, into its 
essence— is therefore central to the relation of his indictment of 
modernity to our analysis of the ecocide. As exposed in ‘A Failure 
in Utilitarian Technology’ above, ‘technology’ must be seen as the 
low-cultural dimension of the essence of technology, this being its 
high-cultural dimension. To come to grips with it, technology must 
be, in the first instance, differentiated from the essence o f  
technology. This intellectual discrimination explains why only “the 
instrumental and anthropological definition of technology: [...] 
technology as a means to an end; [...] technology as a human 
activity” (Heidegger 2000 [1993]: 312), technology in its low-cultural 
dimension, is coeval with the Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth
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century. By way of contrast, the essence of technology, its high- 
cultural dimension, “is a mode of revealing [...], i.e., of truth” (ibid.: 
319, 318). Technology in its high-cultural dimension must be 
conceived as an element intrinsic to Western philosophy:
“Chronologically speaking, modem physical science 
begins in the seventeenth century. In contrast, machine- 
power technology develops only in the second half of 
the eighteenth century. But modern technology, which 
for chronological reckoning is the later, is, from the 
point of view of the essence holding sway within it, 
historically earlier” (ibid.: 327).
Heidegger’s daring thesis consists thus in asserting that the 
essence of technology is “prior to, and by no means a consequence 
of, the Scientific Revolution” (Krell 2000 [1993]: 309). Consistently, 
in order to acquire a complete trace of it one must retrocede to the 
wellspring of this form of rationality, which coincides with the birth 
of Western philosophy. So just as the cradle of Western philosophy 
is in ancient Greece, so too the essence (or low-cultural dimension) 
of technology is originally apparent in Plato’s and Aristotle’s 
w ritings. Indeed , H e id eg g er’s in d ic tm en t of the W estern 
development of the theory of ideas starts with Plato. Heidegger saw 
the pre-Socratic philosophers “as closer to the primal mind, and 
from Nature” (Sessions and Devall 1985: 99). He turned their 
worldviews into key elements for the elaboration of his opus 
magnum, Being and Time (1927).
Thus according to Heidegger, it is the Socratic Hellenic 
philosophers who, in placing human thought above being, inaugurate 
the history of metaphysics proper. The latter, however, does not reach 
its zenith till the advent of the Cartesian theory of knowledge, which 
credits Descartes with the fatherhood of modem philosophy. By way 
of the Cartesian cogito, the modem expression of the humanistic and 
anthropocentric dominance of the subject coalesces. “T think 
therefore I am’ [cogito ergo sum] makes mind more certain than matter” 
(Russell 2000 [1946]: 548). This ascendancy of the mind sets the tone 
for the subsequent philosophical subjectivism typical of the Western 
tradition. However, it is important to emphasize in relation with the 
environmental debacle, that philosophical subjectivism ascertains a 
hierarchical rapport between mind (res cogitans), and the matter of 
which the physical human being and nature are constituted (res
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extenso). The encroachment of this dualism, moreover, subjugates 
matter to the diktats of the mind in a manner that it “is constantly 
available for use by the self-constituting ego” (Berthold-Bond 
1994: 284).
Equally important to point out with a view to relating 
Heidegger’s philosophical corpus to the ecocide is the rise of what 
he calls to be the ‘representational theory of meaning’. This too is 
erected on the line of C artesian m etaphysical thinking. In 
representational theory, things relinquish their intrinsic value. The 
acknowledgement of their existence is only gained in so far as they 
are formulated in the human consciousness. Therefore, Heidegger 
contends, a philosophical framework in which nature is disposed of 
its own worth and submitted to the caprices of the human mind 
paves a royal way to the age of technology. Hence; the thinker’s 
conception of the technological era as “the culmination of the 
history of Western civilization and philosophy and at the same time 
it is the triumph of nihilism [All in all,] a complex interrelationship of 
philosophy, technology and nihilism” (Zimmerman quoted in Devall 
& Sessions 1985: 100).
As much as they are elegant and discerning, Heidegger’s 
writings are notoriously abstruse, fraught throughout with an 
elaborate phraseology of his own. The insertion of quotations in 
this cursory examination of Heidegger’s thinking could prove 
disorienting to the reader. There is nevertheless a passage in his 
essay ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ (Heidegger 2000 
[1993]: 320) worthy of quotation. This passage summarizes the 
transition from traditional to mechanized agriculture as a result of 
the application of modem technology in relatively simple language. 
The slightly lengthy passage will not only present a sample of the 
Heideggerian pungent condemnation of “the instrumental disclosure 
of entities” (Zimmerman 1996: 67) by the human mind. At the same 
time it will contribute to the outcry of N. Georgescu-Roegen, A. J. 
Toynbee and V. Shiva as expressed in the subsection [8.5] ‘A Failure 
in Modern Forms of Agriculture: Industrial, Biotechnological, 
Nanotechnological’ above:
“The earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district, 
the soil as a mineral deposit. The field that the peasant 
formerly cultivated and set in order appears differently 
than it did when to set in order still meant to take care
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of and maintain. The work of the peasant does not 
challenge the soil of the field. In sowing grain it places 
seed in keeping of the forces of growth and watches 
over its increase. But meanwhile even the cultivation of 
the field has come under the grip of another kind of 
setting-in-order, which sets upon nature. It sets upon it 
in the sense of challenging it. Agriculture is now the 
mechanized food industry. Air is now set upon to yield 
nitrogen, the earth to yield ore, ore to yield uranium, 
for example.”
In brief, the ecocidal dimension of Heidegger’s thought could 
be summarized as follows. The mechanizing mind is for sure 
epitomized in the technological era. However, it is the essence of 
technology which approaches the Earth as a mere source of raw 
materials for the individual to harness and obtain gainful yields. 
And this essence is inextricable from the Western mode of thought. 
Hence, Western philosophy per se lies, in a Heideggerian line of 
reasoning, at the core of the ecocide.
[10.3] A Failure in Scientific Paradigm: the Rebuttal from Post-Normal 
Science
Following Thomas Kuhn’s (1996 [1962]) description of 
scientific paradigms, Silvio Funtowicz and Jerome Ravetz have 
fathered a new epistemological framework for the age of uncertainty 
-namely, post-normal science (Funtowicz & Ravetz 2000; Martinez- 
Alier 2002: 35-38; Spash 2002: 144-148). Their basic claim is 
grounded in the observation that the traditional laboratory has been 
isolated in order to obtain objectivity. As a result, it is unable to 
cope with complexity.
Yet complexity is part and parcel of the eco-social or cultural 
net of the present age. Novel uncertainties appear by the time the 
problem s in the old agenda have been presented  w ith the 
opportunity to be cleared up. Specifically, complexity entails the 
acceptance of strong uncertainty, that is, partial ignorance and 
indeterminacy “due to unpredictable interactions between natural 
and social systems” (Spash 2002: 146). Consistently, post-normal 
science rebukes the weak uncertainty formula assumed by orthodox 
positivistic science. Weak uncertainty assumes that a satisfactory 
full understanding of e.g. climate behaviour is attainable with the 
intensification of research.
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To surmount the deficiencies of what they conceive to be an 
obsolete paradigm, the advocates of this new kind of science 
propose the substitu tion  of the technocratic  policy-m aking 
framework for an ‘extended peer review’. In the novel formula, the 
voices of what the technocratic paradigm stigmatized as ‘lay’ gain 
an equal status with that of the traditional expert. Now the 
information of the local peoples and those holding any sort of 
relevant data (journalists, judges, scholars in other disciplines) is as 
important. Post-normal science assumes that this plurality of voices 
is central to the reconstruction of the complex setting.
Out of Funtowicz’s and Ravetz’s proposal for a postnormal 
scientific framework, the nature of the ecocide is a mere logical 
inference. The initial denial and steady severity of the ecological 
dislocation can be attributed to the prevalence of the normal 
scientific paradigm, which is the one that informs policy-making 
processes (Spash 2002). In this paradigm, only technocratic 
knowledge, usually insensitive to the local realities, is considered 
legitimate. Yet it is through local realities that ecocidal tendencies 
are most directly spotted.
[10.4] A Failure in the Homo Economicus: the Institutionalization of 
Rational Utilitarianism
Above Heidegger was blaming the Western philosophical 
tradition for its pernicious proclivities towards nature. This derived 
from the calculative, quantifiable, instrumental human intellect which 
the tradition itself had been in charge to create and develop to its 
utter mastery. The present section deplores with no less vehemence 
the Western celebration of instrumental rationality also on the 
account of its offensive treatment and abuse of nature. Yet it does 
so in a manner a great deal more specific than the one pursued by 
Heidegger. Now the rebuke is confined to the mainstays on which 
mainstream economic theory rests.
We may use a commentary-paper prepared by Clive Hamilton 
(2002) under the telling title of ‘Dualism and Sustainability’, 
published in the journal for Ecological Economics. It is in any case 
a critique endorsed by all the quarters of the ecological circle41 -as
41 Cf. Mellor, 1997b.
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distinguished from the environm ental one. Ham ilton m erits 
acknowledgements for the special skill with which he manages to 
capture the critique in a few pages.
The subject-matter of the reproof is the human profile on which 
neoclassical economics erects its entire edifice -the homo economicus. 
To expose the perils with which instrumental rationality threatens the 
environment, Hamilton first adumbrates the traits of what he conceives 
to be the two basic forms of knowledge. One, rationality, is cognitive, 
deductive and oriented towards the objects of the outer world. The 
other, intuition, is “evocative rather than analytical” (Hamilton 2002: 
89), it is inner-world oriented and permits the perception of the 
sacredness of things, the immanence of the divine.
In the history of Western philosophy, Hamilton attributes the 
epistemological establishment of the rigid separation between the 
rational and the visceral to the proclamation of the Cartesian cogito. 
What is most important to discern in this historical event is that the 
division is an unbalanced one. Rather, with the split, rationality, 
especially instrumental rationality, is endowed with the most 
prestigious status, whilst intuitive knowledge is trivialized and 
dismissed to its complete negligence. Cartesianism institutes a 
division laden with severe inequalities, which is commonly known 
as ‘dualism’. Thereafter this dualism affords the Scientific-Industrial 
Revolutions, the remarkable technical advances of which further 
reinforce the triumph of rationalism.
The emulation entrusted to the rational mind, on the other 
hand, effects intensively how people construe themselves high- 
culturally, and from there the relationship of the individual to the 
natural environment. It is in this sense that Hamilton asserts that 
instrumental rationality marks a psychological (or high-cultural) shift 
of historic prominence:
“The estrangement between the religious and the 
physical worlds was also an estrangement within people 
between their inner and the outer worlds. This rupture 
saw the gradual victory of ‘reason’ over ‘religion’ in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, to the point where 
scientists, the embodiment of the powers of reason, were 
elevated to the position of the saviours of the human 
race, a role previously preserved for the guardians of the 
spiritual world” (Hamilton 2002: 91).
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It is in the hub of this instrumental rationality wherein 
mainstream economic theory embeds its homo economicus. In so 
doing, the expression of the utilitarian desire is admitted as the 
academic and governmental official conception of human nature. 
The consequences of this concerted understanding accorded to the 
psyche of the individual are obviously overwhelmingly drastic. The 
major tragedy which modem economics ushers in the world, argues 
Hamilton, is precisely the overemphasis on the legitimacy of 
instrumental rationality “to the exclusion of other forms of rationality 
and other forms of awareness” (ibid.: 97). In this paradigm, the 
preservation of the environm ent is vulnerable to contingent 
valuation techniques, so widely developed by environmental 
economists. Contrastingly, Hamilton claims that ecologism emanates 
from forms of knowledge which are intuitive, not calculative: “ [a]t 
its deeper levels [...] is a reassertion of the ‘divine unity’ [in which] 
two ways of apprehending the world, the rational (going beyond 
instrumental rationality) and the intuitive” must be intermingled 
(ibid.: 97, 99).
In this section, I have intended to expose how the long­
standing  p o litic a l hegem ony o f orthodox econom ics has 
institutionalized as sort of scientific rationality which appears to be 
ecocidal. Put another way, the construction of society as homo 
economicus sits at the very root of the eco-debacle.
[10.5] A Failure in (Neo)classical & Marxist Political Economic 
Epistemologies: the Obliteration of the Biophysical Constraints of the 
Earth
This section may be most conveniently guided by the 
epistemological critique which the scholarly corpus of ecological 
economics directs to (neo)classical and Marxist political economies 
alike. The reproach substantiates basically on the following lines. 
The epistemological foundations of either theoretical strand ignore 
wholly the natural environment in which the economic process is by 
definition embedded. Disembedded as both epistemologies are, the 
two approaches present the economic process by way of “a circular 
d iagram , a pendulum  m ovem ent betw een  production  and 
consumption within a completely closed system” (Georgescu- 
Roegen 1996 [1971]: 75). A system which is further ruled by the 
supreme law of supply and demand. To translate it into cultural 
parlance, a system which sees economics as an exclusively middle-
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cultural phenomenon, utterly disconnected from low-cultural 
constraints.
Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen -as  underlined above, a pivotal 
name in ecological economics— puts it this way: economic thought 
is customarily fashioned in response to two variables. One, the 
actual economic (or middle-cultural) panorama which colours the 
times during which the theoretical corpus is elaborated. Two, the 
contem poraneous discoveries sw eeping through the natural 
sciences. When setting economic theory on this doubly-contingent 
background, as Georgescu-Roegen pleads us to do, it proves easier 
to understand why both liberal and Marxist economic thinking 
utterly disregards the ecological (or low-cultural) dimension on 
which the economic (or middle-cultural) process depends for its 
functioning. It is the economic and scientific Zeitgeist which holds 
the clues.
Set against this intellectual frame, it appears that the 
unparalleled accomplishments of the Industrial Revolution turned 
economic theory’s focus of attention away from the natural realm. In 
compensation, it “confined [it] to the factory [and] the power of 
technology” (Georgescu-Roegen 1996 [1971]: 81). Moreover, a 
constellation of scientific discoveries presented the possibilities 
inherent in the human condition as unbound. Such a buoyant 
picture enticed “the literati to overestimate and, ultimately, to 
oversell to their audiences the powers of science” (ibid.). The 
technical application of human rationality evinced how dramatic 
changes were brought about in the production process. Liberal and 
Marxist political economy echoed in full this Promethean optimism. 
Raised above the natural realm, humans eclipsed nature and 
subdued it.
Also pointing to the unecological dimension of both schools 
of political economy, we encounter ecological economics’ historian 
Joan M artinez-Alier drawing up his set of arguments. In his 
Ecological Economics: Energy, Environment and Society (1994 
[1987]), where Martinez-Alier traces the historical roots of this 
domain of knowledge, the author formulates rhetorically: to what 
reasons should we a ttribu te  the long -stand ing  h isto ry  of 
in teractions betw een human ecological energetics and the 
economics of exhaustible resources advanced by a number of 
authors ever since the 1880’s -as  the book seeks to evince— and
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the belated academic consolidation of the school of ecological 
economics? His answer is less elaborate than the one forged by 
Georgescu-Roegen: “lack of social atmosphere before 1973 [referring 
to the oil crisis], inside and outside the academic world (Martinez- 
Alier 1994 [1987]: 2).
As a matter of fact, the communalities running through 
(neo)liberal and Marxist political economy appear not to have been 
restricted to the obliteration of the physical (or low-cultural) 
dimension in the characterization of the economic process. 
Additional common ground is to be found beyond this point. Let us 
subsequently review how from three distinct fields of knowledge, 
Adam Smith, David Ricardo and Karl Marx are reported to have 
cultivated different versions out of an original leitmotiv. The analysis 
will come from three different disciplines. In this order: economic 
history, development theory and post-Kantian critique of reason.
From the camp of economic history, Karl Polanyi takes for a 
second time the floor42. Polanyi (2002 [1944]) links classical liberal 
political economy with orthodox Marxist economics by virtue of the 
adherence which both strands of thinking lend to “the economistic 
fallacy” (Block & Somers 1984; Somers 1990). This myth breaks 
down into two major building blocks: one is ontological, the other 
shifts the attention to historiography. As far as the ontological block 
is concerned, Polanyi questions (and castigates) the rational human 
profile -the homo economicus— from which both intellectual bodies 
cull their economic theories. Bound up with this reductionist 
conception of agency, Polanyi points, derogatorily again, to the 
marked disembedded tone which guides the dynamics of history in 
both streaks of thinking. The economic historian detects in both an 
intellectual urge to force the course of human affairs to the 
deterministic tracks of economic laws with self-regulating rules of 
their own, completely blind to the political, legal, religious and 
cultural ethos in which they are actually embedded.
Faced with this alleged poor understanding of human nature 
and dynamics of history, in Polanyi’s scholarship
42 Polanyi’s work has occupied also space o f review in [9.2] ‘A 
Failure in Liberal Market Economy: the Political Institutionalization 
of Chrematistics’.
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“all the tools of philosophy and social science were to 
be deployed to dispute this fallacy, which he [Polanyi] 
considered the greatest danger, the greatest spiritual 
and moral affront to humankind - a  fallacy that, he 
insisted, embraced the core principles of both Marxism 
and liberalism” (Somers 1990: 152).
Let us next proceed with a swift overview of how critical 
stances from development theory argue that “Marx should be 
considered the last of the classical economists” (Rist 2002: 41). 
Gilbert Rist puts forth three main reasons. First of all, the fact that 
Adam Smith and Karl Marx both regarded the economic dimension 
of culture as the motor of human history. Secondly, the fact that in 
this inexorability of the course of human affairs, nature is regarded 
as anthropological nature -in  service of the needs of humankind. 
Thirdly, the fact that the theories of value of both Smith and Marx 
are grounded upon labour -o r labour-power in Marx’s specific case.
Finally, it remains for us to turn to critical theory; in particular 
to the critical theory of Michel Foucault43. To the fierce outrage of 
contemporaneous M arxist thinkers, in The Order o f Things44, 
Foucault highlights how classical liberal and Marxist economic 
thinking belong to one same episteme. Foucault (1972: 191) argues 
that “episteme may be suspected of being something like a 
worldview, a slice of history common to all branches of knowledge, 
which imposes on each one the same norms and postulates, a 
general stage of reason, a certain structure of thought that the men 
of a particular period cannot escape -a  great body of legislation 
written once and for all by some anonymous hand.”
In a somewhat narrower sense, episteme may well be 
supplanted by ‘scientific paradigm’ in the sense postulated by 
Thomas Kuhn in his c lassical The Structure o f  S c ien tific  
Revolutions (1962). The reader should yet be reminded that, in my 
view, the Foucaudian and Kuhnian idea that truth is contingent, 
context-specific, a by-product of its own age must be traced back to 
Hegel’s historicism -already present in the works of Montesquieu,
43 A longside P olanyi’s work, Foucault’s ‘governm entality’ was 
reviewed in [9.2] ‘A Failure in Liberal Market Economy: the 
Political Institutionalization o f Chrematistics’.
44 Les mots et les choses (1966) in its original French.
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James Stuart, Herder, Schelling, Spinoza. This idea is captured in the 
Hegelian one-liner: “Philosophy is its own age comprehended in 
thought” (quoted in Beiser 1999 [1993]: 270 and passim).
At any rate, when Foucault claims that classical political 
economy and M arxist political economy fall under the same 
episteme, he means to say that their respective understanding of 
political economy is pervaded with the same themes. This is the 
passage where Foucault states that Ricardian and Marxist political 
economy belong to one same episteme:
“Marxist economics -through its basic concepts and 
the general rules of its discourse— belongs to a type 
of discursive formation that was defined around the 
time of Ricardo [...] Marx’s work is a Ricardian type of 
economic theory” (Foucault 2000 (1980): 269, 270).
In broad lines, Foucault’s overall argument largely lies in 
arguing that both David Ricardo’s work and Karl Marx’s economic 
manuscripts fall into the episteme of the nineteenth century. The 
episteme of that time, Foucault relates, was characterized by the 
historicity introduced into the economic problematic - a  task by and 
large accomplished by Ricardo. The temporal perspective which 
matters regarding the material provision of life now acquired was at 
the same time permeated with the notion of scarcity; or, its 
equivalent, anthropological finitude. Foucault’s facet as an historian, 
on the other hand, is quick to notice that the temporal dimension 
and the sudden perception of limits were not fortuitous phenomena. 
Rather, they must be identified both with the rapid increase in 
population, which the times witnessed; and the consequent gradual 
unavailability of arable land. In the Foucauldian view,
“the moment History reaches such boundaries, it can 
do nothing but stop, quiver for an instant upon its axis, 
and immobilize itself forever. But this can occur in two 
different ways” (Foucault 1980 [1970]: 259).
According to Foucault, these two alternatives are represented 
by David Ricardo and Karl Marx. Ricardo directs the halt of History 
towards its doomed end. Marx, contrastingly, assumes the opposite 
route and strives to make it finish on its commencement. This is the 
reason why Ricardo’s interpretation of the times of dearth, which 
the insertion of historical sense into economics attests to be
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looming, is Malthusian, pessimistic in character -human and non­
human nature will brutally check the surplus in population to reach 
an optimum stabilization. In a diametrically opposite vein, Marx 
foresees how revolutionary praxis will put an end to the inveterate 
inequalities, among which overpopulation represents an additional 
burden. The growing divide between the standard of living of 
capitalists and that of the impoverished proletariat, as a result of the 
appropriation which the former makes of the latter’s surplus value 
will usher in “an era of social revolution[, and bound up with it], the 
transformation of the whole immense superstructure” (Marx 1970 
[1859]: 21). What is interesting to realize, however, is how in this 
distinctive understanding of history, Foucault classifies Ricardian 
historiography as one which abides by low-cultural constraints. 
Ricardian historiography is Malthusian. Marxist historiography, 
contrastingly, seems to conceive low-culture as an unbounded 
cornucopia. In this light, we can infer that Ricardian epistemology is 
far less disembedded than Marxist’s is. Even if the Ricardian one is 
blind to distributional issues.
Foucault therefore proves how, albeit drawing opposite 
conclusions, David Ricardo and Karl Marx conform to a scientific 
discourse which is identical in its deep structure. As the French 
philosopher further asserts:
“[a]t the deepest level of Western knowledge, Marxism 
introduced no real discontinuity; it found its place [...] 
w ithin an ep istem ological arrangem ent [the one 
ascertained by Ricardo] that [...] had no intention of 
disturbing and, above all, no power to modify, even 
one dot, since it rested entire upon it” (Foucault 1980
[1970]: 261-262).
Strictly from their economic (thus not historical) perspective, 
however, Marxist and Ricardian political economies are said to be 
utterly dismissive of the possibilities of low-culture. A passage in 
Martinez-Alier’s (1994 [1990]: 219) history of ecological economics 
leaves little room for confusion:
“to the extent that Marxist economics has preoccupied 
itself with natural resources, the treatment has not been 
an ecological one (that is, consideration of availability 
of resources, of waste disposal and of intergenerational
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allocations) but a Ricardian one, that is, how rent paid 
to the owners of natural resources would alter the 
pattern of distribution of income, and of savings and 
investment.”
A statement for surely corroborated by Nicholas Georgescu- 
Roegen’s assessment. At the outset of this section, Nicholas 
Georgescu-Roegen claimed likewise that the political economy of 
both ideologies -liberal and Marxists alike— formed a continuum 
from the (un)ecological point of view. Georgescu-Roegen set forth a 
reason of low-cultural order: the “general awe for the power of 
technology [and the correlated conviction] that there is [no] real 
obstacle inherent in the human condition (Georgescu-Roegen 1996
[1971]: 81)”; an optimism which the pessimistic Second Law of 
Thermodynamics is irrevocably to shatter for good.45
[10.6] A Failure in Anthropocentric Morality: the Ecocentrism of Deep 
Ecology
Deep ecology is the leading voice under this heading. As 
announced in the introductory sections, the founding father of this 
school of ecological thought is the Norwegian philosopher Arne 
Naess46, who in 1972 coined the term deep ecology to distance his 
thinking from what he would contemptuously refer to as fake, shallow 
ecology. Acknowledging a core democracy reigning in the biosphere 
which should confer all living forms an equal opportunity to fulfil 
their potential and self-actualization, central to deep ecologists is the 
notion of ecocentrism, biocentric democracy or species egalitarianism, 
three notions which are synonymous with one another.
Analogously, Arnold J. Toynbee’s comparative study of 
civilizations, as set out in his salient Study o f History (1977 [1972]), 
lead him to some observations strongly reminiscent of the type of
45 See ‘[8.4] A Failure in Industrial Production: the Intensification of  
the Entropie Process’.
46 Excluding the obviously decisive contribution o f its founding 
father, the intellectual development o f the school o f deep ecology  
has taken place prevalently in the USA. It has become the major 
contender o f  the other ecophilosophical approach which this 
country hosts, viz. the social ecology of Murray Bookchin. Deep  
ecology has also adherents in Canada, Australia and New Zeland 
(Dryzek 1997; 175).
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ecocentrism instituted by deep ecologists. The passage that follows 
is from a minor, self-reflexive work entitled Surviving the Future 
(Toynbee 1971: 5):
“I think people in India and Eastern Asia have a greater 
wish, a greater sense of the need, to love non-human 
living creatures, and also inanimate nature, than the 
people in the Western world have. This wish to expand 
the field of human love is not so strong in the Western 
tradition” (Toynbee 1971: 5).
An attitude, Toynbee seems to have experienced, which affects 
the very behaviour of the animal realm towards the human one:
“If you travel in India, and if you are a Westerner, you 
are at once struck by the fact that wild animals and 
birds are not afraid of you, as they are, for the most 
part, in the Western world. In India they are on familiar 
terms with human beings. This is because Indians have 
a reverent consideration for the life of non-human 
living creatures [which] does give the W esterner 
reason to think. Is not the Western attitude towards 
non-human living creatures too possessive , too 
exploiting an attitude?” (ibid.: 6; emphasis added).
All the same, in defending “the interests of the nonhuman 
community” (Dryzek 2005: 184), deep ecologists adhere to political 
measures of neo-Maithusian inspiration. Like neo-Malthusians, deep 
ecologists aim at curtailing the human population and keeping it 
below a reasonable threshold. It must be however noted that deep- 
ecologist’s neo-Malthusian leanings differ from those of population 
b io log is ts  in that the grounds claim ed by th is s trand  of 
ecophilosophers are first and foremost of moral order. Deep 
ecologists believe that for the flourishing and self-actualization of 
forms of life in the nonhuman world to become a reality, a 
substantial reduction of the human population is an inescapable 
prerequisite (Naess 1992 [1989]: 140-141).
Now, to comply with the objective accorded to this review, 
the following must be foremost noted. A significant theme in deep 
ecology’s rationale, namely, anthropocentrism, is intimately entwined 
with this school of thought’s characterization of the ecocide. Deep 
ecology surely deems the disdain which humanity so irrespectively
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exhibits towards the natural world as the most ostensible agent of 
environmental degradation. Arne Naess and his disciple David 
Rothenberg clarification of the type of anthropocentrism which they 
disapprove of merits quotation:
“[h]omocentrism’ and ‘anthropocentrism’ which so 
often have been used in a derogatory way should be 
qualified by an adjective, ‘narrow homocentrism’” 
(Naess 1992 [1989]: 141).
All in all, this circle of green thinkers locates the focus of 
environmental decay in the ill-morality held by many members of the 
human species. Humans, in conceiving themselves superior to the 
rem ain ing  liv ing  species, assert the ir superio rity  in their 
ph ilo soph ical expression  as much as they do so in the ir 
idiosyncratic manners to style their lives.
In reviewing the literature in the ecological domain, there 
appear to be two main predecessors to this strand of ecologism. On 
the one hand, Warwick Fox (1995 [1990]: 7) places deep ecology on 
the intellectual line of “the pre-Socratics, [...] St. Francis [of Assisi], 
Spinoza, Thoreau, John Muir, Santayana, Robinson Jeffers, Aldo 
Leopold, and the later Heidegger” . All these historic figures have 
contested and rejected the belief that the human species is superior 
to any other life-form. The environmental discourses compiled by 
John Dryzek (2005: 192), on the other hand, set deep ecology on a 
par with the romantic movement of Coleridge, Wordsworth, and 
Shelly. These refined poets and writers, just as deep ecology 
contends, emphasized in their writings the extant organic bond 
between nature and humanity. Instrumental scientific knowledge is 
unable to respect such a bond. In the romantics view, the perception 
of the link nature-human had a restricted entry: heightened human 
sensitivity.
The roots of deep ecology in the segment of the modem 
ecological movement bear two names inscribed in them. One is 
Rachel Carson with her Silent Spring (1962). Though Carson’s work 
is certainly conceived as the curtain raiser of the modern green 
movement on the whole (Dobson 1998 [1991]: 25; Fox 1995 [1990]: 
5), it has been intellectually appropriated by deep ecologists and 
spiritualist/culturalist ecofeminists. A philosophical reading of 
Carson’s indictment of the modern indiscriminate use of fertilizers,
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of our ecological thoughtlessness, is ultimately indicative of a 
glaring crisis in human morality. The other name occupying the 
theoretical substrate of deep ecology is that of the medieval 
historian Lynn White, whose little but influential essay on ‘The 
Historical Roots of our Ecologie Crisis’ (White 2004 [1967]) will be 
reviewed below in [10.9] ‘A Failure in Christianity and Judaism: the 
Desacralization of the Earth’. Also in that section the reasons why 
deep ecologists have sized W hite’s line of critique as a building 
block of their intellectual corpus will be briefly visited.
[10.7] A Failure in the Cultivation of the Spiritual Constituency: the 
Grand Postponed Challenge of Humankind
Two names come to the fore as unconditional advocates of a 
suffocated spirituality as the ultimate cause for the ecological 
breakdown. One of them, Rudolf Bahro, is himself a member of the 
ecological movement proper. The o ther’s lifespan, Arnold J. 
Toynbee’s (1889-1975), fall into a period just preceding the 
inauguration of an ecological movement aware of itself. Yet the 
intellectual framework of this historian did not only surpass the 
parochial nation-state unit of analysis, to encompass that of 
civilizations; it also included an approach in which the moves in the 
oikoumenê, the part of the world inhabited by the human species, 
were read in the constraining frame of the ‘bioshpere’, “a film of dry 
land, water, and air enveloping the globe (or virtual globe) of our 
planet Earth” (Toynbee 1976: 5).
Perhaps “just as well as Einstein, who finally said, after so 
much preoccupation with physics, that the real problem is the 
human heart” (Bahro 1994: 10; emphasis in the original), so too 
Toynbee’s and Bahro’s works dedicate a pre-eminent position to the 
immaterial constituency of life. Both thinkers converge in regarding 
“the deep structure of our ecological crisis...as a dilemma rooted in 
the design o f our civilization” (Bahro 1994: 75; emphasis in the 
original). In this context, ‘design’ must be understood as the end 
product of the decisions made by “consciousness and ethics[, one 
of humanity’s] mode of existence -the spiritual mode” (Toynbee 
1976: 21), and not as those growing out of its psychosomatic 
constituency, which represents humanity’s other mode of existence. 
Let us nonetheless note that neither Toynbee’s nor B ahro’s 
narratives are of metaphysical nature. They are simultaneously 
orchestrated with the facts and events which guide the course of
A low middle and high cultural characterization o f the ecocide 485
human history. It should however be emphasized that Toynbee’s 
colossal A Study o f History has been often dismissed on the 
grounds of his philosophical idealism and the religious overtones of 
his analyses (Best & Kellner 1991: 6).
Toynbee’s argumentation reasons as follows. The descent of 
humankind -from  its ancestral life forms— can neither be simply 
read as a literal physical descent from the trees, nor as a biological- 
cum-genetic evolution away from the ape. Rather, in Toynbee’s view, 
it is a third form of descent that which ushered in an unprecedented 
stage in the evolution of life forms on the Planet. In the historian 
own words:
“the pre-historic age was inaugurated by the most 
momentous event to date in human history, namely 
the dawn of consciousness in the biosphere. This 
achievement was so immense, and the effort demanded 
by it must have been so arduous, that it is not 
surprising that the dawn of consciousness should 
have been followed by a million or half a million years 
of torpor, before Man [sic] began to exercise actively 
the spiritual and m aterial power with which his 
aw akening to consciousness had endowed him ” 
(Toynbee 1976: 26).
That is, in Toynbee’s cosmology47, “what changed our pre­
human ancestors into human beings like ourselves[...], the 
acquisition of consciousness and will” (1977 [1972]: 87) renders 
the human being aware of its amphibian traits. The dualism 
inherent to the amphibian character of human nature (Toynbee
47 Insofar as it falls into the category o f “religious intuitions”, the 
historian transparently admits that his is “a controversial thesis” 
(ibid. 21), to which, according to the author, humankind will always 
resort “to provide [itself] with provisional answers to the riddles 
presented to [them]” (ibid. 4). This line o f reasoning is at odds 
with the subject-matter o f science and technology. See [10.10] ‘A  
Failure in Theodicy: the Entrenchment o f Natural and Cultural 
Materialism’, where Tim Jackson revisits this assumption. It must 
be however noted that Jackson dwells upon materials from the 
domain o f sociology and social anthropology in order to construe 
his case.
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1976: 19), which Toynbee acknowledges to have borrowed from Sir 
Thomas Browne’s Religio Medici. Amphibian in that a human being 
realizes itself, on the one hand, as a psychosomatic entity who 
dwells within “a world [the biosphere] that is material and finite” 
{op. cit.: 18). On the other hand, the individual is concurrently aware 
of the spiritual realm of which it also partakes. In contrast with the 
traits in the material realm, the spiritual dimension is “non-material 
and invisible” (ibid.).
This hybrid composition of the world, Toynbee reasons, 
engenders a tension in agency, which feels constantly pulled into 
two opposite directions. The discrepancy at hand grows strikingly 
apparent in the dissonant purposes prevalent in each sphere. One 
sphere calls the human being for an outwardly domination, whilst 
the other towards an inwardly. That is, the human psychosomatic 
constituency prompts agency to master its nonhuman environment. 
Yet its non-material entity compels it to the spiritual mastery over 
itself.
In line with his cosmology, Toynbee’s understanding of the 
environment is one which transcends the material conditions of life. 
Toynbee’s conception of the environment echoes the amphibian 
character of humanity as he understands it. In this definition, his 
‘idealism’ is foremost salient:
“Environment is a relative term. It implies the existence, 
the presence, and the action of some other party. This 
o ther party  is som e liv ing  c rea tu re; and the 
environment of every living creature is the sum total of 
the rest of the Universe. For instance, a human being’s 
environment consists of the whole of non-human 
Nature, both inanimate and animate, together with all 
his fellow human beings ([interestingly,] including the 
dead as well as the living). Above all, a person’s 
environment includes the human nature of the person 
him self [sic]. This last-mentioned constituent of a 
human being’s environment -th e  internal spiritual 
constituent- is the key to the person’s relations with 
all the rest of his environment’s constituents; for, if a 
human being fails to master the Nature within himself, 
he will fail to master it in the rest of the Universe that
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lies outside him48. He may ‘understand all mysteries 
and all knowledge’, but the most highly accomplished 
technical expertise will profit him nothing if he is not 
also in command of himself.” (1977 [1972]: 96)
Toynbee’s attributed ecologism, it must be pointed, lends 
support to the kind of enlightened anthropocentrism urged by green 
romantics -viz. deep ecologists and spiritual ecofeminists alike. For 
expediency here, let us summarize the view of the latter group by 
way of a telling description conveyed by Dryzek. The political 
theorist describes this segment of green thinkers in his thorough 
analysis of environmental discourses as follows:
“Green romantics do want to change the world, but they 
believe that the route to change lies through individuals [and 
thus] do not concern them selves with im proved policies or 
institutions that might be achieved in some foreseeable future 
(Dryzek 1997: 155)” .
In the rom antic understanding as it is in that o f our 
historian  philosopher, the key elem ent to either ecological 
disruption or stability is the individual. Person-A improvements 
added to person-B achievements and to those of Person-C, and 
so on and on, hold the potential to bring about a New World 
Order. Human-scale enhancements are the path toward a world­
scale shift. Note that vice-versa this line of reasoning drops its 
validity. Reversely read: a substantial number of human beings 
failing to master the nature within themselves leads to a failure in 
the m astering of the nature which lies outside them selves, 
altogether destabilizing the natural world.
48 Let us point out in passing that Toynbee’s guidelines for the 
exemplary ecologist are analogous to those o f the Aristotelian  
dwellers in the oikos or household, the individuals which Aristotle 
employs as scapegoats to convey the Greek ideal o f  the eligible  
life. See, for instance, what the Greek philosopher retells us in the 
follow ing passage o f the Politica. “[H]appiness, whether consisting  
in pleasure or virtue, or both, is more often found with those who 
are most highly cultivated in their mind and in their character, and 
have only a moderate share o f external goods, than among those 
who possess external goods to a useless extent but are deficient in 
higher qualities” (1921: 1.1323b 1-6).
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Let us draw a note of attention to Toynbee’s sui generis 
approach to the notion of human/nonhuman interconnectedness, so 
central to the ecological lexicon. From his vocal definition of 
‘environment’ we register the fact that Toynbee establishes a 
markedly hierarchical rapport between nonhuman nature and human 
nature. Inadvertedly challenging the ecocentric creed of Arne Naess 
and his entourage, this historian-philosopher attests to the fact that, 
in so far as human beings are concerned, human nature is the very 
podium on which humanity inherently stands. Hence Toynbee’s 
inadvisability of unnaturally forcing to approach the environment 
from any other angle. Interestingly, with his statements, Toynbee 
maintains a certain dualism between the self and the non-self, a 
fracture the traces of which ecocentrism vehemently wrestles to 
erase. Phrased in deep ecologist Robyn Eckersley’s words:
“The world is an intrinsically dynamic, interconnected 
web of relations in which there are no absolutely 
discrete entities and no absolute dividing lines between 
the living and the nonliving, the animate and the 
inanimate, or the human and the nonhuman” (Eckersley 
1992:49).
Hitherto we have outlined Toynbee’s cosmology. The effort 
has not been in vain. Toynbee’s intellectual endeavour is a 
nomothetic study of human affairs predicated upon his conception 
of the human being. A nomothetic methodology exhibits a tendency 
to generalize instead of focusing upon the specificities of one single 
case study. That is, Toynbee’s structuralism does not materialise 
out of the realm of metaphysics -even if it is extremely metaphysical 
in tone. Rather, it is grounded in history. Pitirim Sorokin’s (1956: 172) 
comment upon Toynbee’s intellectual enterprise may well do justice 
of the historian’s “rare combination of the thoughtfulness of a 
philosopher with the technical com petence of a m eticulous 
empiricist”.49
In Toynbee’s view, the course of history sieved through his 
structuralist nomothesis should have been an ongoing to and fro 
quest to meet the demands of the material plane and subsequently
49 Boldly, Sorokin goes on to say that “[t]he combination insures 
against the sterile scholarship o f a thoughtless ‘fact finder’, as well 
as against a fantastic flight o f an incompetent dilettante” (ibid.).
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those of the sp iritual one. This would have reflec ted  the 
ambivalence, which according to Toynbee, is inextricable from the 
human conscious endowment. However, the actual course of 
history, and this point is highly relevant for it discloses the 
Toynbeeian nature of the ecocide, evinces that human beings have 
been reiteratively eluding the confrontation of this moral antithesis:
“Few, if any, human souls have been entirely unaware 
of this goal or entirely indifferent to it” (Toynbee 1977
[1972] 88).
Exception to this historical rule were the saintliness figures 
of the Buddha in India, in the fifth century B.C., as well as that of St. 
Francis of Assisi in the thirteen century A.D., who met head-on the 
moral confrontation and pursued it to the utmost consistent extreme. 
It is precisely the elusion of this ethical confrontation by the mass 
of human beings which has constantly operated to the benefit of a 
monotheist cult for the demands of our psychosomatic constituency. 
Hence a material-oriented development, and hence the pressure of a 
materialistic culture upon the environment.
Analogously, the prominent hallmarks in human history are 
deeds which repeatedly tip the balance towards the material 
requirements of human nature -thereby suffocating the needs of the 
spiritual constituency. This repeated obliteration of the spiritual 
dimension may be conceived as a cultural failure adding to the 
ecological debacle. Toynbee does present the foremost decisive 
moves in human history as mounting stresses on the biosphere. 
Thus the predicament of humankind, which is directly bound up 
with the ecological debacle, lies in the moral bipolarity of human 
nature.
In the h isto rian’s view, nevertheless, these are to be 
ultimately related to the level of consciousness in which humanity 
has locked itself. Here we have yet another example of the 
interconnectedness of culture. A high-cultural assumption (i.e. 
disattendance of the spiritual constituency) is reflected upon low- 
culture (environmental degradation), with its respective sets of 
demands seemingly incompatible with one another:
“one of [Man’s] two objectives and one of his two 
allegiances must be given paramountcy, or must be 
given exclusive devotion if the two turn out to be
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incompatible and irreconcilable. Which of the two 
alternatives is to be chosen?” (Toynbee 1975: 19).
The reiterative capitulation to the material reality, to the 
detriment of the spiritual one, provides Toynbee with the scope to 
conceive the entire of human history as one single epoch. Toynbee’s 
is surely a grand narrative. As a result of humanity’s election in 
favour of the demands of its psychosomatic dimension -which are 
opposed to the spiritual one— now the human being has acquired 
sufficient technological power for the annihilation of life through 
the wrecking of the biosphere. In Toynbee’s view, just as in Bahro’s, 
the ecological riddle can only be surmounted with an “ethical 
parting” (Toynbee 1976: 26) which would push humanity to “an 
anthropological revolution, a jump in the evolution of the human 
spirit [i.e.] the grounding anew of society on the basis of powers of 
consciousness which up to now are not revealed or unfolded” 
(Bahro 1994: 65).
In a few words, Toynbee’s account of the nature of the 
ecocide may be thus rephrased. Starting off with the Upper 
Palaeolithic Revolution, which broke out circa 70,000/40,000 years 
ago (Toynbee 1976: 38)50, there has been a growing misfit between 
humanity’s exponential expansion of its technological capacities -  
which but reflect the priority lent to the material plane, and the 
involution prevalent in its spiritual competence. Yet, as highlighted 
above, Toynbee’s contention is not an assertion suspended in 
metaphysics. Rather, it is grounded in the actual flow of human 
history. Thus Toynbee’s most markedly environmentally-conscious 
opus, M ankind and M other E arth  (1975), an exce llen t  
environmental history, consists of a chronicle of a series of 
economic and technological revolutions. And yet the steady 
mastery of the spiritual dimension appears sine qua non to keep the 
development on the material plane in check.
[10.8] A Failure in Christianity and Judaism: the Desacralization of the 
Earth
Next we turn the centre of attention to ecophilosophy. 
Specifically we focus on an influential discourse set out by medieval
50 For a diachronic tabulation o f the technological series, contrasted 
with the biological, the religious and the political ones, see Toynbee 
(1992 [1966]): 21-22).
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historian Lynn White. White presented to a meeting of the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science held in 1966 a paper 
which one year later was to be published in the journal Science under 
the title of “The Historical Roots of our Ecologie Crisis” (White 2004 
[1967]). Ever since, these pungent few pages have been copiously 
reprinted in anthologies or textbooks on ecotheology and related 
areas in the domain of environmental studies (cf. Fox 1995: 5).
The paper states outright, and this may be its main corollary, 
that “Christianity bears a huge burden of guilt” (White 2004 [1967]: 
199) in conferring theological fiat to a nature-subduing science and 
technology. As a result of the influence which the article exerted, 
W hite’s publication established the discourse that the fundamentals 
of Christianity are environmentally-unfriendly. At the very least, 
W hite inaugurated a line of thinking, research, and heated 
controversies around the extant links between Western religions and 
environmental decay (Gottlieb 2004: 191).
W hite’s intellectual procedure flows under such a logic: to 
understand the “écologie crisis”, the bedrock assumptions which 
allowed the tandem science and technology to develop, must be 
probed and clarified. Indeed, the historian eloquently speaks of an 
“arranged marriage” convened between science, “traditionally 
aristocratic, speculative, intellectual”, and technology, “lower-class, 
empirical, action-oriented” (ibid. 193, 194) auspicated by a nascent 
democratic regime in Western Europe and North-America around 
1850. Perhaps due to his vast knowledge of the middle-age period, 
the first claim that White asserts is that the particularities of the 
Western tradition of science, echoed in the Scientific and Industrial 
R evolu tions of the seven teen th  and e igh teen th  cen tu ries 
respectively, “began in the late eleventh century with a massive 
movement of translation of Arabic and Greek scientific works into 
Latin” (ibid.: 195). Hence, White upholds, the necessity to unearth 
and scrutinize medieval epistemology, for “human ecology is deeply 
conditioned by beliefs about our nature and destiny -that is, by 
religion” (ibid. 196). Let us again note that White too acknowledges 
the extant high- and low-cultural interconnectedness. Religious 
beliefs are reflected upon human ecology.
Set against this assignment, White finds that the assertive 
triumph of Christianity over the pagan animism proper to Greco- 
Roman antiquity (and the Orient) is the chief distinguished feature
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of the West. In this frame, the Judaist heritage into Christianity 
becomes even more central to understand the liking for science and 
technology as developed by the natural theologians, later scientists, 
in the Latin West. Specifically from Judaism, Christianity inherited 
the rupture from the ancient-Greek cyclical notion of time, and the 
compensatory adherence to a non-repetitive, linear timeline instilled 
with a faith in relentless progress. Judaism further imparted to 
Christianity a cosmology of creation according to which man 
partakes of God’s transcendence of nature. Such a theology is also 
responsible for the dualism human world vs. non-human world, in 
which the former can afford to harness the latter to its sole 
advantage.
On the other hand, W hite’s fine exercise of comparative 
theology helps see that the doctrine of Judeo-Christendom was 
propagated in two markedly distinct manners. The Greek East and 
Byzantium would adopt it with contemplative-intellectualist, artistic 
undertones. The Latin West, in radical contrast, em braced 
Christianity as a voluntarist, active theology. This interpretative 
schism explicates why natural theology, from which modern science 
emanates once God was made redundant in the late eighteenth 
century, crystallised in the Latin West as “an effort to understand 
God’s mind by discovering how his creation operates”, not “as a 
symbolic system through which God speaks to men” (ibid.: 198), the 
view adopted in the Greek East.
In sum, Lynn White faults Christianity on the despotic 
anthropocentrism with which humans have been unambiguously 
meeting nature, above all in the modern age. A cruel attitude which 
has been operated with superlative effectiveness with the help of 
the scientific and technological endowment accumulated in the 
modern West. Put another way more akin to our storyline: it is the 
failure of Christianity to preserve the sacral worldview of the Earth 
generic to Greco-Roman paganism is responsible for the eco-debacle. 
Pagan animism was respectful of nature in so far as “the roots of 
our écologie crisis” are tantamount to Christianity’s inability to 
preserve the sacral worldview and adoption of Judaic precepts 
instead.
White’s thesis has been for sure contested. However, as John 
F. Haught (1993: 232) avows: “I think we have to admit that 
environmentally speaking this tradition [Christianity], like many
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others, has been at best ambiguous.” An ambiguity which Haught 
resolves along the lines of White’s thesis. So writes Haught:
“while the doctrines of creation and incarnation clearly 
affirm  the value of the cosm os, m ost C hristian 
spiritualities, saints and scholars have been relatively 
indifferent to nature. The welfare of the natural world 
has seldom, if ever, been relatively indifferent to nature
[8.9] A Failure in Theodicy: the Entrenchment of Natural and Cultural 
Materialism
Mathematician, expert in energy, ecological economics, 
consumer culture and environment policy, and also playwright Tim 
Jackson (2002, 2006) makes yet another contribution to the domain 
of ecotheology. The author proposes the failure in theodicy in the 
modern West as a cause for the untold consumerist patterns which 
this part of the world has been steadily registering. In as much as 
the ecological equivalent of the consumption of goods is depletion 
of resources and generation of waste, we may consider the failure in 
theodicy as yet another agent of environmental degradation.
Let us review how Jackson construes his case, and in what 
regards his approach differs from that of White (2004 [1967]). We 
shall first pick up on the latter concern. Despite the fact that 
Jackson’s object of study -viz. consumer culture— diverges from 
White’s, — science and technology as perpetrators of the ecological 
debacle— both authors ground their explanations in the realm of 
theology. This major concomitance notwithstanding, they conduct 
the case in quite a distinct manner, if  not virtually reversely51. As it 
has been espoused above, Lynn White attributed a nature-subduing 
technology to the epistemology of Christianity, which in the course 
of its institutionalization had desacralized the Earth by wiping out 
pagan animism. The modern world, albeit post-C hristian in 
phraseology and mode of thinking, had preserved integral the 
Christian overtone. Jackson, contrastingly, argues that it is the 
relinquishment of Christian religious faith altogether, or that of a 
metaphysical divine reality able to “vindicate the ways of God to 
man” (Jackson 2002: 16) the prime cause for consumerism today.
51 However, I would yet argue that in the deep structure both points 
are perfectly complementary.
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The latter aggravated by the fact that social (by way of Malthus) 
and natural (by way of Darwin) theory -which were to become the 
basis of the modern world— failed to accommodate a theodicy in 
the firmament of worldly matters.
Jackson’s explanation of the vicissitudes followed by the 
humanities and natural sciences in their course of secularization is a 
perceptive one. It is worth that we dwell for a while upon this point, 
as the author sees the vein of modern consumerism springing 
directly from the secularization of epistemology.
Now, Jackson’s explanation is premised upon Malthus’s ill- 
fated attempt to underpin his influential Essay on Population, first 
anonymously published in 1798 and reworked a total number of five 
times, in a theodicy. As a result of this failure,
“rather than leaving nineteenth century thought with a 
vindication of the ways of God to man, therefore, what 
Malthus left them was a detailed portrait of nature as 
the locus for never-ending conflict, in which evil and 
suffering were the inescapable lot of the less fortunate” 
(ibid.: 7).
As M althus p iece  p ro v ed  so p o w erfu l am ong his 
contemporaneous thinkers, and his notion of nature as struggle 
“provided Darwin with precisely the kind of selective mechanism 
that he needed to turn his embryonic ideas about evolution into 
a scientific theory” (ibid. 9), not to speak of the impetus with 
which neo-malthusianism has been resumed by modern green 
th in k ers52, Jackson argues tha t hencefo rth  God w ould be 
epistemologically - ’theodicilly’— expelled from the realm of 
human affairs. Malthus had rendered the world of the social and 
natural sciences self-sufficient. From the publication of the Essay 
on Population onwards, the sciences could do without a divine 
figure to warrant the suffering endemic to human affairs. In the 
nascent secularised worldview, grief was ‘scientifically proved’ 
to sprung out o f the very bow els o f a m erciless nature . 
Congruently, as the M althusian-Darwinist theses were gaining 
allegiance, the number of adepts to religious faith correlatively
52 See [8.1.] ‘A Failure in Demographic Control: A Neo-Maithusian 
Response’ above.
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plummeted. Yet the fact that no theological explanation cushioned 
human anguish was to reverberate strenuously in the human 
psyche.
Relying heavily on extensive scholarship in sociology and 
social anthropology of consumption, Jackson contends that ‘the 
search for m eaning’ is internal to the human condition. The 
secularised social and natural sciences, to which philosophy 
(N ietzsche, the m urderer o f God) subsequen tly  adhered , 
disintegrated the shelter behind which the individual concealed God. 
This occurred to the deference of “the authority of the Church and 
the entrenchment of scientific and cultural materialism” (Jackson 
2002: 12) -the latter turning into the substrate of the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries. Consequently, holds Jackson, consumer 
culture has step in to occupy the old temple of God.
Research in the fields mentioned above attests to the fact 
that that an individual employs goods as cultural media by which to 
assert and communicate their own identity, if  not the real a cherished 
one displaced in an imaginary world. However, and so the triumph 
of consumer culture may be accounted for, goods carry one no 
further than the stage of mere illusion for reaching the ideal world. 
M aterial commodities are “successful as bridges to displaced 
meaning” (ibid. 16), they are adept at establishing a mirage bridge to 
the perfect world in which each one of us has posited whatever 
longing. Yet they ever fail to bring us effectively to the sought-after 
d im ension. So, as consum er goods are so persu asiv e  in 
“sym bolizing] or evok[ing] the displaced ideal” (ibid.), they 
perpetuate the quest for meaning. The situation is additionally 
exacerbated in face of the wide range of choice which the consumer 
society is proficient at making available.
We may wind up by concluding that in his essay Jackson 
evinces the collapse of a constellation of elements central to the 
stability of human culture, all hit in domino effect by Malthus’s 
inability to render God co-existent with the ‘law of population’. This 
intellectual miscarriage, on the other hand, allowed for the social 
and natural sciences to ascertain themselves with no recourse to 
metaphysics. Yet the emerging secularised canon forced the psyche 
of the individual to pay a high cultural (and thereby ecological) toll: 
condemned to its search for meaning, modern civilization institutes 
consumer culture as “an entirely new, secular theodicy” (ibid. 17),
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conducive to a life-style exceedingly voracious of resources, and 
(and this is none of Jackson’s direct statement, simply an inference 
thereof), in consuming modern go(o)ds, manacled to the abuse of 
nature in its yearning for the pre-modern, responsive, perhaps only 
true God.
[11.]‘Crisis, What Crisis?’
The rather extensive catalogue hitherto reviewed should be 
no reason to overshadow the scepticism exhibited by a host of 
experts in the environment as to the very existence of any ecocide 
whatsoever. One such notorious instance is the widely commented 
(and by now ‘scientifically’ condemned) work of Bjorn Lomborg, 
The Skeptical Environmentalist, a book which saw the public light 
in 2001. An additional list of acolytes of the free-market doctrine, or 
so derogatively associated by ecologists, sits side by side to 
Lomborg’s position. This group either denies the existence of 
preoccupying disruptions in the environment or plays down the 
scope of their severity.
Take, for instance, the booklet by Robert R. Bradley, 
som ew hat se n sa tio n a lis tic a lly  en titled  C lim ate A larm ism  
Reconsidered (2003). In a commentary article, the philosopher Julian 
Baggini opportunely informs us that the book was “published by 
the free-market thinktank the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), 
and its basic claims could be deduced a priori from its publisher’s 
ideology” (Baggini 2003). Bradley’s contention is three-fold: [i.] the 
state of the environment is improving; [ii.] the claims about climate 
fo rcing  are unreasonab ly  m agnified ; [iii.] in s titu tio n a l 
interventionism will prove more environmentally disadvantageous 
than leaving things entirely to the operation of the market. In any 
case, three statements which run frontally counter the findings 
gathered by environmental and ecological economist Clive Spash, in 
his recently released Greenhouse Economics: Value and Ethics 
(Spash 2002).
Would Spash enter into ‘scientific’ dialogue with Bradley one 
can infer that the former would in the first instance expose his 
counterarguments to the la tte r’s firm position: [L] from the 
perspective of the humanly enhanced Greenhouse Effect the state 
of the environment is ominously deteriorating; [ii.] there is mounting 
evidence of the direct link between the combustion of fossil fuels
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and global warming; [iii.] the amorality of neo-classical free-market 
chrematistics, “driven by the incentives to pass harm onto innocent 
others and benefit themselves” (ibid. 244), should be promptly 
addressed with legal and institutional interventionism.
12. E P IL O G U E : E N V IR O N M E N T A L  C R IS IS  OR
INTERCONNECTED CULTURAL FAILURES?
In closing , sw iftly  an observation  w hich is a m ere 
verbalization of a patent piece of evidence running through the green 
scholarship. Namely, in spite of the frequency with which the rubric 
of ‘environmental crisis’ pervades the field of environmental studies, 
none of the discourses reported in this document attest to the fact 
that the ecocide is grounded in an in trinsic failure of the 
environment. Exception to this otherwise true assertion is a debate 
held amongst quarters of climatologists. These scholars seek to 
discern whether global warming is part and parcel of larger-scale 
c lim atic  pa tterns or it m ust be exclu siv e ly  a ttrib u ted  to 
anthropogenic sources. As a matter of fact, recent evidence seems 
to be irrevocably tipping the balance towards the latter hypothesis 
(Spash 2002; Sample 2003; IPCC 2007).
At any rate, we may conclude that ‘environmental crisis’ is a 
mere figure of speech, for it is devoid of scientific backing. As a 
result of a specific high- middle- and low-cultural correlation -the 
one portrayed above, the chemistry of Gaia is being forced to a 
mutation. This is generating a novel homeostasis or high- middle- 
and low-cultural balance, which is rendering the life forms that thrive 
in the current one extinct. Yet the environment has not incurred any 
crisis of its own. As Mary Mellor (2000: 116) points out:
“Nature will go on with or without hu(man)ity [...] It is 
for hu(man)inty itself to judge the ecological impact of 
its own existence.”
Thus against the findings reported in the present literature 
review, ‘environmental c ris is’ proves to be an inappropriate 
misnomer. In effect, it conceals a plethora of unresolved issues 
growing out of the manner in which humanity has been styling its 
way of life at the high- middle- and low-cultural levels. Note, 
however, that the results following from this inquiry into the nature 
of the ecocide should have served, above all, to debunk the general 
character with which ‘unresolved issues’ is conventionally
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conveyed. W hilst it is true that a broad distinction between 
industrialised cultures and rural ones is made, there is a tendency in 
the mainstream to homogenize differences at the middle- and high- 
cultural levels. For instance, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (1997) talks generically of an anthropogenic climatic forcing, 
but ever fails to relate this forcing to issues of gender or to the role 
played by, say, instrumental reason. The reality unearthed with the 
present exercise does nuance this cultural homogenization. Such a 
heterogeneous, nuanced character of the after all human predicament 
is worth retaining. Perhaps less so to cling to a resentful past as to 
enable us to properly locate the foci of ecocidal practices and turn 
our sight to a more auspicious future.
Another remark merits some consideration. Perhaps as a 
result of the steadfast specialization of knowledge, encapsulation 
and isolation of disciplines, the present review reveals that each 
strand of environmentalism or ecologism tends to confine its focus 
of attention to one, two, three at the most, causes leading to the 
ecological debacle. The remaining failures are utterly dismissed. In 
using the analytics of high- m iddle- and low -culture, the 
interconnectedness of failures has been rendered apparent. It has 
exhibited a plethora of ill-reports struck between the human and 
non-human worlds.
So I shall finish off just as I set out this chapter. The 
multicultural dimensions of the ecocide are calling for a more holistic 
approach to knowledge. One which somehow abides by the 
‘Principle of Complementarity’ as set out by the physicist Niels Bohr 
in 1958. According to this; “only the totality of the phenomena 
exhausts the possible information about the objects” (Georgescu- 
Roegen 1974 [1971]: 34). I have posited the analytics of high- middle- 
and low-culture in order to propose a way to show how the totality 
of the phenomena may be correlated. I hope the reader will have 
found the correlation insightful. I would also like to leave the 
proposed analytics open to further suggestions and amendments.
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